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Tony Ward, Gerry Johnstone and Bev Clucas
In November 2007 a conference was held at the University of Hull to discuss the
permissibility of torture. The very fact that such a conference should seem worth
holding is symptomatic, as Massimo La Torre remarks in his chapter, of a signifi-
cant shift in the terms of political and philosophical debate since 2001. The chapters
that follow are based on papers presented at that conference.
It should be said at once that none of the contributors to this book disputes that
torture, in the great majority of instances in which it is actually practiced, is morally
abhorrent. But some our contributors disagree passionately on questions such as the
following:
Are there some circumstances, however rare, in which torture is morally
permissible or even required?
If so, should the legal prohibition on torture be subject to defences which
cover such exceptional circumstances?
Should government agencies prepare their officials to respond to such cir-
cumstances?
What are the terms of acceptable public discourse about the circumstances
in which torture is permissible?
A. The ethics of exceptional cases
The case which best illustrates these questions is, perhaps, one to which Uwe Stein-
hoff refers in his chapter. On 27 September 2002, the 11-year-old son of a senior
German bank executive was kidnapped and a million Euro ransom was demanded
for his release. Three days later, a law student called Magnus Gaefgen was arrested
after collecting the ransom. Under questioning he would not say where the boy was
or whether he was alive. The day after the arrest, Wolfgang Daschner, the senior po-
lice officer leading the investigation, authorized his officers, in writing, to extract
information ‘by means of the infliction of pain, under medical supervision and sub-
ject to prior warning.’1 Gaefgen was duly warned what was in store for him if he
continued to withhold information. According to Gaefgen, he was told ‘that a spe-
1 F. Jessberger, ‘Bad Torture – Good Torture? What International Criminal Lawyers May
Learn from the Recent Trial of Police Officers in Germany’ Journal of International Crimi-
nal Justice 3 (2005): 1059-73, p. 1061; P. Finn, ‘Police Torture Threat Sparks Painful Debate
in Germany’ Washington Post 8 March 2003.
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cialist was being flown by helicopter to Frankfurt who “could inflict on me pain of a
sort I had never before experienced”.’2 Whatever the exact words used, arrange-
ments really were made for a helicopter to bring a police martial arts trainer3 who
‘knew the areas of the body that are particularly sensitive to pain and [could] pur-
posefully attack those areas’,4 to Frankfurt. In the event, the threat was sufficient to
induce Gaefgen to admit that the child was dead and reveal the whereabouts of the
body.
Gaefgen was convicted of abduction and murder and sentenced to life imprison-
ment. The officer who threatened him was convicted of coercion (Nötingung) and
Daschner of instructing a subordinate to commit a criminal offence (Verleitung eines
Untergebenen zu einer Straftat). The Regional Court rejected the defences of self-
defence or defence of another (Nothilfe) and justificatory emergency (rechtfertigen-
der Notstand).5 To allow either defence on the facts of the case would infringe an
absolute constitutional prohibition on violations of human dignity:
Respect for human dignity is the basis of this state, which is based on the rule of law. The
framers of the Constitution have deliberately put such notion at the outset of the Constitution.
In contrast, the right to life and to physical inviolability is only laid down in Article 2 para-
graph 2 of the Grundgesetz. The motivation behind that lies in the history of this state. Docu-
ments relating to the origin of the German Federal Republic make it absolutely clear that the
members of the Parliamentary Council had very much in mind the cruelties of the National So-
cialist regime. They pursued the fundamental purpose of preventing anything similar from re-
curring and clearly to bar any such temptation through the drafting of the Grundgesetz. The
human being was not to be treated for the second time as somebody having information that
the state would wring out of him, even if for the purpose of serving justice.6
One aspect of the ‘cruelties’ to which the Court refers is discussed by Alison
O’Donnell and her colleagues in Chapter 9 – and the unimaginable pain inflicted, for
example, on concentration camp inmates in the course of medical experiments
would clearly constitute torture under the legal definition discussed by Tsvetana
Kamenova in Chapter 5. But do these contingent historical circumstances afford a
basis for a morally absolute prohibition of torture at all times and in all circum-
stances? The court stopped short of that conclusion, acknowledging that there were
‘theoretical borderline cases’ which the facts of the case – where the police had not,
in the court’s view, exhausted all options short of torture – did not require it to de-
cide. Uwe Steinhoff argues in Chapter 2 that self defence or the defence of others
2 J. Hooper, ‘Germans Wrestle with Rights and Wrongs of Torture’, Guardian 27 February
2003.
3 Finn, ‘Police Torture Threat’, p. A19.
4 Regional Court (Landgericht) of Frankfurt am Main, ‘Decision of 20 December 2004.
Daschner Wolfgang and E. Case’, excerpts translated as ‘Respect for Human Dignity in To-
day’s Germany’ Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006): 862-5.
5 Jessberger, ‘Bad Torture – Good Torture?’, p. 1064.
6 Regional Court Decision, p. 863 (paras. 23-4).
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provides both a moral and a legal justification for torture in cases like Daschner’s,
although for reasons that he has stated more fully elsewhere,7 he opposes any institu-
tionalization of torture or training of torturers. Hauke Brunkhorst (Chapter 4), by
contrast, insists that the legal, as distinct from the moral, prohibition on torture must
remain ‘notstandfest’ – firm whatever the emergency.
Though Daschner and his colleague were convicted, the court found there were
‘massive mitigating circumstances’ and imposed only nominal penalties (reprimands
and suspended fines).8 Was this simply a merciful response to two people who had
acted wrongly under overwhelming stress? Or was the court, as Francesco Belvisi’s
analysis (Chapter 3), might suggest, conscious of the difference between its own po-
sition as the guardian of the law and that of a state official who might have to an-
swer to the public or to the victim’s family? Belvisi would maintain the absolute le-
gal prohibition against torture yet endorse torture as morally right in extreme cases –
a sort of civil disobedience by the state against its own laws.9 Hauke Brunkhorst
takes a somewhat similar position, but while Belvisi thinks it is the role of the phi-
losopher to consider what a state official should do in these extreme circumstances,
Brunkhorst leaves the decision to the individual conscience of the official.
In a contribution to the conference which is not included here because it has been
published elsewhere,10 Michael Moore put forward a different defence of Daschner:
that even if torture was absolutely wrong, it was not necessarily wrong to intend to
torture. Intending to torture, or failing to prevent torture, or preventing others from
preventing torture (among other examples) were, he suggested, easier to justify on
consequentialist grounds than torture itself. Moore’s major contribution to the de-
bate on torture, however, remains his article ‘Torture and the Balance of Evils’ first
published in 1989.11 Here he argues that although torture is prima facie always
wrong, it may sometimes be justified on grounds analogous to self-defence, or even
in very extreme cases where that analogy (always a debateable one – see the chap-
ters by La Torre and Steinhoff) clearly does not apply. As he put it at the Hull con-
ference: ‘If I can locate and defuse a nuclear device at 42nd Street only by torturing
the innocent child of the terrorist who planted it there, I torture.’12
7 U. Steinhoff, ‘Torture – The Case for Dirty Harry and against Alan Dershowitz’, Journal of
Applied Philosophy 23 (2007): 337-353
8 Regional Court Decision, p. 864; Jessberger, ‘Bad Torture – Good Torture?’, p. 1065.
9 Cf. H. Shue, ‘Torture’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1978): 124-43, p. 143.
10 M. S. Moore, ‘Patrolling the Boundaries of Consequentialist Justifications: The Scope of
Agent-relative Restrictions’, Law and Philosophy 27 (2007): 35-96.
11 M. S. Moore, ‘Torture and the Balance of Evils’ Israel Law Review 23 (1989): 280-344, re-
vised and reprinted as chapter 17 of Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Crimi-
nal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997). Professor Moore kindly suggested that we
reprint the article again in this volume, but in view of its length relative to the other contribu-
tions we decided not to include it.
12 Moore, ‘Patrolling the Boundaries’, p. 44.
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Moore’s article remains a classic illustration of the philosophical dilemma posed
by torture. A simple consequentialist approach makes torture seem too easy to jus-
tify. On the other hand, the deontologist who insists that torture is absolutely im-
permissible will always be faced with more and more extravagant examples – like
Moore’s 42nd St. bomb or the imaginative scenarios in Uwe Steinhoff’s chapter – in
an attempt to force her to admit that torture will sometimes be justified. Once that
concession is made, ‘any prohibition on torture faces significant dialectical pressure
toward balancing tests and the unwelcome consequentialist conclusion that interro-
gational torture can be justified whenever the expected benefits outweigh the ex-
pected costs.’13
Moore’s own attempt to resolve this dilemma appeals to what he calls ‘threshold
deontology’.14 Otherwise absolute moral rules like ‘don’t torture the innocent’ give
way at some – unspecifiable15 – point where the consequences of adhering to them
become overwhelmingly terrible. Rather than seek to give legal effect to this view,
Moore argues for ‘acoustic separation’.16 If the aim is to ensure that officials torture
only in the extremely rare case where it is justi-fiable to avert catastrophe, the best
way to achieve it may be to prohibit all torture (or, as Moore advocates, all torture of
‘the innocent’)17 and assume that officials will break the law when the threshold of
horrendous consequences is reached. Such cases can then be dealt with by an exer-
cise of clemency. Again this is a possible interpretation of the Daschner decision –
that the exercise of clemency was based on a secret rule that people like Gaefgen
should be tortured, a rule that could not be publicly announced for fear that it would
encourage terror in cases where it was not appropriate. Such an interpretation raises
troubling questions: as the originator of the ‘acoustic separation’ theory acknowl-
edges, ‘the sight of law tainted with duplicity and concealment is not pretty’.18
Whatever the merits of his solution, the way Moore poses the problem takes us to
the heart of the debate. To La Torre’s argument (Chapter 1) that a rule authorizing
13 D. Luban, ‘Unthinking the Ticking Bomb’, Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers (July
2008), available at: <http://lsr.nellco.org/georgetown/fwps/papers/68/> (accessed 21 August
2008), p. 25. La Torre, Ch.1 below, gives examples of this dialectic. Steinhoff’s argument in
Ch. 2, however, is deontological rather than consequentialist.
14 Moore, ‘Torture and the Balance of Evils’, pp. 327-32.
15 Ibid., p. 332. For an argument that this unspecifiability renders Moore’s position untenable,
see L. Alexander, ‘Deontology at the Threshold’, San Diego Law Review 37 (2000): 893-912.
16 Moore, ‘Torture and the Balance of Evils’, p. 337. The phrase is from M. Dan-Cohen, ‘Deci-
sion Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law’, Harvard Law Re-
view 97 (1984): 625-77.
17 There is clearly a problem in reconciling the idea of ‘guilty’ torture victims with the presump-
tion of innocence – see Marina Lalatta Costerbosa, Chapter 8 below – though advocates of
defensive torture could argue that it no more infringes the presumption than does self-
defensive killing.
18 Dan-Cohen, ‘Decision Rules’, p. 673.
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torture is not universalizable, because no-one can accept being subjected to treat-
ment the very nature which is to be unacceptable, an ally of Moore can respond that
there may be cases in which the consequences of refraining from torture are unac-
ceptable. But one riposte to this – see La Torre – is that even to discuss such exam-
ples is immoral because it erodes the sense of the moral unacceptability of torture in
order to establish an exception that has virtually no application in real life.19
The question of the morality of discussing torture is a particularly troubling one
for us, since by the very act of editing and publishing the book we are engaging in a
debate which, Slavoj i ek has argued, ‘every authentic liberal should see…as a
sign that the terrorists are winning’.20 The trouble with the ‘Pandora’s box’ argu-
ment, as Henry Shue told us thirty years ago, is that Pandora’s box is already open.21
Torture has become a matter not merely of debate, but of actual practice not just by
U.S.-backed and trained regimes as in the 1970s, but by the U.S. itself and its core
allies, including some British forces in Iraq.22 If i ek was right in what he wrote in
2002, the terrorists have already won that round. And in that very essay, i ek him-
self joined the discussion of what to do in exceptional cases:
I can well imagine that, in a particular situation, confronted with the proverbial ‘prisoner who
knows’, whose words can save thousands, I might decide in favour of torture; however, even
(or, rather, precisely) in a case such as this, it is absolutely crucial that one does not elevate
this desperate choice into a universal principle: given the unavoidable and brutal urgency of
the moment, one should simply do it.23
‘One should simply do it’ looks suspiciously like a universal principle, the scope of
which cannot (and must not) be precisely specified. This is not far from Moore’s
‘threshold deontology’, and closer still to Brunkhorst’s ‘tragic choice’.
The question now is not whether, but how, to debate torture. There is a case for
discussing real or hypothetical exceptional cases, if only to show how different they
are from virtually all real cases in which torture is practiced. But it is important to
contextualize this discussion by pointing out how difficult, if not impossible, it is to
find any real, documented case where torture has clearly averted some terrible
threat.24
19 Moore acknowledges the virtual absence of real cases, at least so far as ‘innocent’ torture vic-
tims are concerned: ‘Torture and the Balance of Evils’, p. 333.
20 S. i ek, ‘Are we in a War? Do we have an Enemy?’ London Review of Books 23 May 2002
(accessed in the online archive, <http://www.lrb.co.uk> [subscription required]).
21 Shue, ‘Torture’, p. 124. On the global politics of torture at this time see N. Chomsky and E.
Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1979).
22 Joint Committee on Human Rights, UN Convention Against Torture: Discrepancies in
Evidence Given to the Committee About the Use of Prohibited Interrogation Techniques in
Iraq (HL157/HC527, London, TSO, 2008).
23 i ek, ‘Are we in a War?’
24 For careful scrutiny of several alleged instances see P. N. S. Rumney, ‘Is Coercive Interroga-
tion of Terrorist Suspects Effective? A Response to Bagaric and Clarke’, University of San
Francisco Law Review 40 (2006): 479-513; D. Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton and
Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2007).
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Once again, the Daschner case is instructive. The threat of torture failed to save
the boy; the court was not satisfied that torture had truly been a last resort; and, sig-
nificantly in view of the way the whole torture debate is framed by the twin towers,
the case had nothing to do with terrorism. The threat of torture ‘worked’, but on a
man who had no cause to serve, no comrades no protect, and thus little incentive to
hold out or to feed his interrogators false information.25
Although no case we know of provides incontrovertible evidence of the benefits
of torture, we can discuss a real ‘ticking bomb’ case:
In the late 1950s, Paul Teitgen, the prefect of Algiers, caught Fernand Yveton, a Communist
placing a bomb in the gasworks. Teitgen knew Yveton had a second bomb, and if Yveton had
planted and exploded it, it would set off gasometers, killing thousands. Teitgen could not per-
suade Yveton to tell him where the other bomb was. Nevertheless, said Teitgen, ‘I refused to
have him tortured. I trembled the whole afternoon. Finally the bomb did not go off. Thank God
I was right.’26
According to a former senior French intelligence officer (and unrepentant tor-
turer), Yveton was in fact tortured despite Teitgen’s orders.27 Teitgen’s reasons for
refusing to torture (and later resigning his position) appear to have included the fact
that he was himself a torture survivor28 – an illustration, perhaps, of La Torre’s point
that one cannot impose on others what one cannot accept oneself – and his fear, all
too well founded as it turned out, that once permitted, torture would escalate: ‘if you
once get into this torture business, you’re lost.’29 In Henry Shue’s view, for a ticking
bomb case to justify torture, this likelihood of escalation would have to be absent,
and in reality there are no such cases.30 (Perhaps the Daschner case, being an iso-
lated incident, comes closer than the Algerian situation.) Rejali suggests that the rea-
son Teitgen ‘trembled’ was not simply fear of an explosion but the knowledge that if
the explosion occurred he would be blamed for not using every possible means to
prevent it. When officials do resort to torture as a response to terrorism, he suggests,
they are not simply ‘responding rationally to ineffectiveness’ but ‘purging the
wounded community’s furious emotions with human sacrifices.’31
25 Ibid., p. 478.
26 Ibid., pp. 533-4. Rejali spells the prefect’s name ‘Teitgin’ but it is spelt ‘Teitgen’ in other ac-
counts.
27 P. Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah, quoted in A. Bellamy ‘No Pain, No Gain: Torture
and Ethics in the War on Terror’ International Affairs 82 (2006): 121-48, p. 141, n. 86. On
Aussaresses’ career and the furore surrounding his book see F. Kaltenbeck, ‘On Torture and
State Crime’, Cardozo Law Review 24 (2002): 2381-92.
28 T. Todorov, ‘Torture in the Algerian War’ South Central Review 24, no. 1 (2007): 18-26.
29 Quoted by Bellamy, ‘No Pain’, p. 141.
30 H. Shue, ‘Torture in Dreamland: Defusing the Ticking Bomb’, Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law 37 (2005): 231-9.
31 Rejali, Torture and Democracy, p. 835.
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Shue and Rejali’s analyses suggest that rare, non-institutionalized torture, of the
kind envisaged by Steinhoff and Belvisi, is an impossible abstraction – like, as Shue
puts it, the alcoholic who has only one drink.32 The difficulty with this argument is
that precisely because of the extreme rarity of actual known cases, we have no data
on which to base empirical generalizations about their consequences. We can only
speculate on what might have happened in, for example, the Daschner case, if tor-
ture had actually been used. We may assume that prior to this case, torture was not
part of the martial arts trainer’s job description. But if he had tortured, and had been
legally exonerated, he and everyone else in the German police would know he was
the person to call in next time there was an urgent need to torture someone. Would
he not feel the need to prepare for such an eventuality – and to prepare a few train-
ees, in case he was not available when the time came? To step back from institution-
alizing torture in such a situation would not be easy. But ‘hard-nosed consequential-
ists’ may think that is a risk worth taking, if the evil to be averted is great enough,33
and some deontologists might argue that it does not defeat the moral right to defen-
sive torture.
B. Alternative approaches
It is not clear to us that the debate over exceptional cases can ever be resolved. It in-
volves a ‘tragic choice’, as Brunkhorst puts it, between incommensurable evils, ex-
acerbated in any conceivable real life case by lack of certainty over the factors that
will determine the outcome of either course of action. And in any real crisis, it is a
safe prediction that the choice between evils will not be made on the basis of phi-
losophical argument, but will reflect a range of factors such as political calculation,
peer pressure, the gendered self-image of the potential torturer, and racialized per-
ceptions of the potential victim.34 It is also clear that the decision to torture is rarely
an agonized choice between evils: more often it is a routine tool of governance, or a
means to degrade and subdue political opponents.35 The discussion of exceptional
cases may be unavoidable, but it should not be the dominant theme of the torture de-
bate.
In fact it is only the first group of chapters that follow – those by La Torre, Stein-
hoff, Belvisi and (in part) Brunkhorst, that address the ethical issue posed by excep-
32 Ibid., p. 234
33 Luban, ‘Unthinking the Ticking Bomb’, p. 29.
34 See for example Todorov, ‘Torture in the Algerian War’; M. K. Huggins, M. Haritos-
Fatouros, and P. G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers
Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002); D. Rejali,
‘Torture Makes the Man’, South Central Review 24, no. 1 (2007): 151-69; J. Butler, ‘Sexual
Politics, Torture and Secular Time’, British Journal of Sociology 59, no. 1 (2008): 1-23
35 P. Green and T. Ward, State Crime: Governments, Violence and Corruption (London, Pluto,
2004), Ch. 7.
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tional cases. The other chapters more or less explicitly assume that torture is (always
or virtually always) wrong and discuss the issue on other levels.
The chapters by Tsvetana Kamenova, Patrick Birkinshaw and Agustín Menendez
deal with legal doctrines regarding torture. Kamenova examines the jurisprudence of
the UN’s ad hoc tribunals, and Birkinshaw looks at the implications of the House of
Lords’ decision on the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by torture, and points
out some of the limitations of that decision, and of judicial decisions in general as a
means of opposing torture. Menendez takes a more theoretical approach in criticiz-
ing the interpretation of US constitutional law by the Bush government and its ad-
visers – an approach which, like La Torre’s, implies that torture is incompatible with
the nature of law as a form of practical discourse.
Marina Lalatta Costerbosa and Alison O’Donnell’s chapters, as well as a large
part of Hauke Brunkhorst’s, approach the issue from a historical perspective.
Brunkhorst relates the history of torture to the changing nature of European legal
systems since the 12th century. Lalatta looks back to renaissance and enlightenment
debates about torture as a means of interrogation, and finds disturbing parallels be-
tween those debates and today’s political situation. She finds particularly instructive
the argument of Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) about the political character of
torture: it is not simply a means of interrogation, but a tool for the powerful against
their enemies. O’Donnell et al. do not discuss interrogational torture at all, but the
involvement of nurses in the genocidal practices of the Nazi regime, of which tor-
ture, in the form of medical experiments for example, was a subordinate part. The
chapter serves as a reminder that interrogational torture, isolated from other forms of
state terror, is the exception rather than the norm.
Penny Green and Tony Ward also discuss torture as part of wider patterns of state
terror, and argue that once torture is accepted as a permissible institutional practice it
is most unlikely to be confined within the bounds of ‘lesser evil’ justifications. Fi-
nally, Bev Clucas examines the portrayal – and implicit endorsement – of torture in
the highly successful TV series 24, bringing us back again to the issue of the moral-
ity of discussing torture at all.
It seems clear to us that the morality of discussing torture depends on whether the
goal is to prevent it. Whether the goal is the absolute elimination of the practice, or
its elimination in all but the handful of Daschner-type cases, is perhaps of secondary
importance. There is a lot more work to be done on the issue of preventive strategy36
– and the issue is a very difficult one, not least because of the difficulty of knowing
36 Important works in this area include: M. D. Evans and R. Morgan, Preventing Torture : a
study of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Oxford, Clarendon, 1998); T. Risse, S .C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink,
(eds.) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1999); R. D. Crelinstein, ‘The World of Torture: A Constructed
Reality’, Theoretical Criminology 7 (2003): 293-318.
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whether preventive measures are really preventing the practice or simply making it
less visible.37 What we can be clear about is what does not help: the sort of irrespon-
sible legal discussion criticized by La Torre and Mendendez, and the sort of irre-
sponsible media portrayal exemplified by 24.
37 Rejali, Torture and Democracy.
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1. ‘Jurists, Bad Christians’: Torture and the Rule of Law*
Massimo La Torre
Detainee began to cry. Visibly shaken. Very emotional. Detainee cried. Disturbed. Detainee
began to cry. Detainee bit the IV tube completely in two. Started moaning. Uncomfortable.
Moaning. Began crying hard spontaneously. Crying and praying. Very agitated. Yelled. Agi-
tated and violent. Detainee spat. Detainee proclaimed his innocence. Whining. Dizzy. Forget-
ting things. Angry. Upset. Yelled for Allah. […] Urinated on himself. Began to cry. Asked
God for forgiveness. Cried. Cried. Became violent. Began to cry. Broke down and cried. Be-
gan to pray and openly cried. Cried out to Allah several times. Trembled uncontrollably.1
I.
The September 11 attacks of 2001 marked a watershed in political and legal phi-
losophy: What developed in the wake of these attacks has shifted the basic premises
of discussion onto entirely different grounds, in what can be described in certain im-
portant respects as a reversal of the earlier paradigm, or even as a throwback, de-
pending on how one chooses to look at the change.2 In fact it used to be, in the
1990s, that philosophers of law could work on the idea of a cosmopolitan order,
could work on ways to extend constitutional principles to the sphere of international
relations, could even conceive (not ingenuously) of institutionalizing the Kantian
project for a perpetual peace.3 But that has quickly vanished, the discussion now fo-
* Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the School of Law of the ‘Robert Schu-
man’ University of Strasbourg, on 15 May 2007; at the School of Political Science of the
Università Statale in Milan, on 26 February 2007; at the Centro de Estudios Políticos y Con-
stitucionales in Madrid, for a researchers’ seminar held on 19 February 2007; at an interna-
tional conference on the rights of man held on 18–20 October 2006 and organized by the In-
stituto Universitario de Historia Simancas of the University of Valladolid; and at the Univer-
sity of Kiel for a seminar in legal philosophy held on 28 July 2006. I am grateful to the Alex-
ander von Humboldt Foundation for making it possible for me to research this paper at the
University of Kiel in the summer of 2006.
1 Internal log detailing the interrogation at Guantanamo of a man identified as Detainee 063,
quoted by P. Sands in his article ‘The Green Light’, Vanity Fair, May 2008.
2 See the bleak and dreary assessment presented in E. Denninger, ‘Recht, Gewalt und Moral –
ihr Verhältnis in nachwestfälischer Zeit: Ein Bericht’, Kritische Justiz 38 (2005): 359ff.
3 Significant in this regard, because emblematic of a certain outlook or Stimmung that had a
noticeable hold on the community until a few years ago, is Jürgen Habermas’s fine essay
‘Kants Idee des ewigen Friedens – Aus dem historischen Abstand von 200 Jahren’, now in J.
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cussing on the merits of preventive war, on the eclipse of international law in the
mould of Westphalia, and on ‘benevolent hegemony’ – and the idea has even been
floated of empire and imperialism, literally so stated.4 We thus have, among others,
essayists and scholars like Michael Ignatieff and Michael Walzer, once styled as
‘liberal,’ who are making the case for a ‘light’ form of ‘Empire,’5 and Thomas Nagel
reminds us that if we are to achieve justice on a global scale we will have to take a
Hobbesian path, by going through the (equally global) injustice of rule by the
strongest, with a de facto monopoly of force exercised on an international stage.6
The paradigm reversal goes even deeper, however. Before 9/11, we were still
working from within a conception of law that minimized law’s coercive side and to
a certain extent extruded force and violence from the archetypal context in which
law is experienced. When confronted with a choice between ‘facts’ and ‘norms,’ be-
tween ‘facticity’ and ‘validity,’ jurists and theorists generally seemed to favour
norms and validity, embedding these in the language of rights, principles, reasons,
and arguments. Law was thus conceptualized as being fundamentally grounded in
argumentation, discourse, and persuasion rather than in coercion: Essential to law
was its laying a claim to justice, not its being a fait accompli. In a word, a ‘milder,’
kinder law was being forged.7
But in a dramatic turn now, the idea of force and violence as essential, founda-
tional elements of law has swung back into action.8 This resurgence can primarily be
observed in international law – with John Bolton, for example, former U.S. ambas-
sador to the United Nations, arguing that this law does not ‘really’9 exist – and the
Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1996), 192ff. Similar, too,
is G. Teubner, ‘Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungsthe-
orien’, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 63 (2003): 1ff. Evi-
dence that the upbeat ‘mood’ was not to last, however, came as early as in J. Habermas, ‘Hat
die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?’, in Der gespaltene Westen
(Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2004) 113ff.
4 For a discussion, see M. La Torre, ‘Global Citizenship? Political Rights under Imperial Con-
ditions’, Ratio Juris 18 (2005): 236ff.
5 Compare the words of the British historian and essayist Tony Judt: ‘In today’s America, neo-
conservatives generate brutish policies for which liberals provide the ethical fig-leaf’ (T. Judt,
‘Bush’s Useful Idiots’, London Review of Books, vol. 28, no. 18, 21 September 2006,
<http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n18/judt01_.html>)
6 T. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 113ff.
7 The appropriate reference here can only be G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite (Turin, Einaudi,
1992). Cf. M. La Torre, Constitutionalism and Legal Reasoning (Dordrecht, Springer, 2007).
8 Perhaps the pithiest policy encapsulation of this new embrace should be credited to Cofer
Black, the head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center who in testimony to Congress in late 2002
made the now-famous remark, ‘There was a before-9/11, and there was an after-9/11: After
9/11 the gloves came off’.
9 See J. R. Bolton, ‘Is There Really Law in International Affairs?’, Transnational Law & Con-
temporary Problems 10 (Spring 2000). More or less in the same vein, though more sophisti-
cated and ‘law and economics’ re-styled, is the argument presented by J. L. Goldsmith and E.
A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005).
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same is happening in the sphere of international relations, now being depicted as
Mars contra Venus, as a Hobbesian world in which the Kantian (and European) ideal
of peace cannot flourish except under the shield of American might and power.10
This new paradigm has crept into domestic law too, however: Here the Bush ad-
ministration and its Kronjuristen have pushed onto a nation the idea of an unbridled
executive power, legitimized to eschew the general laws, and even the constitution
in certain respects, not to mention international treatises, their force being regarded
as mostly symbolic: ‘I’m the decider,’ says President Bush, ‘and I decide what is
best,’11 which in political theory and jurisprudence translates to the proposition that
protection of the law is the president’s business. This formula, worthy of Carl
Schmitt, captures the new doctrine of executive exceptionalism as set out by the ad-
ministration’s top theorist, John Yoo. It is doubtless significant, and an indication of
the new zeitgeist, that this young constitutional theorist now teaches law where the
great Hans Kelsen once taught, at the University of California, Berkeley.
Kelsen emphatically and rigorously upheld the primacy of international law over
national law and spoke of peace through law; Yoo, in stark contrast, is saying there
is no obvious reason why the United States should make it a policy objective to curb
violence and contain war around the world, and the same goes for the U.S. constitu-
tion: ‘It is no longer clear that the constitutional system ought to be fixed so as to
make it difficult to use force.’12
Change the language slightly, and there reemerges the old doctrine of the presi-
dent (chief executive) as Hüter der Verfassung – as keeper of the constitution. The
underlying argument here is once more of a ‘realist’ cast and roughly Schmittian in
origin: Legal reasoning is in large part political or policy-oriented, and therefore,
says the argument, it cannot be entrusted exclusively to ‘nonpolitical,’ and hence
‘politically unaccountable,’ bodies such as courts of law: ‘When courts resolve
genuine ambiguities, they cannot appeal to any ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky’;
often they must rely on policy judgments of their own. Those judgments should be
made by the executive, not the judiciary.’13 This turns on its head the basic principle
of constitutional justice as expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its finding that it
10 It is Robert Kagan who has famously described Americans and Europeans as coming from
two different planets: Mars and Venus, the one Hobbesian (and powerful) and the other Kant-
ian (and weak). This power equation is seen as essential to the transatlantic relationship, and
its solution – i.e., peace through power – is outlined in his very much quoted ‘Power and
Weakness’, Policy Review, June/July 2002.
11 From a speech delivered 18 April 2006. Cf. R. Cohen, ‘“The Decider” Has Rules, All of
Them Are Big, “Yo”’, Herald Tribune, 22–23 July 2006.
12 J. Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005), ix. See
also J. Yoo, War by Other Means (New York, Atlantic Press, 2006).
13 C. R. Sunstein, ‘Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is’, Yale Law
Journal 115 (2006): 2580 ff.
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is ‘emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is,’14 which is the main holding in Marbury v. Madison, the foundation on
which rests the federal system of judicial review in the United Sates.
They say that if you want peace you should be prepared for war. This adage has
been newly conceptualized as a primary government function, and as a justification
for government action, by bringing war into analogy with law and arguing that just
as a lawless state could not ordinarily exist, so a warless one could not, either: ‘War,
like law, sustains the State by giving it the means to carry out its purposes of protec-
tion, preservation, and defense.’15 The notion of a just war sets international law into
motion – it does so as the reaction consequent upon a violation of such law. But re-
action (a response) morphs into aggression (an initiative), and so comes to also em-
brace the preventive use of force, which comes into play even in situations in which
there is no imminent threat to national security (a point made by the White House in
its annual National Security Strategy report of 2002). In fact the concept of collec-
tive security is effaced from international law, displaced by the concept of national
interest, which becomes paramount and whose interpretation is brought under the
exclusive control of the U.S. president in his capacity as commander in chief. The
sovereign thus reclaims an unqualified jus ad bellum, a privilege no longer subject to
any of the rules the international community lives by.
So viewed against this background, law essentially becomes force and violence –
as it does in Carl Schmitt’s conception – and sovereignty once more projects itself as
decision-making power under an Ausnahmezustand, the dreaded state of emergency
in which the tenuous fibre and connections by which the law is held together wear
away under the ultimately overriding standard of friend and enemy. In fact, in this
fibre, which is thinning out by attrition under the force of this revived framework,
we find some old foundations of law, first among which habeas corpus: It is now a
presidential prerogative to decide who has the right to petition for this writ; the
president may qualify anyone as an ‘unlawful enemy combatant,’ a category hitherto
unknown, and anyone so qualified is thereby denied any right or guarantee under
any system of law, whether domestic, international, or humanitarian, and so be-
comes fair game (Freiwild), and can therefore be taken away to a secret black-site
location, can be locked up in a prison camp off-limits to judicial oversight, can be
detained indefinitely and without charges.
This doctrine has in large part been formalized in the Military Commissions Act
of 2006, signed into law by President Bush on 17 October 2006, which also acts to
undercut the significance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan v.. Rums-
feld [126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)], where it is argued that a state of war does not amount
to a ‘blank cheque’ for the executive, and that the exercise of exceptional executive
powers requires the approval of Congress. Yet the Military Commissions Act [under
14 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1802), p. 177.
15 P. Bobbit, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York, Anchor
Books, 2003), p. 780.
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Section 6(a)(3)] vests in the chief executive (in the U.S. president) the authority to
interpret Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention, relative to the treat-
ment of prisoners of war, thereby authorizing the president to determine the article’s
purview. And under Section 948(d)(c) of the same act, the president is further au-
thorized, along with the secretary of defense, to designate any non-U.S. citizen as an
unlawful enemy combatant, a status that strips the person so designated of the right
to petition for habeas corpus16. A ‘state of exception’ has thus been set up under the
war on terror, a state in which force suspends the rule of law, and which produces its
own brand of exceptional subjects, the unlawful enemy combatants—exceptional
precisely because what applies to them is not law but force. In this sense the jus ad
bellum, so reinstated without let or hindrance, ends up gutting the jus in bello and
taking away all its force.17
II.
If we look through the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, a
report issued in March 2005 by the U.S. Defense Department and the Pentagon, we
will find under the heading ‘Our Vulnerabilities’ the revealing proposition that ‘our
strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a
strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.’18
What is revealing here is the underlying assumption that international institutions
and judicial processes stand on the same level with terrorism: All three are tools that
‘the weak’ use to thwart and derail ‘the strong.’ There is a definite Nietzschean and
capitalistic theme lodged in this idea: Law and rules can fall into the hands of ‘the
weak,’ who can aptly use them to thwart the progress, triumph, and vitality of those
on the ‘winning’ side.
Words are deeds, and their consequences are not long in coming. So it seems that
among several other moral and legal aberrations of our time, there is one in particu-
lar which has been every legal system’s bête noire since the Enlightenment and yet
is creeping back upon us, this being the legalization of torture. Thus, even though in
the first half of what has been called the ‘dumb’ century (the 18th century), Ales-
16 Such denial of habeas corpus has now been struck down by the Supreme Court in its Boume-
diene v. Bush decision (128 S. Ct. 2229, issued on June 12, 2008), whereby aliens detained in
Guantanamo Delta Camp now have an acknowledged right to challenge their detention in
U.S. Courts: see R. Dworkin, ‘Why It Was A Great Victory’, The New York Review of Books,
August 14, 2008, pp. 18 ff.
17 Cf. D. Luban, “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb,” in The Torture Debate in
America, ed. K. J. Greenberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 64–65.
18 D. H. Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington
DC, U.S. Department of Defense, 2005), p. 5.
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sandro Manzoni could confidently proclaim that torture is ‘dead and gone, a thing of
the past,’19 the tide seems to be turning now, with a growing number of jurists and
policymakers enthusiastically looking to convince us otherwise. And indeed torture,
as an anticipatory and hence inevitably disproportionate use of force, reproduces to
some extent the phenomenological mechanics of the preemptive war advocated in
President Bush’s newfangled national-security doctrine. It can be argued, by anal-
ogy, that torture is to criminal law as preemptive war is to international law, in that
both make useless and ineffectual any criterion of predictability or proportionality in
the lawful use of force. And both find their basis in the idea of an imminent yet un-
certain threat, and in the overriding and exclusionary value of national security. The
breakup of international law by way of preemptive war thus paves the way for the
equivalent breakup of domestic law by way of ‘the torment.’
It should not come as a surprise, then, that when White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales (later serving as U.S. attorney general) requested an opinion on the legality
of torture under international law, the response, laid out in a leaked August 1, 2002,
U.S. Defense Department memo of the Office of Legal Counsel, involved none
other than John Yoo – the Kronjurist (then acting as deputy assistant attorney gen-
eral) who has been responsible for theorizing for the United States the legality of
preemptive war. The memo, coauthored by Yoo along with Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Jay S. Bybee,20 points out in the first place that while the United States does
have international obligations under the 1987 ‘United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (or
CAT), these obligations are restricted by an instrument of ratification the United
States deposited upon signing the convention in 1988, an instrument exercising
which the first Bush administration submitted its own, apparently narrower under-
standing of torture, which would later become law (with passage of the 1994 Federal
Anti-Torture Statute: 18 USC § 2340), and under which nothing counts as torture
unless it inflicts ‘prolonged mental harm caused by [...] the threat of imminent
death.’21 In the second place, the Bybee memorandum further restricts this definition
by finding it to mean that ‘physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in
19 A. Manzoni, Storia della colonna infame, ed. by G. Lesca (Florence, Barbera, 1923), pp. 39-
40 (my translation).
20 The full version of the document was signed by Bybee alone, for which reason it has come to
be known as the ‘Bybee memorandum.’
21 ‘Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, August 1, 2002’, now in
M. Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror (New York,
New York Review Books, 2004), p. 115. The re-legalization of torture practices pursued
through this first memorandum is later supported in detail and made more explicit by John
Yoo in his ‘Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense’, dealing with military interrogation of ‘alien unlawful combatants held outside the
United States, March 14, 2003. See also – to have a concrete image of what is at stake – Don-
ald H. Rumsfeld, in his capacity as US Secretary of Defense, ‘Memorandum for the Com-
mander, US Southern Command’, having as its subject ‘counter-resistance techniques in the
war on terrorism’, April 16, 2003.
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intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, or
impairment of bodily function, or even death.’22 Anything below this threshold – in-
cluding repeated physical violence – does not, according to Yoo and Bybee, qualify
as torture.23
Through a broad reading of the understanding the United States entered with its
accession to CAT, Yoo seems also to be introducing a doctrine of double effect
whereby nothing counts as torture unless there is a ‘specific intent’ to torture. Under
this specific-intent standard, in other words, it is legitimate to inflict serious pain and
suffering (there is no finding of torture) so long as such suffering is not the immedi-
ate and direct intent behind the conduct in question, that is, so long as the suffering
is a side effect and not the primary purpose of the infliction.24 Now, let us assume
that the specific aim of any act of duress is to obtain information (rather than to in-
flict pain): If we couple this assumption with the doctrine of the double effect as
found in the memorandum, we get a specific-intent standard under which any inflic-
tion of pain aimed primarily at extracting information is simply that, plain interroga-
tion, even if it clearly is torture by any other account.
Indeed, the only meaning of torture Yoo accepts as valid for the United States is
that referred to in 18 USC § 2340A (part of the 1994 Federal Anti-Torture Statute).25
Yet even under this restriction, the final outcome is that anything will pass muster,
regardless of whether it counts as torture or not, for in the Bybee memorandum,
Yoo’s doctrine on presidential powers is brought to bear in such a way that section
2340A of the U.S. Code would prove unconstitutional if it were to be constructed as
a limitation on such powers: ‘Even if an interrogation method arguably were to vio-
late Section 2340A, the statute would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly en-
croached on the President’s constitutional power to conduct a military campaign. As
Commander-in-Chief, the President has the constitutional authority to order interro-
gations of enemy combatants to gain intelligence information concerning the mili-
tary plans of the enemy.’26 Terrorists, it is further commented, are not regular com-
batants, and this makes the Geneva Conventions obsolete and amenable to exception
with respect to this class of subjects.
22 ‘Memorandum’, in Danner, Torture and Truth, p. 115.
23 Under Bybee’s (and of course Yoo’s) standard, then, many cruel practices now widely re-
garded as torture no longer count as such, on which point see H. H. Koh, ‘Can the President
Be Torturer in Chief?’, Indiana Law Journal 81 (2006): 1150.
24 ‘Memorandum’, in Danner, Torture and Truth, p. 142.
25 The actual definition is stated in 18 USC § 2340, which quotes almost verbatim the under-
standing the first Bush administration submitted as a reservation to CAT. As defined in Sec-
tion 2340, torture is ‘an act [...] specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain
or suffering’, which in turn ‘means [among other things] the prolonged mental harm caused
by [...] the threat of imminent death.’
26 ‘Memorandum’, in Danner, Torture and Truth, p. 142.
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When asked whether the president could, for example, be prohibited from tortur-
ing a child, John Yoo responded with an unqualified no – there is no binding treaty
in this regard. The question was asked by Doug Cassel: ‘If the president deems that
he’s got to torture somebody, including by crushing the testicles of the person’s
child, is there no law that can stop him?’ Yoo’s response: ‘No treaty.’ Moreover, ac-
cording to the now Professor of Law at Berkeley University ‘customary interna-
tional law, whatever its source and content, does not bind the President.’27 Further,
even an act of Congress could not limit the president’s exceptional powers in time of
war. And the war on terror is a war proper (however unprecedented it may be, pre-
cisely on account of its being waged on an enemy whose methods are those of ter-
rorism). This balance of public powers must, according to Yoo, be resolved by tip-
ping the scales in favour of executive power: ‘Congress cannot tell the president
how to exercise his judgment as commander in chief.’28
Any provision of law that might interfere with the president’s power to declare a
situation extraordinary – such as to warrant the use of interrogation methods prohib-
ited by law – must be held unconstitutional: ‘If the president really made this deci-
sion, that there are these extraordinary circumstances where the president needs to
order interrogation that’s in conflict with the congressional regulation, that regula-
tion will be unconstitutional, too.’29 Bybee then adds to this that officials who may
be involved in torture can still avoid criminal or civil liability by claiming that ‘they
were carrying out the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers.’30 The president’s
immunity from domestic, constitutional, and international law thus extends to all
those who have acted under an order ultimately traceable to the president’s author-
ity.
In short, Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution (which makes the president com-
mander in chief of the armed forces) is constructed as meaning that the president
may at discretion declare a state of exception as a matter of final decision and may
in this case use full executive powers, such as are deemed necessary to handle the
emergency so declared: ‘The Commander in Chief Clause is a substantive grant of
authority to the President conferring all those powers not expressly delegated by the
Constitution to the Congress.’31 This does nothing short of taking the Ninth
Amendment constitutional principle of the citizens’ unenumerated rights and trans-
mogrifying into a doctrine of the ‘president’s unenumerated powers’; that is, by a
27 J. Yoo, ‘Memorandum for William J. Haines II, General Counsel, Department of Defense’,
January 9, 2002, now in K. J. Greenberg and J. L. Dratel (eds.) The Torture Papers – The
Road to Abu Ghraib, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 39.
28 ‘The Torture Question’, interview with John Yoo, PBS, Frontline series,
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html> (posted 18 October
2005). See also Yoo’s comments reported by J. Mayer, ‘Outsourcing Torture: The Secret His-
tory of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program’, New Yorker, 14 February 2005.
29 ‘The Torture Question’, interview with John Yoo.
30 ‘Memorandum’, in Danner, Torture and Truth, p. 146.
31 J. Yoo, ‘Transferring Terrorists’, Notre Dame Law Review 79 (2004): 1198.
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dramatic analogy, just as the citizens retain any rights not expressly set forth (enu-
merated) in the Constitution, so the president acquires any and all powers the Con-
stitution does not expressly reserve to the nonexecutive branches and agencies of
government (in plain contradiction to the basic idea of the United States government
as a government of enumerated powers and limited jurisdiction).
III.
Now, the passing events just briefly outlined serve as background, and I will take
them as my occasion to broach the broader question of whether torture is consistent
with the rule of law. Which connects, too, with another question, that of whether
there is any moral justification for torture. But before I proceed, I should say some-
thing about the kind of perspective I am bringing to the subject of torture. This is, to
begin with, something we should never have been compelled to write about in the
first place. As Seth F. Kreimer has expressed the idea, ‘there are some articles I
never thought I would have to write; this one.’32
Alan Dershowitz – an advocate of torture, his preferred method at least since
1989 being that of driving needles under the terror suspect’s fingernails33 – submits
that professors, such as he is, are there to bring up any subject of discussion and to
question our deepest, most settled, and long-established convictions. As he puts it,
‘professors have yet a different responsibility: to provoke debate about issues before
they occur and to challenge absolutes.’34 This may have some logic going for it as a
general platitude about the role of academia; less so when we bring the idea to bear
on the issues themselves, and torture is one such issue: it cannot be approached as a
mere philosophical exercise, just as it is senseless to take a theoretical perspective
on, say, violence committed against women and children.35 So I must express my
deepest disagreement with this learned fellow professor, finding instead common
ground with Jeremy Waldron, whose words (at the other end of the spectrum) cap-
32 S. F. Kreimer, ‘Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in
the War on Terror’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 6 (2003): 278.
33 The method, in his own words, is that of ‘a sterilized needle inserted under the fingernails to
produce unbearable pain without any threat to health or life’: A. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism
Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven, CT, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2002), p. 144.
34 A. Dershowitz, ‘Tortured Reasoning’, in Torture: A Collection, ed. by S. Levinson (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 266.
35 Cf. J. Gardner and H. Shute, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence,
4th series, ed. by J. Horder (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 194.
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ture precisely my attitude to torture: ‘It is dispiriting as well as shameful to have to
turn our attention to this issue.’36
Moral and legal philosophy – understood as reflection on what is right and wrong,
on what we should and shouldn’t do – lives in a sphere apart from that of theoretical
philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, or the theory of meaning. Theoretical
philosophy is fundamentally concerned with what the world is and what can be
known about the world. This is a sphere in which any question may legitimately be
asked, in contrast to moral philosophy, wherein not every question can seriously and
responsibly be put forward as a subject of discussion. To be sure, there are some
frivolous questions that can conceivably be asked even in theoretical philosophy,
questions such as what would happen if grass were pink instead of green, but these
questions are precisely that: trivial and inconsequential. Not so in moral philosophy,
for we are working here within the practical realm, where everything we do, speak,
or think carries a consequence. And just as we all know there are certain things we
cannot and should not say, so there are things we shouldn’t even think: We have to
be thoughtful about our own thoughts and be able to rein them in accordingly, be-
fore they become reality. Contemplating someone’s death or suffering and using and
practicing such power of imagination – even on someone we understand to be our
worst enemy – is certain to morally taint and debase us, and to undermine our ability
to exercise sound moral judgment and act on it.
In the realm of practical reason and reflection there are questions of legitimate
conduct the very discussion of which can be consequential in unhelpful ways. True,
discussion is in itself valuable, but it can cause us to have second thoughts about our
deepest moral convictions (and this is not always useful) and it can equally become
ambiguous and offensive (which is never useful). Thus, we could enter on a phi-
losophical discussion to test the legitimacy of certain items of conduct under hypo-
thetical exceptional situations: Is it okay to rape our own child if we are stranded on
a desert island and know we are the only human survivors of a nuclear war? Would
it be okay to sell our mother’s organs if we were living under reduced circumstances
and would otherwise go hungry? Would it be okay to kill our father and thus save
ourselves? Would it be okay to round up all the criminals and undesirables of the
inner city, deport them to concentration camps, and perhaps implement on them the
Final Solution? Of course, we could engage in such discussions, but whether we
should is an entirely different matter: we could bring subtle philosophical argument
to bear on the discussion, but no matter how sophisticated, articulate, or eloquent we
might sound, we would surely be judged morally blighted (or even downright evil)
and undeserving of any public audience.
There is a relevant connection here with utilitarianism as a moral theory, since
one of the biggest faults found with this theory is precisely that everything in it is up
for discussion: no topic is off the table; any topic, no matter how offensive to moral
36 J. Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House’, Columbia Law
Review 105 (2005): 1683.
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sensibility or how trivial or counterproductive, can plausibly be taken up and dis-
cussed in full earnest.37 But then, descanting on what is more appropriate –
‘enhanced interrogation’ by electric shock or by waterboarding (i.e., strapping the
victim to a board and simulating drowning, a practice enthusiastically supported by
the vice president of the United States, Dick Cheney) – will prove repugnant to any-
one except to someone who has vowed a strict allegiance to utilitarianism.
So then, I believe that engaging in any discussion on torture comes close to the
scenarios just briefly described: Torture is morally objectionable not only in itself
but also as a subject of discussion (a discussion about its pros and cons, even a mock
discussion staged for purely academic interest). This is the sort of discussion that
Bernard Williams would likely call a ‘moral unthinkable,’38 and that Robert Alexy
would describe as ‘discursively impossible.’ It behooves us, I think, to bring our best
judgment to bear on what we decide to say – to use our sense of the morally un-
thinkable, so as to exercise control on what we say, and to some extent even on what
we think. Debating whether torture is morally or legally admissible strikes me as
plain despicable, and the reason I am doing it, in seeming contradiction, is that this
is a sentiment that needs a public voice. In April of 1811 at the Cádiz Cortes, Lord
of Villanueva requested that ‘this point not be discussed,’ and that, ‘without further
ado, a vote be taken to abolish the judicial practice of the torment.’39 And this is pre-
cisely the appeal and example that needs to be made public: Any different attitude is
cause for suspicion as either inhuman or as likely lead to inhumanity.
So if I am taking up the matter it is because other people more impolitic than I –
whether it be politicians, lawmakers, judges, jurists, or philosophers – have un-
abashedly set themselves at work to open this Pandora’s Box. Torture is being not
only discussed but also practiced; the imperialist-minded political changes referred
to at the outset have put it on the agenda, and it is by this unfortunate historical con-
tingency that discussion about torture has now become a must: This is unbelievably
not a what-if discussion about hypotheticals but a necessary and real one with re-
spect to which there is no choice but to be engaged.
IV
If we look at the debate that has unfolded in recent years, and at the different
schemes that have been evolved to bring torture back as a legitimate practice under
37 The point is stated in B. Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, in J. J. C. Smart and B. Wil-
liams (eds.) Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973),
p. 93.
38 ‘One might have the idea that the unthinkable was itself a moral category’ (ibid., p. 92).
39 Tomás y Valiente, La tortura en España, p. 7.
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the laws of our states, we can make out in this landscape five main argumentative
strategies that have been deployed to this end. In what follows, I briefly illustrate
each of these strategies in turn and offer the arguments that I think make each of
them invalid.
(i) The first strategy is that which John Yoo and Jay S. Bybee adopted at the U.S.
Justice Department under White House Counsel (and later Attorney General) Al-
berto Gonzales. This is a strategy that has been instrumental in bringing about,
among other horrors, the Abu Ghraib prison-abuse scandal and the extensive ex-
traordinary-rendition program, i.e., taking suspects into U.S. custody, by abduction
or other method, and delivering them to third-party countries where they can be
more easily tortured at secret locations outside the reach of U.S. jurisdiction. The
strategy, as was pointed out earlier, consists in asserting the exceptional executive
powers of the U.S. president as commander in chief of the armed forces, a capacity
in which (as the argument goes) the president has free rein and cannot be held ac-
countable under any national or international law.
This assertion of powers comes into conflict with established constitutional doc-
trine in the United States,40 with the doctrine of jus cogens in international law41 (a
doctrine upheld in a House of Lords ruling of 17 December 2005), and especially
with the basic principles of democratic constitutional government, in which execu-
tive power forms the main focus of constitutional limitations. Unbridled executive
power not subject to any control, whether in ordinary or extraordinary circum-
stances, has no place in a government established under the rule of law, much less in
a constitutional government, in which the fundamental rights set a limitation on the
scope and depth of political action, and in which human dignity delimits an area out-
side the reach of legislative power, and all the more so of executive power. Thus,
there is no doubt as to what the Founding Fathers intended when, in framing the
U.S. Constitution in 1787, they vested in Congress the power to declare war: Entry
into war – far from being a privilege of the executive, as Yoo would have it – is a
matter of such consequence for the nation as a whole and for its future that any deci-
sion to that effect must be entrusted to the wisdom and judgment of all of the na-
tion’s representatives. So says explicitly the Constitution, and so read the Federalist
Papers: ‘The President is to be the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States. [...] In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with
that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would
40 For an authoritative statement of this doctrine, see J. H. Ely, War and Responsibility: Consti-
tutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993) –
and it is no coincidence that Yoo takes critical aim at this book throughout his theoretical
construction.
41 See M. Jahn, ‘Gute Folter – schlechte Folter? Straf-, verfassungs- und völkerrechtliche An-
merkungen zum Begriff “Folter” im Spannungsfeld von Prävention und Repression’, Krit-
ische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 87 (2004): 33-34, where
international law prohibiting torture is argued to enjoy jus cogens status.
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amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military
and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the
British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of
fleets and armies – all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would apper-
tain to the legislature’ (The Federalist, no. 69).42 For James Madison and his fellow
Federalists, one of the great advantages of republicanism over the monarchy, and of
federalism over sovereign states, was that of making it so that a decision to make
war does not fall into the hands of a single person or of a few but is rather entrusted
to many, who will have to persuade one another and will thus have to exercise good
reason and be thoughtful: The single person or the few are more likely to act in the
heat of passion, whereas the many will be able to ponder the decision and put a
check on one another through collective decision-making in legislative bodies.
Monarchy was felt to be pernicious by the Federalists precisely because it grants the
executive branch those powers that Yoo is now claiming for the chief executive.
If the president is not master of war and peace, but is bound in this very delicate
matter by the Constitution and by Congress, then his role as supreme commander of
the armed forces (under Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution) cannot be refashioned
into a role designed for rule by diktat, beyond good and evil, above national and in-
ternational law, and without regard to basic rights. Hence, not every means will be
justified in view of military victory. The president as envisaged by Yoo – a president
subject to no judgment other than his or her own, with regard to such fundamental
matters as peace and war and the freedom and dignity of citizens and foreigners
alike – would bring about a government of men (of a single man) rather than one of
laws. It is despotism that this vision sadly prefigures.
(ii) The second strategy in the effort to ground torture on a moral and legal basis
is to cast the practice in a presumptively descriptive light. Torture, in other words, is
presented as a matter of fact, a manifold phenomenon that may come in any shape,
from a terrorist strike to a serious threat to national security, and it is here to stay,
which leaves us with only two alternatives: We can take the hypocritical stance of
formally rejecting torture while allowing it go unchecked underground in the secret
chambers of executive power, or we can come to terms with its presence in society
as a necessary evil, thus legalizing its use as a practice subject to oversight, making
it, therefore, a transparent, responsible practice. ‘I pose the issue as follows,’ writes
Alan Dershowitz: ‘If torture is in fact being used and/or would in fact be used in an
actual ticking-bomb mass terrorism case, would it be normatively better or worse to
42 J. Madison, A. Hamilton, and J. Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. by I. Kramnick (Harmonds-
worth, Penguin, 1987), p. 398 (italics in original).
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have such torture regulated by some kind of warrant, with accountability, record-
keeping, standards, and limitations?’43
The objection here seems quite obvious. The argument proceeds on the assump-
tion that torture is a de facto practice in fairly wide use – an established government
practice. But that is arguably not an assumption that can safely be made universally
with respect to every country. Thus, for example, it is doubtful that torture ever be-
came a serious option among Spanish law-enforcement officials in the wake of the
Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004, or among British law enforcement fol-
lowing the London subway bombings of 7 July 2005.
Despite Dershowitz’s view of torture as an inevitable social fact, there can still be
found countries in the world where government is based on the rule of law and
where society is decent. But at any rate, this second justificatory strategy proceeds
on an additional and important assumption; that is, in addition to assuming that ter-
ror suspects get tortured as a matter of course – i.e., the practice is part and parcel of
the business of running a government: it ‘comes with the territory’ – we also have to
assume that this phenomenon, precisely by virtue of its being a ‘social’ fact, cannot
morally be judged inherently loathsome, and so does not draw onto itself such con-
tempt as to rule out the idea of legalizing it. Legalizing a practice entails that the
practice itself be judged all in all ‘okay’; that is, the practice may not have all it
takes to qualify as moral, and may even be immoral to a certain extent, but not intol-
erably so, and not so much as to unsettle and shock the conscience of those who are
called upon to judge it, for if it did reach such an extreme point, it could not even
begin to make a case for itself as legitimate enough to be legalized.44 Yet these are
precisely the extremes that torture reaches. We have before us a type of conduct so
plainly wrong and intolerable to common moral sentiment that even its possible or
likely uptake in society would still not offer a good reason why it should be legal-
ized. In fact, legalization implies a value judgment that does not cast the practice in
a completely negative light but rather views it in certain respects positively. If, by
contrast, we are morally convinced that torture cannot be engaged in, and that this
tenet carries the highest moral force, then there is no way that torture can legally be
found legitimate.
43 A. Dershowitz, ‘The Torture Warrant’, New York Law School Review 48 (2004): 277.
44 It should be pointed out, too, that legalized practices appearing on their face to violate the
Constitution (as torture would seem to do if it were to be legalized) come under what the Su-
preme Court has called a ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ (US v. Carolene Products Co. 304
U.S. 144 (1938), 152 n. 4), which has come to be known as ‘strict scrutiny’ and which forms
part of the court’s understanding of the due-process principle. Strict scrutiny clearly requires
more than just loose acceptance of something as not immoral, and in fact one cannot help but
notice its close resemblance to Radbruch’s formula, from German legal theory, whereby a
law or provision is found invalid (unconstitutional) if it oversteps the threshold of ‘extreme
injustice.’
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(iii) The most powerful and widely used strategy for reintroducing torture in law
consists in laying out the loosely utilitarian ticking-bomb scenario of a device that
could go off any minute now – a hypothetical scenario, true, but which vividly
seizes the imagination.
The case is that in which someone is arrested who is known or suspected to have
somewhere planted an explosive device that will soon detonate, killing many inno-
cent people. In a dramatic situation such as this one, the only way to prevent the
bomb from exploding, thus saving the lives of many, is to resort to torture, coercing
from the person in custody information about where the bomb has been placed.
A hypothetical case like this one was presented by Niklas Luhmann at a confer-
ence held in Heidelberg in December 1992,45 and it has also been used by Winfried
Brügger, a German professor of public law who has been defending for over a dec-
ade now what he terms a Rettungsfolter, or ‘lifesaver torture,’ with a view to legaliz-
ing the practice.46 Similar, too, is the case Dershowitz invokes in his proposal to
make torture subject to a court warrant.47 The proposal had already been laid out
along similar lines by Luhmann, who envisages a scheme under which international
judges authorize torture and supervise its execution by way of video cameras that
record the entire procedure live, thus enabling the judges to instruct the torturers in
real time on how to appropriately gauge the infliction of pain (as by increasing or
decreasing the intensity of it or otherwise interrupting the treatment altogether): ‘Zu-
lassung von Folter durch international beaufsichtigte Gerichte, Fernsehüberwachung
der Szene in Genf oder Luxemburg, telekommunikative Fernsteuerung.’48 It will be
up to the ‘torturee,’ Luhmann comments, to decide whether to hold out and be a
hero or give in and be a traitor. Certainly, he concludes, this falls far short of being a
satisfactory solution, but it nonetheless does much better than the alternative, which
is to let innocent people die at the hands of terrorists. Dershowitz seems unaware of
Luhmann’s conference paper, yet proceeds very much à la Luhmann in his oblique
defence of torture, by laying insistent emphasis on there being no moral absolutes:
Right and wrong is not an all-or-nothing affair but a matter of degree.
45 See N. Luhmann, ‘Gibt es in unserer Gesellschaft noch unverzichtbare Normen?’, (Heidel-
berg, C. F. Müller, 1993), p. 1: ‘In Ihrem Lande – und das könnte in nich zu ferner Zukunft
auch Deutschland sein – gäbe es viele linke und rechte Terroristen, jeden Tag Morde, Bran-
danschläge, Tötung und Schäden für zahlreiche Unbeteiligte. Sie hätten den Führer einer sol-
chen Gruppe gefangen. Sie könnten, wenn Sie ihn folterten, vermutlich das Leben vieler
Menschen retten – zehn, hundert, tausend, wir können den Fall variieren. Würden Sie es tun?’
46 See W. Brügger, ‘Würde gegen Würde’, in Verwaltungsblätter (Baden-Württemberg, 1995),
414ff.; W. Brügger, ‘Vom unbedingten Verbot der Folter zum bedingten Recht auf Folter?’
Juristen-Zeitung 55 (2000): 165–173; and W. Brügger, ‘Das andere Auge: Folter als
zweitschlechteste Lösung’, now in Rettungsfolter im moderneen Rechtsstaat: Eine Verortung
(Bochum, Kamp, 2005) 107-17.
47 Dershowitz presents the same proposal in Ch. 4 of Why Terrorism Works, pp. 131ff.
48 Luhmann, ‘Gibt es in unserer Gesellscahft noch unverzichtbare Normen?’ p. 27.
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The reply here is that just as there is no absolute right and wrong, because these
concepts are relative, so there can be no absolute relativity, either; that is, relativity
is itself a relative concept subject to restraints: If all moral criteria were subject to
infinite gradation, then they could all be thinned out until they became meaningless
by attrition and exception, and we would eventually come to a world in which noth-
ing would make sense. No longer would the Latin maxim say Fiat justitia et pereat
mundus (Let justice be done, though the world perish), but ‘Fiat justitia, and let the
world perish in consequence,’ since it would no longer be the moral criterion that
holds its ground against the exception, but the exception that trumps the criterion in
the name of justice or (much to the same effect) in the name of utility. Indeed, this is
the same sort of abrasive relativism the utilitarian theory is apt to usher in. The point
can be illustrated in narrative by way of Agamemnon, who resolves to sacrifice his
daughter in order to bring favourable winds and make it possible for the Achaeans to
make sail toward Troy. He does so to please the vast majority of his people, and his
behaviour on this occasion is that of a good utilitarian. But, as the story goes, the
girl’s mother, Clytemnestra, never forgives Agamemnon for that gesture. In fact, if
the rationale behind Agamemnon’s pliant behaviour were carried to its logical con-
clusion (i.e., all criteria are always and without exception relative), we could proba-
bly, and imperceptibly, bring ourselves to justify anything and everything, or some-
thing close to it. Thus, for example, it was this logic that came to bear in justifying
the Jewish councils when for some time the Germans, in an unsurpassed cynical test
of human behaviour in distress, made these councils responsible for drawing up the
lists of people from the ghetto to be deported to extermination camp. Similarly, Carl
Schmitt and Karl Larenz, two insightful legal theorists, appealed to the logic of the
lesser of two evils to justify ex post facto their adherence to the Nazi movement. Yet
we know at least since Auschwitz that evil is bottomless, and so we should likewise
know that the lesser of two evils can descend ever so close to unfathomable depths.
Stated otherwise, once we relativize the absolute, rock-solid prohibition against
doing what we regard and experience as an outright, intolerable evil, and start mak-
ing concessions to such evil – balancing different evils against one another to see
which is the lesser one, the one toward which we could bend our behaviour – we
will soon find that we have made a practice out of such tradeoffs (allowing in a
measure of evil as a condition for what seems like a great gain in practicability), and
by a natural progression we will thus become inured to the blatant evil that had ini-
tially elicited our dismay and outrage: No longer will we be morally inhibited from
acquiescing in any evil of any kind, for once we accept torture in one case, there will
be no compelling reason not to do so in other cases, too. This is perhaps best known
as the slippery-slope thesis, which Steven Lukes succinctly captures in this observa-
tion that ‘removing the general prohibition would soon dissolve inhibitions.’49
To see this thesis borne out, we can look at the dynamics involved in the torture
argument presented by Richard Posner, the U.S. federal judge widely known as a
49 S. Lukes, ‘Liberal Democratic Torture’, British Journal of Political Science 36 (2005): 15.
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legal theorist and pragmatist, and as a prominent exponent of the law-and-economics
school, and recently an advocate of torture on ‘moral’ grounds. What is significant
here is that he starts out by accepting torture in ‘exceptional’ cases, only to accept it
later on in ‘less exceptional’ ones. His main argument is pragmatic and consequen-
tialist; that is, torture is the lesser evil, with the only other alternative being a far
worse evil that torture is effective at preventing: ‘Many consciences will not be
shocked at the use of torture when it will ward off a great evil and no other method
would work quickly enough to be effective.’50 Which means, too, that if we should
actually come face to face with a terrifying ticking-bomb scenario, it would be so
much as irresponsible on our part to foreclose recourse to a tool so useful as torture:
‘In so extreme a case, it seems to me, torture must be allowed,’ Posner reflects. But
he shortly thereafter softens this statement: ‘And perhaps in less extreme cases,’51
too, it should be allowed.
Another place where we can see the slippery-slope thesis borne out – despite all
the attempts made at demonstrating its logical ineptness – is in Dershowitz’s exten-
sive rhetorical appeal. The Harvard professor first presents a hypothetical situation
in the extreme (the ticking-bomb scenario) and then concedes that the very concept
of extreme circumstances is subject to interpretation and can therefore be stretched
indefinitely.52 He therefore concludes that the judge must have full discretion in de-
ciding whether to issue a torture warrant – the judge mustn’t be hamstrung by rigidly
framed statutory constraints. Indeed, the difference between the ad hoc discretion of
law-enforcement and intelligence officials and the judge’s discretion under the tor-
ture-warrant scheme, Dershowitz argues, lies not in any exceptional-circumstances
standard the judge is held to (in fact, no such standard is envisioned under the
scheme) but in the judge’s accountability: The determination must be made ‘openly
and with accountability.’53
But now the question bears asking: If we are in fact willing to accept a lesser evil
(here, torturing another soul) as a way to avert a greater evil (allowing many inno-
cent others to die), why should we not also be willing to take the blame that comes
50 R. A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 85.
51 R. A. Posner, ‘Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation’, in Levinson (ed.) Torture: A Collec-
tion, 293. Cf. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, Ch. 4. Despite defending an exceptional use of tor-
ture on moral grounds, Posner rejects the idea of formally legalizing the practice, choosing
instead to refashion the torturer’s activity as a case of ‘civil disobedience’, to be judicially as-
sessed on its merits with lenience and perhaps even justified by criminal exemption. This
view is interestingly made to rest on the slippery-slope argument: If torture were legal, ‘offi-
cials would be tempted to test the outer bounds of so extraordinary a grant of authority’ (ibid.
p. 86); law enforcers, in other words, might be apt to stretch the rule beyond its intended
meaning and purpose.
52 See Dershowitz, ‘The Torture Warrant’, p. 283.
53 Ibid. p. 290.
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with that evil (however much it may be a ‘lesser’ evil)? If we are willing to sacrifice
another’s integrity and dignity – and reduce that person to a pulp, both physically
and emotionally – why should we not also be willing to sacrifice our own dignity,
and positively assert that what we are doing (if we are in fact doing it) is hateful and
inexcusable?54 If what we are doing is evil (albeit ‘less’ evil), why, then, should we
need the community, the state, and the law to support us and lift us from responsibil-
ity for the exceptional violence and pain we have inflicted? If the circumstances are
so exceptional and terrifying – and no less terrifying is our response (as both Brüg-
ger and Dershowitz own up to, albeit in not so many words) – then let those deeds
recoil upon ourselves, upon the doers, the torturers: Let the consequences visit us
with equal ghastliness; let the law be our judge us and let it punish us accordingly,
with all its harshness.55
This is a proposition we are unlikely to accept. In fact, as Hannah Arendt points
out, ‘the weakness of the argument has always been that those who chose the lesser
evil forget very quickly that they chose evil.’56 And as it happens – precisely be-
cause we are so prone to forget – what only a moment ago we were claiming as an
exceptional circumstance under which our bad behaviour might be justified, we are
now claiming as a matter of right. This much can be observed in the dynamics of the
argumentative strategy by which the German professor Brügger advocates the use of
torture as a ‘life-saving device’: He first introduces an exceptional circumstance jus-
tifying torture so understood (as a means by which to save the lives of innocent peo-
ple) and then converts this circumstance into a foundation for the right to torture, a
right the state claims for itself under its duty to protect its citizens.57
(iv) One argument deployed in Brügger’s writings, and especially in the Bybee
memorandum, is that of legitimate self-defence: ‘If an attack appears increasingly
likely, but our intelligence services and armed forces cannot prevent it without the
information from the interrogation of a specific individual, then the more likely it
will appear that the conduct in question will be seen as necessary.’58 Bybee concedes
that this case does not make a fit with the traditional understanding of self-defence,
which becomes available to us only when confronted with an immediate frontal
threat that is certain to materialize: ‘Self-defence as usually discussed involves using
54 This point has been made with insight and sensitivity by Elaine Scarry, ‘Five Errors in the
Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz’, in Levinson, Torture, pp. 281ff. See also E. Scarry, The
Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1987), esp. her discussion of torture, pp. 27ff.
55 Cf. H. Brunkhorst, ‘Folter vor Recht: Das Elend des repressiven Liberalismus’, Blätter für
deutsche und internationale Politik (2005): 80-81.
56 H. Arendt, ‘Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship’, in H. Arendt, Responsibility and
Judgment, ed. by J. Kohn (New York, Schocken Books, 2003), 36.
57 See Brügger, ‘Vom unbedingten Verbot der Folter zum bedingten Recht auf Folter?’ pp.
165ff.
58 ‘Memorandum’, in Danner, Torture and Truth, p. 153.
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force against an individual who is about to conduct the attack. In the current circum-
stances, however, an enemy combatant in detention does not himself present a threat
of harm. He is not actually carrying out the attack.’59 Still, this is someone who, by
hypothesis, has had a part in planning the attack, and if he or she can disclose rele-
vant information about such an attack, then we do (on Bybee’s doctrine) have a case
for self-defence. In support of this thesis, Bybee invokes an article by Michael S.
Moore, who in the 1980s discussed the Israeli practice of torturing detained Pales-
tinians suspected of terrorism. According to Moore a terrorist can be said to have
‘culpably caused the situation where someone might get hurt. If hurting [the terror-
ist] is the only means to prevent the death or injury of others put at risk by his ac-
tions, such torture should be permissible, and on the same basis that self-defense is
permissible.’60 So the terrorist, having been a party to the planning, can be regarded
as part of the threat itself, as an accomplice and author – a circumstance that may
justify acting in self-defence. The same principle, Bybee further comments, applies
equally to individuals under threat and to the nation as a whole if it should come un-
der the threat of terror.
So the gist of the argument is that we can torture someone in self-defence. But
surely there is something deeply amiss here – just speaking these words should be
enough to alert us to the discordant note within. Indeed, the person on whom torture
is inflicted (the ‘torture recipient’) is by definition defenceless, unable to do any-
thing that may inhibit the torturer’s ability to do anything at will: ‘In an interrogation
torture case, the person being tortured is attacking no one. He has already been
physically subdued and imprisoned [...]. In traditional self-defense, the person
against whom one uses defensive violence is dangerous; in the torture case, he is
helpless.’61 A person in these incapacitating conditions – having no power of mind
or body – cannot plausibly be described as a source of danger, except in a sophism
designed to justify the unjustifiable.
Further, there needs to be a direct causal connection between self-defence and the
threat it is intended to drive back, and the connection must be such that this will be
the likely result. Yet we cannot say as much about torture, in which it is uncertain
whether the information being sought will be obtained, or whether any information
coercively obtained will be useful, or whether any useful information so obtained
will causally and decisively contribute to extinguishing the threat. In addition, self-
defensive action needs to be proportional to the threat posed; torture, in contrast, is
overkill, by definition disproportionate and abusive: A deep, structural imbalance is
built into the torture situation, with the inflicted harm far outweighing the danger
59 Ibid.
60 M. S. Moore, ‘Torture and the Balance of Evils’, Israel Law Review 23 (1989): 323.
61 Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb’, p. 63; cf. Koh, ‘Can the President Be
Torturer in Chief?’, p. 1163.
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against which it is defending. If there does not seem to be an inherently one-sided
situation, that is because the danger being repelled is understood as having in it the
potential to bring destruction on a great scale – but in torture, any harm inflicted is
real harm, and it meets up against a counter-harm that comes to nothing: It is either
inexistent, since the torturee cannot counteract, or it is merely presumptive, based on
an assumption of baneful things to come, not on any knowledge of them (for, other-
wise, there would be no need for the torturous act in the first place). So there is a
definite hypocrisy involved in styling torture as self-defence: It is doublespeak
whose real purpose is to overlay with a veneer of legitimacy what is actually an ag-
gression, a behaviour that is always offensive and never defensive.
(v.) The last argumentative strategy appeals once more to the ticking-time-bomb
scenario: This is an exceptional situation that, precisely on that account, engages in
the politician an ethic of responsibility. The focus thus shifts to the politician, in a
role much like that which Max Weber describes: that of a decision-maker who takes
responsibility for any decisions made. Hence, when an extraordinary circumstance
comes up that calls for swift action, the politician rises to the occasion and sets a
policy for which he or she will ultimately be held accountable.
In reply to this accountability argument comes the caveat about equality under the
law. In other words, accountability as such is all well and good, but not when it
amounts to exceptionalism, for in this avatar it must come to grips with the principle
that no one is above the law: Even the politician, despite the connections and back-
room dealing that bind him (or her) to the occult demons of power, cannot skirt the
rules of civilization that hold for everybody without exception. The politician’s re-
sponsibility as Weber understands it does not exempt the politician from the conse-
quences that come by operation of law within an institutional setting of general rule-
making. Responsibility in this sense is none other than the politician’s responsibility
before the law – a moral commitment to follow the rules that everyone else lives by.
There is no apparent reason why the politician should subscribe to a separate stan-
dard and responsibility, one that is ultimately lower or laxer than that which the or-
dinary citizen is held to.
Then, too, it is unclear what is meant by politician, what kind of role this word re-
fers to. The responsible politician is generally understood to be a statesman (or
stateswoman) in the elitist and Weberian tradition of thought, designating a person
of exceptional skill and leadership, someone on whom weighs responsibility for at-
tending to the res publica, the public good, but who can equally interpret and satisfy
the needs arising under the reason of state. We have here before us what might be
described as a process of parallel hypostatization: There is an underlying substance,
a preexisting ‘stateness’ or ‘reason’; then out of this essence a constitution and a pol-
ity are formed as its concrete expression; and then in comes a subject who connects
with this ‘political essence’ and grasps its meaning through a privileged relationship,
a bond so special and strong as to lift this person from ordinary moral obligation.
There is a quality about this conceit which is at once romantic and authoritarian, for
it casts the politician in a heroic light: ‘Whoever enters on such an enterprise must
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have the makings of a leader,’ says Weber. ‘But that will not suffice: This leader
will also have to emerge as a hero, however much in a subdued, almost muted
way.’62 On this conception, what ultimately drives political activity, the fulcrum
around which this activity revolves, is the use of force: ‘Those who seek wellness
for their own soul and blessing for that others will not do so by going through poli-
tics, for the tasks undertaken here fall into an altogether different category, and are
such as can only be accomplished through violence.’63 It seems to flow naturally that
a heroic and exceptional figure so conceived – not bound by common morality, a
sort of Nietzschean overman for all seasons – should take a relaxed attitude toward
torture and not scruple too much about resorting to it: ‘Those who get involved in
politics, that is, who make use of power and violence, make a pact with diabolical
powers,’64 and if that is the case, then it wouldn’t be so much out of character for
these persons to also draw the hangman and the torturer into their coterie.
But it is worth asking now: Is this truly and invariably what politics is about? Is
this breed of ‘heroic’ politician, unhindered by scruple with respect to his own soul
or that of others, the person to whom we would entrust our future? Is this the kind of
figure a democratic polity should rely on in its management of public affairs? The
politician’s role in democracy should tend to closely resemble that of the citizen, and
have very little to do with the aristocrat, the Hyperborean statesman conceived in a
Weberian mould. Politics in democracy should tend toward a taming of force, and
anywhere force plays a role in driving the course of the res publica, it will signify a
failure in the effort to reach mutual understanding and agreement – the mainstay of a
democratic order. How could citizens deliberate and make decisions together all the
while knowing and accepting that any one of them could turn around and, should the
occasion arise, declare a willingness to torture others in the group, reducing them to
inert matter, extinguishing these persons as autonomous bearers of rights, and hence
as beings endowed with an inalienable dignity?
After all, a constitutional democracy does not have its basis in any preexisting
‘stateness’ or political essence from which spring forth basic constitutional rights
and principles. The salus populi and the reason of state – so often adduced as
grounds for a constitutional democracy’s use of force and violence, even a brutal use
– still answer to the content of constitutional rights and principles. There is no dark,
inner quintessence concealed within a constitutional democracy, no latent ‘state of
exception,’ no unattended crucible of radical forces brewing beneath the surface,
ever ready to break out into violence at the next prepolitical situation of existential
danger. The only existence at stake in a democracy is that of the constitution and its
62 M. Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf’, in Gesammelte Politische Schriften, ed. by J. Winckelmann
(3rd ed., Tübingen, Mohr, 1973), p. 560 (my translation).
63 Ibid. p. 557 (my translation).
64 Ibid. p. 554 (my translation).
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rights.65 For in a constitutional order, and under the rule of law generally, the state
never exists as a pliant argument waiting to be filled in.66 Here torture – far from be-
ing a sort of arcanum constitutionis, as some would have us believe – is the final
seal attesting to the existential crisis of a political community willing to forsake its
own principles and hence its own welfare and survival.67 The point has been well
expressed by Michael Ignatieff: ‘For torture, when committed by a state, expresses
the state’s ultimate view that human beings are expendable. This view is antithetical
to the spirit of any constitutional society whose raison d’être is the control of vio-
lence and coercion in the name of human dignity and freedom.’68
V..
In this concluding section I will defend the thesis that a necessary, conceptual con-
nection holds between torture and illegality. The thesis found an early defender with
Christian Thomasius, in his daring essay on torture, ‘Dissertatio de tortura ex foris
Christianorum proscribenda’:69 Torture victims perceive themselves as victims of
abuse, and are so perceived by others.
This much seems intuitive. But it is not just that: The immediate evidence and ac-
companying sense of revulsion can be explained by a discursive reason, too, which
is that torture resists universality. Torture defeats any attempt at bringing it under a
principle of universal material application: No one who accepts infliction of torture
on others will accept it on oneself; this is not a standard that anyone would advocate
and at the same time choose to live by. And it stands to reason that no one should do
so, because torture is experienced by those on the receiving end of it as an act of ex-
treme, intolerable violence, as an abuse and an excess – and it must be so experi-
enced if it is to qualify as torture, as an unbearable torment, as a method for effec-
tively obliterating another’s will. Torture could never pass the test of universal ac-
ceptability that acts more or less as a final criterion of morality, for it is defined as
an excess and an abuse even by those who use and apply it. Nor should it be other-
65 Compare Hauke Brunkhorst on the constitutional order set up under the Federal Republic of
Germany: ‘A state existing prior to the constitution, and capable of obliging its citizens to en-
sure its own survival should the constitutional order cease to exist, is unknown to the
Grundgesetz (or basic law of the republic) and is foreign as well to the emergency laws estab-
lished under its framework’ (Brunkhorst, ‘Folter vor Recht’, p. 78 (my translation, italics in
the original)).
66 Cf. C. Möllers, Staat als Argument (Munich, Beck, 2001).
67 Cf. H. Brunkhorst, ‘Folter, Würde und repressiver Liberalismus’, in Rückkehr der Folter, ed.
by G. Beestermöller and H. Brunkhorst, 88ff.
68 M. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2004), p. 143.
69 For a modern edition of this essay, see C. Thomasius, Über die Folter, ed. by R. Liebewirth
(Weimar, Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1960).
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wise, since the act is designed that way: Its deliberate aim is precisely to be intoler-
able and excessive; in the words of one expert, Professor Dershowitz, it must consist
in the infliction of ‘unbearable pain,’ and for this reason it is graduated to the occa-
sion – it is made to depend on the varying degree to which the victim can bear pain
(the idea being to break that limit).
But at the same time, this very characteristic of torture – its being perceived as an
intolerable abuse even by those who resort to it – also offers an argument against the
practice. Indeed, while torture may fail the test of universality as a standard, it does
not fail in its ability to cross that line and be universal in its consequences. In other
words, it is not only the torturee’s dignity that is being assailed in and through tor-
ture, but also that of the torturer (however much in a different and less painful way),
who likewise gets transformed into an instrument, an instrument of evil and horror.
It is for this reason that torture must not be allowed, because it would transform the
whole of society into a ‘body torturous,’ a body of torturers and torturees. Who
among us would ever like to live next to a torturer? But by the same token, who
among us would like to live as a torturer, with a finger pointed at us, not only by
others but also by our own consciences? As Hannah Arendt has put it,70 what self,
what individuality – in the permanent dialogue we each by ourselves carry on with
the other, with that interlocutor who at the same time is our own conscience – would
bear the company of a torturer within? And that is, too, the main argument used by
Michael Ignatieff: ‘The problem with torture is not just that it gets out of control, not
just that it becomes lawless. What is wrong with torture is that it inflicts irremedi-
able harm on both the torturer and the prisoner. It violates basic commitments to
human dignity.’71
‘In principle,’ Michael Davis points out, ‘torture is limited only by the tortured’s
endurance,’72 which makes this an unreliable and shaky method – a point with a long
history on its side, going back at least to Roman jurisprudence. Thus, Ulpian de-
scribed torture as fragile and dangerous, and by no means a guaranteed way to arrive
at the truth: a ‘res fragilis et periculosa et quae veritatem fallat.’ In effect, torture is
overdependent on the degree to which the pain being inflicted can be tolerated:
‘Nam plerique patientia sive duritia tormentorum ita tormenta contemnunt; alii fit, ut
etiam vario modo fateantur, ut non tantum se, verum etiam alios criminentur’ (De
officio proconsulis, 48, 18, 1, 23). The same point was made by Cesare Beccaria,
who in his celebrated book On Crimes and Punishments (Chapter 16, ‘On Torture’)
70 Arendt, ‘Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship’, pp. 97ff.
71 Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, p. 140.
72 M. Davis, ‘The Moral Justifiability of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment’, International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2005): 165.
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observed how ‘it is confounding all relations to expect that [...] pain should be the
test of truth, as if truth resided in the muscles and fibres of a wretch in torture.73
Torture therefore is abuse and excess – necessarily so, by its own phenomenol-
ogy. Which goes to show that, unless law is itself conceived as abuse and excess, we
cannot at one and the same time be subject to the rule of law and be acting as tortur-
ers. As evidence for this proposition, consider how paradoxical it would be to con-
ceptualize and set forth in the law an offence called ‘abusive torture,’ ‘excessive use
of torture,’ or ‘cruel and unusual torture.’ It rings odd for a reason, which is that tor-
ture carries these attributes by definition: It is inherently excessive and abusive; it
cannot conceivably make for a use of the public powers congruent with the rules of
law, a congruence that Fuller lists as one of the requisites essential to the very con-
cept of law.74 This holds true quite apart from the obvious fact about torture, namely,
that it consists in a punishment inflicted before ascertaining whether a crime has
been committed, and indeed regardless of whether such a crime is even on the
books.
This failure of correspondence had been noted in the early 18th century by
Thomasius, who discussed the possibility of the judge overseeing and ‘controlling’
the torturer at work. Yet this activity frustrates any attempt at objective regulation,
for it is governed through and through by a criterion of rational instrumentality. The
‘object’ of torture – invariably a human being – has to be treated precisely as such,
as an object, that is, as a means to something else. Torture can thus be framed in
such a way as to make it functional to its own end, but it can never be brought under
any different standard, a normative standard conceived from without. Indeed, the
efficacy of torture turns precisely on its ability to drive its own action to excess. As
Pietro Verri would write later on in the century, in his Osservazioni sulla tortura, in
which he took up the work of the Italian jurist and magistrate Giulio Gallo, ‘there
being no certain norms that can be established in regard to the evidence justifying
the use torture, the entire matter is remitted to the judge’s discretion.’75
Discretion, understood as freedom to judge on one’s own, is thus connatural with
torture, and woven into its deep fabric. This made plain sense to Alessandro Man-
zoni, too, who noted certain inconsistencies in Verri’s discussion, to be sure, but
then observed that the point in question – about discretion falling into the judge’s
hands when no clear rule is available – had been a long-running theme among ju-
rists. In fact, ‘Bartolus himself introduced it as a matter of established opinion: Doc-
73 In the original: ‘Ma io aggiungo di più, ch’egli è un voler confondere tutti i rapporti, l’esigere
[...] che il dolore divenga il crociuolo della verità, quasi che il criterio di essa risieda nei mus-
coli e nelle fibre di un miserabile’ (C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, ed. by G. D. Pisapia
(Milan, Giuffrè, 1973), p. 40).
74 See L. L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969 (rev ed.)),
pp. 81ff.
75 In the original: ‘in materia di tortura e di indizj, non potendosi prescrivere una norma certa,
tutto si rimette all’arbitrio del giudice’ (P. Verri, Osservazioni sulla tortura (Milan, Feltrine-
lli),p. 83).
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tores communiter dicunt quod in hoc non potest dari certa doctrina, sed relinquitur
arbitrio judicis [Jurists commonly say that in the matter at hand (whether any evi-
dence is deemed sufficient grounds for torture) there can be no certain doctrine, and
that discretion is therefore relinquished to the judge]. And with this they were not
meaning to offer any sort of principle, but were rather stating a plain fact, namely,
that the law, having no criteria for determining when evidence is grounds for torture,
leaves it to the judge to make this determination at discretion.’76
The effort in jurisprudence is nonetheless to contain the judge’s discretion, using
to this end various arguments and artifices – yet, as Manzoni concludes, these
amount to nothing more than ‘ineffectual patches for something that fundamentally
could not be cast in any good shape.’77
No deontological criteria are at hand that could possibly help us work out in ad-
vance the measure or the means of violence to be used in torture. As Klaus Günther
has underscored,78 this indeterminacy begins with the very choice of instruments for
the infliction of pain. And then the pain must always be carried to a level beyond the
threshold of bearability: ‘Until the tortured dies,’ Michael Davis observes, ‘the point
at which the torture should stop is a matter of the torturer’s judgment (or that of a
superior).’79 We could attempt to set out, as Brügger does,80 types of cases in which
government bodies might be allowed to use torture. But still, in doing so we could
not, and should not, make provision for the degree of violence to be used, a measure
that we would not be able to control. And as Thomasius observes, the executioner,
the torturer, can always use his terrible instruments in such a way as to fool the
onlooker, the judge acting as controller: ‘Carnifex hic iudici in applicandis instru-
mentis fucum facere potest.’81
If these findings are all accurate, and everything suggests that they are, the rule of
law – a rule by which to preestablish the boundaries of admissible behaviour in this
or that circumstance, thus precluding abuse and excess in the behaviour so regulated
– presents itself as phenomenologically incompatible with the way torturous action
is structured. This crucial point is given a compelling statement by Klaus Günther,
76 In the original: ‘Bartolo la ripeteva anche lui come sentenza comune: Doctores communiter
dicunt quod in hoc (quali che siano gl’indizi sufficienti alla tortura) non potest dari certa doc-
trina, sed relinquitur arbitrio judicis. E con questo non intendevan già di proporre un princi-
pio, di stabilire una teoria, ma d’enunciar semplicemente un fatto; cioè che la legge, non
avendo determinato gl’indizi, gli aveva per ciò stesso lasciati all’arbitrio del giudice’ (Man-
zoni, Storia della colonna infame, pp. 56–57).
77 Ibid. p. 62.
78 See K. Günther, ‘Darf der Staat foltern, um Menschenleben zu retten?’ in Rückkehr der
Folter: Der Rechtsstaat im Zwielicht? ed. by G. Beestermöller and H. Brunkhorst (Munich,
Beck, 2006), 107.
79 Davis, ‘The Moral Justifiability of Torture’, p. 165.
80 Brügger, ‘Das andere Auge’, p. 115.
81 Thomasius, Über die Folter, title. 2, sec. 5.
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among others, who argues that there is no such thing as ‘clean’ torture: This is an
activity that cannot be made consistent with any scheme of law, on account of the
increasing aggressiveness and violence this activity is inherently designed to exert.82
In particular, there is no way to conceptualize a ‘proportionate’ and ‘predictable’
form of torture, which must invariably manifest itself as disproportionate and unpre-
dictable: ‘Assuming that torture is at all effective, it can be such only insofar and as
long as the person under torture cannot anticipate how much it can still be escalated
or be made to last.’83
Our conclusion, then, can only come down to this: There is no room for torture
under the rule of law. In fact, torture would come as a setback in the process of civi-
lization set in motion during the Enlightenment period and the modern age, a proc-
ess aspiring to carry on in ways that will bring down the rate of violence in social
relations and in the law itself. The cruelty of torture makes this an activity squarely
antithetical to the mildness distinctive to the law as a principle and technique by
which to tame and pacify social and interhuman relations. But more significantly
perhaps, there is a structural reason why torture has no place under the rule of law.
This form of rule acts as a criterion whereby any action, and all the more so the vio-
lent action of a government body, must be framed in ways that make it predictable
and proportional. And there is no way that a criterion so conceived can accommo-
date torture, structurally designed as it is to repel any hint of predictability, propor-
tionateness, or restraint.
And there is yet a third reason for the permanent illegality of torture, a reason
showing this activity to be illegal in an even more fundamental way. A legal system
is based on the assumption of its members being free and equal subjects under the
law, and along with this subjectivity comes a dignity recognized for each such
member as a person endowed with a free will, or a capacity for autonomous action.
Now, torture is so conceived as to deny and violate this dignity and capacity in the
most flagrant way possible. As Günther explains, torture must act on the tortured in
such a way that their will be broken (‘Sein Wille soll gebrochen werden’).84 And as
another German scholar has emphasized, ‘torture is incompatible with the rule of
law precisely because the activity attacks individuals in their capacity to be subjects
under the law – in fact the activity inclines toward crossing a further limit, beyond
which one is broken and destroyed as an autonomous person.’85 In this respect, tor-
ture stands on an equal plane with enslavement, for in either case a subject is trans-
formed by law into chattel, into something to be disposed of at will, ad libitum. Tor-
82 Günther, ‘Darf der Staat foltern’, p. 107. Cf. also K. Günther, ‘Folter kennt keine Grenze’,
Die Zeit, 13 March 2008.
83 Günther, ‘Darf der Staat foltern’, p. 107 (my translation).
84 Ibid. p. 106.
85 J. Ph. Reemtsma, Folter im Rechtstaat? (Hamburg, Hamburger Edition, 2005), 125 (my
translation, italics added).
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ture thus means despotism, slavery, tyranny. As Thomasius cautions us, ‘quaestio
omnibus tyrannis praebet occasione, sub specie iustitiae in subditos saeviendi.’86
VI.
I should like now to close my statement against torture with this addendum: ‘Juris-
ten, böse Christen!’ (Jurists, bad Christians!). It was Martin Luther who gave forth
with these words,87 for it seemed to him that positive law – the justice of men – is
inevitably tied up with violence, blood, coercion, even torture: ‘Recht ist Gewalt’
(Law is violence).88 To a Christian, law paradigmatically presents itself in the shape
of the cross, a tool of affliction and torture, and also a symbol of treatment that is
degrading in the extreme and suppressive of dignity: It meant to slaves, but not to
freemen, deep torment and punishment by death. Furthermore, the jurists had taken
it upon themselves to judge their own kind, thus claiming a power that can rightfully
be exercised only by God: ‘Judge not, that ye be not judged,’ ‘He that is without sin
among you, let him first cast a stone at her,’ Jesus said. The jurists have paid no
heed to these words, for they have taken the supreme moment of judgment into their
own hands, wasting no time to cast the first stone.
There is also third reason why Luther denounced jurists as bad Christians. This
can be described as a conceptual (or ‘logical’) reason, which is that the law they
handle perpetrates its own injustice; it does so by its inability to overcome the form
of justice, this being the form of law: ‘Jeder Richter ist ein Feind Christi, weil er die
Gerechtigkeit der Werke treibt.’89 Stated otherwise, a form of justice that cannot be
bent toward kindness and charity will convert into patent injustice. Jurists are in this
sense bad Christians, an immoral lot, because they confine themselves to judging
conduct by the classificatory and systematizing criterion of the formal rule.
Nor were these learned experts of the law much inclined toward the golden rule
of reciprocity, ‘Do not do to others what you would not have them do to you’: This
principle the jurists were unwilling to make into a universal law of torture, to take
one example. In fact, the jus commune they all shared would not allow the hangman
to ply on them the terrible trade he plies on others; the Medieval jurists, in other
words, took care to exempt themselves from torture, an exemption that also took in
(besides doctors of laws) judges, lawyers, physicians, and the nobility and clergy –
86 Thomasius, Über die Folter, title 2, sec. 4.
87 M. Luther, Tischreden, ed. K. Aland, Reclam (Stuttgart, 1981), 205.
88 Ibid. p. 207.
89 Ibid. p. 205.
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all were granted immunity from ‘the question’ (though, in fairness, immunity was
also extended to pregnant women and children).90
Now, the jurists who are urging today a return to torture – however much within
its restricted use as a ‘life-saving’ device, or Rettungsfolter – must equally reckon
themselves as bad Christians by Luther’s standards, in the first place because they
no longer have any notion of the sufferings endured carrying the cross, but even
more so because there is a definite callousness about them, predisposing them to
show what appears to be no compassion at all for the soul of a battered body. As we
have learned, John Yoo’s hand will not shake even at the sight of a tortured child,91
though it should be mentioned here to Yoo’s credit that he seems to endorse, appro-
priately enough, a universal extension of the criteria he adopts with respect to tor-
ture: This much can be gleaned from his comment that it would be legitimate for Al
Qaeda militants to torture Donald Rumsfeld should they capture him.92
But Yoo, Bybee, Dershowitz, and Brügger, and many others following their lead,
also show themselves to be ‘bad jurists.’ They do so in the first place by failing to
honour certain basic duties under their code of professional ethics, such as the duty
not to cater to the whims and wishes of those who pay them, even if it is the sover-
eign pro tempore they are working for. Yoo and Bybee should not make it their call-
ing to devise ways by which to answer any request whatsoever their client may pos-
sibly express, regardless of how all-powerful this person may be.93 More impor-
tantly, however, what makes them ‘bad jurists’ is their denying the law its quality as
form – their willingness to bypass the rule of law, the sworn enemy of abuse and
cruelty. Like the High Priest, they rehearse the motto of expediency whereby one
man should die lest an entire people should perish (cf. John 18:14). Legality as we
understand it brooks no abuse, but they say this kind of law can be broken when
special circumstances arise that justify doing so. And one might think that these cir-
cumstances, justifying our rising above the law, should be used to exercise mercy –
but no, they are used instead to indulge in lawless cruelty and excess.
And yet, as Blackstone observed in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, it
is mercy that we can see being invoked as a justification for torture: ‘It seems aston-
ishing that this usage, of administering the torture, should be said to arise from a
90 See P. Fiorelli, La tortura giudiziaria nel diritto comune, vol. 1 (Milan, Giuffrè, 1953), pp.
276ff., and J. H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien
Régime (2nd ed., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 13.
91 The allusion here is to the PBS interview with John Yoo: see note 26 above. Compare the
hypothetical case used by M. Strauss to criticize the ticking-bomb scenario, in ‘Torture’, New
York Law School Law Review 48 (2004): 275–276.
92 See Yoo, War by Other Means, p. 166. The comment was set down the context of Rumsfeld’s
former position as U.S. defense secretary and gets its full meaning within that context, but the
point comes across clearly regardless.
93 On this point, and on the charge levelled at Yoo and Bybee for breaking the deontological
code of lawyers and jurists, see the lucid considerations offered in R. B. Bilder and D. V..
Vagts, ‘Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture’, in The Torture Debate in America,
ed. by K. J. Greenberg (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 151ff.
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tenderness to the lives of men: and yet this is the reason given for its introduction in
the civil law, and its subsequent adoption by the French and other foreign nation’
(Commentaries, bk. 4, chap. 25). To be sure, mercy and torture do share a trait in
this bizarre comparison, for they both break the formal constraints of justice – both
debouch into the concrete – but they do so in dramatically different ways: Only tor-
ture does it contra legem, effecting abuse and assault in the process. So we have
mercy, the highest justice in the concrete case, against torture, the highest injustice
in the concrete case: Both break the rule of law, but one engages in cruelty, and out-
rageously claims a spurious equivalence with the other under the pretext of a paral-
lelism it craftily uses as a shield by which to conceal what is actually a deep antithe-
sis.
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2. Justifying Defensive Torture
Uwe Steinhoff
In this paper I will argue that there is something like self-defensive torture (which
can include the defence of others), and that such torture is morally justified if certain
general requirements for the justifiability of self-defensive violence/force are met.
These requirements come under the headings of imminence, necessity and propor-
tionality. In the first part of the paper I will briefly discuss the English, US and in
particular German legal regulations regarding self-defence. I will argue that the
same moral reasoning that underlies these laws is also applicable to torture cases,
and that the necessity and the imminence requirements can be met in some torture
cases. In the second part of the paper I will turn to the proportionality requirement
and in that context discuss arguments that attempt to show that torture is worse than
killing. I will argue that these arguments cannot hold water. Many forms of torture
are definitely not worse than killing. In fact, I will show that there are cases where
self-defensive torture is the morally preferable and more humane alternative to self-
defensive killing. I conclude that if self-defensive killing is justified in some cases –
and it is – then self-defensive torture is also justified in some cases. Finally, I will
deal with the charge that justifying torture in some perhaps legitimate cases never-
theless somehow contributes to the spread of the illegitimate use of torture, and that
therefore publishing justificatory articles like the present one is itself immoral. I will
argue that such rather cheap charges have no rational basis whatsoever.
A. What is torture?
For the purposes of this article I shall define torture as follows:
Torture is the intentional (as opposed to merely foreseen or accepted) and con-
tinuous or repeated infliction of extreme physical suffering on a non-consenting
victim.
Some claim that torture has to involve the intent to break the will of the victim.1
This might be true for interrogative torture, where the torturer seeks to get some in-
1 S. Miller, ‘Is Torture Ever Morally Justified?’ International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19
(2005): 179, p. 191, n. 2. Miller accepts, though, ‘that, notionally at least, there might be
some cases in which extreme physical suffering is inflicted but in which the torturer does not
have as a purpose the breaking of the victim’s will. However, I do not regard these as the cen-
tral cases when it comes to torturing human beings, as opposed to other sentient beings that
lack a will in anything other than an attenuated sense.’ As I say in the main text, punitive tor-
ture was widespread in the Middle Ages and is still practiced today. There is no reason to ex-
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formation out of the tortured person. I say ‘might’ because it is not entirely clear
what ‘breaking the will’ actually means, nor is it clear that the interrogative torturer
must intend more than that the victim give the desired information. If the victim de-
cides with an intact will: ‘I do not want to be tortured anyany more, therefore I will
give the information’, this, it seems, should be fine with the torturer. Be that as it
may, interrogative torture is not the only kind of torture; there is also punitive tor-
ture, which was widely practiced in the Middle Ages (and is, incidentally, still prac-
ticed today). Punitive torture, however, does not normally involve the intention to
break the will of the victim. Whether his or her will is broken is completely inciden-
tal to the aims of this form of torture. The aim is simply to punish the victim by in-
flicting extreme physical suffering.
Some also claim that the victim has to be defenceless.2 I agree that in most cases
(perhaps even in all real cases) he or she will be defenceless, but this in itself is no
reason to make this a definitional requirement. Consider this case: theThe robber
breaks into the house of the jeweller, who has a safe with a lot of money in his
house. The robber points a gun at the jeweller and says: ‘Give me the combination,
or I’ll kill you.’ The jeweller says: ‘Well, if you kill me you won’t get the combina-
tion.’ ‘Right’, thinks the robber and draws something else, namely his pain-inflicting
device, which when activated causes extreme pain (almost like drilling on the unpro-
tected nerve of a tooth) to any person in the radius of ten metres, excepting the per-
son holding the device. He activates it. The jeweller writhes with pain on the
ground, the robber says: ‘Give me the combination’, but the jeweller manages to
reach for her own revolver. For all the pain she cannot take real aim and can hardly
hold the gun; yet she manages to shoot in the general direction of the robber, who
dives behind a couch. ‘Let go of the gun!’ the robber shouts, but the jeweller, still in
extreme pain since the device is still activated, shoots in the direction of the couch,
which offers no real protection, and the bullets go right through. The jeweller is ob-
viously not defenceless. However, it seems that she was tortured nevertheless.
Someone was intentionally inflicting pain on her nearly as intense as the pain in-
flicted by drilling the unprotected nerve of a tooth, and doing so in order to get some
information or in order to have the person do something (let go of the gun) – how
could this not be torture? The mere fact that the victim still has means of defence
seems not to satisfactorily answer this question.
At this point someone might object that this is a silly constructed example, noth-
ing that could happen in the real world. Well, first, of course it could. Second, one
might well see a taser as an equivalent of such a pain-infliction device. Thus there
may already have been equivalent cases. Third, even if there has never been a real
such case and never will be, that is not a counterargument against the definitional
point. There is not, nor will there ever be, a tyrannosaurus rex walking through the
clude it from a definition of torture, which as a definition, after all, should include the ‘no-
tional’ cases – the more so if those cases are also very real.
2 Ibid., p. 179; M. Davis, ‘The Moral Justification of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment,’ International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2005): 161, p. 164.
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Black Forest in the years 2008-10. However, that does not mean that by definition a
tyrannosaurus rex cannot do so. Whether one of them does is an empirical question,
not a definitional one. A definition that simply stipulated that they cannot walk
through the Black Forest in these years would be a wrong definition even if the
tyrannosaurus rex actually is extinct once and for all. Thus, if we would say about
the case of the jeweller that it is (or would be) a case of torture, the alleged fact that
such cases are not real is no counterargument to the claim that it indeed is (or would
be) a case of torture.
The international conventions concerning torture seem to consider torture, for the
purposes of those conventions, as something that can only be done by state agents.
However, the legal usage of certain terms does not always coincide with the ordi-
nary one. In any ordinary use of the term, torture can be practiced by private agents
(for example the Mafia or a sadist).
A note on the expression ‘continuous or repeated’: this is only meant to exclude
isolated and single ‘shocks’ of intense pain. I find it hard to consider such ‘shocks’
as torture (which is not the same as saying that they are quite all right).
Finally, what is ‘extreme’? That is contentious, but one kind of physical suffering
that clearly is extreme is the above-mentioned pain produced by drilling on an un-
protected nerve of a tooth. I will use this as a reference point throughout the paper.
This in no way implies that I think that lesser pains or certain other forms of pain
and suffering are not also extreme.
B. What is self-defence?
People have a right to defend themselves or others against wrongful aggression, in
particular if the aggression is life-threatening. Let us take a look at how German law
(which I know best) treats self-defence. In the course of doing so I will also make
some comparisons with British law and US statutes before coming to a moral as-
sessment.
§ 32 of the German Penal Code states (my translation):
(1) Whosoever commits an act that is required (geboten) in self-defence does not act against
the law.
(2) Self-defence is the defence necessary to avert a present (gegenwärtig) unlawful attack on
oneself or others.
A few comments are in order. First, while the necessity requirement is supposed
to prevent excessive violence (i.e. violence that clearly goes beyond the amount of
violence of equally promising alternative means that have not yet been tried), it is
not intended to guarantee minimal force. In other words, its actual judicial interpre-
tation prefers to err on the safe side – that is, it favours the defender, not the attacker.
While the general idea is that the defender should select among the equally effective
means the one that harms the attacker the least, German courts have made it abun-
dantly clear that the defender is not obliged to use less dangerous means of defence
if the effectiveness of those means is doubtful. In addition, a person defending with
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milder means may escalate his or her defence if these milder means have proven un-
successful. And, of course, if no effective means are available, the defender is al-
lowed to take his or her chances. A rape victim is not required to abstain from slap-
ping the rapist merely because it is highly unlikely that this will have any effect.
And although air rifles will hardly stop an aggressor (although it might slightly hurt
him), I am completely within my rights to use them. Indeed, police would not prose-
cute a person according to the following logic: ‘Well, Herr Fritze, blasting the ag-
gressor away with your shotgun was of course an effective means of self-defence,
but you should not have first used the air rifle. There was practically no probability
of success. So you are off the hook for the shotgun, but we are afraid that for using
the air rifle we have to prosecute you for battery.’
It is also important for the interpretation of the ‘necessity’ requirement that Ger-
man law does not require one to retreat from the aggressor if one could safely do so.
A basic German principle of law is Das Recht muß dem Unrecht nicht weichen
(roughly: law/justice does not have to give way to the unlawful/unjust).3 This princi-
ple does not exist in US law. However, it seems that there is no duty in US law to
retreat from an aggressor threatening deadly force before defending with deadly
force. As regards the UK, common law once contained a duty to retreat. This, how-
ever, is not the case any more.4
Thus, the ‘necessity’ requirement is in fact very lenient, in the USA and the UK
as well. And rightly so. Although the self-defence paragraph gives some protection
(namely against excessive violence) to the aggressor, its main task is to protect the
defender. There is no moral symmetry between innocent defenders and culpable ag-
gressors.
German law takes this asymmetry very far (which is a direct consequence of the
principle that law/justice does not have to give way to the unlawful/unjust). There is
no proportionality requirement in the German self-defence law. The NECESSITY
requirement is NOT the same as a PROPORTIONALITY requirement! I put this
statement in italics and use capitalization because necessity and proportionality are
regularly confused by many people. This confusion is facilitated by the fact that we
can say in some sense that the necessity requirement is a proportionality require-
ment. However, it is important to be clear in which sense it is and in which it is not.
The ‘necessity’ requirement prohibits excessive violence or force when using defen-
sive measures against unlawful actions. It does not, however, weigh the value of the
defended good against the harm inflicted upon the aggressor. In other words, it says
that you are not supposed to kill a thief if you can also stop him by knocking him
out. It does not, however, say that you shouldn’t use lethal force at all in defending
3 Kindhäuser provides a succinct overview of German self-defence law. U. Kindhäuser, ‘Skript
zur Vorlesung Strafrecht AT, § 16: Notwehr’, <http://www.jura.uni-bonn.de/fileadmin/
Fachbereich_Rechtswissenschaft/Einrichtungen/Lehrstuehle/Strafrecht3/Strafrecht_AT/s-at-
16. pdf> (visited 25 March 2008).
4 E. Baskind, ‘The Law Relating to Self Defence’, <http://www.bsdgb.co.uk/index.php? Infor-
mation:The_Law_Relating_to_Self_Defence> (visited 25 March 2008).
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yourself against theft. It does not argue that human life is more valuable than prop-
erty, and that therefore defending property with lethal force is disproportionate. This
latter argument would be a proportionality argument, which exists, for example, in
English law. In Great Britain you are not allowed to use deadly force if this is the
only way you can keep a thief from stealing your car. In Germany, you are allowed
to do so. Some extreme disproportionalities are now forbidden under German law
(you are not supposed to shoot a thief in order to prevent him from escaping with an
apple), but the fact remains that a principle that rules out extreme disproportionali-
ties is not yet one that demands proportionality.5
An attack is present according to German law if it is imminent, has started or is
ongoing.
An attack, in German law, is every threat of a violation or actual violation of an
interest that is protected by law insofar as this threat stems from human action. Thus,
the German law makes use of the term ‘attack’ here in a way that does not necessar-
ily follow ordinary usage, which associates ‘attack’ with fists and knives and guns –
with ‘action’. If someone has been kidnapped and is now alone in a room, we might,
therefore, want to say that he is not currently under attack any more, but only was so
when the gangster grabbed him and threw him into the car. For German law, how-
ever, the kidnapped person, stripped of his freedom, is still under attack.
In light of this brief exposition of German self-defence law, let us look at what I
call a Dirty Harry Case (there are real-life examples of Dirty Harry cases, the most
recent one being the famous German Daschner case):6 A criminal kidnaps a child
and puts her in a place where she will suffocate if not rescued in time. There is not
much time left, according to the very claims of the kidnapper, who has been cap-
tured by the police. They ask him again and again where the child is. He refuses to
tell. The police decide to torture the kidnapper in order to get the information they
need to save the child. (In the Daschner case the kidnapper was only threatened with
torture. Facing this threat, he gave up the location of the child. Tragically, the child
was already dead.)
This case falls under the German self-defence law. The kidnapped child is still
under ‘attack’, in the sense in which German law uses this expression. And the ne-
cessity requirement – whether in the German, British or American interpretation – in
itself does not rule out the use of torture. The police had already tried normal inter-
rogation, without success. In other words, the milder means did not work. So they
were entitled to use harsher means.
At this point the usual objection will probably be heard, repeated like a mantra by
many torture opponents: ‘Torture does not work to gain information.’ Actually, it
sometimes does. In the real life Daschner case the threat of torture sufficed to make
the kidnapper spill the required information. The child was already dead, but that
5 To be sure, from a moral standpoint it is actually not evident that defending an innocent per-
son’s property against a culpable aggressor by using deadly force if necessary really is dis-
proportionate. But this is not a question we have to go into here.
6 See Introduction, pp. 1-2 above (eds.).
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was not some kind of metaphysical necessity. If he had still been alive, he would
have been saved thanks to the use of torture. Incidentally another case surfaced in
the judicial proceedings of the Daschner case: In 1988 police had beaten up a kid-
napper, who then gave up the information as to where he had hidden the child. The
police were able to rescue the child alive from a wooden box.7 I suppose that there
are many more cases like these, but for obvious reasons police officers have an in-
terest in denying that they used torture.
Moreover, even if torture were highly unreliable, this does not even matter. As al-
ready explained above, the so-called ‘necessity’ requirement, which actually is a No
Excessive Force Requirement, allows you to use even ‘improbable’ means to defend
yourself if your (or another innocent person’s) life is threatened by a culpable ag-
gressor. And that is exactly how it should be. Even if it were an empirically well-
proven and commonly well-known fact that stopping a serial murderer and rapist by
ramming a sharp pencil deep into his ear only works one out of 10,000 times, a vic-
tim of a rapist would still be well within her rights to ram a sharp pencil deep into
the rapist’s ear if that is the only option remaining that at least could have success.
But, so it is often said by torture opponents, couldn’t the police have talked to the
kidnapper longer? Maybe then he would have finally given up the information. Yes,
maybe, but as already stated, if milder means – like talking – do not work in a self-
defence situation, the defender is allowed to try harsher means. Besides, there are in
fact cases where a rapist has been verbally persuaded by his victim to stop. How-
ever, hardly anyone would say to a rape victim: ‘Why did you ram the pencil into
his ear after only 30 minutes of rape? Why didn’t you endure some more rape,
maybe half an hour more? Maybe your begging would finally have worked.’ Simi-
larly, it should not be forgotten that the situation faced by the police is not one
where the child is happily playing in a garden and would then, if the kidnapper does
not give the required information, suddenly and peacefully die. While the kidnapper
is not being tortured by the police, the child is being tortured, namely by the kidnap-
per. It is suffocating in a box the kidnapper put it in.
Thus, in Dirty Harry cases torture is not excluded by the ‘necessity’ requirement,
that is, the requirement that among equally promising methods of defence that have
not yet been tried in that particular case the one that inflicts the smallest harm upon
the aggressor has to be used. (Whoever wants to object at this point that torture is
somehow ‘intrinsically excessive’ only confuses necessity and proportionality again.
I will come to proportionality shortly.)
From the perspective of German law the child is clearly in a situation that could
justify self-defence. Is this also the case from the perspective of British and Ameri-
can law? The self-defence laws in these jurisdictions allow self-defence against the
unlawful use of force only if the imminence requirement is fulfilled, that is, if the
unlawful use of force is ongoing or imminent. Clearly, this requirement is fulfilled
in the Dirty Harry case (as it is in ticking bomb cases, incidentally). The child is al-
7 V.. Erb, ‘Folterverbot und Notwehrrecht’, in W. Lenzen (ed.), Ist Folter erlaubt? Juristische
und philosophische Aspekte (Paderborn, Mentis, 2006), p. 19.
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ready victim of unlawful force, and not only at the moment when it dies. It is also
already victim of deadly force. Deadly force is not only force that has already killed
you, but force that is typically capable of doing so. Someone who has been poisoned
with something that will kill her in a month has suffered deadly force already at the
moment she was poisoned, and not first at the end of the month. Thus, under British
law and US statutes as well, the Dirty Harry case is one where the child is in a situa-
tion that can justify self-defence.
However, for the sake of argument, let us take a look anyway at whether it does
morally make a difference – as it is sometimes claimed – that in ticking bomb cases
or Dirty Harry cases death is not always imminent (the deadly force is, of course).
Some think it does. The underlying idea seems to be that if the expected harm (here
in the form of death) is not imminent, there remains enough time to try all kinds of
milder means to avert the danger. However, that is simply not always true. The fact
that the ultimate harm might befall me much later, does not mean that I have much
time to react. The incubation time of rabies can be up to 10 years, but after having
been bitten one only has a couple of hours to get a vaccination. After that everything
is too late. Now consider this situation. Jeanette is in a jungle camp with Bob. A
black mamba bites her. The poison will kill her in few minutes if she does not im-
mediately get the antidote from the refrigerator. Bob wants Jeanette dead and blocks
the refrigerator. She draws her gun and threatens to shoot him if he does not go out
of the way. He does not, and so she shoots him in the leg. If for some reason it were
necessary to kill him in order to get him out of the way, she would even be allowed
to do that. It is a clear case of self-defence. Now imagine that she has not been bitten
by a black mamba but by a dog with superrabies. It will kill her in five years, but she
needs the antidote as quickly as she needed the one against the mamba poison.
Again Bob blocks the way to the refrigerator. Is she now not allowed to shoot him in
the leg or to kill him if necessary to reach the antidote? Of course she is. The differ-
ence in the time frame of the ultimate harm is normatively irrelevant. What is deci-
sive is the time frame wherein defensive action to avert the danger is still possible.
This is, incidentally, reflected by a large part of US case law, by the Model Penal
Code and by the statutes of some US states.8
Thus it seems that torturing an aggressor in order to save an innocent life from the
aggressor’s claws can be justified with the law of self-defence. To be sure, one
might object that torture is still prohibited by international anti-torture conventions,
which are also binding for the national jurisdictions of the UK, the USA and Ger-
many. However, it seems that the anti-torture conventions define torture as some-
thing undertaken by state agents. Thus, they might not be applicable to private de-
fensive torture (for example, a Dirty Harry case where not a police officer but the
father of the kidnapped child tortures the kidnapper). Second, for the German case,
Volker Erb argues that a law or an international convention that protects the kidnap-
per from being tortured even where torture would be the last available means to save
8 See V. F. Nourse, ‘Self-Defense and Subjectivity’, University of Chicago Law Review 68
(2001): 1235-1308.
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the innocent child violates the human dignity of the child.9 The highest article of the
German constitution, however, states that human dignity must not be violated. Inter-
national conventions that violate that article would therefore be null and void under
the German constitution.
Be that as it may, here I can set aside the question as to whether torture is actually
legal in the three jurisdictions. I am dealing with the moral question. Why am I then
discussing self-defence laws in the first place? Because the self-defence law and its
application in case law reflects intuitions many people have about self-defence. It
also reflects the moral reasoning behind it. My moral argument is that if injuring or
killing a person can be morally justified in self-defence as long as the defence abides
by the so-called necessity, imminence and proportionality or no-gross-
disproportionality requirements, the same is true for torture. To be sure, a legislator
or an international convention could simply stipulate: ‘Never mind the self-defence
law. We just want to rule out torture, even if it occurs in self-defence.’ (Or: ‘Never
mind the self-defence law. We just want to rule out stabbing, even if it occurs in
self-defence.’) However, such a stipulation would not follow the previous legal rea-
soning nor in particular the moral reasoning supporting the self-defence laws. It
would be something externally imposed on the self-defence law and the moral rea-
soning behind it, something contradicting it. And since self-defence law is ex-
tremely plausible and the moral reasoning behind it very convincing, the contradic-
tion would not show that self-defence law and the moral reasoning behind it are mis-
taken if they allow torture. Rather, it would show that the absolute prohibition of tor-
ture is wrong.
The only way out for the absolutist opponent of torture or the opponent of self-
defensive torture would be to show that there is a normatively relevant difference
between killing a person in self-defence and torturing him in self-defence that rules
out the permissibility of the latter act. As I have already argued, appeals to the ne-
cessity and to the imminence requirements do not work. Yet, apart from the propor-
tionality requirement (or the no-extreme disproportionality requirement, respec-
tively), there are no other requirements.
This fact is often ignored. For example, sometimes it is considered to be a good
argument against torture that you can never know for certain that the person tortured
in the Dirty Harry case (or a ticking bomb case) really is guilty. However, there is no
certainty requirement in self-defence cases. In fact, in German law there is not even
the requirement that the defender reasonably believes him- or herself to be under at-
tack. If the defender is under attack, then necessary and not grossly disproportionate
counter-measures are justified, whether the belief of the defender to be under attack
is itself reasonable or not. As regards American and British self-defence law, there is
certainly no requirement that there be no reasonable doubt for the defender that he or
she is under attack. Thus, the fact is that there are many cases of legally and morally
9 Erb, ‘Folterverbot’, pp. 28-33. In an earlier article, I mistakenly took the legal prohibition of
torture for granted. U. Steinhoff, ‘Torture – The Case for Dirty Harry and against Alan Der-
showitz’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (2007): 337-353, p. 346.
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justified killings in self-defence where the certainty that an actual attack was immi-
nent was much lower than the certainty the policemen in the Daschner case had that
they were dealing with a child kidnapper. The circumstance that the no-certainty ar-
gument gets repeated and repeated and repeated does not make it any better. If self-
defensive killing without certainty is justified, self-defensive torture without cer-
tainty is justified, too.
Another rather bad argument I came upon is this: A Kantian maxim allowing tor-
ture in certain cases would be too complicated. I offer two replies. 1. complicated
wrong. 2. A Kantian maxim allowing self-defensive torture is not more complicated
then a Kantian maxim allowing self-defensive killing. As far as I know, Kant did
allow self-defensive killing and injuring. So where is the problem?
A further strange argument one sometimes encounters is that torture is ‘inherently
limitless’. What is that supposed to mean? Carl von Clausewitz said that war is in-
herently limitless, that the logic of war is escalation. However, he admitted that in
reality war can be restrained and often has been restrained successfully. The same
holds true for torture (whether justified or not). In the Middle Ages punitive torture
was often used in a restricted way – that is, the amount of torture previously pre-
scribed as punishment was administered, not limitless amounts of torture. Interroga-
tive torture also has been limited in many cases by certain regulations (for example
in Israel). But must interrogative torturers, if they want to be successful, not be
ready to use any means – so that as long as the tortured person does not give up the
information, they will use harsher and harsher means? Well, if the painful interroga-
tor is ready to use any means, she will use any available means unless somebody
stops her. So she might become a very painful interrogator. But the same logic ap-
plies to any course of action which aims by any means at making another person do
something. Thus, it not only applies to painful interrogation, but to any interroga-
tion. Any interrogator who is ready to use any means will transform into a painful
interrogator, if need be, and a very painful interrogator, if need be, etc. Thus, the ar-
gument ‘proves’ more than it can take. Besides, there actually is an inherent limit to
interrogative torture: Killing the painfully interrogated person is not an available
means to get the information. Dead people do not speak. Thus, killing is not a possi-
ble means for interrogative torture. Other forms of self-defence, however, do not ac-
knowledge this limit. Killing is a means by which one can keep an aggressor from
attacking with a knife. Thus, it seems that self-defensive interrogation is actually
more limited than self-defensive non-interrogative beating, stabbing or shooting.
Besides, why should the fact that a certain course of action could escalate into some-
thing excessive make the course of action wrong even if it does not so escalate? Af-
ter all, any self-defensive course of action, for example in the form of hitting an op-
ponent or stabbing him, could escalate – that, however, obviously does not make all
self-defensive action wrong. In short, the argument that torture is ‘inherently limit-
less’ and therefore unjustified is confused.
Thus, the fact remains that the last hope for someone who does not deny the per-
missibility of self-defensive killing or harming but nevertheless wants to show that
defensive torture in Dirty Harry cases is impermissible can only lie in the propor-
tionality requirement or the no-extreme-disproportionality requirement. Here, how-
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ever, the proponent of defensive torture has a certain advantage. For the torture op-
ponent it would not be sufficient to show that torturing is somehow worse than kill-
ing in order to rule out its permissibility. That one means of defence is harsher than
another means of defence does not yet in itself show that the harsher means is unjus-
tified. After all, killing someone in self-defence is harsher than merely knocking him
out; still, self-defensive killing is justified in certain circumstances. Thus, even if
torture were harsher than killing, torture could still be justified in certain circum-
stances. On the other hand, if the proponent of torture in certain cases can show that
killing is worse than many forms of torture, than the fact that killing is sometimes
morally justified demonstrates that torture can sometimes be morally justified too.
With this in mind, let us turn to the question as to how bad torture really is in com-
parison to killing.
C. Proportionality or: Many forms of torture aren’t as bad as killing
Now, why should torture always be wrong? Of course, on the face of it,
(a) the intentional and continuous or repeated infliction of extreme physical
suffering on a non-consenting victim
sounds like a pretty gruesome practice. But how gruesome? After all,
(b) the intentional blowing out of someone’s brain with a .44 Colt,
or
(c) the intentional chopping off of someone’s head
also sound like pretty gruesome practices. In fact, practices (b) and (c) sound much
more gruesome than practice (a). Yet, according to the principle of self-defence,
most accounts of just war theory, and the overwhelming majority opinion of people
around the world, these practices are permissible in some circumstances (for exam-
ple in circumstances where they are the only promising defence of an innocent per-
son against a culpable and life-threatening aggressor). Why, then, should torture not
also be permissible in some circumstances (for example where it is the only promis-
ing means to save an innocent person from a culpable aggressor)? If you could
choose to be the victim of practice (a), (b) or (c) – which would you choose? It de-
pends, of course. There are some forms of practice (a) that might be worse than any
form of practices (b) and (c), but, for example, being subjected to a pain nearly as
excruciating as that of an unprotected nerve maltreated by a drill for 15 minutes is
not one of them. If this were the choice, most people would, no doubt, prefer being a
victim of this form of practice (a) to being a victim of any form of the other two
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practices. The fact of the matter is that most people prefer extreme physical suffer-
ing to death. Death is worse than (most forms of) extreme physical suffering.
Once this is granted (and there is no rational way around granting it) the person
who thinks that torture is never permissible is in a tight spot. So is the person who
thinks that torture can only be allowed in certain extreme threshold cases, for exam-
ple in ticking bomb cases where the live of hundreds, thousands or even millions of
innocents are at stake. After all, killing is permissible in a good many less spectacu-
lar cases; and if being tortured is not worse than death, the obvious question arises as
to why torturing should be worse than killing.
It should be noted, of course, that the mere fact that death is worse than many
ways of being tortured does not logically imply that killing is worse than torturing.
Losing most of your property in a poker game nobody compelled you to take part in
is worse than many forms of being stolen from; this, however, does not show that
winning most of another person’s property in a poker game nobody forced the other
person to take part in is worse than stealing a rather limited amount of money from
him. Nevertheless, the mere fact that a particular answer to the obvious question
posed regarding the comparative moral status of killing on the one hand and torture
on the other is not logically impossible does not make the question go away. It still
has to be answered. In the case of stealing and winning it is not too difficult to point
out essential differences between the two cases and then to demonstrate that they are
normatively relevant (such explanations, for example, would involve reference to
the presence and absence, respectively, of consent to the poker game and to being
stolen from).
In the case of torture, however, such explanations are much more difficult to pro-
vide. One of the most prominent attempts has been offered by Henry Shue. For him
torture necessarily involves inflicting suffering on defenceless people (while killing
does not); and he thinks, appealing to just war theory, that there is a moral constraint
against assaults on the defenceless.10 However, as I have argued elsewhere,11 there
simply is no such constraint in just war theory. While attacking defenceless people
might conflict with some warrior’s code of honour (I am sceptical about how strong
that code actually is), it is not regarded as immoral in just war theory – nor in the
laws of armed conflict, for that matter; nor should it be. I do not want to go into this
debate again here, so let me illustrate my point with another example, which stems
not from just war theory but from self-defence theory instead. In this theory talk
about the fat innocent man falling from a cliff is ubiquitous. Let us say Jeanette is
beneath the cliff, and for whatever reasons she is unable to move out of the way of
the falling man. When he lands on her, she will be crushed (but he will survive due
to the cushioning effect). She has a ray gun, though, with which she can vaporize the
man (who himself is unarmed). This man, thus, is completely defenceless; in vapor-
ising him Jeanette would attack a defenceless person. Yet, on the accounts of most
10 H. Shue, ‘Torture’, in S. Levinson (ed. ) Torture: A Collection (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2004): 49-60, pp. 48-51.
11 Steinhoff, ‘Torture’, pp. 337-338.
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moral philosophers (Shue included, as far as I can see), vaporising the man would be
justified.
One could attempt to amend Shue’s position by saying that in this case the princi-
ple that you ought not to attack defenceless people is overridden by a principle that
allows the attack on threats (even if they come in the form of innocent and defence-
less persons). This move, however, does not help much. It only converts the previ-
ous obvious question (‘Why should torturing be worse than killing?’) it is supposed
to answer into this obvious question: ‘Why should torturing a culpable aggressor be
worse than killing an innocent threat?’ And this question cannot be answered in fa-
vour of the more or less absolutist opponent of torture any more easily than the pre-
vious one.
To see this more clearly, consider this amended example:
The fat man has been pushed off the cliff by an evil aggressor, who was simply
in the mood to kill a person (he does not care much whether it is Jeanette or the
fat man). Jeanette has not only a vaporizing gun, but also a pain-infliction gun
(that inflicts pain nearly as extreme as the pain from drilling on the unprotected
nerve of a tooth). The fat man does not fall directly; some strange rock formation
is involved that works like a long and intertwined slide so that it will take some
time until the fat man crushes her (however, he himself is completely unable to
stop his fall or slide). The evil man above, on his part, accidentally stepped into
one of his own devious traps so that he cannot move any more and can easily be
shot at by Jeanette. He is unarmed. Jeanette is trapped in one of the evil man’s
traps (that is the reason why she cannot move). The man knows the combination
of the locks, and Jeanette knows that he knows (he is, however, unable to free
himself of the trap he is caught in, due to a malfunction of this trap). She also
knows that unlocking her trap would simultaneously activate a mechanism that
would save the falling man. Jeanette sees two options to save her life: Vaporize
the falling innocent man (who, let’s say, has a gun himself and would try to shoot
Jeanette if she tries to vaporize him – thus, he is not defenceless) or torturing the
evil aggressor with the pain-infliction gun until he gives her the combination of
the lock so that she can save the lives of the only two innocent people involved in
this situation. What should she do? It seems completely obvious that she should
use her pain-infliction gun and try to get the combination. In fact, I consider this
example to be an absolutely compelling refutation of the claim that torture could
never be justified and of the claim that it could only be justified in ticking bomb
cases involving high numbers of innocents instead of just one or two. What ra-
tional and moral way could there possibly be to get around this conclusion?
Thus, I think Shue’s argument as well as the modified argument (that being a
threat trumps being defenceless) does not work.
The above example shows that it is better to torture a culpable aggressor than to
kill an innocent threat. However, most forms of torture are preferable not only in
situations where the choice is between torturing an aggressor and killing an innocent
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person, but also in situations where the choice is between torturing or killing one
and the same aggressor. Consider this longer example.
The case of the humane torturer and the bloodthirsty anti-torture fanatic:
Bill works for a company that has a lot of trolleys on its enormous property to
transport different goods. He is in charge of the maintenance of the trolleys.
There is some kind of animal in the region that often enters the trolleys from be-
low and bites through the wires. Therefore, Bill planted several foot traps, which,
however, can also trap humans. The traps have combination locks, and Bill
knows the combination. In order to set in motion certain trolleys, one has to hold
on to a lever well above one’s head. Since Bill is very small, he has to jump to
reach the lever. One day, Jeanette and Paolo, two completely innocent persons,
cross the tracks and both accidentally step into a foot trap. Jeanette shouts to
Bill: ‘Help us!’ ‘You wish’, he shouts back. ‘I prefer to kill you.’ And he jumps up
to a lever and sets in motion a trolley, which is slowly but fatally moving in
Jeanette’s and Paolo’s direction. If not stopped, it will crush them. Jeanette has
with her both her explosive projectile gun (these projectiles can blow people into
small pieces but do not much affect trolleys) and her pain-infliction ray gun. Bill,
for whatever reasons, would rather die than let the two escape. Fearing that they
might shoot at him with normal guns so that he lets go of the lever, which would
stop the trolley, he handcuffs himself to the lever and throws away the keys, and
shouts sneeringly: ‘I know the combination of your traps – but I won’t tell you. I
will watch you die.’ Even if they shoot him dead, that would not stop the trolley
since Bill would still be hanging on to the lever by the handcuffs. Jeanette draws
her pain-inflictor and shows it to Bill: ‘If you do not tell me the combination of
the traps, I will torture you! This gun inflicts pain like a dentist drilling on an un-
protected nerve.’ Bill remains silent. Jeanette sadly aims the pain inflictor gun at
him. ‘What are you doing’, screams Paolo now. ‘What am I doing? I am trying to
save our lives!’ ‘No, no, but you can’t torture him. Torture is brutal, it’s – the
horror, the horror!’ ‘So what am I supposed to do?’ ‘Well, non-torturing self-
defence is permissible. Draw your projectile thrower and blow him into small
pieces!’ ‘Are you crazy? That is not minimal force! Besides, maybe the guy is just
having a psychotic break, or somebody’s drugged him, and maybe he has family.
If I get the combination by a few minutes of torture, maybe we can all still be-
come friends. Why should I kill him?’ ‘You like to torture, you like to torture’,
Paolo shouts, his face red in righteous indignation.12 Two police officers ap-
12 One comic at the Hull torture conference shouted in his talk: ‘Dr. Steinhoff likes to torture,
Dr. Steinhoff likes to torture.’ What I do is to defend torture in certain extreme circumstances.
To do that I do not have to like torture more than one has to like killing in order to argue for
the right of self-defence. I am aware, though, that the subtle art of differentiation is well
beyond the intellectual capabilities of some people.
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proach from behind. They too step into traps and cannot interfere. They have
overheard the loud argument. As Jeanette aims with the pain-inflictor, one police
officer shouts: ‘Don’t do it! Torture is really bad. Blowing people into small
pieces is much better.’ Jeanette is for a moment paralysed by the sheer amount of
idiocy and moral insanity she is confronted with. Paolo uses the opportunity and
knocks her out, takes her explosive projectile gun, aims at Bill and blows him into
small pieces. The trolley stops. ‘Thanks’, say the police officers. ‘You did the
right thing. So good that we prevented torture.’ ‘My pleasure’, says Paolo, while
he is picking bloody pieces of Bill’s flesh and bones from his jacket. ‘I’m always
happy to uphold human rights and human dignity.’
This elaborate example shows quite clearly that the whole idea that torture neces-
sarily violates human dignity while at the same time self-defensive killing does not
is untenable. Don’t get me wrong: Of course nearly all instances of torture in our
actual world violate human rights and human dignity. But so do nearly all instances
of killing (I use the term ‘killing’ exclusively for homicide in this paper). Self-
defensive torture and self-defensive killing, however, as long as the general moral
requirements of self-defence are met, do not violate human dignity or human rights.
Therefore, the habit of some (by no means all) absolutist torture opponents of bran-
dishing the concepts of human rights and human dignity as if they had a monopoly
on them is quite inappropriate. The argument I am propounding here is a rights-
based argument. It is not utilitarian or consequentialist at all. It is based on the right
to self-defence.
While in my view the above examples already show conclusively in themselves the
unfeasibility of any attempt to demonstrate that torture is more difficult to justify
than killing, all else being equal, let us nevertheless have a look at another failed but
instructive attempt. Heiner Bielefeldt argues as follows:
The point of torture is not merely, as it is for example in coercive detention or in many other
coercive measures of the state, to impose upon a person unpleasant consequences of his ac-
tions (or non-actions) that are supposed to influence his voluntary decisions [Willen-
sentscheidungen] without directly [unmittelbar] breaking the will. Nor is the point to limit his
external freedom of action … through such police measures as for example tying him up, or to
completely eliminate it in the extreme case – through a death shot. Rather, the intent of torture
is precisely to strategically use the physical and psychological vulnerability of a person for di-
rectly breaking his inner freedom of the will. For this reason torture is the direct negation of
the subject status of the human being and hence of his dignity.13
13 H. Bielefeldt, ‘Menschenwürde und Folterverbot: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den jüngsten
Vorstößen zur Aufweichung des Folterverbotes’, Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte,
Berlin 2007, <http://files.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/437/IUS028_E_Folter_ RZ_WWW
_ES.pdf>, p. 13 (my translation). David Sussman argues similarly: ‘What’s Wrong with Tor-
ture?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 1-33. For a critique of Sussman, see Stein-
hoff, ‘Torture’, pp. 338-340.
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Really? I doubt it. First, I already noted at the beginning that I am quite sceptical
about the notion of ‘breaking the will’. What precisely does that mean? I took the
liberty to google the expressions ‘Wille gebrochen’, ‘gebrochener Wille’, ‘broken
will’, ‘will was broken’ in connection with different sports. Judging from this, it
seems that in football, boxing and other sports the wills of persons are broken quite
often. Is the person’s status as human being negated in such cases? Do sports violate
human dignity? One might indignantly object that in these contexts the expression
‘his will was broken’ is only used metaphorically. Indeed, it is. However, my con-
tention is precisely that there is no non-metaphorical use of the expression. All one
typically means by saying that someone’s will is broken is that after having for a
while determinedly endured in some undertaking he has finally given up in the light
of obstacles or some kind of attrition or because all hope was gone or because he
was finally too exhausted to go on. What ‘breaking the inner freedom of the will’
means, in contrast, is entirely unclear.
Besides, in criticising Rainer Trapp, Bielefeldt complains:
Well-nigh cynical is the claim that the person [namely the kidnapper of a child who has put it
in some hole to let it suffocate and is asked by the police for the location] subjected to the
painful interrogation procedure would merely suffer the ‘disadvantage of being confronted
with the choice between the voluntary and the coerced exercise of his duties.’ For the alleged
freedom of choice in this situation can be nothing else but the freedom to collapse; and the col-
lapse will sooner or later occur nearly inevitably either because of unbearable pain or because
of the fear of unbearable pain.14
One might wonder, of course, whether Bielefeldt’s suggestion that in the case of
threats with death shots we still are dealing with freedom of choice is not also well-
nigh cynical. Be that as it may, although I agree with Bielefeldt that Trapp’s use of
language is unduly euphemistic, I definitely do not agree that the kidnapper’s only
option is collapse. For example, in the face of the threat of torture (Trapp is in par-
ticular referring to the famous German Daschner case) the kidnapper could say:
‘Hey boys, slow down, take it easy … I had no idea that you guys take the life of
that child so seriously. I certainly don’t. So, what the heck: Here’s the address.’
Where is the collapse here?
More important, however, is that Bielefeldt says that even just the fear of unbear-
able pain can break a person’s will. This undermines his position. Since, as argued
above, nearly all people fear death more than some forms of torture,15 it follows that
fear of death can break the will of nearly all persons more easily than fear of some
forms of torture. Then, however, the police shouting to a criminal who fears death
more then some forms of torture (which is true of practically all criminals and of
practically all other people) ‘Don’t move, or we’ll shoot!’ or ‘Put down the gun, or
we’ll shoot!’ would ‘negate’ the criminal’s ‘inner freedom of will’ and his human
14 Bielefeldt, ‘Menschenwürde’ pp. 12 f. (my translation).
15 To be sure, if Bielefeldt understood ‘unbearable’ in such a way that pain would only be un-
bearable if people preferred death to this pain, my argument of this paragraph would not
work. His argument against torture as such, however, would not work either, for not all tor-
ture is unbearable in this sense.
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dignity. In fact, however, such warnings and threats are completely legitimate, and it
seems that Bielefeldt does not want to deny this. But then ‘breaking’ someone’s will
is not always illegitimate, and hence torture not always wrong.
One could try to avoid this conclusion by taking back the claim that even just the
threat of torture is capable of ‘breaking’ a person’s will and instead claim that only
real torture can achieve this. Yet, there still remains the problem of what ‘breaking
the will’ is supposed to mean. Why is the case of someone who after fifteen minutes
of torture says ‘Please stop it, please stop it, I’ll tell you what you want to know’ a
case of broken will, while the case of someone who after fifteen months of coercive
detention says ‘Please let me out, please let me out, I’ll tell you what you want to
know’ is not? Without providing some phenomenological account of what breaking
the will means and empirical evidence that it is caused by all forms of torture but not
by coercive detention or death threats, the whole talk that torture breaks the will
while those other forms of coercion do not is nothing but empty rhetoric.
Besides, it should be noted that some people hold out under torture. They do not
give up the information. Furthermore, as already said, punitive torture does not even
aim at the will of the victim, hence it does not aim at breaking his will, either. Biele-
feldt claims that Jörg Splett has proffered the ‘most succinct’ definition of torture by
designating it as the ‘abolition (by physical or psychological means) of the freedom
of the will while maintaining consciousness’.16 For the reasons already adduced, this
definition is not so much succinct as confused, as is any critique of torture that relies
on it.
Last, but not least: Even if there were anything to this whole talk about ‘breaking
the will’, it by no means answers the question at all as to why torture is worse than
killing. Bielefeldt has quite correctly identified a difference between killing and tor-
ture – the first one, if successful, necessarily eradicates the consciousness of the tar-
get person, whereas the latter does not. But why does that make killing worse? Why
is torture ‘the direct negation of the subject status of the human being and hence of
his dignity’, while killing is not? Could Paolo in our above example say: ‘Well, true,
I blew Bill against his consent into small pieces – but at least I did not negate his
subject status as a human being’? Isn’t this statement downright idiotic? And if it is
not – could not Jeanette make the claim of being much more respectful of Bill’s sub-
ject status, a status she, after all, does not want to destroy once and for all by killing
him? The answer can only be yes. Thus, Bielefeldt has certainly not provided any
argument that would demonstrate that torture is worse than killing. He has only
made a dogmatic claim.
This dogmatism, for the record, can also be found in the statements of one of the
most outspoken opponents of torture at the torture conference in Hull, Massimo La
Torre. He claims:
Torture defeats any attempt at bringing it under a principle of universal material application:
No one who accepts infliction of torture on others will accept it on oneself; this is not a stan-
16 H. Bielefeldt, ‘Menschenwürde’, p. 13 (my translation). Bielefeld quotes Splett from an un-
published manuscript.
55
dard that anyone would advocate and at the same time choose to live by. And it stands to rea-
son that no one should do so, because torture is experienced by those on the receiving end of it
as an act of extreme, intolerable violence, as an abuse and an excess—and it must be so ex-
perienced if it is to qualify as torture, as an unbearable torment, as a method for effectively
obliterating another’s will. Torture could never pass the test of universal acceptability that acts
more or less as a final criterion of morality, for it is defined as an excess and an abuse even by
those who use and apply it.17
First, torture is not defined as an excess and an abuse even by those who use and
apply it. If La Torre thinks it is, his knowledge of the history of torture is very lim-
ited indeed. Nor is there any reason, as should be clear from my above remarks on
the definitional issues, to define it in such a way. There is, after all, also no reason to
define self-defensive killing as an abuse even though most people would rather be
tortured for a few minutes than killed for good. Second, as already said, not all tor-
ture is unbearable. Some people do bear it and do not break. Unsuccessful interroga-
tive torture is still torture (why is that so difficult to understand?). Third, interroga-
tive torture is indeed to some extent aimed at being ‘unbearable’, but so is coercive
detention. ‘Unbearable’ coercive detention, however, can still be justified. So can
‘unbearable’ torture. Besides, for both interrogative torture and coercive detention
limits can be accepted by those who use these methods. Fourth, the criterion of uni-
versal acceptability is not a final criterion of morality; rather, it is itself unacceptable
– and perhaps universally so. The norms ‘Do not abuse children for your sexual
pleasure’, ‘Do not suppress free speech only to keep yourself in power’, ‘Do not tor-
ture for fun’ are not universally acceptable, for they are not acceptable to dedicated
rapists, child abusers and sadistic dictators. However, that obviously says nothing
against their validity. Fifth, will anyone who accepts that others are killed in self-
defence also accept that she be killed in self-defence? Perhaps not, in the act, but
what does that say against the permissibility of self-defence? Nothing. Moreover,
one might still (and most people do) accept a maxim that allows self-defensive kill-
ing, in the full knowledge that this maxim might lead to oneself being killed in self-
defence. And again there is no difference here to the case of self-defensive torture.
Many people, myself included, do, after all, support a moral maxim allowing self-
defensive torture.
It does not help matters here, by the way, to claim that at least in principle one
might accept even in the act being killed in self-defence (thinking, with the bullet
entering the heart: ‘I had it coming, I accept it’). I suppose that is indeed possible,
but it is of course also possible in the case of torture. To be sure, my definition of
torture rules out that a person is tortured with her consent, but one can still accept
things one did not consent to. Since most people would prefer being tortured for a
few minutes to being killed, the case in which someone accepts being tortured is, all
else being equal, more likely than the case in which someone accepts being killed.
Besides, I can define a special kind of self-defensive killing, namely ‘unaccepted
self-defensive killing’, which by definition only takes place when the person killed
17 La Torre, p. 34 above.
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in self-defence does not accept being killed in self-defence. Then obviously the
same would be true of this form of self-defensive killing that La Torre thinks is true
of torture: No one who accepts that others be killed in unaccepted self-defensive
killing would accept being killed by unaccepted self-defensive killing herself (if she
did, it would obviously not be unaccepted self-defensive killing any more). How-
ever, unaccepted self-defensive killing (practically all actual self-defensive killing is
of this kind) is certainly justified in certain circumstances. So is unaccepted self-
defensive torture.
To summarize: There just is no argument that could show that torturing is always
worse than killing. Thus, if killing in self-defence or defence of others or in a justi-
fying emergency is justified, torture in self-defence and defence of others is justified
too.
D. Is justifying torture bad even if torture is sometimes justified?
Some people claim that our talk about torture should be accompanied by a certain
‘shyness’. What that means is that rational argumentation should only be allowed to
go so far. Bielefeldt, for example, claims:
The uncircumventability [Unhintergehbarkeit] of human dignity has also an emotional side. It
manifests itself, for instance, in a kind of intuitive shyness to argumentatively engage with fic-
tional scenarios that are aimed at undermining the unconditional respect of human dignity.18
He experiences this shyness with regard to one of my examples, in which a dicta-
tor confronts a prisoner with the choice to either kill one of ten prisoners or to tor-
ture one of them for two hours (all these prisoners are innocent and have no special
relation to the first prisoner). If the prisoner refuses to choose and to act on his
choice, all ten prisoners will be killed. He is not permitted to ask them (if he did, all
ten prisoners would be killed). Of course, I argue that the prisoner is justified under
these conditions in torturing one of the other prisoners.19 Bielefeldt declares:
The intuitive shyness to argumentatively engage such a constructed scenario has nothing to do
with ingenuousness or intellectual incompetence. One might even admit that the macabre
situation constructed by Steinhoff could become reality. However, to positively develop in
light of such a mere eventuality a normative criteriology that is supposed to make it possible to
weigh violations of dignity against one another is a monstrous undertaking; it leads us legally
and ethically astray.20
First of all, this scenario is not one of self-defensive torture. Most of my exam-
ples, however, are, and they are precisely supposed to show that torture does not al-
ways violate human dignity (after all, self-defensive killing does not violate human
dignity either). To not even rationally consider such examples and to simply
18 Ibid, p. 22 (my translation).
19 Steinhoff, ‘Torture’, p. 339.
20 Bielefeldt, ‘Menschenwürde’, p. 22, (my translation). .
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stipulate instead that all torture violates human dignity might not attest to shyness so
much as arrogance.
Secondly, this talk about the ‘normative criteriology’ that ‘leads us legally and
ethically astray’ is sheer phrase-mongering. As already said, the case of the ten
prisoners is not a case of self-defence. It is a case of what the German law calls
justifying emergency (rechtfertigender Notstand) and what other jurisdictions call
necessity. The laws of necessity were precisely made to cover extreme situations like
this one. In fact, since the international torture conventions are arguably not
applicable to private torture, torturing a prisoner in my scenario probably is legal
under German, British and American law. But whether legal or not: necessity
clauses require and allow the weighing of health against health, injuries against
injuries, lives against lives,21 life against health, injuries against lives, pain against
lives etc. – why should the weighing become more difficult or even ‘monstrous’
when torture is involved? I assume Bielefeldt is too ‘shy’ to ask this question, let
alone to answer it.
Besides, examples like the Daschner case, my Jeanette/Paolo/Bill case and the
case of the prisoners not only show that torture is justified in such circumstances,
they also show that the shyness Bielefeldt and others recommend is quite
inappropriate. If the police officers in the Daschner case said ‘Oh, no, no, we are too
shy to even consider the possibility of torture, when in doubt it’s just better if the
child suffocates’; if the prisoner who could save the life of one other prisoner said
‘Oh, no, no, I am too shy to even consider the possibility of torture, when in doubt
it’s just better if one of you dies, whether you agree with me or not’; when Paolo
says ‘Oh, no, no, I am too shy to even consider the possibility of torture, when in
doubt it’s better if we just blow up somebody’, then this is not only irrational but
also immoral. I think the ten prisoners, Bill and the suffocating child would agree.
They would have little sympathy for Bielefeldt’s ‘shyness’.
Sometimes some absolutist opponents of torture cannot resist the temptation of
morally blaming a proponent of a limited permission of torture for somehow
contributing to the spread of illegitimate torture. Of course, they think that all torture
is illegitimate. I don’t. If I somehow contribute to the spread of self-defensive
torture that helps to save innocent children from culpable kidnappers, then that
would be a good thing. If absolutist torture opponents with their arguments or
pseudo-arguments contribute to more children suffocating in the hands of
kidnappers, then that would be a bad thing.
However, I completely agree that nearly all torture currently being undertaken on
our planet is immoral. There are very few cases of defensive torture or torture
justified in light of a justifying emergency. (There are also very few cases of killing
21 Weighing of life against life is, according to majority opinion, not allowed under the German
justifying emergency paragraph. It is allowed under the necessity statutes of some US states.
See P. D. W. Heberling, ‘Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statutory
Reform’ Columbia Law Review 75 (1975): 914-962, n. 33.
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that are justified by self-defence or in light of a justifying emergency.) Thus, one
criticism I have heard (and several times) is this: ‘Even if you were right about self-
defensive torture, by publicly justifying torture in some cases you contribute to a
slippery slope, you contribute to there being more cases of illegitimate torture too.’
Can that criticism stick?
First of all, let us remember that absolutist torture opponents argue against torture
by appealing to the notion of rights. When, for example, they argue against a nuclear
ticking bomb case, they say: ‘Even if millions of lives are at stake, the terrorist has a
right not to be tortured. This right cannot be overridden by utilitarian
considerations.’ Well, perhaps my right to speak my opinion can also not be
overridden by utilitarian considerations. In other words, even if by speaking my
opinion I contributed somehow to the spread of torture, I would still have the right to
do so. To be sure, one might object that liberty of speech is not absolute (the right
not to be tortured isn’t, either). So it could perhaps be overridden. But, of course, if
it were to be overridden, this would have to happen on grounds of credible and
substantial evidence that my speaking my opinion indeed does cause harm on a
scale large enough to override my right to free expression.
Maybe, however, the criticism does not so much want to suggest that one does
not have the right to present arguments that justify torture under certain
circumstances, but that nevertheless one ought not to present such arguments. After
all, one can have a right to do immoral things. Having a right only means that others
are not at liberty to forcibly keep you from doing what you have a right to. For
example, people have a right to claim that the Holocaust never happened; however,
making such a claim is still immoral. Thus, if the claim is only that I ought not to
justify some forms of torture, the opponents would perhaps bear weaker burdens of
proof.
They do still bear a burden of proof, though. However, in fact there is not a shred
of evidence for the claim that by justifying self-defensive torture one also
contributes to the spread of torture that is not self-defensive. Indeed, the claim is
rather silly. How is this contribution supposed to work? Is some spokesperson of the
US State Department supposed to quote me in support of torturing in Guantanamo?
That would be counterproductive, for anti-torture groups could immediately point
out that I have argued that the torture in Guantanamo is not self-defensive nor an
instance of a justifying emergency, and therefore not justified; and that I have
argued that the institutionalization of torture is wrong.22 They could thus blame the
spokesperson for manipulating and distorting things. That would hardly help his
case.
I suspect that behind the charge that by justifying torture in some circumstances
you also contribute to the spread of illegitimate torture is nothing more than the
vague suspicion that one contributes to some kind of ‘general atmosphere’ in which
22 Steinhoff, ‘Torture’, pp. 346-351.
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torture can ‘thrive’.23 This charge is more or less as intelligent and substantiated,
though, as the claim – and such claims have been made – that by arguing for the
right to sexual self-determination one contributes to a general atmosphere of sexual
permissiveness in which rape will thrive. The claim is also comparable to the one –
interestingly, hardly ever made – that by arguing for the right to self-defensive
killing one contributes to an atmosphere in which murder thrives. There is no way of
either proving or disproving such claims. Making them anyway simply amounts to
the manipulative and defamatory attempt to shut people up whose arguments one
doesn’t like and probably cannot refute.
Finally – there is some evidence that morality and moral behaviour profit more
from rational discussion than from censorship, prejudice and thought-restraint.
E. Conclusions and some clarifications on the scope of my argument
I have argued here that self-defensive torture is morally justified. Thus, I have
argued that torture is justified in very rare and extreme circumstances, for the cases
in which self-defensive torture could be applied are extremely rare. Torturing so-
called terrorists to find out more about their networks is not a case of self-defensive
torture. The Daschner case, on the other hand, is a case in which self-defensive
torture could have been applied.
I also think – although I have not further argued here for it – that it is not in itself
contradictory to legally prohibit torture while admitting that it can in certain
circumstances be morally justified.24 Yet, I do not think that all torture should be
legally prohibited (and perhaps it isn’t either).25 However, there is as little need to
introduce a special paragraph allowing self-defensive torture into the penal codes as
there is a need to introduce a special paragraph allowing self-defensive throat-
cutting. Both forms of self-defence can be easily covered by the normal self-defence
regulations.
23 In this context, one observation: If thought experiments like, for example, the ticking bomb
case are so dangerous and might be ‘abused’, then one probably should not give them a
platform. However, in most pamphlets and articles of torture opponents these and other
examples are always described (if not always discussed) and presented to people who
probably have never heard of them before. Those torture opponents who really think that
these thought experiments are dangerous can then hardly exclude the possibility that they
themselves are contributing to the spread of torture by acquainting their audience with these
arguments. In other words: Why, then, don’t they shut up?
24 For a contrary opinion see R. Trapp, Folter oder selbstverschuldete Rettungsbefragung?
(Paderborn, Mentis, 2006), Ch. IV
25 I had not quite made up my mind on this question in Steinhoff, ‘Torture’: see p. 346.
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Finally, I am adamantly against the institutionalization of torture – and thus
against training torturers or introducing the infamous torture warrants. Doing so, as I
have argued elsewhere,26 would have disastrous consequences. As history has
shown, the state is not to be trusted to use torture only in self-defence cases once it
becomes institutionalized. This, however, in no way undermines the argument that
self-defensive torture is morally permissible.27
26 Ibid., pp. 346-351.
27 Wolfendale thinks otherwise, if I interpret her correctly: J. Wolfendale, ‘Training Torturers:
A Critique of the ‘Ticking Bomb’ Argument’ Social Theory and Practice 32 (2006): 269-277.
While I mostly subscribe to her arguments as to why the institutionalization of torture would
be bad, I do not see how from that finding one could possibly derive the moral
impermissibility of torture in concrete cases. A basic assumption of her argument seems to be
that in the ticking bomb case a torturer can only be justified in torturing the ‘terrorist’ if the
torturer is some kind of super-torturer – that is, highly trained and extremely capable of
getting results. Apart from the fact that even if one granted this assumption, it would not
provide the conclusion Wolfendale is looking for, the assumption is also wrong. After all, no
one is required to be a super-shooter or super-stabber or, more generally, a super-defender in
order to be justified in defending herself against an aggressor by, for example, using a knife
or a gun. As I have already argued, even in cases where the defender has not much of a
chance to stop an attacker by using a certain form of violence, he is still permitted to try if
there are no other means left that would promise more success. Thus, self-defensive torture,
too, is justified in certain cases – and not only in hypothetical, but also in real ones.
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3. The Ticking Bomb Scenario as a Moral Scandal*
Francesco Belvisi
I.
A skandalon is an insidious obstacle, a stumbling block. Here it is a ‘ticking bomb’
known to have been triggered by a terrorist group in a densely populated area. Not
just a tricky talking point, the obstacle becomes a hellish trap: tripping up on it
stretches the safety wires of our moral convictions to the limit.
Considering the ticking bomb scenario means accepting a ‘tragic choice’ since
there is no one inexorably right and just solution in terms of a consistent application
of legal and moral values.
Let us, however, accept the challenge to lift the cover of the trap and examine the
loaded question: ‘What would you do? Would you resort to torture?’ I shall consider
the case as if I were the politician or a policeman, putting myself in their uncomfort-
able position, not maintaining the lofty distance of those who assert the inviolable
nature of human rights, but assuming the viewpoint of the politically responsible. In
so doing, I plunge into the abyss where, paradoxically, the very foundation of our
moral order is to be found: not high moral principles but Abgrund, its murky depths,
abomination, or that which is ‘morally unthinkable’.1
What lies in the abyss is torture, a subject we would rather sidestep. ‘It is dispirit-
ing as well as shameful to have to turn our attention to this issue,’ laments Jeremy
Waldron.2 But torture3 has been put squarely on the agenda by the 9/11 attacks and
* I would like to thank Stefano Bertea, Thomas Casadei, Marco Goldoni, Massimo La Torre
and Gianfrancesco Zanetti for their important comments and suggestions on the first version
of this contribution.
1 B. Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, in J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism:
For and Against (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973) 77-150, pp. 92-93. Wil-
liams is wrong, however, to exclude this category from moral considerations since it can
highlight an event that, although logically conceivable had not been entertained, and although
highly improbable, has actually taken place. It is just this contingency that is the main feature
of a complex society: see N. Luhmann, ‘Kontingenz als Eigenwert der modernen Gesell-
schaft’, in N. Luhmann, Beobachtungen der Moderne (Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992)
93-128 [English trans. Observations on Modernity, Stanford, Stanford University Press,
1998]. Clearly, then, morals cannot duck the ungrateful task of debating these intriguing al-
beit unique cases. Otherwise we would have to capitulate and admit that Luhmann, is right to
maintain that basing an argument on values becomes untenable in the very instances where
values are at stake, in those tragic choices. Rather than withdraw scandalized and powerless
before the unthinkable, philosophers – and especially Kantian philosophers – should reflect
on the conditions for the possibility of an adequate solution. N. Luhmann, Gibt es in unserer
Gesellschaft noch unverzichtbare Normen? (Heidelberg, Müller, 1993), p. 20.
2 J. Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House’ Columbia Law
Review 105 (2005): 1681-1750, p. 1683.
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consequently the war on terrorism. One aspect of the wider debate is the ticking-
bomb scenario. This essentially is the case in which the police have apprehended a
terrorist who knows the whereabouts of a deadly bomb or unconventional weapon
set to go off soon and likely to cause hundreds, thousands or even more casualties.
The only way to extract information about the bomb’s whereabouts is to torture the
prisoner who otherwise refuses to collaborate. The question is: ‘What would you
do? Would you resort to torture?’
The ‘absolutists’, those who maintain that the ban on torture is an absolute princi-
ple to be upheld in all circumstances without exception, do not understand – and
therefore object4 – that the example given can vary widely and be portrayed deliber-
ately in extreme terms so as to make decision-taking dire. The decision, indeed, ap-
pears obligatory, part of the very order of things created by the hypothetical sce-
nario.5 Yet such a catastrophe-invoking move is made necessary by the intractability
of those who will tolerate no waiver, either legal or moral, of the absolute prohibi-
tion on torture.6
The question was first posed by Niklas Luhmann, in 1992, in a conference enti-
tled: ‘Do unrenounceable norms still exist in our society?’,7 as an exclusively theo-
retical issue. Luhmann set out to demonstrate that in our complex and functionally
differentiated society underpinned by positive and contingent law,8 unassailable
norms no longer exist since the social conditions that made them possible no longer
exist either. The existence of unchangeable, over-arching rules presupposes princi-
ples serving as universal criteria according to which all questions are settled. But our
3 For his definition, see: R. Marx, ‘Folter: eine zulässige polizeiliche Präventionsmaßnahme?’
<http://www.proasyl. info/texte/mappe/2004/91/16.pdf> (visited 11-05-2006), 5-9; S. Miller,
‘Torture’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2006, <http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2006/entries/torture/> (visited 11-05-2006), 2-5.
4 D. Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb’, in K. J. Greenberg (ed.), The Torture
Debate in America (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006) 35-83, pp. 36 and 51:
‘The ticking time-bomb scenario is an intellectual fraud.’
5 This is the case of the provocation launched by Luhmann, Gibt es unverzichtbare Normen?,
p. 2. For this reason some authors try to solve the question on the grounds of the highly im-
probable and artificial nature of the case: see H. Shue, ‘Torture’, in S. Levinson (ed.), Tor-
ture. A Collection (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 47-60, p. 57. In this way, perhaps
sustaining that the hard cases that can be tackled by morals must be much less hard, Shue
holds: ‘There is a saying in jurisprudence that hard cases make bad law, and there might well
be one in philosophy that artificial cases make bad ethics.’ But the central issue here is that
neither the cases are artificial or the ethics good, but the limits of deontological ethics. Trying
to undermine the scenario by pointing out inconsistencies and improbable aspects creates a
similar situation to when the sage points to the moon and the dunce looks at the pointing fin-
ger.
6 See Part I, Art. 2, para. 2 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: ‘No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture.’
7 Luhmann, Gibt es unverzichtbare Normen? pp. 1-2.
8 A situation that is not accepted by J. Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law’, pp. 1709-1713,
who asks: ‘Is nothing sacred?’
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society has no centre from which similar principles emanate, nor are such principles
embodied by a pre-eminent social class able to establish and impose rules and values
congruous with its dominant position, and then ensure the constant validity of these
rules whatever the consequences of their application.9
The same argument applies if the issue is shifted to the plane of what are claimed
to be universal values (human dignity and human rights). At this level, the case of
conflicting individual rights can lead to paradoxical situations10 solvable only by
balancing objective values and taking reasonable yet arbitrary decisions that then
serve as precedents.11 This paradox becomes acute in the case of (massive) human
rights violation: ‘norm-generating scandals’.12 These are cases where the violation of
human dignity is such that effective protection requires some violation of the dignity
of the perpetrators.13 The ‘ticking bomb’ scenario is a case in point.
Luhmann’s challenge was theoretical in nature. His intention was to show that
there are circumstances that, albeit hypothetical, though not completely absurd nor
unlikely, can rock the raft of principles we take as unquestioned and unquestionable
truths. Luhmann’s example was meant to warn against the naive belief that the
workings of a legal system, set up to judge right from wrong, can be founded and
justified even when its claimed validity is grounded in values. But in our social real-
ity the distinction between right and wrong has a much more flimsy basis, namely
the contingency of legal decision-making that may be indifferent to moral judge-
ment. If this is how our legal system works, then establishing a given value as the
principle underpinning legal judgement is fraught with difficulties.14
Subsequently, however, the attacks in Madrid and London made Luhmann’s
provocation highly relevant to real-life situations at the beginning of the new mil-
lennium when the ticking-bomb scenario was no longer seen as implausible or un-
thinkable as its critics claimed.
9 Luhmann, Gibt es unverzichtbare Normen? pp. 8-16.
10 For an effective example, see Brugger’s presentation in W. Brugger, D. Grimm, B. Schlink,
‘Darf der Staat foltern?’ – Eine Podiumsdiskussion. Humboldt Forum Recht, 4/2002,
<http://www.humboldt-forum-recht.de/4-2002/Drucktext.html> (visited 10-03-2005), 17: the
person who, in a situation of necessity defence, uses violence against the kidnapper of his
daughter in order to find out where she is being held and risks death by suffocation, should
desist on the arrival of the police since the police have the duty, as guardians of the kidnap-
per’s dignity, to take action against the father of the victim. In fact Art. 1, para. 1, Grundge-
setz reads: ‘Human dignity is inviolable. Respecting and safeguarding human dignity is the
duty of every power of the State.’
11 Luhmann, Gibt es unverzichtbare Normen? pp. 17-23.
12 Ibid. pp. 28, 30 and 31-32.
13 Ibid. pp. 27 and 30.
14 For a more in-depth reconstruction of the author’s thought, see F. Belvisi, ‘Niklas Luhmann e




Unlike Luhmann’s challenge, the debate following the September 11th attacks fo-
cused on the practical issues at stake: Whether the action of security forces, soldiers
and governments fighting against international terrorism, particularly Islamic terror-
ism, can be morally and/or legally justified or must be rejected as unlawful. Opinion
is split by and large into three major positions:
1) the deontological position that upholds, without exception, the absolute moral
and legal illegitimacy of torture,15 often arguing this on the grounds of the principle
of inviolable human dignity;16
2) the ‘emergency’ position of Alan Dershowiz who holds that torture should be
legalized in exceptional circumstances and only after receiving authorization from a
judge (the torture warrant), who would be the guarantor of the legitimacy of the re-
quest and act as an agent of control;17
3) the pragmatic position that recognizes the moral legitimacy of ‘preventive in-
terrogational torture’ practised in exceptional cases to save the lives of potential at-
tack victims, but at the same time, advocates the need to maintain the ban on tor-
ture.18
1. The deontological postion
The first position is that of scholars who conceive morals as the rigorous application
of principles irrespective of the consequences. Faced with the hypothetical ticking-
bomb case, they consider neither the possibility of the bomb going off nor the politi-
cal responsibility that encumbers such a decision.19 Such scholars do not consider
the scenario in which, following a terrorist outrage, a Minister of Internal Affairs or
Chief of Police has to inform the public that despite the fact that a member of the
terrorist group had been apprehended, no information had been obtained during
questioning on the whereabouts of the bomb, and that before the terrorist’s refusal to
15 See, for example, Ch. W. Tindale, ‘Tragic Choices: Reaffirming Absolutes in the Torture De-
bate’ International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2005): 209-222.
16 Waldron provides an exemplary case: J. Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law’, pp. 1726-
1728.
17 A. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002), chap. 4.
See also A. Dershowitz, ‘Tortured Reasoning’, in S. Levinson (ed.), Torture 257-280. For
similar critiques, see: O. Gross, ‘Are Torture Warrants Warranted?’ Minnesota Law Review
88 (2004): 1481-1555, pp. 1534-1553; R. A. Posner, ‘Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation’.
in S. Levinson (ed.), Torture 291-298, pp. 295-298; R. A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact. (Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press, 2006) pp. 35-38; B. A. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack
(New Haven , CT, Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 108-109; Miller, ‘Torture’, pp. 15-16.
18 See O. Gross, ‘Torture Warrants’, pp. 1490-1497 and 1500-1511; O. Gross, ‘The Prohibition
on Torture and the Limits of the Law’ in Levinson, Torture, pp. 231-232; Miller, ‘Torture’,
pp. 7-11; Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, pp. 12, 38, 77-87 and 152-158.
19 An aspect also underlined by Gross, ‘Prohibition on Torture’, p. 238.
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collaborate, the police had declined to resort to torture because this would have been
a grave affront to the prisoner’s dignity as a human being. In the light of a similar
situation, it is difficult to give meaning to the statement that ‘we aspire to… a State
that pursues its purposes (even its most urgent purposes) and secures its citizens
(even its most endangered citizens) honorably and without recourse to brutality and
terror’.20 It might indeed imply that the State is in part responsible for the victims it
did not protect.
The ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court stands out as an exception on this ‘abso-
lutist’ scene. In 1999, examining a case of violent interrogations of alleged Palestin-
ian terrorists by secret service agents, the Court while admitting that ‘a democratic
society… is prepared to accept that an interrogation may infringe upon the human
dignity and liberty of a suspect,’ nonetheless upheld the absolute ban on torture or
any other violent means of interrogation.21
This seemingly ‘absolutist’ stance of the Israeli Court is not simply grounded in
universal values and the Kantian obligation to respect moral law in compliance with
the deontological conception of morals. In their concluding remarks the judges af-
firmed that ‘deciding these petitions weighed heavily on this Court… the possibility
that this decision will hamper the ability [of the State] to deal properly with terrorists
and terrorism disturbs us. We are, however, judges. We must decide according to the
law… [and] act according to our purest conscience’.22
Such self restraint sums up the specificity of a Constitutional Court’s ‘non-
political’ function,23 in the sense that even when faced with the problem of the State
having to guarantee public security, and thus with the issue of rights versus security,
the judges’ decisions must uphold rights in accordance with the principle of judicial
review. In other words, Courts cannot be asked to put themselves in the place of the
politician or public officer who, by his very function, has to consider the aims and
consequences of his actions. This is something that may be asked of philosophers.24
For philosophers, a deontological concept of morals may present as one of the pos-
sible options. For judges, however, respect for the law and the constitution is an ob-
ligation sanctioned by the principle of the division of powers.
20 J. Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law’, p. 1750. In this, hopefully rare instance, the politi-
cian and police chief could be – rightly – held responsible for the death and suffering of inno-
cent victims. This is also the view of J. B. Elshtain, ‘Reflection on the Problem of ‘Dirty
Hands’’, in S. Levinson (ed.), Torture 77-89, p. 83.
21 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel HCJ 5100/94. In Judgments
of the Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism within the Law,
<http://www.mfa.govil/MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Fighting+Terrori
sm+within+the+Law+2-Jan-2005.htm> (visited 20-05-2006) 23-58, pp. 42-48.
22 HCJ 5100/94 (2005), 55 (italics added).
23 G. Zagrebelsky, Principî e voti (Turin, Einaudi, 2005), pp. 35-40.
24 For a sound example, see M. Walzer, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’, Phi-
losophy and Public Affairs 2 (1973): 60-80, partially reprinted in Levinson,Torture.
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2. The ‘emergency’ position
Turning to the view of Dershowiz, this is admittedly consistent with the idea of rule
of law whereby all State organs must function in compliance with the law. However,
legalising torture, albeit in specific cases, can be opposed on at least three different
counts.
a) The ticking bomb scenario is posited as an exceptional instance for which le-
gitimate recourse to torture might be possible, on the condition that it remain within
the realms of an exception. However, in no legal order can exception – which is lit-
erally ‘extra ordinem’ – be foreseen in terms of a specific event and regulated ac-
cordingly.25 An exception goes against the very nature of the law, which aims to
provide rules governing recurrent situations, not rare occurrences. According to
Posner, in the case of emergencies it is appropriate to maintain ‘the distinction be-
tween authority and power’.26 Exceptional situations must therefore be dealt with
not following the criteria and procedures of legitimate authority, but according to the
power. In these cases something must be done not because it is required by law, but
simply through sheer power, because of someone’s ‘raw ability’ to do it.27
Making rules for specific exceptions is an oxymoron and would inevitably un-
dermine the coherence of the legal system and the guarantees this provides, with
grave consequences for fundamental rights.
b) Some considerations in the theory of institutions and organizations also lead to
the rejection of legalized torture on account of the real likelihood of its escalation.
Institutions and organizations trigger what I call adaptive behaviour,28 i.e., behav-
iour that is not the result of truly autonomous individual decision, but action condi-
tioned by the particular environment or organization in which the individual oper-
ates. Adaptive behaviour is not born simply out of a desire to avoid clashing with
other members of the institution, rather it is induced by coercive influences or by
what Emile Durkheim calls contrainte sociale.29 Adaptive behaviour develops when,
for example, the members of an organization pursue the same aims, carry out the
same tasks, hold by the same rules and follow the same procedures – in a word –
25 The recent German law on flight security (Luftsicherheitsgesetz) of 11 January 2005 goes in
this direction. In the wake of the public outcry caused by the September 11th attacks, Art. 14,
para. 3 of the law provides for the use of military airplanes to shoot down hijacked passenger
aircraft that have been aimed to crash against targets on land. With its ruling BvR 357/05 of
15 February 2006, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared the law illegal on the
grounds that it violated the principle of human dignity and the right to life of the passengers
and crew.
26 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, p. 38.
27 Ibid. p. 14: This according to his ‘law of necessity’ (pp. 12 and 158).
28 The term derives from the concept of ‘adaptive preference’ coined by J. Elster, Sour grapes:
Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.
109-124.
29 E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. by S. Lukes (New York, Free Press,
1982).
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share the same institutional ‘culture.’ Opposing that culture, innovating or removing
certain practices and behaviours becomes extremely difficult.30
If we transfer these general considerations to specific institutions and organiza-
tions like the military, security forces and police, it becomes clear how real the risk
is of violence becoming widely practised and torture an interrogational option were
it to be legalized, even if only for exceptional cases.31 The logic is the same: By its
very nature the organization tends to metabolize the exception, transform it into a
practical possibility, institutionalize a practice, and consider it a routinely available
resource. In this sense, one can truly speak – as Henry Shue does – of ‘torture’s me-
tastatic tendency’.32 Furthermore, even if the practice of torture did not directly in-
volve all the members of a given organization, becoming a standardized, and thereby
tolerated, practice, the adaptive behaviour mechanism means that the torture would
become accepted out of a sense of solidarity by those who would not themselves be
willing to practise torture or who would resort to torture only in cases sanctioned by
law.33
From a normative point of view, these theoretical considerations could underpin a
dual weakness: that of not being based on principles, but on generalizations that lead
to the formulation of purely inductive argument; and, in consequence, that of being
instrumental and purpose-driven (restricting a practice) rather than geared to uphold-
ing the intrinsic value of the principle to be preserved (the absolute prohibition of
torture). On this last point, mine is certainly not a ‘principled’ defence of the abso-
lute ban on torture. With regard to the first objection, I believe that the legal argu-
ment cannot be divorced from an understanding of the particular situation for which
the solutions must be adequate.34
c) Even conceptual considerations of principle are against legalising torture on an
exceptional-case basis.
Torture is the antithesis of everything a liberal-democratic regime stands for,
since torture strikes at the very core of the citizen (as a person) and his capacity for
independent decision-making,35 a component of the Kantian concept of human dig-
nity. Hence the absolute prohibition on torture is the strongest form of protection
and ‘the only realistic barrier against governmental abuse of powers in the context of
interrogational torture’.36 Furthermore, the torture prohibition is a powerful factor
30 See Miller, ‘Torture’ (2006), pp. 12-14.
31 See also Posner, ‘Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation’, p. 296.
32 Shue, ‘Torture’, p. 58.
33 See also Miller, ‘Torture’, p. 13.
34 On this question, see F. Belvisi, ‘Una riflessione normativa per la società multiculturale’
Diritto, immigrazione e cittadinanza 5 (2003): 28-47, pp. 28-34. See also G. Zanetti,
Introduzione al pensiero normativo.(Reggio Emilia, Diabasis, 2004), in particular Ch. 2.
35 M. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil. Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. (Princeton, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2004), pp. 136 and 143; J. Ph. Reemtsma, Folter im Rechtsstaat? (Hamburg,
Hamburger Edition, 2005), pp. 119-120 and 124-126.
36 Gross, ‘Prohibition on Torture’, p. 236.
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contributing to the political legitimization of the democratic system and a corner-
stone of the legal foundation on which our society rests.
These are important considerations amply dealt with by several authors and con-
tributors to this volume, and do not require further explanation here. More pertinent
to the argument is the logic underpinning banning torture on the grounds of an abso-
lute principle. It is one thing to conceive the ban on torture as an absolute principle
(a practical aspect); it is another to recognize the need to maintain the ban on torture
expressed in absolute terms (a semantic aspect). In this case, a distinction must be
made between the empirical validity of the principle (the practical aspect) and its
formulation (the semantic aspect). As a principle – similar to what happens for other
so called universal principles (e.g., human dignity that in Germany is considered an
absolute principle by a large part of public law scholars as well as by the German
Federal Constitutional Court),37 the ban on torture must manifest the claim to abso-
lute validity if it is not to fall into a sort of performative fallacy.38 As a valid norm,
however, it can be applicable only taking the circumstances into consideration and
thus, envisaging possible exceptions. In criminal law this is the ratio for the mitigat-
ing circumstances of self-defence and necessity.
The absolute, uncompromising wording of Art 2 of the 1984 UN Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
flags its very weakness, demonstrating in a nutshell the very reason for its great fra-
gility: the easy and obvious facility with which such prohibitions may be disre-
garded. What indeed is more banally human than to inflict ‘severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental… on a person’?
As a petition of principle therefore, the ban on torture is a ‘formula that contains
its own disappointment’.39 Just as freedom cannot be unconditional or equality abso-
lute, nor can the torture ban. Compared to these principles, the real questions arise
the moment the principles are disregarded for justified motives supported by sus-
tainable arguments. It becomes evident that principles undergo a strange metamor-
phosis as soon as they are applied. From a universal ‘basic quality’ they mutate into
a mouldable ‘scalar quality’.40
Circumstances do the job of showing up the weakness of the absolute principle.
As Justice Ben-Porat ruled: ‘There simply are cases in which those who are at the
helm of the State and bear responsibility for its survival and security, regard certain
37 For a critique, see R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte. (Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1986),
pp. 94-97.
38 I refer to the concept of R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (Freiburg, Alber, 1992),
pp. 64-70: To avoid an error in the construction of the concept, just as those who make the
law must assert that such law is just (richtig), similarly, those who establish a principle must
assert the absolute validity of such principle.
39 N. Luhmann, ‘Gesellschaftstheorie und Normentheorie’, in U. Fazis and J. C. Nett (eds.),
Gesellschaftstheorie und Normentheorie (Basel, Karger Libri, 1993), pp. 15-29, at 21.
40 For the distinction between ‘basic quality’ and ‘scalar quality’ see G. Zanetti, ‘Patrick Lee on
Human Dignity and Equality’. Paper presented at the conference on The Philosophical Foun-
dations of Human Dignity (Washington DC, 8/10-03-2007).
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deviations from the law for the sake of protecting the security of the State, as an un-
avoidable necessity’.41 Moreover, this sense of duty not only exists among those ac-
countable for a country’s security, it is indeed demanded of them by their citizens.42
An absolute torture ban is something we all immediately understand and applaud
as long as we are not directly concerned. It is easy to see things in terms of butchers
on the one hand, and Jews and persecuted minorities on the other, or people fighting
for independence, the victims of authoritarian regimes, prisoners of war etc. Yet the
moment we are in the front line faced with defending ourselves from a looming
threat, the torture taboo is quickly set aside and its practice suddenly becomes an
available, and feasible, resource, calling into question a prohibition that up to that
point had seemed obvious. The circumstance triggering this possibility today has
been terrorism.
3. The pragmatic position
Finally, the third position – the pragmatic approach. This approach justifies the
moral and political legitimacy of torture as a last resort, to be inflicted in exceptional
cases in order to acquire information to prevent a terrorist attack, but opposes, how-
ever, legitimising torture.
The argument is clear: While the legal ban on torture must be upheld, in excep-
tional cases, persons with public security responsibilities will find themselves in
situations requiring them to break the law, committing ‘official disobedience’43 by
using force to oblige a terrorist suspect to reveal information. Although this illegal
action may be considered morally appropriate, and the torture carried out to be in the
officer’s line of duty, it can only be justified in law ex post, by means of due proc-
ess. Oren Gross and Richard Posner agree that this is the best way to deal with a
grave national threat: realistically upholding the ban on torture and taking effective
measures to censure against the risk of this odious practice spreading. In their words:
‘Civil disobedience can be a duty of government in extreme circumstances to its
citizens, even if not a right.’44
41 Referred to by O. Gross, ‘Prohibition on Torture’, p. 237.
42 Ibid. p. 236: Gross notes that the opinion whereby ‘torture… may have to be resorted to in
certain circumstances… is shared by many segments of the population. ‘
43 Ibid. pp. 239-248; Gross, ‘Torture Warrants’, pp. 1487-1488 and 1519-1534; Posner, Not a
Suicide Pact, pp. 85-87. The original idea was voiced by Shue, ‘Torture’, p. 58.
44 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact, p. 14. See also Gross, ‘The Prohibition on Torture’, p. 249. Gross
states: ‘most of us believe that most, if not all, government agents, when faced with a genu-
inely catastrophic case, are likely to resort to whatever means they can wield – including pre-
ventive interrogational torture … And most of us hope they will do so.’
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III.
By and large I agree with this last position since it arrives at a nuanced solution of
the questions posed by the ticking bomb scenario and deals appropriately with the
relations existing between the parties involved. In fact the key relation is not that
which sets victim against butcher in a torture scenario. Clearly, however, if the ap-
prehended terrorist is seen as a defenceless victim at the mercy of cruel police offi-
cers, no act of torture can ever be morally justified. In the ticking bomb case, how-
ever, the terrorist is no longer a defenceless victim, but a criminal whose failure to
collaborate is tantamount to aiding and abetting a murderous attack by other mem-
bers of his terrorist group. On this basis, the prisoner has it in his power to avoid tor-
ture, or end it, by collaborating.45
When viewed from this perspective, a third party appears on the scene for the first
time: the citizens targeted by the terrorist attack. This leads intuitively to the moral
justification of torture.46 It seems evident to me that the dignity and life of (many)
innocent people are of greater value than the dignity of one guilty person.47
Supporting this, is a series of factors that have not been taken into account in the
current debate, but come into play in a ticking-bomb scenario. Firstly, the preventive
strategies with which our welfare State governs our complex ‘risk society’.48 The
State’s fundamental task is to ensure the security of its citizens and do so in a much
less abstract manner than conceived by any modern 19th century State of law.49 It is
undoubtedly true – as Oliver Lepsius argues – that the transformation of the democ-
ratic constitutional State into a preventative State entails risks in terms of the safe-
guard of human rights50 with the ‘de-individualization of freedom,’ whereby ‘indi-
vidual rights are replaced by collective interests’ of security and ‘subject to society’s
45 R. Trapp, ‘Wirklich ‘Folter’ oder nicht vielmehr selbstverschuldete Rettungsbefragung?’ In
W. Lenzen (ed.), Ist Folter erlaubt? (Paderborn, Mentis, 2006), pp. 106-108: he redefines the
torture practised in the ticking bomb case as ‘interrogation geared to safeguard attributable to
the criminal’ (selbstverschuldete finale Rettungsbefragung).
46 See: F. Allhoff, ‘A Defense of Torture’ International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19
(2005): 243-264; Miller, ‘Torture’, pp. 8-9; U. Steinhoff, ‘Warum Foltern manchmal moral-
isch erlaub, ihre Institutionalisierung durch Folterbefehle aber moralisch unzulässig ist’, in
W. Lenzen (ed.), Ist Folter erlaubt?
47 This intuitive concept is not shared either by the case law of the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court which holds that human dignity is an imponderable principle, or by those who
uphold the doctrine of ‘dignity as essential human feature’: On this point, see H. Hofmann,
‘Die versprochene Menschenwürde’, Humboldt Forum Recht, 8, 1996, <http://www.rewi.hu-
berlin.de/online/hfr/8-1996/Drucktext.html>, pp. 3-6.
48 See E. Denninger, Diritti dell’uomo e Legge fondamentale, ed. by C. Amirante (Turin, Giap-
pichelli, 1998) Part 1 and Appendix. For a social and legal approach to this issue, see T.
Pitch, La società della prevenzione (Rome, Carocci, 2006).
49 U. Volkmann, ‘Sicherheit und Risiko als Probleme des Rechtsstaates’ Juristenzeitung 59
(2004): 696-703.
50 E. Denninger, Diritti dell’uomo e Legge fondamentale, p. 86.
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purposes’.51 On the other hand, ‘for some time now, citizens no longer expect the
State just to safeguard their freedom; they also expect it to guarantee their secu-
rity’.52 In this way security ‘becomes, in a very general sense, a fundamental right
that can be jeopardized by the failure of a State to take action, a circumstance that
could be brought by citizens before a court of law’.53 It must be recognized therefore
that the role of the State does not stop at respecting and guaranteeing human rights
but includes (active) protection of its citizens. Guaranteeing the rights and ensuring
security are mutually complementary and constitute a single, fundamental two-
pronged task of the State.
This argument in no way intends to underestimate the concerns expressed regard-
ing the risk of a democratic State taking a degenerate, authoritarian turn,54 as testi-
fied by current US events. It does draw attention, however, to the important fact that
the academic world and ordinary citizens may be at odds and have different percep-
tions of social phenomena. These perceptions cannot be preferred unilaterally by
critical reflection, but must be considered together as elements of the same social
reality. In this way, following the concept that ‘the true meaning of social practices
is their social meaning’,55 the sense of social phenomena is (also) given by their so-
cial perception, i.e., by public opinion’s perception of such phenomena.
There is the risk that terrorism, considered as a ‘danger brought on by an external
enemy… from which the community… is obliged to defend itself against,’ may be a
figment of popular prejudice, the latest version of that ‘summary political dialec-
tic… already pointed out by Carl Schmitt in the reductive dichotomy between friend
and enemy’.56 However, the widespread and not just popular perception of the ter-
rorist as a public enemy, cast in the existentialist mould described by Schmitt,57 is
also extremely relevant to sustaining a normative argument that attempts to tackle
the issue in a socially adequate manner. For this perception, not only creates in the
potential victims a sentiment of extreme injustice, but also introduces an important
element to the debate: fear, or in other words, the need for security. This is a central
component of the terrorism phenomenon that obviously cannot be dismissed by, for
example, rational argument or even appeal to the population to show ‘courage’.58
51 O. Lepsius, ‘Liberty, Security, and Terrorism’ German Law Journal 5 (2004): 435-460, pp.
454-459.
52 E. Denninger, Diritti dell’uomo e Legge fondamentale, p. 2.
53 U. Volkmann, ‘Sicherheit und Risiko als Probleme des Rechtsstaates’, p. 700.
54 Concerns these expressed by authors like: J. Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty’ Journal of Po-
litical Philosophy 11 (2003): 191-210; B. A. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack; R. Dworkin,
Is Democracy Possible Here? (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006) Ch. 2.
55 J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 186.
56 F. Rimoli, ‘Più sicuri o più liberi?’ in A. Giannelli, and M. P. Paternò (eds.), Tortura di Stato
(Rome, Carocci, 2004), p. 128.
57 C. Schmitt, Le categorie del ‘politico’ (Bologna, il Mulino, 1972), pp. 108-111 [English
trans., The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976).]
58 See: Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty’, p. 194; E. Scarry, ‘Five Errors in the Reasoning of
Alan Dershowitz’, in Levinson, Torture, pp. 281-290 and 282-283; Dworkin, Is Democracy
Possible Here? pp. 50-51.
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It is in this real-life context that the State is expected by broad sections of society
to produce effective measures that will safeguard its citizens. And it is just these
real-life contexts and the social and psychological circumstances imposed by terror-
ism that have made lifting the torture taboo even thinkable.59 In a situation where
there can be no appeal to human solidarity for terrorists, where one’s existence is at
stake, the instinct for survival becomes paramount and the (quality of) life of the
other person (the terrorist) is of little count. In fact the traditional consensus against
torture crumbles swiftly before a scenario in which the human dignity of the terror-
ist/enemy is all there is preventing the safeguarding of innocent lives,60 with whom
moreover the ordinary citizen can immediately identify.
Faced with the fatal question: ‘Would you torture him?’ Jan Philipp Reemtsma
has a clear answer: ‘Yes, I would inflict suffering on this man until he reveals where
the bomb has been placed. In any case, however, the limit of my actions would not
be dictated by any compassion for this person but by the disgust that sooner or later I
would have for my own behaviour. What I did, I would do without considering the
criminal liability of my actions… In the end, however, the deciding factor will be
not so much what suffering we inflict upon another person, but what we expect of
ourselves,’ because we are what we do and we are judged by our actions and in the
light of the values by which we abide.61
This is all very true, but it is valid in a reflexive way. Indeed, we must bear in
mind that as the circumstances in which the potential torturer finds him/herself de-
mand that action be taken, they also concur to justifying whatever action is taken to
acquire urgently needed information that would enable a bomb to be defused and
human lives saved. In such circumstances, not only does our threshold of disgust for
ourselves rize several notches but our very reason for action, our duty to save hu-
man lives turns an odious, immoral act like torture into a moral one.
59 See F. Rimoli, ‘Più sicuri o più liberi?’ pp. 122-125.
60 M. Herdegen, Art. 1, Abs. 1 GG, in Th. Maunz, G. Dürig et al., Grundgesetz Kommentar
(Munich, Beck, 2003), rn. 45. For Trapp, ‘Wirklich “Folter”?’ p. 104, resolving the ticking
bomb scenario by reiterating the absolute ban on torture would lead to ‘ethically scandalous
consequences.’
61 Reemtsma, Folter im Rechtsstaat? pp. 122-123.
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4. Torture and Democracy
Hauke Brunkhorst
Torture and law were always already closely connected in the Western legal tradi-
tion. In the 13th Century, torture was put on a legal basis in the context of the inquisi-
tion trials. This juridification is a late part of a large-scale law reforms of the 12th
and 13th Century, from which the church (according to Harold Berman´s ground-
breaking studies on the Papal Revolution)1 emerged as the first modern state that
was ruled by law. `Inner´ actions, attitudes, schemes, desires and intentions were no
longer liable to prosecution – with the exception of the two strictly defined, if spec-
tacular, offenses of treason and heresy.
Ordeals and torture during the hearing of evidence and adjudication were first
prohibited within canon law and replaced with formal requirements of evidence so
strict that a condemnation in criminal cases was often difficult, and in hard cases or
cases of covert crime, nearly impossible.2 Although the formal presumption of inno-
cence did not exist yet, the burden of proof was put on the prosecution from then
onwards. A professional lawyer was admitted to trials. Fact finding and sentencing
became separate processes, and at least two independent eyewitnesses were required
for a complete hearing of evidence. The confession became the silver bullet of
criminal proceedings. Later, towards the end of the 13th Century, torture was reintro-
duced but subject to norms in accordance with the rule of law. Torture was approved
in certain hard cases of capital crime, and especially in those that were related to
criminal states of consciousness, such as heresy and treason.
Yet, the application of torture was strictly standardized and, thus, limited. It was
to be applied only if at least one eyewitness and strong evidence indicated the de-
fendant’s guilt. Moreover, a confession extorted from someone under torture was
only valid if it was repeated voluntarily in court.3 If the defendant revoked it, he or
1 H. Berman, Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, (Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1983).
2 J. H. Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof. Europe and England in the Ancien Regime,
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977). One must add that there were not only moral
and legal reasons for the abolishment and condemnation of ordeal and torture but also simple
class interests of the noble and the higher clergy, and in particular of the new and highly in-
creased powers of the mighty kings of Sicily, France and England, and the Pope who strived
for the monopolization and centralization of all power in their own hands and to get control
over the local communities. Therefore it was no longer in the interest of the new ruling class
that ordeal and great parts of the jurisdiction laid in the hands of decentred local communities,
and they now were persecuted as heresy and pagan praxis, see: R. I. Moore, The First Euro-
pean Revolution, c. 970-1215 (Oxford, Blackwell, 2000).
3 Berman, Law and Revolution II. The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western
Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 133.
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she was exposed to torture again, and if he/she repeated the confession, the ‘volun-
tary’ confession was obligatory for verification in the second ‘round’ as well. Why
was torture reintroduced in canon law? The problem partly was a self-produced trap
because the burden of proof in the 12th and 13th Century was simply too high. There-
fore the new criminal law was too weak to fulfil the stabilizing function of law as an
‘immunity system’ of the society (Luhmann). But the legal revolution was not only
oriented to the stabilizing function of law but law was also, and for the first time in
history, designed as a means of changing the world, and to realize parts of the civitas
dei within the civitas terrana.4 Since that time modern law has the double function
of stabilizing expectations (Luhmann) and emancipating us from informal power.5
The jurists and legal philosophers of the 11th and 12th Centuries were aware of the
repressive use of law and its stabilizing function but they also wanted to improve
and correct the individual’s behaviour, and they wanted a criminal law that worked
not only as punishment but also as an expression of divine grace and as an embodi-
ment of parts of the realm of God on earth. In strengthening the stabilizing function
of law since the late 12th Century, torture (and in particular the persecution of her-
esy) became a means for those in power to reduce the tension between the two fun-
damental purposes of law and to get its emancipatory use (and with it the poor who
were the subjects of their rule) under control, and this was due to the new economic
and political class structure that was established after the revolution.6
This is the famous Habermasian Janus face of law: ‘rechterfüllte Kriege’ – ‘law-
full wars’ (Carl Schmitt) and ‘rechterfüllte’ or ‘lawful’ torture – in the name of God,
and both at the same time fitting very well the ‘material interests’ (Weber) of the
ruling classes. A case study in the dialectic of enlightenment: The end of ordeal and
result enlightened Christian legal reforms during the so called Renaissance of the
12th Century empowered the individual human with the full responsibility for his or
her deeds, and in particularly made the judges individually responsible for their
judgments. The legal reforms indicated an emancipation of subjectivity and an in-
crease of autonomy7. Therefore they increased the burdens of proof in cases of capi-
tal crime, and this progress then became the reason for the re-invention of torture in
great measures, because this re-invention in the course of time (and in particular in
times of crisis) became a useful instrument for the increased oppression and expro-
priation of peasants and the destruction of self organized rural communities.8
A book written by a German legal historian in 1940 (when he was serving as a
soldier in the Wehrmachtsgerichtsdienst [Army legal service] in Berlin in a time of
terribly increased use of torture) shows very well how this dialectic of enlightenment
worked during the late 14th and 15th Century. At that time the interest of the emerg-
4 Ibid.; see also H. Brunkhorst, Solidarity. From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Commu-
nity (Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005), pp. 23-54.
5 C. Möllers, Die drei Gewalten. Legitimation der Gewaltengliederung in Verfassungsstaat,
Europäischer Integration und Internationalisierung (Weilerswist, Velbrück 2008), p. 226.
6 Moore, The First European Revolution.
7 Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof.
8 Moore, The First European Revolution.
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ing territorial state in the social order of things increased. Torture then was used sys-
tematically to produce reliable knowledge about criminality, security of citizens, and
better means of stabilization of power.9 More and more facts became criminal facts,
and new and extraordinary crimes were invented to justify the use of torture for the
‘protection’ of indigenous and economically well established good citizens against
the poor people, homeless knights and (as usual since the 12th Century) the Jews.
These groups became then the preferred subjects of torture, and if they had done
their part to increase knowledge and discursive power of the state or the city, ‘nit vil
umbstand’ was made with them if they had come through the torture alive.10 This
anticipates already a distinction which emerged during the debate about the new se-
curity and anti-terror legislation in Germany. This distinction is that between two
kinds of penalty law: Bürger- v.. Feindstrafrecht, or in English: ‘penal law for citi-
zens’ v.. ‘penal law for enemies’ which denies enemies or illegal fighters the status
of legal persons who belong to the race of beings that are born equal.11
Yet, in the late 13th Century there was also an intrinsic motivation to reintroduce
torture then, and this was more ideological and religious. Even if it was related com-
pletely to the stabilizing function of law it corresponded even more to the ‘ideal in-
terests’ (Weber) of the ruling (clerical and noble) elites than to their material inter-
ests, and I guess one should take this ideal interest as seriously as material interests.
Torture, re-introduced simultaneously with enhanced prosecution and the death pen-
alty for heresy, was designed as a means to make the world safe not (as in present
day America) for democracy but for the true believers in the holy and only church of
Rome, and to save the indestructible soul and eternal life of all Christians. For that
spiritual purpose the fundamentalist opposition, the Antichrist and the inner and
outer Axis of Evil should be excluded and exterminated. In Christianity the inner
self mattered, and in particular this was so since the new discovery or construction
of the individual subject of consciousness in legal theory, scholastic philosophy,
theology and poetry during the Renaissance of the 12th Century.12 The intrinsic pur-
pose of torture now reveals another chapter of the negative dialectic of enlighten-
ment, subjectivity and progress. Torture was supposed also to offer the defendant a
chance to salvage his or her immortal soul from eternal condemnation by means of
revocation and acknowledgment of Christianity’s objective truth, and – as a true be-
liever – accepting the physical penalty authentically.13 Torture in the inquisition tri-
als of the 13th and 14th Century was ‘Rettungsfolter’, i.e. salvation-oriented torture,
torture exerted as a legal instrument to save the eternal life of men. It was a regime
9 E. Schmidt, Inquisitionsprozess und Rezeption (Berlin, 1940), p. 24.
10 Ibid., pp. 17, 54, 84.
11 G. Jacobs, ‘Bürgerstrafrecht und Feindstrafrecht’, HRRS 3 (2004): 88-95, pp. 89ff, in particu-
lar p. 93. [Available at: <http://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/archiv/04-03/hrrs-3-04.pdf>]
12 R. M. Kiesow, ‘Das Experiment mit der Wahrheit. Folter im Vorzimmer des Rechts’, Rech-
tsgeschichte 3 (2003): 98-110. For the broader context of the development of individualiza-
tion see: N. F. Cantor, Medieval History. The Life and Death of a Civilization (London,
Macmillan, 1969).
13 Berman, Law and Revolution; Berman, Law and Revolution II.
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of truth, the intertwinement of reason, belief and torture, a power discourse that once
was opened by Jesus’ word ‘I am the truth’ – a truth belonging to nobody, being
completely egalitarian but had to be introduced by torture as well as by grace and
insight.
II.
The German term ‘Rettungsfolter’ or salvation-oriented torture originally was not
invented by the old canonists but by a German legal scholar, Wilfried Brugger, who
was the first German lawyer after World War II who suggested an argument for the
legalization of torture in certain cares of terror suspects, hijackers etc.14 Yet, Brug-
ger’s idea of juridified and lawfull (‘rechtserfüllte’) Rettungsfolter – law no longer
expected to save eternal but mortal life of victims of crime and terror – fits nicely
with the canon law of the late 13th Century, and so does the whole social and legal
context. In the same way as 700 years ago, torture again is accompanied by en-
hanced prosecution, much extended punishment, death and life sentence for terror-
ism, heavy and notorious criminals etc.; by new forms of discoursive power, bio-
power etc.; by new disciplinary instruments to control and construct the inner self;
by a strong preference for the stabilizing and repressive function of law and a grow-
ing suspicion against its emancipatory component;15 by the ideal and – not to forget
– the material interests of an emerging and again transnational but now global ruling
class.16
Those who argue today in favour of legalized torture clearly argue from within
the Western legal tradition. As we have seen, within the legal principles of this tradi-
tion Rettungsfolter, the salvation-oriented torture is completely compatible with rule
of law or the state of law (Rechtsstaat). Yet, here the question arises if Rettungsfolter
is also compatible with a Rechtsstaat that is democratic?
14 W. Brugger, ‘Würde gegen Würde’, Verwaltungsblätter Baden-Württemberg (1995): 414ff;
Brugger, ‘Darf der Staat ausnahmsweise foltern?’, Der Staat (1996): 67 ff; Brugger, ‘Vom
unbedingten Verbot der Folter zum bedingten Recht auf Folter?’, Juristenzeitung 55 (2000):
165-73.
15 N. Berman, ‘Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of
War’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 43 (2004): 1-72; O. Lepsius, ‘Freiheit, Sicher-
heit und Terror: Die Rechtslage in Deutschland’, Leviathan 1 (2004): 64-88; Ehrhard
Denninger, ‘Freiheit durch Sicherheit? Anmerkungen zum Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz’,
StV (2002): 96 ff.; T. Groß, ‘Terrorbekämpfung und Grundrechte’, KJ (2002): 1 ff.; S. Buckel
and J. Kannankulam, ‘Zur Kritik der Anti-Terror-Gesetze nach dem 11. September’, Das Ar-
gument 44 (2002): 34 ff; G. Frankenberg, ‘Kritik des Bekämpfungsrechts’, G. Beestermöller
and H. Brunkhorst (eds.), Folter: Sicherheit zum Preis der Freiheit (Munich, Beck, 2006).
16 On the emergence of this class: Brunkhorst, ‘There Will Be Blood. Konstitutionalisierung
ohne Demokratie?’, in: Brunkhorst (ed.) Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft, Special Issue of
Soziale Welt (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008); Brunkhorst, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Democratic
Freedom,’ in C. Thornhill and S. Ashenden, (eds.), Normative and Sociological Approaches
to Legality and Legitimacy (forthcoming, 2008)
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I think not. From the point of view of German law, European law and Interna-
tional Law torture is forbidden unconditionally: ‘notstandsfestes’ ius cogens with
erga omnes binding power.17 As Mathias Hong rightly says: ‘A new constitution is
needed by those’ German lawyers who want to alter the German laws against tor-
ture, and one should add: a new European and Intentional Law as well.
Yet, the more philosophical or theoretical debate of this question – so I argue –
depends deeply on our understanding of law, constitution and constitutionalism.
From its very beginning the Western legal tradition has been characterized, as I al-
ready mentioned, by the tension or even dialectical opposition between a repressive
and an emancipatory understanding of law. Since Hobbes and from Austin, through
Laband and Jellineck, to Carl Schmitt, including even Hans Kelsen and Niklas
Luhmann, a onesided understanding of law as peace-keeping repression (the legal
system as the expectations stabilizing immunity system) has prevailed on the one
hand; but on the other hand a lot of philosophers of law have interpreted the very
concept of law, not as repressive and peacekeeping, but basically and primarily as
emancipatory. Law, in this reading that is inspired by the French Revolution, is
deeply connected with the idea of realizing and implementing equal freedom of all,
and not only of all citizens, but of all people. From Kant´s definition of law as com-
partibilization of reciprocal spheres of freedom that relies completely on the one and
only human right to equal freedom, this track of argumentation runs via Savigny and
Hegel’s famous definition of law as the existence of freedom (‘Dasein der Freiheit’)
to Rawls, Habermas or Ingeborg Maus today.
Since the German and English Protestant Revolutions of the 16th and 17th Centu-
ries, and since the American and French Constitutional Revolutions of the 18th Cen-
tury, both competing understandings of law have been reflected by different com-
prehensive ideas of a constitution, and during the 19th and 20th Centuries both ideas
were implemented and tried out in different constitutional regimes. The first one his-
torically stems from the German and English revolutions, and the early inventions of
constitutional Monarchy are its paradigmatic cases. This kind of constitution, fol-
lowing Christoph Möllers, can be called a power-limiting constitution.18 That means
that the constitution is invented to limit the already prevailing power of a certain
non-democratic regime. Granting its citizens a constitution, this regime binds itself
17 M. Hong, ‘Das grundgesetzliche Folterverbot und der Menschenwürdegehalt der Grundrechte
– eine verfassungsjuristische Betrachtung’, in G. Beestermöller and H. Brunkhorst (eds.),
Rückkehr der Folter (München, Beck, 2006), pp. 24-35; see further: A. Peters, ‘Compensa-
tory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and
Structures’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 19 (2006): 519-610, S. Oeter, ‘Jus cogens
und der Schutz der Menschenrechte’, in S. Breitenmoser, B. Ehrenzeller, M. Sassòli, W. Stof-
fel and B. W. Pfeiffer (eds.), Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Rechtsstaat, (Baden-Baden,
Nomos, 2007), pp. 499-521; A. Emmerich-Fritsche, Vom Weltrecht zum Völkerrecht (Berlin,
Duncker & Humblot, 2007), pp. 493ff, 706f.
18 On the distinction between power limiting and power founding constitutions: C. Möllers,
‘Verfassungsgebende Gewalt—Verfassung—Konstitutionalisierung’, in A. von Bogdandy
(ed.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (Berlin, Springer, 2003), pp. 1ff. The distinction is
prominently used by H. Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1973).
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to the rule of law (Jellinek). Though it only grants (like a merciful and good prince:
like the prince of the mythical tale of a ‘Glorious Revolution’) individual rights and
legal remedies to its subjects. These subjects or in French or German: su-
jets/Untertanen are citizens only as long as the regime is pleased to treat them as
citizens. The consitutionalized asymmetry between the ruler and his subjects never
vanishes except in the case that the regime transforms itself into a full fledged de-
mocracy (as it was the case with English history during the late 19th and early 20th
Century). The point here is that power limiting constitutionalism must not but can be
reduced to a mere repressive understanding of law. The repressive understanding in
any case has priority over the emancipatory or freedom-enabling understanding of
law (which form the very beginning was much more alive in the English than in the
German constitutional monarchies).
The philosophical background of power-limiting constitutionalism is clearly
Hobbesian. Freedom has to be relative with security, and in case of emergency or
exception the self preservation of the constituent power, of the monarchy or the
‘state’ (Jellinek) becomes an absolute and unconditioned norm even at the price of
individual rights, legal remedies and democratic participation. Torture, in this case
of a self-tamed, self-bound Leviathan can or even must become a legal and constitu-
tional measure in the struggle against public enemies who oppose the constitutional
regime fundamentally. Following Lord Tony Giddens: Human rights could not be
applied to enemies of the basic human rights.19
The latter is an implication of a power-limiting understanding of constitutional-
ism for which the work of Georg Jellinek is paradigmatic. Power-limiting constitu-
tionalism presupposes a ‘law-free’ state which is of the ready beyond law as an
‘emergency resource of argument’ (‘argumentative Notstandsreserve’) in order to
‘withdraw the legal standards it originally granted.’20 Or in the affirmative words of
Ernst Forsthoff (from the 1970s): ‘Only where government and administration ap-
pear as an executive that is no longer bound to law, they are the ‘state’ and nothing
else.’21 One of the present advocates of legalized torture, who suggest the introduc-
tion of a specific criminal law for enemies (‘Feindschaftsrecht’), the highly recom-
mended legal scholar from Bonns Law School, Günther Jacobs brings that to the
striking formulation: ‘Those who win the war define the law.’22 (This is nothing else
than a reformulation of Carl Schmitt’s infamous definition of sovereignty: The one
who determines the state of emergency is the sovereign.)
19 Speech in the debate on the Terrorism Bill, H. L. Debs, 1 March 2005, cols. 148-51. [Lord
Giddens did not use the phrase in the text, but it could be seen as implicit in his argument that
we cannot ‘sustain our traditional procedures’ in the face of ‘new style terrorism’ – eds.]
20 C. Möllers, ‘Skizzen zur Aktualität Georg Jellineks’, in S. L. Paulsen and M Schulte (eds.),
Georg Jellinek – Beiträge zu Leben und Werk (Tübingen, Mohr, 2000), pp. 164-5.
21 E. Forsthoff, Der Staat der Industriegesellschaft – dargestellt am Beispiel der Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland (München, Beck, 1971), pp. 46-7, 105.
22 Jacobs, ‘Feindstrafrecht’, p, 95.
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III.
The other kind of constitutional regime, the power-binding kind, introduces a com-
pletely different perspective. The paradigm cases of power-founding constitutions
stem from the French and American Revolutions. Not how to limit power was – ac-
cording to Arendt – the problem of the American Revolution but how to establish
power, and how to preserve, enlarge and improve the constituent power of the peo-
ple?23 The revolution (with Thomas Jefferson) should be transformed into a perma-
nent revolution, and a German jurist and revolutionary from the year 1848 Justus
Fröbel followed the Jeffersonian track and defined democracy as a ‘permanent legal
revolution’.24 Contrary to power-limiting constitutions power-founding constitutions
are from the very beginning democratic. Power founding constitutionalism is de-
mocratic constitutionalism because it is relying on the legal principal of democratic
inclusion.25
A power founding constitution constitutes a citizenship of free and equal citizens
who control the state and its branches of power. In this case of a power-founding
constitution it is not an already existing power that grants rights to its subject but the
citizens themselves ascribe rights to each other reciprocally.26 Therefore, in a mod-
ern democracy exists no legitimacy (‘Legitimität’) of rulership or a ruler (like the
legitimate king) but only procedures of the egalitarian legitimation (‘Legitimation’)
of binding decisions (legal norms). Power-founding constitutionalism necessarily is
committed to an understanding of law that is emancipatory because there are no
longer any legal norms allowed which are not legitimated by the free and equal dis-
course and free and equal decisions of all legal subjects affected by the specific
norm. Democratic legitimation does transfer the right to equal freedom into positive
law that interprets and implements this right that does not exist before the self-
corrective procedure of its legitimization.
Now, the basic idea of a democratic constitution is first that there exists no longer
any sovereign subject that keeps outside or rules over the law because a free and
equal citizenry is constituted by the always already legal procedure of implementing
and concretizing this very constitutional procedure. Democracy allows ‘only as
much state as its constitution creates.’27 There is no state outside the legal procedure
of constitutional and normal legislation and concretization of law, hence there is no
difference left between state and law (as in Kelsen’s theory of law).28 Yet, also the
23 Arendt, On Revolution.
24 Quoted from J. Habermas, ‘Ist der Herzschlag der Revolution zum Stillstand gekommen?’, in
Habermas (ed.) Die Ideen von 1789 (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1989).
25 See: S. Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000).
26 I. Maus, Zur Aufklärung der Demokratietheorie (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1992); J.Habermas
Faktizität und Geltung (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1992; trans. W. Rehg as Between Facts and
Norms, Cambridge, Polity, 1996).
27 A. Arndt, ‘Umwelt und Recht’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 25 (1963): 848 ff.
28 On Kelsen see now: H. Brunkhorst and R. Voigt, Rechts-Staat. Staat, internationale Gemein-
schaft und Völkerrecht bei hans Kelsen (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2008).
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people are no longer a substantial sovereign before and over the law. The pouvoir
constituant is (and must be if democracy is possible at all) always already mediated
by the pouvoir constitué in a (hopefully) virtuous circular process. The difference
between the two is not a fundamental dualism, as in Sieyes (natural v.. positive law)
or in Carl Schmitt (state of exception v.. legal state) but a gradual difference within a
continuum, and with the idea of transforming dualism into a continuum I try to com-
bine John Dewey´s pragmatism with in Hans Kelsen’s legal theory.29 Only then we
can keep Kelsen’s anti-sovereign inside but to get rid of Kelsen’s Non-Kantian, yet
already formal, Apriorism.
Second, modern democracy is not simply rulership of the majority over the mi-
nority (constrained by law or not) but ‘rulership of the ruled’ or self-rule, self-
legislation. Democracy therefore formally and procedurally presupposes the identity
of rulers and ruled. Self-rule or self-legislation is possible only, if everybody who is
affected by collectively binding decisions has a say, has a voice and a vote, has equal
access to the whole process of political discussion, creation and concretization of
legal norms on all levels of Kelsen´s ‘Stufen des Rechts’ (hierarchy of legal actions)
which is on all levels at once is legislation and application/ implementation of norms
and standards (against we have here a continuum of creation and implementation of
legal actions). As individual human being everybody who is affected by a legally
binding decision has to have sufficient and equal access to the discussion, creation
and implementation of legal norms, on all levels of the legal hierarchy, in parlia-
ments as well as in referenda, in international organization as well as in courts, in
governments as well as in local administrations. Hence, universal human rights are
the indispensable and necessary condition for any democratic will formation that is
self-legislative rulership by the ruled (‘Herrschaft Beherrschter’).30 Without these
rights no equal access would be possible, and without universal rights no access for
all affected would be possible. This is mirrored by constitutional history: All democ-
ratic power-founding constitution textbooks are based on the dialectical tension be-
tween universal human rights which do not allow to exclude anybody on the one
hand, and concrete rights of citizenship, constitutional norms of check and balances
etc. on the other hand, which never can avoid to exclude or silence some people or
groups, minorities or even majorities etc.31 Therefore we can argue with Susan
29 For more see: H. Brunkhorst, ‘Kritik am Dualismus des internationalen Recht – Hans Kelsen und
die Völkerrechtsrevolution des 20. Jahrhunderts’, in R. Kreide and A. Niederberger (eds.) Inter-
nationale Verrechtlichung. Nationale Demokratien im Zeitalter globaler Politik, (Frankfurt
am Main and New York, Campus, 2008); further the last section of Brunkhorst, ‘Cosmopol-
itanism and Democratic Freedom’.
30 For this definition see C. Möllers, ‘Der parlamentarische Bundesstaat – Das vergessene
Spannungsverhältnis von Parlament, Demokratie und Bundesstaat’, in Föderalismus – Au-
flösung oder Zukunft der Staatlichkeit? (München, Boorberg 1997), p. 97; Brunkhorst, Soli-
darity, 70ff.
31 This is Derrida´s point: see J. Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Author-
ity”’ in D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and D. G. Carlson (eds.) Deconstruction and the Possibility
of Justice (London, Routledge, 1992).
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Marks, that the function of the legal principle of democratic inclusion in national
and international law is to keep the meaning of democracy open for ever new voices,
new definitions of citizenship, democratic participation beyond representative gov-
ernment, and new institutions of democratic legitimation beyond prevailing national
borders etc.
IV.
Coming back to torture, there can be no doubt that the principle of democratic inclu-
sion and the idea of self-legislative rulership of all ruled individual human beings
(of all human being affected by collectively binding decisions) categorically ex-
cludes torture. A democratic constitution stipulates the relativization of security with
freedom and prohibits in reverse the relativization of freedom with security. Security
however fundamental for the exercise of rights, is limited by the basic right that is to
protect. A democratic legal system that does not allow a loophole for ‘salvation’ tor-
ture, ‘does not miss the opportunity to a state of emergency, it only refuses to offer
the revocation of itself in that case’, Gertrude Lübbe-Wolf wrote already in the
1980s, now judge at the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.32 This is so be-
cause legalized torture would destroy the possibility of individual self-determination
of the one exposed to torture, hence, torture would destroy the possibility to say
freely yes or no. Moreover, torture in particular would destroy the democratic self-
determination because legalized, and only legalized torture oppresses the opportu-
nity of subjects to the law of torture, to intervene every time into the public issue on
this law once it is applied to her or him. Thus, the most elementary method of the
individual affected by law to participate democratically in its making – namely to be
able to interfere with an argument about its validity at every time, as the chain of
democratic legitimacy demands it – would cease to exist. A law to which both, the
torturer and the tortured could accept or reject, no longer would be possible. As op-
posed to legal torture, not even the otherwise barbarian death penalty destroys that
option. The condemned individual can agree or disagree with it until the very last
second in order to continue the egalitarian argument about its validity even beyond
his own death.
V.
A brief additional remark on the ticking bomb: Legal and moral discourse are differ-
ent matters. Besides other advances, the differentiation of legal and moral norms in-
creases our individual freedom. The difference enables us to behave immorally
32 Quoted from Heribert Prantl, ‘Rettungsfoltern’, Süddeutsche Zeitung 19 November 2004, p.
13.
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without fear of legal sanctions. The increase here is an increase of liberal freedom,
the freedom of Kant’s ‘Volk von Teufeln’ – ‘people of devils’, or Hobbes’ negative
or legal freedom that allows the citizens to do everything they want to do unless it is
not explicitly forbidden by law. Yet there is also an increase of moral (or practical-
rational) freedom because acting in accordance with the moral law now depends
only on the individual conscience, deliberation and decision of the actor; hence the
difference of law and morality increases the (Kantian) personal autonomy of the in-
dividual human being who is no longer bound to the imperative of the concrete
moral life or Sittlichkeit of the societal community, and its traditional overlap of mo-
rality and law.
The separation of morals and law therefore puts the full responsibility for deci-
sions on the conscience on the individual. Someone who thinks for moral reasons
that it is in a case of emergency necessary to torture and to violate the constitution
fundamentally as a bearer of public authority, has to set the record straight with his
or her own conscience, and with the public moral discourse which cannot bind him
or her externally, and can not excuse him or her legally. For the sake of legal and
moral freedom, law cannot resolve this tragic conflict. There may be cases where
arguments both for and against torture can present morally sound arguments. Once
the bomb has started ticking, the respective officials (and only they) may see it fit to
violate the constitution, because they believe to have good moral reasons for torture.
As opposed to law, morality doesn’t know any limits and does not allow for
dogmatics. That in itself excludes an overlap of moral and legal discourses. Contra-
dictions between morals and law can, contrary to Kant´s beliefs, never be excluded.
Therefore, it is true that an, in current law, irreparable collision between morals and
law can occur in any single case, although positive law has to remain morally ac-
ceptable as a whole. This is the price to be paid for what is gained from differentia-
tion. From the perspective of law, there is nothing ‘outside the law code’: ‘Torture is
either right or wrong – tertium non datur. Legal prohibitions of torture do not pro-
hibit the political and moral discussion. But they do assign the competence to de-
cide.’33 The law would have to be executed on the German chancellor Merkel, or
any other official who takes his or her competence to order torture to prevent Berlin
from falling victim to a nuclear bomb, as Kant´s in this case justified rigorism de-
mands. Kant would have had her executed because of high treason. In the people’s
collective memory, however, that same chancellor would probably be worshiped as
a moral hero – even if both the legal and the moral prize for this rescue would re-
main visible (like in classical tragedy).
33 Hong, Folterverbot 25.
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5. Survey of the Crime of Torture in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY
Tsvetana Kamenova1
A. Introduction
The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law is governed by its Statute, adopted by
the Security Council of the United Nations on 25 May 1993 and by the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal, adopted by the Judges of the
International Tribunal on 11 February 1994, as amended. Under the Statute, the In-
ternational Tribunal has the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991. Articles 2 through 5 of the Statute further confer upon the
International Tribunal jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949 (Article 2); violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3);
genocide (Article 4); and crimes against humanity (Article 5).
The practice of torture has existed through all periods of history and is not confined
to any single political system, regime, culture, religion or geographic location.2 The
offences of torture as they are set forth in the ICTY Statute are not defined, thus
leaving the determination of the meaning of ‘torture’ to the jurisprudence of the Tri-
bunal.
The prohibition of torture in international law derives from a number of instru-
ments, notably Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and from international jus
cogens. It is generally understood to be without any exceptions whatsoever, but at-
tempts have recently been made to reduce the prohibition, allowing torture in situa-
tions of grave emergency, for instance, in the notorious case of the ticking time
bomb. It may therefore be said that the prohibition of torture is indeed absolute, re-
gardless of recent attempts to reduce this prohibition.
The Appeals Chamber of ICTY determined that under customary International
Law crimes against humanity could be committed in peacetime and that war crimes
are punishable when committed in non-international armed conflict. As one re-
nowned scholar states ‘[these findings are of direct relevance to the International
criminalization of torture, which was already acknowledged to be a crime against
1 Dr. Kamenova is at present judge at ICTY and law professor at the Institute for Legal Studies,
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The views expressed are those of the author.
2 D. Derby, ‘Torture’ in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law (2nd ed., New
York, Transnational Publishers, 1999) vol. I, p. 705.
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humanity as well as a war crime, but only in a narrow ambit.’3 It had been contended
that the crime of torture as a crime against humanity could only be committed in as-




The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the fol-
lowing crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in charac-








(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
The traditional view that war crimes could only be committed in international
armed conflicts would have excluded torture prosecutions with respect to internal
conflict. The conclusions of the Appeals Chamber were of great importance for re-
jecting such restrictive interpretations. Note that these conclusions were made in
1995, before the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC4. The first indicted before
the Tribunal, Tadic, was found responsible for acts of torture by the Trial Chamber
of ICTY in May 1997.
B. Developments in the case law of the ICTY with regard to the definition of torture
I. Prosecutor v. Delalic et al.5
In one of the early cases before the ICTY, the so-called Celebici case, known by the
name of the Celebici prison-camp, a detention facility, located in Central Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Trial Chamber accepted that the prohibition against torture is jus
3 See W. Schabas, ‘The Crime of Torture in the International Criminal Tribunals’. Case West-
ern Reserve Journal of International Law 37 (2006): 349.
4 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court accepted a far broader definition of
torture.
5 Trial Chamber Judgment, 16 November 1998
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cogens.6 In this Judgment the Trial Chamber referred to various international in-
struments that prohibit torture starting with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, including the Convention against torture and the Declaration on the prohibi-
tion of torture. The Trial Chamber said that these General Assembly declarations
and the various treaty provisions established that the prohibition of torture was also
a norm of customary International Law. Accepting that the prohibition of torture
was a norm of jus cogens, the Trial Chamber cited as authority for the proposition
the UN Special Rapporteur for torture.. ‘The prohibition of torture contained in the
International instruments is absolute and non-derogable in any circumstances, says
the Judgment in Celebici case.
1. The Definition of Torture under Customary International Law
There are two international instruments that are solely concerned with the prohibi-
tion of torture, the most significant of which is the Torture Convention7. This Con-
vention was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1984 and has been
ratified or acceded to by many states, including the SFRY, representing more than
half of the membership of the United Nations. It was preceded by the Declaration on
the Protection from Torture, which was adopted by the United Nations General As-
sembly on 9 December 1975 without a vote.
The Trial Chamber Judgment notes that the prohibition contained in the interna-
tional instruments is absolute and non-derogable in any circumstances.
Despite the clear international consensus that the infliction of acts of torture is
prohibited conduct, few attempts have been made to articulate a legal definition of
torture. In fact, of the instruments prohibiting torture, only three provide any defini-
tion. The first such instrument is the Declaration on Torture, article 1 of which
states:
torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inten-
tionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons. . . .
Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading punish-
ment.
This definition was used as the basis for the one subsequently articulated in the
Torture Convention, which states, in article 1 that,
the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
6 Prosecutor v. Z. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, para. 454
7 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or pu-
nishment. As of 2008 the Torture Convention has been ratified by 145 states.
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reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting
in an official capacity.
This differs from the formulation used in the Declaration on Torture in two ways.
First, there is no reference to torture as an aggravated form of ill-treatment in the
Torture Convention. However, this quantitative element is implicit in the requisite
level of severity of suffering. Secondly, the examples of prohibited purposes in the
Torture Convention explicitly include ‘any reason based on discrimination of any
kind’, whereas this is not the case in the Declaration on Torture.
Having in mind also the third such instrument, the Inter-American Convention,
the Trial Chamber Judgment concludes that the definition of torture contained in the
Torture Convention reflects a consensus which the Trial Chamber considers to be
representative of customary international law.
Having reached this conclusion, the Trial Chamber considers in more depth the
requisite level of severity of pain or suffering, the existence of a prohibited purpose,
and the extent of the official involvement that are required in order for the offence of
torture to be proven.
2. Severity of Pain or Suffering
Although the Human Rights Committee, a body established by the ICCPR to moni-
tor its implementation, has had occasion to consider the nature of ill-treatment pro-
hibited under article 7 of the ICCPR, the Committee’s decisions have generally not
drawn a distinction between the various prohibited forms of ill-treatment. However,
in certain cases, the Committee has made a specific finding of torture, based upon
the following conduct: beating, electric shocks and mock executions, plantones,
beatings and lack of food; being held incommunicado for more than three months
whilst being kept blindfolded with hands tied together, resulting in limb paralysis,
leg injuries, substantial weight loss and eye infection.
The European Court and the European Commission of Human Rights have also
developed a body of jurisprudence that deals with conduct constituting torture, pro-
hibited by article 3 of the European Convention. As with the findings of the Human
Rights Committee, it is difficult to obtain a precise picture of the material elements
of torture from the decisions of these bodies, although they are useful in providing
some examples of prohibited conduct8.
The Trial Chamber Judgment notes that the Special Rapporteur on Torture, in his
1986 report, provided a detailed, although not exhaustive, catalogue of those acts
which involve the infliction of suffering severe enough to constitute the offence of
8 The Judgment discusses in detail the Greek Case, (1969) 12a Yearbook of the European
Convention of Human Rights, the Northern Ireland Case (Ireland v. UK (1979-80) 2
E.H.R.R. 25), and Aksoy v. Turkey (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 553.
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torture, including: beating; extraction of nails, teeth, etc.; burns; electric shocks;
suspension; suffocation; exposure to excessive light or noise; sexual aggression;
administration of drugs in detention or psychiatric institutions; prolonged denial of
rest or sleep; prolonged denial of food; prolonged denial of sufficient hygiene; pro-
longed denial of medical assistance; total isolation and sensory deprivation; being
kept in constant uncertainty in terms of space and time; threats to torture or kill rela-
tives; total abandonment; and simulated executions.
The conclusion is made that the most characteristic cases of torture involve posi-
tive acts. However, omissions may also provide the requisite material element, pro-
vided that the mental or physical suffering caused meets the required level of sever-
ity and that the act or omission was intentional, that is an act which, judged objec-
tively, is deliberate and not accidental. Mistreatment that does not rise to the thresh-
old level of severity necessary to be characterized as torture may constitute another
offence.
It is difficult to articulate with any degree of precision the threshold level of suf-
fering at which other forms of mistreatment become torture. However, the existence
of such a grey area should not be seen as an invitation to create an exhaustive list of
acts constituting torture, in order to neatly categorize the prohibition.
3. Prohibited Purpose
Another critical element of the offence of torture is the presence of a prohibited pur-
pose. The list of such prohibited purposes in the Torture Convention expands upon
those enumerated in the Declaration on Torture by adding ‘discrimination of any
kind’. The use of the words ‘for such purposes’ in the customary definition of tor-
ture, indicate that the various listed purposes do not constitute an exhaustive list, and
should be regarded as merely representative. Further, there is no requirement that the
conduct must be solely perpetrated for a prohibited purpose. Thus, in order for this
requirement to be met, the prohibited purpose must simply be part of the motivation
behind the conduct and need not be the predominating or sole purpose.
A fundamental distinction regarding the purpose for which torture is inflicted is
that between a ‘prohibited purpose’ and one which is purely private. The rationale
behind this distinction is that the prohibition on torture is not concerned with private
conduct, which is ordinarily sanctioned under national law. In particular, rape and
other sexual assaults have often been labeled as ‘private’, thus precluding them from
being punished under national or international law. However, such conduct could
meet the purposive requirements of torture as, during armed conflicts, the purposive
elements of intimidation, coercion, punishment or discrimination can often be inte-
gral components of behavior, thus bringing the relevant conduct within the defini-
tion.
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II. The Prosecutor v. Furundzija9
The approach of the Trial Chamber Judgment differs: it discusses first international
humanitarian law and after that international human rights law.
The judgment cites the relevant articles of the Geneva Conventions and the Addi-
tional Protocols, which explicitly prohibit torture in times of armed conflict10.
The Trial Chamber also noted that torture was prohibited as a war crime under ar-
ticle 142 of the Penal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and that
the same violation has been made punishable in the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina by virtue of the decree-law of 11 April 1992.
The Trial Chamber agrees that a general prohibition against torture has evolved in
customary international law. This prohibition has gradually crystallized from the
Lieber Code and The Hague Conventions, in particular articles 4 and 46 of the
Regulations annexed to Convention IV of 1907, read in conjunction with the `Mar-
tens clause' laid down in the Preamble to the same Convention. Torture was one of
the acts expressly classified as a crime against humanity under article II(1)(c) of Al-
lied Control Council Law No. 10. As stated above, the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and the Protocols of 1977 prohibit torture in terms.
All these treaty provisions have ripened into customary rules and it is evinced by
various factors. The Trial Chamber Judgment goes on:
First, these treaties and in particular the Geneva Conventions have been ratified by practically
all States of the world. Admittedly those treaty provisions remain as such and any contracting
party is formally entitled to relieve itself of its obligations by denouncing the treaty (an occur-
rence that seems extremely unlikely in reality); nevertheless the practically universal participa-
tion in these treaties shows that all States accept among other things the prohibition of torture.
In other words, this participation is highly indicative of the attitude of States to the prohibition
of torture. Secondly, no State has ever claimed that it was authorised to practice torture in time
of armed conflict, nor has any State shown or manifested opposition to the implementation of
treaty provisions against torture. When a State has been taken to task because its officials al-
legedly resorted to torture, it has normally responded that the allegation was unfounded, thus
expressly or implicitly upholding the prohibition of this odious practice. Thirdly, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has authoritatively, albeit not with express reference to torture, con-
9 Trial Chamber Judgment, 10 December 1998
10 Under the Statute of the International Tribunal, as interpreted by the Appeals Chamber in the
Tadic Jurisdiction Decision, these treaty provisions may be applied as such by the
International Tribunal if it is proved that at the relevant time all the parties to the conflict
were bound by them. In this case, Bosnia and Herzegovina ratified the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and both Additional Protocols of 1977 on 31 December 1992. Accordingly, at least
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and article 4 of Additional Protocol II,
both of which explicitly prohibit torture, were applicable as minimum fundamental
guarantees of treaty law in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time relevant to the
Indictment. In addition, in 1992, the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina
undertook to observe the most important provisions of the Geneva Conventions, including
those prohibiting torture. Thus undoubtedly the provisions concerning torture applied as
treaty law in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as between the parties to the conflict.
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firmed this custom-creating process: in the Nicaragua case it held that common article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, which inter alia prohibits torture against persons taking no active
part in hostilities, is now well-established as belonging to the corpus of customary interna-
tional law and is applicable both to international and internal armed conflicts.
The Trial Chamber Judgment concludes that the treaty and customary rules im-
pose obligations upon States and other entities in an armed conflict, but first and
foremost address themselves to the acts of individuals, in particular to State officials
or more generally, to officials of a party to the conflict or else to individuals acting
at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of a party to the conflict. Both
customary rules and treaty provisions applicable in times of armed conflict prohibit
any act of torture. Those who engage in torture are personally accountable at the
criminal level for such acts.
Under current international humanitarian law, in addition to individual criminal
liability, State responsibility may ensue as a result of State officials engaging in tor-
ture or failing to prevent torture or to punish torturers. If carried out as an extensive
practice of State officials, torture amounts to a serious breach on a widespread scale
of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human
being, thus constituting a particularly grave wrongful act generating State responsi-
bility.
When discussing international human rights law the Trial Chamber Judgment
notes that the prohibition of torture laid down in human rights treaties enshrines an
absolute right, which can never be derogated from, not even in time of emergency
(on this ground the prohibition also applies to situations of armed conflicts). This is
linked to the fact, that the prohibition on torture is a peremptory norm or jus cogens.
This prohibition is so extensive that States are even barred by international law from
expelling, returning or extraditing a person to another State where there are substan-
tial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.
These treaty provisions impose upon States the obligation to prohibit and punish
torture, as well as to refrain from engaging in torture through their officials. In inter-
national human rights law, which deals with State responsibility rather than individ-
ual criminal responsibility, torture is prohibited as a criminal offence to be punished
under national law; in addition, all States parties to the relevant treaties have been
granted, and are obliged to exercise jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute and punish
offenders. Thus, in human rights law too, the prohibition of torture extends to and
has a direct bearing on the criminal liability of individuals.
The Trial Chamber Judgment points that the prohibition against torture exhibits
three important features:
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1. The Prohibition Even Covers Potential Breaches
States are obliged not only to prohibit and punish torture, but also to forestall its oc-
currence: it is insufficient merely to intervene after the infliction of torture, when the
physical or moral integrity of human beings has already been irremediably harmed
In the case of torture, the mere fact of keeping in force or passing legislation con-
trary to the international prohibition of torture generates international State respon-
sibility.
2. The Prohibition Imposes Obligations Erga Omnes
Furthermore, the prohibition of torture imposes upon States obligations erga omnes,
that is, obligations owed towards all the other members of the international commu-
nity.
Where there exist international bodies charged with impartially monitoring com-
pliance with treaty provisions on torture, these bodies enjoy priority over individual
States in establishing whether a certain State has taken all the necessary measures to
prevent and punish torture and, if they have not, in calling upon that State to fulfill
its international obligations. The existence of such international mechanisms makes
it possible for compliance with international law to be ensured in a neutral and im-
partial manner.
3. The Prohibition Has Acquired the Status of Jus Cogens
While the erga omnes nature appertains to the area of international enforcement, the
other major feature of the principle proscribing torture relates to the hierarchy of
rules in the international normative order. Because of the importance of the values it
protects, this principle has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a
norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and
even ‘ordinary’ customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this higher
rank is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by States through inter-
national treaties or local or special customs or even general customary rules not en-
dowed with the same normative force.
Clearly, the jus cogens nature of the prohibition against torture articulates the no-
tion that the prohibition has now become one of the most fundamental standards of
the international community. Furthermore, this prohibition is designed to produce a
deterrent effect, in that it signals to all members of the international community and
the individuals over whom they wield authority that the prohibition of torture is an
absolute value from which nobody must deviate.
Some of the consequences include the fact that torture may not be covered by a
statute of limitations, and must not be excluded from extradition under any political
offence exemption.
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The broad convergence of the aforementioned international instruments and in-
ternational jurisprudence demonstrates that there is now general acceptance of the
main elements contained in the definition set out in article 1 of the Torture Conven-
tion.
The Trial Chamber concludes that it is appropriate to identify or spell out some
specific elements that pertain to torture as considered from the specific viewpoint of
international criminal law relating to armed conflicts. The Trial Chamber considers
that the elements of torture in an armed conflict require that torture:
(i) consists of the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental; in addition;
(ii) this act or omission must be intentional;
(iii) it must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing, intimi-
dating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at discriminating,
on any ground, against the victim or a third person;
(iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict;
(v.) at least one of the persons involved in the torture process must be a public of-
ficial or must at any rate act in a non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of a
State or any other authority- wielding entity.
III. Prosecutor v. Dragoliub Kunarac et al.11
In the Judgment of the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac further clarification is provided
as to the nature of the definition of torture in customary international law as it is
given in the Torture convention, in particular with regard to the participation of a
public official or any other person acting in a non-private capacity. The Appeals
chamber agrees that the definition of the crime of torture, as set out in the Torture
Convention, may be considered to reflect customary international law.
The Torture Convention was addressed to States and sought to regulate their
conduct, and it is only for that purpose and to that extent that the Torture Convention
deals with the acts of individuals acting in an official capacity. Consequently, the
requirement set out by the Torture Convention that the crime of torture be commit-
ted by an individual acting in an official capacity may be considered as a limitation
of the engagement of States; they need prosecute acts of torture only when those acts
are committed by a public official or any other person acting in a non-private capac-
ity
11 Appeals Chamber, 20 June 2002
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In the Furundzija Trial Judgment, the Trial Chamber noted that the definition
provided in the Torture Convention related to the purposes of the Convention.
The accused in that case had not acted in a private capacity, but as a member of
armed forces during an armed conflict, and he did not question that the definition of
torture in the Torture Convention reflected customary international law. In this con-
text, and with the objectives of the Torture Convention in mind, the Appeals Cham-
ber in the Furundzija case was in a legitimate position to assert that at least one of
the persons involved in the torture process must be a public official or must act in a
non-private capacity.
This assertion, which is tantamount to a statement that the definition of torture in
the Torture Convention reflects customary international law as far as the obligation
of States is concerned, must be distinguished from an assertion that this definition
wholly reflects customary international law regarding the meaning of the crime of
torture generally.
The Trial Chamber Judgment in Kunarac was right to say that the public official
requirement is not a requirement under customary international law in relation to the
customary responsibility of an individual for torture outside of the framework of the
Torture Convention. This is confirmed by the Appeals Chamber Judgment.
IV Conclusions
Having reviewed these three cases, it is possible to conclude that two trends could
be observed in the ICTY jurisprudence.
Firstly, this is the expansion of the list of prohibited purposes as well as the dele-
tion of the specific purpose requirement.
Secondly, the removal of the official sanction requirement. All three judgments
accept that the term torture can encompass non-state actors. The first two judgments
qualify this by requiring that such non-state actors act in an official capacity for a
state-like entity. Kunarac accepts that torture can be committed by private individu-
als in violation of international humanitarian law, regardless of official capacity. It
rejects any requirement relating to the status of the perpetrator, considering that tor-
ture is defined solely by the nature of the act committed.
C. Constitutive elements for the crime of torture at present
The constitutive elements required for the crime of torture at the ICTY are:
the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental;
the act or omission must be intentional; and
the act or omission must be for a prohibited purpose, such as obtaining
information or a confession; or punishing, intimidating or coercing the
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victim or a third person; or discriminating, on any ground, against the
victim or the third person.12
Here is a more detailed explanation of the constitutive elements.
I. Severe Pain or Suffering
The threshold level of suffering that is necessary to meet the definition of torture is
difficult to articulate with any degree of precision.13 Moreover, existing case-law has
not determined the absolute degree of pain required for an act to amount to torture.14
However, the Trial Chamber in Kvo ka articulated the following approach:
[i]n assessing the seriousness of any mistreatment, the Trial Chamber must first consider the
objective severity of the harm inflicted. Subjective criteria, such as the physical or mental ef-
fect of the treatment upon the particular victim and, in some cases, factors such as the victim’s
age, sex or state of health will also be relevant in assessing the gravity of the harm. 15
The articulation by the Kvo ka Trial Chamber has received the endorsement of
the Trial Chambers in other subsequent judgements.16 One such judgement provided
a further detailed articulation:
When assessing the seriousness of the acts charged as torture, the Trial Chamber must take
into account all the circumstances of the case, including the nature and context of the infliction
of pain, the premeditation and institutionalization of the ill-treatment, the physical condition of
the victim, the manner and method used, and the position of inferiority of the victim. In
particular, to the extent that an individual has been mistreated over a prolonged period of time,
or that he or she has been subjected to repeated or various forms of mistreatment, the severity
of the acts should be assessed as a whole to the extent that it can be shown that this lasting
period or repetition of acts are inter-related, follow a pattern or are directed towards the same
prohibited goal.17
Mistreatment that does not rise to the threshold level of severity necessary to be
characterized as torture may constitute another offence.18
The physical or mental suffering need not be visible after the commission of the
crimes in question.19 Though torture often causes permanent (physical or mental)
12 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, paras. 142 and 144; see also Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvo ka et
al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, 2 November 2001 (‘Kvo ka Trial Judgment’), para. 141, cited
with approval in Kvo ka Appeal Judgment, para. 289.
13 elebi i Trial Judgment, paras. 461-469.
14 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 149.
15 Kvo ka Trial Judgment, para. 143.
16 See Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, 15 March 2002
(‘Krnojelac Trial Judgment’), para. 182; Br anin Trial Judgment, para. 484.
17 Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para. 182.
18 elebi i Trial Judgment, para. 469.
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damage to the health of the victims, permanent injury is not a requirement of tor-
ture.20
The act of rape, once it has been proved, necessarily implies the pain or suffering
as required by the definition of the crime of torture.21
II Intentional Act or Omission
Most characteristic cases of torture involve positive acts. However, omissions may
also provide the requisite material element, provided that the mental or physical suf-
fering caused meets the required level of severity and that the act or omission was
intentional, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not acciden-
tal.22
There is an important distinction between ‘motivation’ and ‘intent.’ For instance,
in torture of sexual nature, the Appeals Chamber has held that even if the perpetra-
tor’s motivation is entirely sexual, it does not follow that the perpetrator does not
have the intent to commit an act of torture or that his conduct does not cause severe
pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, since such pain or suffering is a
likely and logical consequence of his conduct. … In view of the definition, it is im-
portant to establish whether a perpetrator intended to act in a way which, in the nor-
mal course of events, would cause severe pain and suffering, whether physical or
mental, to his victims.23
III. Prohibited Purpose
The prohibited purposes listed in the definition of torture ‘do not constitute an ex-
haustive list, and should be regarded as merely representative.’24
Humiliation of a victim has been included as a prohibited purpose by some Trial
Chambers, while other Trial Chambers have rejected this notion.25 The Appeals
Chamber has not clearly taken a position with respect this question.26
19 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 150. In the appellate brief, the Applicant-Accused had ar-
gued that the evidence from his expert medical witnesses showed that there were no severe
consequences to the victims thereafter.
20 Kvo ka Trial Judgment, para. 148.
21 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 151.
22 elebi i Trial Judgment, para. 468.
23 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 153.
24 elebi i Trial Judgment, para. 470.
25 Kvo ka Trial Judgment, para. 152; Furund ija Trial Judgment, para. 162 (specifically includ-
ing the humiliation of the victim among the possible purposes of torture). But see Krnojelac
Trial Judgment, supra n. 15, para. 186 (explicitly rejecting the Trial Chamber’s dicta in
Kvo ka and Furund ija).
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Acts need not have been perpetrated solely for one of the purposes prohibited by
international law.’27 According to the Appeals Chamber, ‘if one prohibited purpose
is fulfilled by the conduct, the fact that such conduct was also intended to achieve a
non-listed purpose (even one of a sexual nature) is immaterial.’28
The prohibited purpose need not be the predominating purpose.29
26 The Appeals Chamber endorsed the Trial Chamber definition given in Furund ija. However,
the Appeals Chamber has also endorsed a definition given by the Trial Chamber in Kunarac,
which specifically did not include humiliation of a victim as a prohibited purpose. See
Furund ija Appeal Judgment, para. 111; Kunarac Appeal Judgment, , paras. 142-144.
27 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 155.
28 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 155.
29 elebi i Trial Judgment, para. 470; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al, Case No. IT-96-
23-T & IT 96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001 (‘Kunarac Trial Judgment’) para. 486. The Appeals
Chamber has been silent as to whether the prohibited purpose must be predominating.
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6. English Law and Evidence Obtained by Torture: Vindication of Basic
Principle or Judicial Abnegation? Implications of A v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department.
Patrick Birkinshaw
There can be few issues on which international legal opinion is more clear than on the con-
demnation of torture.1
Unhappily, condemnatory words are not always matched by conduct.2
Many of the chapters in this book deal with the question of torture in a philosoph-
ical, pragmatic, jurisprudential, socio-cultural or broad contextual sense. The present
chapter deals with a specific point of law raised in the case A(FC)3 but to understand
what was involved in resolving that point of law, it is necessary to outline some fea-
tures behind the background to present terrorist activity and the UK government’s
response to international terrorism. The point of law raised is of vital importance.
Furthermore, if the arguments of Dershowitz are supported, namely as torture is
widely practised in ‘civilized states’ we should stop being hypocritical and torture
should be made lawful under strict judicial conditions,4 it would be difficult to see
why the next step should not be taken: that statements extracted by torture should be
admissible in judicial proceedings – the point at issue in A(FC). And if statements,
why not confessions? The universal condemnation of torture since the Second
World War would then count for nothing.5 Behind the judgment of the appellate
committee of the House of Lords is a warning from Holdsworth: ‘Once torture has
become acclimatized in a legal system it spreads like an infectious disease. It saves
the labour of investigation. It hardens and brutalizes those who have become accus-
tomed to use it.’6
1 A (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71 per Lord Bingham
para. 33.
2 Ibid, per Lord Nicholls para. 67.
3 See note 1 above.
4 A. Dershowitz Shouting Fire: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age (Boston, Little Brown and
Company, 2002). The debate about torture is legion but an antidote to Dershowitz is J.
Waldron’s ‘Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House’ Columbia Law
Review 105 (2005): 1681-1750.
5 See D. M. Rejali Torture and Democracy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008).
6 W. F. Holdsworth History of English Law (London, Methuen, 1922), vol 5 pp. 194-95.
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A. Terrorism in the UK
Despite the long history of Irish Republican terrorism within the United Kingdom it
is surprising that the decision in A(FC) raised points of law that had not previously
been addressed by British or Northern Irish courts. Were statements obtained by tor-
ture admissible before a judicial tribunal in the UK? Previous case law and legisla-
tion had focused upon the admissibility or otherwise of confessions obtained by im-
proper means and s. 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 excluded such
confessions. The situation in A(FC) raised the question of the admissibility of evi-
dence from a third party, which had allegedly been obtained by torture overseas
without the involvement of British agents and which had been used as intelligence to
order executive detention of suspected terrorists within the UK. That novel point had
arisen because of the global context in which terrorism operated and because of the
contention that national security was now an internationally influenced concern and
not simply a national one. That was the result of the House of Lords decision in
Rehman v. Secretary of State for the Home Department which had given a new
meaning to terrorism and actions contrary to the interests of national security.7
Within this evolving context, governments faced the problem of having within
their jurisdiction individuals suspected of terrorist activity who were not citizens of
the UK but who could not be deported to their place of origin or elsewhere because
of the risk of breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the
way they would be treated in those countries, specifically torture or inhuman and
degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR. This was the effect of the Strasbourg
Court of Human Rights judgment in Chahal v. UK.8 There was correspondingly not
enough evidence to bring before a criminal court to offer the prospect of a successful
prosecution for criminal offences. Forms of executive detention were therefore in-
troduced in the UK under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 s.23.9 It
was in procedures leading to such detention before the Special Immigration Appeal
Commission (SIAC) that the issue of admissibility of the evidence was called into
question.
The present war on terrorism had therefore raised the question of detention and
admissibility of evidence. However, the British government had a long history of
involvement in counter terrorist activities and the strain that such involvement ex-
erted on values of liberal democratic society and security. The conflict brought
about by British involvement in Ireland has a long heritage. Internment (detention
without trial) in Northern Ireland was re-introduced between 1971-75 and powers of
detention without trial were introduced in 1975;10 Diplock Courts (a criminal trial
without a jury for ‘scheduled’ offences) operated for over thirty years until 2007.
7 [2002] 1 All ER 122 (HL).
8 (1996) 23 EHRR 413 – there was intervention by UK in July 2007 to overrule this decision in
Ramzy v. The Netherlands Application No. 25424/05.
9 Detention followed certification by the Secretary of State under s. 21.
10 Removed by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1998 s. 3.
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Although the question in A(FC) had not been squarely confronted by British courts,
the use by British forces and officials of techniques for questioning interned suspects
in Northern Ireland had attracted the attention of the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights. In Ireland v. UK11 five techniques of sensory deprivation
practised on internees amounted to degrading and inhumane treatment but, by ma-
jority, they did not amount to torture. The former European Commission on Human
Rights did establish unanimously that the combination of techniques amounted to
torture.
B. Further Developments
Before examining how the operation of procedures introduced in 2001 precipitated
the legal challenge in A(FC), some other important developments have to be exam-
ined. The UK Security and Intelligence Services had been brought within the remit
of statutes beginning in 1989 and continuing with legislation in 1994, 1996 and the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Some limited forms of Parliamentary
oversight via the Security and Intelligence Committee were introduced in 1994. Un-
til this legislation, the services operated clandestinely under the royal prerogative
with only minimal statements concerning them made to Parliament. Information
about operations and identities were strictly prohibited. Under the prerogative, the
services as intelligence gathering bodies had no executive powers and the security
service acted through the agency of domestic police forces where necessary. As well
as allowing some more information to be published about the services, albeit very
limited, the legislation was necessary to give the services powers to carry out what
would otherwise be unlawful actions, both at home and abroad. In order not to allow
the operations of the services to be exposed, evidence obtained by telephone or
email intercepts cannot be admitted as evidence in a court of law. The Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 does allow evidence which is otherwise in-
admissible to be used in proceedings before SIAC which hears appeals from sus-
pected terrorists and this was seen as crucial in the Court of Appeal judgment in
A(FC). This special dispensation was given, as we shall see, a wider significance.
The further development was the decision in Pinochet (No. 1).12 The case in-
volved the former dictator and president of Chile, Pinochet. As is widely known, a
Spanish prosecutor sought his extradition from England to Spain to face various
charges covering murder, torture and kidnapping of Spanish citizens resident in
Chile during Pinochet’s dictatorship. The case made three appearances in the House
of Lords. The first case provided a wide ranging judgment to the effect that ius co-
gens (binding and generally accepted norms of international law) and customary in-
11 (1978) 2 EHRR 25: these involved ‘wall-standing’ under stress, hooding, subjection to noise,
deprivation of sleep and deprivation of food and drink.
12 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1) [1998] 4
All ER 897 (HL).
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ternational law determined that a former head of state could not be immune from
prosecution for acts for which he was responsible and which did not form a part of
his official functions – immunity only applied to acts performed by him in the exer-
cise of his official functions as a Head of State – acts of torture and hostage taking
could not be so regarded. The judgment imposed no limits in relation to the time of
Pinochet’s lack of immunity while in office. The judgment was nullified by a differ-
ent panel of the appellate committee of the House of Lords because of the associa-
tion of one of the judges with a body that had intervened in the case. This was un-
precedented. In Pinochet (No. 3),13 the Law Lords ruled that the combined effect of
s.134 Criminal Justice Act 198814 and the Convention against Torture meant that
there would be no immunity from charges of torture for a former head of state of
Chile after Chile signed the Convention in 1988. While many of the offences ruled
extraditable in the first hearing were now inoperative, some were still ‘live’ and Pi-
nochet’s extradition was ordered for these offences.15 Because of intervention by the
Home Secretary, he was not, however, extradited to Spain.16
C. Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)
SIAC was introduced by legislation in 1997 as a response to the decision in Chahal
by the Court of Human Rights (above).17 That case centred on the inadequacy of the
procedures adopted by the British authorities to determine whether a person whose
presence in the UK was deemed not to be conducive to the public good on the
grounds of national security should be deported. The procedure amounted to a
breach of Art 5(4) ECHR18 so that Chahal’s detention was unlawful. He could not be
deported because this would amount to a breach of Art 3 ECHR.19 The SIAC was
influenced to some extent by Canadian procedures. The rules of procedure of SIAC
had the imprimatur of no less a figure than Lord Lester QC – a long standing cham-
pion of human rights protection. He described them in Parliamentary proceedings as
‘a fair compromise’ between the liberties of an individual and national security.20
The Commission is chaired by a High Court judge and since 2001 is a superior court
13 R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [1999] 2
All ER 97 (HL).
14 S. 134 implemented the Convention against Torture in the UK.
15 [1999] 2 All ER 97 (HL) by virtue of s. 2 Extradition Act 1989.
16 Pinochet (No. 3) was distinguished in Jones v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26
when the House of Lords refused to allow the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its officials from
being sued in civil law in English courts for damages for alleged acts of torture inflicted on
British citizens in Saudi Arabia. The court ruled this would be contrary to state immunity.
17 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 and the procedural rules contained in SI
1034/2003 and SI 1285/2007.
18 The right to a ‘speedy challenge’ before a court.
19 T. Poole ‘Courts and Conditions of Uncertainty in “Times of Crisis”’ LSE Legal Studies
Working Paper No. 7/2007.
20 HL Debs. vol 580 cols. 1437-38.
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of record. SIAC had been criticized by the House of Lords in Rehman for taking too
prescriptive an approach when reviewing decisions by the Secretary of State on
questions of ‘the interests of national security’ lying behind a deportation or deten-
tion -- this was a matter of judgement peculiarly within the area of expertise of the
Secretary of State and those who advised him although a decision could be reviewed
on grounds of unfairness or perversity.21 SIAC’s task is to establish: were there rea-
sonable grounds for the Secretary of State’s belief or suspicion and not whether the
latter had made a proper judgement call on what the interests of national security
required and what amounted to terrorism? As we shall see below, the procedures in
SIAC weigh heavily against the appellant and are heavily compromised because of
national security implications. This is common throughout administrative decisions
in the war on terror.22
The 1997 Act witnessed the introduction of ‘special advocates’ or counsel to deal
with sensitive evidence that could not be disclosed to the suspected terrorist ‘de-
portee’. Special counsel cannot meet or have contact with the ‘client’ after the spe-
cial counsel has seen the closed evidence. Although such a meeting was stated to be
theoretically possible it was not allowed as a practice. Examination and cross ex-
amination of witnesses may take place in the absence of the appellant. The appellant
may receive a summary of evidence but this will not include items that should re-
main ‘closed’. The limitations of special counsel procedure from the point of view
of fairness were graphically illustrated by Lords Bingham and Steyn in Roberts v.
Parole Board23 although the two judges were in the minority in the decision. The
security and intelligence parties involved in SIAC proceedings operate under inter-
nal guidance on what should be disclosed and material helpful to the appellant
should be disclosed, but not to the appellant or his lawyers. This self-regulating or-
dinance operated under the control of one of the parties to the process.24 SIAC can
hear evidence which is not otherwise admissible in legal proceedings.25 This would
21 [2001] 4 All ER 122 (HL).
22 R (Gillan) v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [2006] UKHL 12 where in making
decisions in relation to security and individual liberties Lord Bingham said there are ‘what
appear to be considered and informed evaluations of the terrorist threat on one side and
effectively nothing save a measure of scepticism on the other. There is no basis on which the
respondents’ (Government’s) case can be rejected. This is not a question of deference but of
“relative institutional competence”’ (at para. 17).
23 [2005] UKHL 45. Lord Woolf ruled use of special counsel in Parole Board hearings was
permissible, providing ‘If a case arises where it is impossible for the Board both to make use
of information that has not been disclosed to the prisoner and, at the same time, protect the
prisoner from a denial of his fundamental right to a fair hearing then the rights of the prisoner
have to take precedence, but we have not in my view reached the stage in this case where we
can say this has happened’ (paras. 78 and 62).
24 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 per Laws LJ paras.
278-280.
25 SIAC (Procedure) Rules 2003, SI 1034, r. 44(3).
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be directed to the exclusion in English law of ‘hearsay’ evidence in criminal trials.26
Some of this, however, was the evidence allegedly obtained by torture. An exception
was made so that evidence obtained by intercepts was allowed to be heard.27 The
procedures represent an attempted balance between the requirements of justice and
fairness and secrecy in the public interest. The names of witnesses or informers or
agents or the latter’s methods for instance could not be disclosed.
D. Detention and Control Orders
It should be noted that the proceedings in A(FC) had been preceded by a decision of
the House of Lords concerning the same appellants in which the UK government’s
post 9/11 reaction to the shocking events in the United States, the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 s.23 and indefinite detention without trial for being a
suspected terrorist had been challenged.28 This involved an appeal from the decision
of SIAC which had allowed the appellants’ appeal against detention. The House of
Lords in the detention case reversed the Court of Appeal which had upheld the legal-
ity of the detentions.29 The Law Lords declared that s.23 was incompatible with the
Convention because it amounted to breaches of Articles 5 (unlawful detention) and
14 (discrimination in enjoyment of protection of rights) of the ECHR on the grounds
of proportionality and that they were discriminatory. The orders derogating from Art
5 ECHR were quashed although apart from one judge the Law Lords upheld the
Home Secretary’s declaration of a state of emergency which was a necessary condi-
tion for derogation.
The government’s eventual response to this adverse decision on detention was to
introduce a regime of control orders (CO) under the Prevention of Terrorism Act
2005. These are subject to the Secretary of State having reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that an individual is or has been involved in terrorism related activity and the
Secretary of State considers a CO necessary for purposes connected with protecting
members of the public from a risk of terrorism. They involve confinement to one’s
home for a fixed period each day and other restrictions such as electronic tagging. In
certain circumstances, the Court of Appeal ruled that they may amount to a breach
of Article 5.30 This ruling on control orders caused the then Home Secretary to sug-
gest that protection of the ECHR should be removed in some areas. If there were a
26 Under special circumstances, hearsay may be admitted in criminal trials: ss. 114-118
Criminal Justice Act 2003.
27 RIPA s. 18(1)(e).
28 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. These powers were
subject to annual renewal. They are now replaced by control orders as explained which are
also subject to annual renewal. An independent reviewer is appointed under the Prevention of
Terrorism Act to review the operation of the Act.
29 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1502.
30 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ [2006] EWCA Civ 1141; see also Secretary
of State for the Home Department v. E [2007] EWHC 233 (Admin)
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derogation from the Convention, only the courts could make a control order. Other-
wise they are made by the Secretary of State and challengeable in the Administrative
Court of the High Court. The Court of Appeal, however, ruled separately that the
procedures involved in making control orders, very similar to the SIAC procedures,
which used closed evidence which was not shown to the subject of the order and the
use of special counsel did not constitute a breach of Article 6 ECHR which provides
a right to a fair trial in the determination of one’s civil rights.31 The Administrative
Court originally ruled that there had been a breach of Article 6 but was overruled by
the Court of Appeal.
The House of Lords subsequently upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in
holding that a non derogating control order of 18 hours did amount to detention and
breached Article 5 ECHR.32
However, in relation to Article 6, the majority of Law Lords disagreed with the
Court of Appeal and were not convinced that the prohibition on disclosing ‘closed
material’ to the subject of a control order would allow a fair procedure to take place
within the terms of Article 6 and the civil limb of justice. There may be cases where
the use of special advocates and other devices could not overcome a basic lack of
fairness.33 Each case would have to be dealt with carefully to ensure existing proce-
dures comply with fairness and with Article 6.34 The Council of Europe Commis-
sioner for Human Rights and UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights
‘had difficulty in accepting that a hearing could be fair if an adverse decision could
be based on material that the controlled person had no effective opportunity to chal-
lenge or rebut.’35 Para 4(3)(d) of the Schedule to the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism
Act (which requires a court not to order disclosure of material which it would be
against the public interest to disclose) should be read and given effect under s.3
HRA 199836 ‘except where to do so would be incompatible with the right of the con-
trolled person to a fair trial’ said Baroness Hale.37 She emphasized that evidence
used against the subject of the order may be obtained by torture and as we shall see
the burden is upon the challenger to prove that the evidence was obtained by torture.
It is particularly difficult for a person subject to a CO to do this.38 Intercept material
may be used on CO proceedings and the features involved in SIAC proceedings will
be present, ie secrecy. At para 66 of her judgment, she gave examples of how the
judge and special advocate should stringently test the material and the advocate
should be allowed to call witnesses to rebut the closed material noting the tendency
31 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB [2006] EWCA Civ 1140.
32 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ [2007] UKHL 45.
33 See note 22 above.
34 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB (FC) [2007] UKHL 46. The procedures
are in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 Schedule para. 4 and Part 76 CPR.
35 Per Lord Bingham in MB at para. 41.





to over emphasize the claim for secrecy in terrorist cases.39 Some of these instruc-
tions seem to contradict the wording of Civil Procedure Rules 76.25 which govern
CO procedures and the Secretary of State can object to the special advocate commu-
nicating with the subject of the CO. The case was remitted to the Administrative
Court for reconsideration in the light of this guidance.
E. A(FC) in SIAC and the Court of Appeal
Having set the context of the A(FC) decision we come to the crucial point of law.
Can evidence obtained by torture be admissible before SIAC? SIAC itself decided
that torture only went to the ‘weight’ of evidence, i.e. its reliability, not its admissi-
bility.40 The Court of Appeal upheld this ruling.41 The court ruled that there was no
precedent against it; the authorities only covered confessions extracted from the de-
fendant. International prohibitions (Art 15 Covenant against Torture (CAT)) con-
cerning non admissibility of evidence extracted by torture) had not been imple-
mented to that extent in domestic law and did not amount to ius cogens. SIAC was
not in breach of Article 6 ECHR because of the nature of its task – it was not deter-
mining a fact: was the detainee a terrorist? It was asking: were there reasonable
grounds for the Secretary of State’s belief or suspicion that the detainee was a terror-
ist and his presence in the UK was against the interest of national security? How this
can be interpreted as a non judicial act carried out by a judicial tribunal chaired by a
High Court judge beggars belief although the criticism of the House of Lords in
Rehman had emphasized the limits of the capability of SIAC in second guessing
judgements about national security. This was noted above. The receipt of evidence
by torture was not ‘offensive’ under Article 6 given the limited nature of the SIAC’s
review of the Secretary of State’s belief or suspicion and its support by ‘reasonable
grounds’.42 Article 6 ECHR was not subject to Article 15 CAT because ‘a general
requirement to interpret Article 6 in harmony with other rules of international law
does not make compliance with those other rules a condition of compliance with Ar-
ticle 6.’ That, said Laws LJ ‘proves too much’.43 There are objections to these points
that were considered by the House of Lords on appeal, and some that were not (see
below) but one of the most telling points was raised by Neuberger LJ, the dissenting
judge, who saw disparities between the common law and the position under the
European Convention in the judgment of the majority:
39 Citing S. Turner and S. Schulhofer The Secrecy Problem in Terrorism Trials (New York,
Brennan Centre for Justice, NYU School of Law, 2005).
40 29 October 2003. SIAC gives open judgments and closed judgments.
41 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123: a 2-1 majority
decision. The decision was made after the Court of Appeal decision involving detention of
the parties involved in A(FC) but before the House of Lords decision reversing the Court of




If my [dissenting] conclusions on the issue so far are correct, they may be said to be somewhat
ironic: the common law of England, which has a particularly good record as to the vice of tor-
ture since 1640, does not exclude evidence obtained by torture, whereas the law of Europe,
where the abolition of torture is rather more recent, would exclude such evidence.44
The judgment was met with disbelief, shock and even horror. There was certainly
criticism of the majority judgments in the House of Lords but Lord Rodger did
spring to the defence of the majority.
F. A (FC) in the House of Lords.45
The large part of the remainder of my chapter will focus on this immensely impor-
tant case and the separate judgments of the Law Lords who decided unanimously
that such evidence could not be admissible in a judicial forum in the UK.
The appeal was heard by a seven judge panel of the appellate committee (usually
it is five) denoting the importance of the question at stake. Can a judicial body re-
ceive evidence obtained by torture administered by foreign agents or is it inadmissi-
ble under the common law or otherwise? Torture itself was outlawed in 1640 (by
implication) and no known warrants had been issued in England by the Crown to
extract torture since that date. Although, victims were sent to Scotland after that date
to be tortured -- an early form of ‘extraordinary rendition’ – until cessation of this
practice in 1708 after union with England.46
There was unqualified criticism by several of the Law Lords of the majority in the
Court of Appeal where the matter had been approached as a technical point of evi-
dence and where one might add the matter of substance was defeated by technicali-
ties. ‘This condemnation [of torture by the common law] is more aptly categorized
as a constitutional principle than as a rule of law’ declared Lord Bingham.47 ‘It trivi-
alises the issue ... to treat it as an argument about the law of evidence. The issue is
one of constitutional principle.’48 For Lord Hoffmann: ‘Rejection of torture has a
constitutional resonance for English people which cannot be overestimated.’49
Before examining the arguments under the various heads of law presented to the
Law Lords, Lord Bingham noted that since 2001 SIAC had been a superior court of
record by virtue of amendments introduced by the Anti-terrorism etc Act. The fact
44 Para. 474
45 [2005] UKHL 71.
46 S. 5 Treason Act 1708 disallowed admission of confessions extracted by torture. The UK
Joint Parliamentary Committee on Security and Intelligence has reported on Rendition Cm
7171 (2007) Government Response Cm 7172 and The Handling of Detainees byUK
Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq Cm 6469 (2005) and
Government Response Cm 6511.
47 Para. 12.
48 Lord Bingham at para. 52.
49 Para. 93.
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that the majority of the Court of Appeal therefore ruled that SIAC was not a judicial
body for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR is remarkable. The argument as to the in-
admissibility of such evidence was made under three heads: common law, the
ECHR and international law.
I. The Common Law
The common law had long established that statements by an accused are inadmissi-
ble if improperly obtained: the common law authority is Ibrahim v. R50 although
there are numerous examples and ss. 76 and 78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act
1984 have confirmed the route taken by the common law in legislation. The latter
section does provide a discretion to exclude evidence where in all the circumstances
its admission would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings that
the court ought not to admit it.51 But this would not apply to inadmissible evidence –
the very question at issue in A(FC). What the House of Lords noted, unlike the
Court of Appeal, was that the question had not been tested in English courts (unlike
confessions) because evidence of statements of others was hearsay and thereby in-
admissible in any event. The rules of criminal evidence in English law prevented the
issue from being discussed until SIAC was allowed to hear evidence which was oth-
erwise inadmissible. How, asked Lord Bingham, could evidence obtained by torture
be admissible when common lawyers regarded torture as ‘totally repugnant to the
fundamental principles of the common law’ and as a creature of royal prerogative. It
was a ‘revolting brutality of the [erstwhile] continental criminal procedure’.52 This
sounds admirable, but punishment ordered by common law courts could have
amounted to torture or at least inhumane and degrading treatment until compara-
tively recently even though the Bill of Rights 1688 prohibited ‘cruel and unusual
punishment’. Flogging may have been cruel but it was not unusual. For Lords Hope
and Carswell, if the position re statements was not authoritatively stated as inadmis-
sible, it was a ‘small but certain step’ and a ‘modest but logical extension’ of the
rule against admitting confessions’ obtained by torture.53 The House of Lords is to
be applauded for placing a prohibition on the reception of statements obtained by
torture in judicial proceedings and for re-asserting the common law repugnance of
torture. More widely still, courts have a discretion, which they must exercise, to pre-
vent an abuse of their process brought about by a threat to basic human rights or the
rule of law.54 The judgment is a fitting tribute to the judicial development of the
50 [1914] AC 599 (PC).
51 D. Ormerod and D. Birch ‘The Evolution of the Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence’
Criminal Law Review (2004): 767-788.
52 Lord Bingham, para. 12 citing W. F. Holdsworth History of English Law, (3rd ed., 1945) vol.
5 pp. 194-195.
53 Paras. 110 and 152 respectively.
54 R v. Horseferry Road Magistrates Court ex p Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 at 61-62. In R (Ramda)
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC (Admin) 1278 extradition to
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‘common law of human rights’. However, the judgment leaves many holes in the
common law as we shall see.
II. The European Convention on Human Rights
Several of the judgments presume that the Court of Human Rights (CHR) at Stras-
bourg which adjudicates on claims to breaches of the ECHR against member states
of the Council of Europe would reject such evidence. Lord Bingham’s judgment
gives this subject the fullest analysis. In Soering v. UK55 the CHR described Article
3 and its absolute prohibition of torture as ‘one of the fundamental values of the de-
mocratic societies making up the Council of Europe.’ But the issue was whether Ar-
ticle 6 would be breached by admitting such evidence. Would it be a denial of a fair
hearing? The Convention against Torture is emphatic in its denunciation of torture
as is the CHR; would the CHR be any less so in such a case as the present under Ar-
ticle 6, queried Lord Bingham? For the point is that the issue has not as of writing
been dealt with directly by the CHR. ‘Had the CHR found (in Harutyunyan v. Ar-
menia56) that the complaints of coercion and torture appeared to be substantiated, a
finding that Article 6(1) had been violated would .. have been inevitable’.57 But
there is no authority on the question. The Jalloh case58 left the issue open, even if it
seems clear that torture will more or less automatically invalidate the use of the in-
formation as evidence under the Convention. The issue is however squarely before
the court in the Gäfgen case.59 The Convention itself had to be interpreted under
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations of the parties (Vienna
Convention Art 31(3)(c)). One of these would be the Convention against Torture.
This was the very point rejected by the majority of the Court of Appeal.
III. Public International Law
The third ground of attack lay under public international law. Lord Bingham’s
judgment in particular is an articulate and glowing tribute to the universal condem-
nation of torture and again he dealt most extensively with the discussion on this
point under international law. The other judges concentrated on the common law.
France was resisted where it was alleged that evidence to be admitted against R in France had
been obtained by torture. The principle also covers prosecuting authorities: R (CH Research
& Campaign against Arms Trade) v. Director SFO and BAE Systems [2008] EWHC 714
(Admin.).
55 (1989) 11 EHRR 439.
56 App. No. 36549/03 (5 July 2005).
57 Lord Bingham, para. 26.
58 Jalloh v. Germany App. No. 54810/00 (11 July 2006). See I. Cameron ‘European Court of
Human Rights: April 2006 – March 2007’ European Public Law (2007) 533-568.
59 Application (pending); see decision for App. No. 22978/05 (10 April 2007).
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The ‘prohibition of torture enjoys the highest normative force recognised by interna-
tional law.’60 It is present in the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture includ-
ing Art 15 which requires the exclusion of statements made as a result of torture as
evidence in any proceedings. The UN Resolution on Prohibition concerns evidence
and not just confessions. The language of international law is not simply the prohibi-
tion of torture but the full implementation of legislative, judicial and administrative
means to suppress it and any encouragement to it. ‘States must act positively to sup-
press torture’.
Lord Bingham accepted that outlawing torture was ius cogens – peremptory
norms of behaviour deemed to be worthy of a special status because of their impor-
tance.61 Even the Court of Appeal decision acknowledged such a status62 but that
court would not hear an argument about Article 15 CAT being a principle of cus-
tomary international law and therefore applicable in domestic proceedings because it
had not been raised as an argument before SIAC or in the appeal. But Bingham also
accepted that the ius cogens nature of the norm also forbade the use of evidence ob-
tained by torture.
In assessing the impact of these international developments on English law and
on the European Convention, Bingham was at his most creative and helped in draw-
ing new inspiration from international legal principles for the development of the
common law in particular. Both the common law and ECHR should and would be
developed and influenced under international law. English law has traditionally been
firmly based on a dualist tradition in relation to international law and municipal law.
They operate in different spheres affecting parties in different ways. International
norms cannot be binding in municipal law unless implemented by municipal law or
have effect unless they are accepted as principles of customary international law or
as part of ius cogens.63 There was a very important practical consequence of this du-
ality when it came to interpreting domestic statutes in England. The orthodox posi-
tion could be summed up by saying that a treaty could be examined in order to inter-
pret an implementing statute that was unclear or ambiguous and where the treaty
might confer that clarity or assist in establishing it.64 The more recent approach, one
would not refer to it as apostasy but it is certainly not conventional, is that a judge
should not interpret a statute in a manner inconsistent with treaty obligations where
such an interpretation was possible. If more than one interpretation is possible, adopt
that which fulfils international obligations.
In A(FC) the appellants ‘rely on the well established principle that the words of a
UK statute, passed after the date of a Treaty and dealing with the same subject mat-
60 Para. 28.
61 Vienna Convention Art 53: Prosecutor v. Furundzija [1998] ICTY 3 (International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).
62 Paras. 112 and 267.
63 The precise scope of customary international law is subject to qualifications.
64 J. Buchanan & Co. Ltd v. Babco etc Ltd [1978] AC 141 (HL). The case law also discussed
travaux préparatoires.
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ter, are to be construed, if they are reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as
intended to carry out the treaty obligation and not to be inconsistent with it’.65 This
is not confined to implementing measures and nor to provisions that are unclear or
ambiguous but where more than one interpretation is possible – a frequent occur-
rence in legislation. The universal condemnation of torture and the use of evidence
obtained by torture enshrined in these international norms set the context in which
the domestic legislation had to be interpreted.
I am startled, even a little dismayed, at the suggestion (and acceptance by CA majority) that
this deeply rooted tradition and an international obligation solemnly and explicitly undertaken
can be overridden by a statute and a procedural rule which make no mention of torture at all.66
For Lord Hoffmann, a power to admit evidence obtained by torture would have to
be given expressly in primary legislation so that Parliament could be notified and
debate the point.67 Were Parliament to authorize such a development in flagrant
breach of international law it would doubtless put the doctrine of Parliamentary sov-
ereignty under the severest of scrutiny. But in reality that would seem to be an event
for a class-room discussion and not a prospect that we would face. It has come close
to occurring in the USA where the President vetoed a bill outlawing use of water-
boarding and other practices. In setting up SIAC to act ‘like a court’ and to review
the Secretary of State’s decision Parliament expected it to act like a court, said Lord
Hoffmann.68 For him, it had become a general rule that evidence obtained by torture
was inadmissible.69
All the judges therefore condemned torture and the use of statements obtained by
torture although Lord Rodger said he found the case very difficult because of the
nature of decision-making by the Secretary of State and SIAC and not because he
did not share the revulsion of torture.70
The judgments nonetheless leave many questions unresolved and which are ex-
amined below.
G. Problems?
There are several difficulties resulting from A(FC).
65 Para. 27 citing Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd [1983] 2 AC 751, 771.
66 Lord Bingham, para. 51.





I. The use of statements obtained by torture by the executive in non judicial proc-
esses, or to defend itself against an allegation of unlawful action.
Such statements may not be used to establish guilt or innocence but, Lord Nicholls
believed, they could be used to defend officials against an allegation of unlawful ac-
tion (for example, if the police were sured for wrongful arrest and some of the in-
formation on which they had acted had been obtained by torture) although public
interest immunity may require the information be kept secret.71 Information obtained
by torture can still be used providing it is not led or used directly in evidence before
a judicial tribunal. But using such evidence to defend actions one took would be di-
rect use. Could such evidence be used by the executive to issue a control order, or to
make an order for deportation such as Rehman above? Lord Hope believed the an-
swer to this is for another day – it was not ruled out. Lord Hoffmann said:
It is not the function of the courts to place limits upon the information available to the Secre-
tary of State, particularly when he is concerned with national security. Provided that he acts
lawfully, he may read whatever he likes. In his dealings with foreign governments, the type of
information that he is willing to receive and the questions that he asks or refrains from asking
are his own affair.72
The answer seems to be ‘Yes’ and Lord Rodger answers this point affirmatively73
pointing out that a Secretary of State’s certificate of suspected terrorism under s.21
of the Anti-terrorism etc Act 2001 may last for six months if no appeal is made and
until SIAC reviews the certificate under s.26(1). In other words Parliament allowed
a significant period of detention in the absence of an appeal. Lord Brown also an-
swers the question affirmatively.74 But they would not be admissible before a judi-
cial body. Nothing seems to prevent them being used by lawyers in a way that inter-
cept intelligence is used: the intelligence cannot be admitted but it will be used to
formulate the argument and assist the case. Foreign intercepts incidentally are not
inadmissible.75 Indeed, Lord Brown was at pains to point out that the decision would
not undermine the fight against terrorism.
Your Lordships’ decision on these appeals should not be seen as a significant setback to the
[executive’s] necessary efforts to combat terrorism. Rather it confirms the right of the execu-
tive to act on whatever information it may receive from around the world, while at the same
time preserving the integrity of the judicial process and vindicating the good name of British
justice.76






75 R v. P [2001] 2 All ER 58 (HL).
76 Para. 171.
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II. Could evidence obtained as a result of the torture apart from statements and
confessions be used in judicial proceedings?
This is graphically known as the fruits of the poisoned tree doctrine. In the USA the
fourth amendment to the constitution has been used to exclude such evidence. In
England, the approach has not been as restrained and evidence illegally obtained
may be admitted if it is relevant.77 English law places ultimate reliance upon the
probative quality of the evidence. Here we have the topic so beloved by supporters
of torture; finding the ticking bomb after a statement by a third party or accused ex-
tracted by torture? Finding finger prints upon the bomb and using that evidence.
How independent is the evidence of the torture? How tainted is it by the ‘corruption
and stench of torture’? How far removed is it from the core evidence which is inad-
missible – the confession or statements of a third party? There is a reason to regard it
as a duty of states, save perhaps in limited and exceptional circumstances, as where
immediately necessary to protect a person from unlawful violence or property from
destruction, to reject the fruits of torture inflicted in breach of international law, said
Bingham.78 So his powerful judgment acknowledges exceptions.79 Could the police
implead such evidence to make an arrest and defend an allegation of false arrest in a
court? Lord Brown (a former treasury counsel ie advocate for government) was clear
that the ‘forbidden fruits’ may be used, as were Lords Hope and Hoffmann.
III. The burden of proving torture.
This is absolutely crucial. The procedures involving control orders as well as pro-
ceedings before SIAC which use closed material and special advocates should be
recalled and the difficulty in which the appellant is placed. Given the circumstances
it is not a procedure in which all the cards are face up. Much of the evidence would
not be seen by the appellant or his lawyers. Nonetheless, the majority decided that
the burden of proving torture lies on the appellant. The judges concluded differently
on the reliance to be placed on two cases in which this question was relevant. One
came from Germany80 where evidence was admitted even although the United States
officials refused to give evidence of interrogation practices conducted by them. The
other was a decision of the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights Mamatkulov and
Asharav v. Turkey which dealt with related themes where a breach of Article 3
ECHR was not found when a receiving state made assurances about treatment de-
spite widely recorded evidence of torture.81 The court could not make a finding of
77 R v. Sargent [2001] UKHL 54.
78 At para. 34. And paras. 46, 47.
79 S. 76 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that evidence may be admitted under
s. 76(4) where a confession is excluded.
80 El Motassadeq NSW 2005 2326 (Hamburg).
81 CHR App. Nos. 46827/99 and 46591/99 (4 February 2005).
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fact but placed its emphasis on Uzbekistan’s assurances. One finds it difficult not to
side with Bingham in his criticism of the reliance of the majority on these cases both
of which he felt to be of ‘questionable value’ at best.82
The minority (and incidentally the three most senior judges) Bingham, Nicholls
and Hoffmann – agreed that the Secretary of State must show that once it is alleged
that evidence was obtained by torture, he must establish that it was not. It would be
absurd to require the appellant to prove that evidence was obtained by torture when
he knows little of the evidence against him.83 ‘If SIAC is unable to conclude that
there is not a real risk that the evidence has been obtained by torture, it should refuse
to admit the evidence.’84 Lord Hope’s test is said Bingham, a test which in the real
world can never be satisfied.85 Hope’s test runs as follows: ‘Is it established, by
means of such diligent unquiries into the sources that it is practicable to carry out
and on a balance of probabilities, that the information relied on by the Secretary of
State was obtained under torture?’86 The court should not set up ‘insuperable bar-
rier[s]’ to the use of information from foreign regimes. To trigger the exclusion, it
must be shown that the statement in question was obtained by torture – I repeat on a
balance of probabilities. For Lord Rodger the statement must be shown (by the ap-
pellant) to have been obtained by torture.87 Lord Carswell said: ‘If SIAC is unable to
conclude that there is not a real risk that the evidence has been obtained by torture, it
should refuse to admit the evidence.’88 The onus of proving torture was on the appel-
lant and the quantum appears to be ‘a balance of probabilities’.
SIAC should make its own inquiries where the appellant raised plausible reason
for thinking that a statement was obtained by torture. This was a crucial point in
Othman v. Secretary of State89 where the Court of Appeal discussed what ‘diligent
enquiries’ by SIAC entailed. The Court of Appeal held that this duty of inquiry had
not been properly discharged by SIAC in a situation where the appellant would have
faced so many barriers to establishing the test.90
The Court of Appeal ruled that a Jordanian, Mr Othman, could not be deported to
Jordan where he would face terrorist charges on the grounds that his presence in the
UK represented a threat to national security. The court accepted that it was open to
SIAC to find that the appellant would not be ill-treated in Jordan, based on a memo-
randum of understanding between the Kingdom of Jordan and the UK that Jordan
would desist from such treatment.91 Nor was he likely to be tried by a court – the
82 Paras. 54-60.
83 Lord Hoffmann, para. 98.
84 Lord Bingham, para. 56
85 Para. 59.
86 Para. 121, but see paras. 116-122.
87 Para. 138.
88 Para. 156.
89 [2008] EWCA Civ 290.
90 Othman, para. 61; and see para. 439 of SIAC’s decision.
91 Such agreements had passed judicial scrutiny in the case of Algeria but had been ruled invalid
in relation to Libya.
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Jordanian State Security Court (SSC) – that was not independent and impartial.92
But the Court of Appeal differed from SIAC in its finding that SIAC applied an ‘in-
sufficiently demanding test to determine the issue of whether Article 6 rights would
be breached’ by the SSC hearing evidence obtained by torture.93 The SIAC had mis-
understood and misinterpreted the speeches of the law lords in A(FC) and had
placed mistaken reliance upon the case. SIAC had not satisfied itself by proper en-
quiry that evidence obtained in breach of a fundamental principle of the Convention
would not be acted upon by the SSC. The outcome of such admission would ‘consti-
tute a total denial of justice in Soering terms’.94 In short, the SIAC had not paid suf-
ficient regard to the constitutional and fundamental nature of the ruling in A(FC).
The test set by the Court of Appeal is very high and given the tone of the majority
decision on this point is surprising. They seem to have placed the threshold higher
than the majority in A(FC).
However expressed, the burden is on the person alleging torture. We shall have to
see whether the higher courts adopt as strict a test on the nature of SIAC’s inquiries
as the Court of Appeal.
IV What amounts to torture?
The question of what amounts to torture was addressed by the judgment. There is
not the immediacy of the red hot poker and the pliers but there are well documented
practices which are barbaric. A major plank in America’s war on terror involved
clear breaches of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment and even tor-
ture. George Bush’s has famously called for ‘unprecedented severity’ in the methods
of interrogation. There was a statutory redefinition of torture and authorized tech-
niques.95 The President in 2008 vetoed an Interrogation Authorization Bill outlawing
‘specialized techniques’ and which would have restricted interrogation to those in
the Army Field Manual. The legal justification and argument from officials support-
ing such practices as legal within existing restraints were farcical were it not so des-
perately serious an issue. It had the stench of perversion and lickspittle.
Does inhuman and degrading treatment automatically exclude statements in the
way torture would? Bingham said there is a difference in quality but lesser may be-
come the greater over time and would thereby become excluded. Otherwise such
evidence is subject to ss 76 and 78 Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Hoffmann be-
lieved the interrogation techniques in Ireland v. UK (above) would meet the defini-
92 See Soering v. UK, (1989) 11 EHRR 439.
93 Othman, para. 46.
94 Ibid., para. 41.
95 P. Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and the Compromise of Law (London, Penguin,
2008); P. Gourevitch and E. Morris Standard Operating Procedure: A War Story (London,
Pan Macmillan, 2008). M. Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 2008).
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tion of torture set out in s.134 Criminal Justice Act: severe pain and suffering ad-
ministered by officials in the exercise of their duties or purported duties and these
would be unlawful and inadmissible. But not all conduct ruled against Article 3 in
Ireland would be caught by s.134, he believed.
Lord Hope saw the distinction as ‘fluid’ but ‘we should apply the standards that
we wish to apply to our own citizens and not accept a foreign definition’. US prac-
tices, he exclaimed ‘shock the conscience’.96
V.. Intelligence and the secret services.
This is the most important dimension to the war on terror. The Crown accepted that
any British agents using torture would be acting unlawfully and the evidence would
be inadmissible before judicial hearings. The question was to what extent this prohi-
bition affected foreign security and intelligence services. The security and intelli-
gence communities are networked like ground elder. And as Lord Hope observed:
‘Information – the gathering of intelligence – is a crucial weapon in the battle by
democracies against international terrorism.’97
It was noted above that secret intelligence services in the UK had been placed un-
der a legislative framework since the late 1980s. There is oversight by the Intelli-
gence and Security Committee established under the Intelligence Services Act 1994
which is a joint committee of both houses of Parliament (members are ‘notified’ un-
der the Official Secrets Act 1989 (OSA) s.1 so they are subject to the absolute duty
of secrecy under that Act (below)). Information may be refused by service chiefs if it
is deemed ‘sensitive’ (Sch 3(4)), or it may be refused on the determination of the
Secretary of State. Sensitive includes that which is about operations, which might
lead to the identity of the provider or is provided by foreign government or its
agency and it does not consent although the Secretary of State may override this if
‘desirable in the public interest’. The Prime Minister may exclude matters from be-
ing published in annual reports published by the committee under s.10(7) after con-
sulting the committee.
The OSA s.1 places an absolute prohibition on disclosure by security and intelli-
gence officers and others who are ‘notified’ by a Minister of information from their
work and about the special investigation powers in s.4(3) – intercepts, entering
property etc. The House of Lords ruled in Shayler98 that s.1 OSA did not constitute a
breach of Art 10 ECHR – the free speech provision. Secrecy for intelligence gather-
ers was necessary and not disproportionate and there were a variety of internal and
external mechanisms through which a security or intelligence officer could raise
96 A (FC), para. 126.
97 Ibid., para. 105.
98 [2002] 2 All ER 477 (HL). The courts have ruled that under civil law, security and
intelligence officers are under a ‘life-long’ duty of confidence: Attorney General v. Blake
[2001] 1 AC 268.
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their concerns. ‘Whistleblowing’ is not necessary and the members of the services
are not protected by the legislation that introduced whistleblowing into UK law, the
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. Ultimately, a refusal to allow publication by the
authorities of the disclosure of an officer may be challenged by judicial review.
Finally, under Freedom of Information Act 2000 in the UK, the security and intel-
ligence services and GCHQ are excluded from the statutory provisions on access to
information held by public authorities. An absolute exemption protects their infor-
mation from disclosure when it is held by another public body. In other words, nei-
ther officials nor the Information Commissioner can order disclosure in ‘the public
interest’.
As one imagines the position is cocooned in secrecy without any effective outlet
for an officer troubled by what he or she knows about the provenance of intelligence
and how it was extracted.
The Butler Report on the use of intelligence and weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq was not dealing with the problem of torture but the manipulation and malleabil-
ity of intelligence for political purposes.99 If intelligence is to be used more widely
by governments in public debate, its uses and limitations must be carefully ex-
plained and there must be clearer division between assessment and advocacy.100
Nonetheless, there were some compelling conclusions on the uses of intelligence.
There were world-wide networks of intelligence communities but procedures are
‘still not sufficiently aligned to match the threat’.101
These limitations [in intelligence transforming mysteries into knowable secrets] are best offset
by ensuring that the ultimate users of intelligence, decision makers at all levels, properly un-
derstand its strengths and limitations and have the opportunity to acquire experience in han-
dling it. It is not easy to do this while preserving the security of sensitive sources and methods.
But unless intelligence is properly handled at this final stage, all preceding effort and expendi-
ture is wasted.102
Does the ‘proper handling’ of intelligence include use of that by the UK executive
which has been procured by torture, no matter how unreliable? The answer from
A(FC) appears to be ‘yes’.
H. Some comparisons between the UK and USA courts in the war on terror
There is a self congratulatory tone in some of the judgments in A(FC) about the vir-
tues of British justice but the general condemnation of torture by the law lords was
99 Lord Butler (Chair), Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (HC 898,
London, The Stationery Office, 2004).
100 Ibid., para. 468.
101 Ibid., para. 136
102 Ibid., para. 52.
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nonetheless invigorating. The case also has to be seen in company with its predeces-
sor A etc in which detentions under s.23 Anti-terrorism etc Act were declared unlaw-
ful and the more recent control order case in which the law lords ruled very strictly
on the fairness of control order procedures.103 It has displayed the appellate commit-
tee of the House of Lords as a robust tribunal defending human rights and civil liber-
ties. The Human Rights Act has been a central feature in that defence. This deserves
applause.
Until the judgment in Boumediene by the Supreme Court (below) the position
compared very favourably to the role of US courts and their relationship to oversight
of executive powers in the war on terror and the President’s promotion of legislation
to enhance the executive primacy, to exclude the role of the ordinary courts in over-
sight of executive detentions and to have cases heard before military commissions. I
can only make fleeting references to this widely reported saga. Although Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld104 and Rasul et al v. Bush105 supported the application of habeas corpus
following executive detentions, the justifications required by the courts from the ex-
ecutive were criticized for requiring only the thinnest of evidence.106
The Military Commissions Act 2006 provides for military commissions to try
‘enemy unlawful combatants’ and prohibits challenge in ordinary courts of matters
before military commissions and any use of the Geneva Conventions before a court
proceeding seeking habeas corpus. The MCA makes clear that statements procured
by torture are inadmissible. Statements produced by treatment ‘short of torture’ can
be admitted if a military judge finds that ‘the totality of the circumstances renders
the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value; and the interests of
justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.’107
After an initial refusal to hear the case challenging the constitutionality of the
Act, the Supreme Court ruled that an appeal concerning this legislation would be
heard. Commentators were sanguine that the court would rule that a constitutional
right to habeas corpus applies in such cases but the procedure before the Commis-
sions and the right of appeal to the ‘DC circuit’ may satisfy those requirements. Fur-
thermore, the view has been expressed that the MCA will have successfully ex-
cluded the operation of the Geneva Convention in Commission hearings.108 The Su-
preme Court, however, ruled that the MCA had not removed the right of those de-
tained in Guantanamo to seek habeas corpus before the federal courts and the inade-
quate and ineffective procedures in use before the Commissions meant the MCA op-
103 See n. 34 above.
104 542 US 507 (2004).
105 542 U. S. 466 (2004).
106 There was greater sophistication shown in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) where
the Supreme Court held that the Geneva Convention was not removed in hearings before
military commissions and the federal courts’ jurisdiction was not removed by the Detainee
Treatment Act 2005.
107 S. 948r.
108 C. Bradley ‘The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions’
Duke Law School Working Paper No. 96/2007.
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erated as an ‘unconstitutional suspension of the writ’.109 The 5-4 judgment has done
much to repair the reputation of the judicial branch in the USA and its vindication of
the rule of law.
Conclusion
Despite its limitations A(FC) will doubtless be added to the lexicon of great state-
ments of principle from the courts in protecting the individual against arbitrary ac-
tion. It stands beside the Public Committee against Torture in Israel case110 where
interrogation techniques based on torture and inhumane treatment were outlawed
and where the court noted:
Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has
the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes
an important component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen
its spirit and allow it to overcome its difficulties.
Committee against Torture left open the necessity argument to justify torture
which did not apply in that case. Despite its great constitutional resonance, A(FC)
has left largely unchanged the reliance by ‘civilized governments’ on intelligence
extracted by torture. Indeed, the government according to the judgment of some of
the Law Lords would be in denial of a fundamental duty of preserving national secu-
rity were it to ignore such intelligence. The chances of such evidence being admitted
before judicial proceedings in the UK depends upon whether the stringent test of the
Court of Appeal in Othman is upheld by the House of Lords and on whether the self
denying ordinance of the Home Secretary not knowingly to use such material as evi-
dence is maintained.111 The eradication of the wider practice of using such intelli-
gence to survey, investigate, detain and question is beyond the capability of judicial
bodies.112 Indeed the widespread blanket of secrecy which protects intelligence and
security would prevent their effective challenge in any representative forum. Life-
saving information may be obtained. Is torture a price worth paying in the war
109 Boumediene et al. v. Bush et al. 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008)
110 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel (1999) 7 BHRC 31 (Supreme
Court, Israel) para. 39.
111 That, said Lord Hoffmann, is a policy, not a rule of law: A(FC) para. 90.
112 The use of intelligence obtained by torture puts the efforts by Mr Blair and Mr Brown’s
governments to extend pre-charge detention in the case of suspected terrorists beyond 28 days
into perspective. In R (Binyan Mohamed) v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2008]
EWHC 2048 and 2100 (Admin) the Divisional Court ruled that the claimant,who was a
detainee in Guantanamo Bay and who had been subject to torture, was entitled, subject to any
public interest immunity pleas, to documents in the possession of the Foreign Office which
were relevant to his trial before the US Military Commission outlined above. This was
despite the vehement protests of the US government.
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against terrorism – a war that seeks to uphold civilized standards and the integrity of
the individual?
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7. Bush II’s Constitutional and Legal Theory: The Constitution of
Emergency between Law and Propaganda
Agustín José Menéndez
Sometimes … the values to be secured by the genuine Rule of Law and authentic constitu-
tional government are best served by departing, temporarily but perhaps drastically, from the
law and the Constitution. Since such occasions call for that awesome responsibility and most
measured practical reasonableness which we call statesmanship, one could say nothing that
may appear to be a key to identifying the occasion or a guide to acting in it.
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights
The problem is not renegade actors; the problem, frankly, is renegade lawyers.
Philippe Sands debating John Yoo
A. Introduction
This chapter analyses the positive and theoretical aspects of the doctrine of constitu-
tional law put forward by the administration of Bush II since the terrorist attacks of
September 11th 2001. The chapter is divided into four parts. First, I claim that Bush
II’s doctrine of constitutional law can be identified by reference to the four amend-
ments to the positive constitutional law of the United States his lawyers have advo-
cated and relied upon when offering legal advice.1 It has been claimed that the
President can establish in a definitive and final manner who poses a threat to na-
tional security and deny her some key constitutional rights; in particular her rights to
liberty, privacy, life and physical integrity, as the President can order their indefinite
arrest, warrantless surveillance, assassination or torture. Second, I maintain that all
these amendments are to be understood as the rather consistent application of Bush
II’s theory of constitutional law, which affirms that there are two US constitutions
(one applicable to ‘ordinary’ citizens and circumstances, the other to enemies and
‘emergency’ or ‘exceptional’ circumstances) and that international norms other than
bilateral treaties are not real law. Third, I submit that changes in positive constitu-
tional law and in constitutional theory are underpinned by an eclectic, minimalist
and decisionistic theory of law, which denies any structural relationship between law
and public reason. The minimalism of Bush II’s legal theory accounts for the fact
1 By the phrases ‘Bush II’s lawyers’ or the ‘court lawyers of Bush II’, I make reference to the
main legal architects of the four constitutional amendments described in section I and in par-
ticular to David Addington, Alberto Gonzales, James Bybee, Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo and
William Haynes II.
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that it relies on an ‘overlapping consensus’ of three different mainstream legal theo-
ries (originalism à la Scalia, ‘modern’ natural law à la Finnis, and pragmatism à la
Posner). Fourth, it seems to me that there are very good reasons to take very seri-
ously the consequences of Bush II’s constitutional doctrine and theory, but that
should not entail considering them as serious legal and political theories. They have
been intended as part and parcel of the propaganda effort to transform constitutional
practice. This should make us reflect on the structural similarities between Bush II’s
constitutional and legal theories and the strategic legal advice characteristically pro-
vided by the attorneys of mafia dons and by the ‘court lawyers’ of Fascist states, all
of whom area keen on instrumentalising the form of law at the service of raw power.
B. The four constitutional amendments of Bush II
Bush II has tried to alter key aspects of US constitutional law so as to expand execu-
tive power to the detriment of other institutions and decision-making process.2 Such
changes have resulted in a constitutional doctrine which seriously infringes the
rights to freedom, privacy, physical integrity and life of both non-citizens and citi-
zens, and openly infringes international legal standards.
The four constitutional amendments described below are said to temporary and
narrow deviations from ordinary constitutional standards exclusively applicable to
‘enemy combatants’. However, it would be wrong to take such characterization at its
face value. On the one hand, the affirmation that the ‘war on terror’ is a ‘long war’
which will last for at least one generation3 implies that the changes could be as per-
manent as formal amendments to the Constitution. On the other hand, the term ‘en-
emy combatant’ designates anybody deemed by the President to be a threat to US
national security.4 The vagueness of the standard and the lack of any review whatso-
ever render fully uncertain who would be fall under the description.
All four amendments are defended on three concurrent grounds, namely: (1) a
‘dogmatic’ interpretation of the legal texts, based on the search for the ‘literal’ and
‘original’ meaning of the provisions; (2) peculiar normative arguments which focus
on the morality of acting unmorally under extreme circumstances; (3) prudential ar-
guments, concerning the consequences of interpreting constitutional norms one way
2 The best overall description is to be found in C. Savage, Takeover (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co., 2007).
3 By declaring ‘war on global terror’ and defining the scope as to stop and defeat ‘every terror-
ist group of global reach’, Bush II clearly indicated that the war on terror was bound to be a
very long war. See Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 Sep-
tember 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html.
4 A comprehensive analysis of how the category has been defined by the Bush II Administra-
tion can be found in P. J. Honigsberg, ‘Chasing ‘Enemy Combatants’ and Circumventing In-
ternational Law: A Licence for Sanctioned Abuse’ UCLA Journal of International Law and
Foreign Affairs (2007): 1-74.
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or the other in the ‘post 9/11’ world in which we are ‘one bomb away’ from disaster.
While the specific dogmatic arguments employed vary from one amendment to the
other, in all cases Bush II’s lawyers rely on close readings of the literal tenor of legal
provisions and make extensive (and exclusive) use legislative materials, while teleo-
logical arguments and systemic interpretation are formally discarded. This results in
wider discretion for the interpreter. As regards normative arguments, two are fre-
quently invoked. The first goes that the legality and morality of given acts cannot be
determined during emergencies by reference to what positive law prescribes, but by
the ‘practical’ judgment of leaders. In brief, not only inter armas silent leges, but
inter armas silent mores. The second is that the existential threat to the political
community posed by terrorism entitles the political community to deny all rights to
those (generally, aliens) who make use of such rights to threaten the life of the re-
public. The typical prudential argument is that the nature of the ‘new’ terrorist threat
requires replacing criminal procedure, with its simultaneous affirmation of liberty to
do wrong and retroactive punishment, with ‘preemptive’ justice, aimed at rendering
impossible the commission of the crime. This entails that constitutional rights should
be redefined (and weakened) so as to render possible the efficient gathering of in-
formation from suspected terrorists.5
Before considering Bush II’s constitutional amendments in detail, it is important
to notice that the radical character of his constitutional agenda stems from the fact
that it aims at changing the very content of constitutional law. We are not dealing
with unconstitutional acts undertaken in the ‘dark side’; what we face is the explicit
promotion of the ‘dark side’ to constitutional normality.6 There is a world of differ-
ence between the two projects.
I. No habeas corpus for enemy combatants
Bush II’s first constitutional amendment affirms the inherent power of the President
to order the detention of any person (including a US citizen), who has been previ-
ously certified as an enemy combatant. The decision of the President to either con-
fine enemies within military facilities in the United States, or order their transfer to a
location abroad is final and cannot be reviewed by any other institution or decision-
making process.7 This is the same as denying the privilege of habeas corpus to en-
emy combatants.
This first amendment is the result of three closely interrelated decisions.
5 Gonzales memorandum of 25 January 2002, available at <http://www.gwu.du/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf>, p. 2.
6 Cheney interviewed in Russert’s Meet the Press, 16 September 2001.
7 See B. Egelko, ‘Gonzales says the Constitution doesn't guarantee habeas corpus’, San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, 24 January 2007, available at <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.
cgi?f=/c/a/2007/01/24/MNGDONO11O1.DTL>.
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First, enemy combatants were denied the right of access to a US ordinary court or
to a standard military court; instead, they were expected to be brought before a
‘military commission’, and denied basic legal guarantees.8 Although the original text
of the executive order excluded from its scope US citizens, two of them were later
deemed to be enemy combatants and arrested on the sole authority of the President.9
Second, enemy combatants were denied the protection of the Geneva conven-
tions, because they were found to be inapplicable to the ‘war on terror’ as ‘quaint’
and ‘obsolete’ norms.10
Third, the allegedly more ‘valuable’ enemy combatants were transferred to ‘law-
free zones’ such as Guantanamo,11 ‘black sites’ in Iraq, Poland, Romania, Diego
García and Djibouti (among others)12, or prisons in third countries (Morocco, Syria,
Egypt and others, all characterized by their appalling treatment of detainees), in the
latter case after being ‘extraordinarily rendered’.13
All this was advocated on the grounds that the fight against Al Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations was a war and thus enemy combatants could be indefinitely
arrested until the war ended; and that this was such a radically novel type of war that
fundamentally new legal norms should be devised for it, overcoming the quaint and
obsolete norms contained in the Geneva Conventions and in the Code of Military
Justice.14 In concrete, Bush II’s lawyers denied both that the Fourth Amendment
8 ‘Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism’, Ex-
ecutive Order of 13 November 2001, available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index. php?pid=63124>.
9 On Padilla and Hamdi, see B. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack (New Haven, Yale Universi-
ty Press, 2006), pp. 24ff.
10 On 18 January 2002 Bush issued an executive order accepting the legal advice put forward by
Office of Legal Counsel which denied Geneva rights to enemy combatants (J. Yoo and R. J.
Delahunty to W. J. Haynes II, ‘Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees’, 9 January 2002, available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.01.09pdf>. This was followed by the Bybee memorandum of 22 January
2002, available at: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.22.pdf>
and the Gonzales memorandum of 25 January 2002: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf.
11 See ‘Memorandum for William J. Haynes, ‘Re: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction Over Aliens
Held in Guantanamo Bay’ (signed by J. Yoo and P. Philbin), of 28 December 2001, available
at <http://www. pegc. us/archive/DOJ/20011228_philbinmemo pdf>.
12 D. Priest, ‘CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons’, The Washington Post, 2 November
2005. Bush II openly admitted the existence of secret prisons on 6 September 2006
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html).
13 Legal memorandum by J. Yoo ‘The President Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer
Captive Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations’, 13 March 2002, which
remains classified. On the rendition program, see CIA above the law? Secret detentions and
unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees in Europe (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2008);
and the ‘report on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and
illegal detention of prisoners’ from the Committee of the European Parliament, 26 January
2007 (A6-9999-2007) available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jan/ep-cia-
rendition-cttee-report.pdf. See also S. Gray, Ghost Plane (New York, St Martin Press, 2006).
14 J. Yoo, War by Other Means (New York, Atlantic Press, 2006), p. 36.
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provided a universal right of judicial protection and that the Geneva Conventions
(especially Common Article III) reflected a mandatory norm of international law. By
means of an allegedly literal interpretation of these norms, they concluded that posi-
tive US law only granted protections to those who were part and parcel of the politi-
cal community, from which those aiming at undermining it should be excluded.15
The Geneva Conventions were only applicable to the community of, one guesses,
civilized nations, from which Al Qaeda and the Taliban were excluded (the latter as
rulers of a ‘failed state’, a legal concept used for the occassion).
Judges Advocates General and the State Department expressed their firm dis-
agreement. This explains why it took so long to draft the actual rules governing mili-
tary commissions. The long saga of decisions of the Supreme Court16, and the reac-
tions by Congress17 seem to have resulted in the (at least temporary) reversal of
Bush II’s first amendment.
II. Warrantless surveillance of enemy combatants
Bush II’s second constitutional amendment affirms that the President has the power
to order the warrantless surveillance of enemy combatants, and incidentally, of US
residents or even citizens. This entails a redefinition of the scope of the right to pri-
vacy, as enshrined in the Fourth Amendment as usually interpreted (in particular, on
the basis of the rulings of the Supreme Court in Katz18 and Keith,19 and of the 1978
Foreign Intelligence and Security Act).20
Bush II’s lawyers have argued that the Fourth Amendment only requires that sur-
veillance is conducted in ‘reasonable’ ways. A court warrant is not the most reason-
able way to protect the rights of citizens against state intrusion when it comes to in-
telligence gathering during a war; reasonableness is then better guaranteed by trust-
ing the President or his Attorney General to take the right decisions.21 Explicit statu-
15 Ibid., pp. 16, 23 and 33.
16 In particular, Rasul, 542 US 466 (2004), Hamdi, 542 US 507 (2004), Hamdan, 548 U. S. 557
(2006) and Boumediene 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)
17 The Detainee Treatment Act 2005, 119 Stat 2680, at 2739 (see also the signing statement of
President Bush, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-
8.html> and the Military Commissions Act 2006, 120 Stat 2600.
18 Katz v. U. S. 389 US 347 (1967).
19 U. S. v. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, et al. 407 US
297 (1972).
20 92 Stat 1783. FISA did not govern physical searches until 1994. See 108 Stat 3423, section
807, at 3443. For the practice before 2001 see A. R. Cinquegrana, ‘The Walls (and Wires)
have Ears: The Background and the First Ten Years of The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978’, University of Pennsylvannia Law Review 137 (1989): 793-828.
21 President Bush’s Radio Address of 17 December 2005, available at:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html>. See also ‘Legal Au-
thorities supporting the activities of the National Security Agency described by the President,
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tory limitations of the powers of the President (such as those contained in FISA) are
to be deemed unconstitutional if they encroach upon his power to do so.
Bush II’s second amendment resulted in the Terrorist Surveillance Program
started in October 2001.22 Although it remains a secret program, we know that it af-
fected all communications in and out the United States in which there was ‘reason-
able basis’ to conclude that one of the parties was a member of ‘Al Qaeda’. There
are good reasons to suspect that the said program was only one among several simi-
lar initiatives.23 For example, there is a wealth of information indicating that the ma-
jor switches of telecommunications companies were used for surveillance pur-
poses.24
The tragicomic events surrounding the re-certification of the Terrorist Surveil-
lance Program in March 200425 proved that there were doubts concerning the legal-
ity of the program within the administration, only increased after its existence was
publicly revealed.26 But against some odds, Bush II was rather successful in obtain-
ing the endorsement of Congress in the Protect America Act of 2007.27 In particular,
the requirement of a judicial warrant for each specific surveillance operation was
substituted by judicial review of the executive guidelines according to which sur-
veillance of foreign intelligence targets ‘reasonably believed’ to be outside of the
United States was to be conducted. This rendered legal surveillance within the
United States and of US persons, even citizens.28 At the time of writing, Congress
had just passed a permanent reform of FISA confirming a good deal of such powers
published on 19 January 2006, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ whitepaperonnsalega-
lauthorities.pdf.>
22 J. Risen and E. Lichtblau, ‘Bush Lets U. S. Spy on Callers Without Courts’, The New York
Times, 16 December 2005.
23 The most spectacular of which was without doubt the so-called Total Information Awareness
program, based on massive mining of major public and private databases. It is surprising how
little effort has been made to elucidate the relationship between such plans and intelligence
activities realized under the UKUSA Agreement, in particular the so-called Echelon network.
See L. D. Sloan, ‘Echelon and the Legal Restrains on Signal Intelligence: a Need for Reeval-
uation’, Duke Law Journal 50 (2000): 1467-1510.
24 See also the USA today revelations about the government having access to list of phone calls.
‘NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone calls’, USA Today, 5 October 2006. See al-
so the information on the case brought by Electronic Frontier Foundation against AT&T at
<http://www.eff.org/nsa/hepting>. The first official acknowledgment of the role played by
telecommunications companies can be found in C. Roberts, ‘Debate on foreign intelligence
surveillance’, El Paso Times, 22 August 2007.
25 See the definitive account in Savage, Takeover, pp. 185-88.
26 For a sample of the scholarly criticism, see C. Bradley, D. Cole, W. Dellinger, R. Dworkin,
R. Epstein, P. B. Heymann et al, ‘On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress’, (2006) 53 The New
York Review of Books, 9 February 2006, available at: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
18650#fn1>. It was formally withdrawn in early 2007. See Letter from Attorney General
Gonzales to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 17 January 2007, available at <http://www.fas.
org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag011707.pdf>.
27 12 Stat 552.
28 ‘Shifting the FISA Paradigm: Protecting Civil Liberties by Eliminating Ex Ante Judicial Ap-
proval’, Harvard Law Review 121 (2008): 2200-21.
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(and granting immunity to the companies which have cooperated in the conduct of
domestic warrantless surveillance since 2001).
III. Assassination of enemy combatants
The third Bush II amendment says that the President has the power to order the as-
sassination of enemy combatants.
There was a rather world-wide consensus on the legal prohibition of targeted as-
sassinations in the late XXth century,29 Israel being the exception.30 In particular, the
blatantly illegal actions of the CIA during the Cold War exposed by the Church
Committee31 resulted in a further explicit reinforcement of the legal prohibition in
the US legal order, through the Executive Orders of Presidents Ford, Carter and
Reagan.32
Bush II signed a secret intelligence finding in which he authorized selective as-
sassinations a few days after 9/11.33 The scope of the order was expanded in 2002.34
By the spring of 2003 the use of targeted assassinations had become fully normal-
ized, as proved by the far from covert attempt to kill Saddam Hussein immediately
before the open war in Iraq.35 Manifold assassinations have been authorized and
conducted since, including assassinations as part of covert operations in Iran.36
Although it seems that the decision was so quick as not have left time for previ-
ous written legal advice, the man who would have provided it, John Yoo, has
claimed that the usual interpretation of the ban on assassinations does not apply to
the ‘war on terror’,37 a new type of conflict in which enemies will not only be killed
29 M. N. Schmitt, ‘State Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law’ (1992) 17
Yale Journal of International Law 609-685.
30 See J. Nicholas N. Kendall, ‘Israeli Counter-Terrorism: Targeted Killings under International
Law’, North Carolina Law Review, 80 (2002): 1069-88; K. Eichensehr, ‘On target? Israeli
Supreme Court and the Expansion of Targeted Killings’, Yale Law Journal 116 (2007): 1873-
82.
31 See Church Committee’s report on selective assassinations at <http://www.aarclibrary.
org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports_ir.htm.>
32 See Executive Order 11905, of 18 February 1976, section 5(9)available at <http://www. pres-
idency.ucsb.edu/ws/print. php?pid=59348>; Executive Order 12036, of 24 January 1978, sec-
tion 2-305, available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31100>; Execu-
tive Order 12333, of 4 December 1981, section 2. 11, available at <http://www. arc-
hives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html>.
33 B. Woodward, ‘CIA Told to Do ‘Whatever Necessary’ to Kill Bin Laden’, Washington Post,
21 October 2001.
34 J. Risen and D. Johnston, ‘CIA Expands Authority to Kill Qaeda Leaders’, New York Times,
15 December 2002.
35 D. E. Sanger and J. F. Burns, ‘Bush Orders Start of War on Iraq: Missiles Apparently miss
Hussein’, New York Times, 20 March 2003.
36 A. Cockburn, ‘Secret Bush “Finding” Widens War on Iran’, Counterpunch, 2 May 2008.
37 Ibid., p. 58 and especially pp. 60 and 63.
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in traditional operations, but in ‘surgical targeted killings’.38 The latter are an appli-
cation of the doctrine of ‘collective self-preemption’ which also underlies Bush II’s
first amendment.39
IV Torturing enemy combatants
Bush II’s fourth constitutional amendment says that the President has the power to
choose the techniques with which enemy combatants will be interrogated, even if
they are tantamount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment according to
all other nations parties to relevant international treaties.
As a matter of positive constitutional law, both US statutes (the 1994 Anti-
Torture Statute and the 1996 War Crimes Act)40 and international treaties ratified by
the US (more specifically the Convention Against Torture of 1984)41 establish an
absolute prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
A series of legal opinions from the Office of Legal Counsel reconsidered what
was actually forbidden by those norms. Three of them have been rendered public
until now.42 In the three of them, the definition of torture is so narrow as to exclude
any act short of the killing of the detainee (and not even that under certain circum-
stances). Questions concerning the legality of techniques of interrogation employed
38 Ibid., p. 54. The force of the argument carries Yoo to claim that the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 would have been legal had it not been for the fact that the method of the at-
tack was ‘the hijacking of civilian airliners’ (Yoo, War, p. 64), a very intriguing and in my
view ridiculous claim. A similar one is made regarding the eventual capture of Rumsfeld or
Tenet on p. 166.
39 Ibid., p. 61.
40 Anti-Torture Statute, 108 Stat 382; War Crimes Act 1996, 110 Stat 2104.
41 See, among others, M. Nowak and E. MacArthur (eds. ), The United Nations Convention
against Torture: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008).
42 Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, ‘Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U. S.
C. §§ 2340-2340A’, of 1 August 2002, available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf>; Letter of Yoo to Gonzales, regarding ‘the views of
our Office concerning the legality, under international law, of interrogation methods to be
used on captured al Qaeda operatives’, of 1 August 2002, available at <http://www. gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/020801. pdf>; Yoo to Haynes II, ‘Memo Regarding
the Torture and Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the Unit-
ed States’, of 14 March 2003, available at <http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/ safe-
free/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf.> Bybee had addressed an opinion to Haynes II concerning
the interplay between the decision to bring detainees before Military Commissions and the
admissibility of evidence obtained through interrogation. See ‘Potential Legal Constrains Ap-
plicable to Interrogations of Persons Captured by US Armed Forces in Afghanistan’, of 26
February 2002, available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.
26.pdf>.
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by military personnel were settled in a series of specific, but closely related (in
chronological and substantive terms) opinions.43
The core of the defence of the right to torture was a peculiar interpretation of the
literal tenor of the law. In particular, it was claimed that an act could only be quali-
fied as torture if it complied simultaneously with two conditions: one objective, the
other subjective.44 The objective condition was the infliction of ‘severe harm’, either
physical or mental. ‘Physical harm’ amounting to torture was ‘death, organ failure or
the permanent impairment of a significant body function’.45 The critical standards
for determining the accrual of mental pain or suffering were the lasting character of
the harm (to be counted in months or years) and its resulting from the specific ac-
tions codified in the US Code.46 The subjective condition was met when the interro-
gator ‘acted with specific intent’, or what is the same, ‘he must expressly intend to
achieve the forbidden act’.47 Thus, it was not sufficient that interrogation results in a
prolonged physical or mental pain or suffering; for a crime to be committed, the
mental state of the interrogator must be that corresponding to the intentional of se-
vere and lasting mental pain or suffering to the concrete detainee.48
There was considerable dissent expressed within the ranks of the administration
on this definition.49 During his brief stint as head of the Office of Legal Counsel in
2003-4, Jack Goldsmith (assistant to Haynes II until he was promoted to the OLC)
43 Diane Beaver to General James T. Hill, ‘Legal Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strate-
gies’, and ‘Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques’, of 11 October 2002;
Haynes II to Rumsfeld, ‘Counter-Resistance Techniques’, of 27 November 2002, and ap-
proved 2 December 2002 by Rumsfeld. The three documents are available at <http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.12.02.pdf>. A compilation of opinions and
decisions which helps understanding who and why took decisions has been posted by Senator
Levin of the Armed Services Committee, and is available at <http://levin.senate.
gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Documents.SASC.061708.pdf>.
44 Bybee to Gonzalez, ‘Standards of Conduct’, p. 3.
45 Ibid., p. 6. This phrase derives from the definition of severe physical pain triggering compul-
sory health assistance of uninsured people. It was used to define torture, despite the lack of
comparability of the two situations, because allegedly it was the only positive definition of
‘severe physical pain’ which could be found in the US Code.
46 Ibid., pp. 9-12. Namely (a) intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering; (b) administration or application, or threatened administration or applica-
tion, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or the personality; (c) threat of imminent death; (d) the threat that another person will
imminently be subject to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or ap-
plication of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality.
47 Ibid., p. 3.
48 Ibid., p. 8.
49 See Alberto J. Mora’s memo of 18 June 2004, ‘Statement for the Record: Office of General
Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues’, available at <http://www.aclu. org/pdfs/ safe-
free/mora_memo_july_2004.pdf>.
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withdrew Yoo’s and Bybee’s opinions.50 Still, Bush II’s fourth amendment has not
been abandonded.51 The President himself has opposed any attempt by Congress to
reaffirm the prohibition of the use of torture (in particular, through his signing
statement added to the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act and his recent veto of the bill
reiterating the prohibition of any interrogation technique beyond those contained in
the Army Field Manual).52 Moreover, the director of the CIA has explicitly admitted
that at least three detainees were waterboarded, while it is now accepted that the Na-
tional Security Council explicitly discussed and approved specific techniques of in-
terrogation before the interrogation of concrete detainees, and that was approved by
Bush II himself.53
C. The constitutional theory of Bush II
The four amendments proposed and relied upon by Bush II’s lawyers are to be con-
structed as specific concretizations of the constitutional theory to which Bush II’s
lawyers subscribe. This constitutional theory rests upon two key premises which re-
interpret the legal meaning of the two main sources of limits to presidential action,
namely, the US Constitution and international law. First, the US Constitution is said
to contain two different sets of fundamental norms: the ordinary constitution and the
emergency constitution. The latter is said to vest massive powers in the President
which entitled him to override limits to his action set by other institutions. Second,
international law, and very especially, multilateral treaties and international manda-
50 J. L. Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency (New York, Norton, 2007), pp. 144 ff (especially p.
155). Yoo, War by Other Means, pp. 185-6 seems to have resented that, although he (in my
view, rightly) claims that changes have been more aesthetical than substantive.
51 J. Mayer, ‘The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees was
Thwarted’, The New Yorker, 27 February 2006, reports that Mora was shown by late January
a draft – one guesses, given the dates – of Yoo’s legal opinion on specific interrogation tech-
niques. The said opinion had been solicited by Haynes in what seems hard not to believe was
an effort at influencing and perhaps rendering moot the Working Group itself. Mora kept on
arguing that both Yoo’s memo and the draft report of the Working Group were flawed. And
so had done Judges Advocate General Romig, Bohr, Sandkhuler and Rives when proposing
changes to the draft (their opinions are available at <http://www.dod.
mil/pubs/foi/detainees/05-F-2083_JAGmemos. pdf>). Even if it was not rendered public, not
even known within Army circles, the Working Group produced a final report by 4 April
(available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf>), which
only became declassified after the Abu Grahib scandal broke out. Rumsfeld issued new
guidelines concerning interrogation methods by 16 April; available at:
<http://www.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.16.pdf>.
52 The full text of the bill can be found at <http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-h2082/text>.
53 S. Shane, ‘C. I. A. Chief Doubts Tactic To Interrogate Is Still Legal’, New York Times, 8 Feb-
ruary 2008; J. C. Greenburg, H. L. Rosenberg and A. de Vogue,. ‘Top Bush Advisors Ap-
proved ‘Enhanced’ Interrogation’, ABC News, 9 April 2008; J. C. Greenburg, H. L. Rosen-
berg and A. de Vogue, ‘Bush Aware of Advisers' Interrogation Talks’, ABC News, 11 April
2008.
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tory norms are said to lack legal bite and to be properly described as congeries of
behavioural regularities.
I. The dual constitution
The theory of the dual constitution affirms that there is not but two US constitutions.
Along with the ordinary constitution, applicable during the times in which the life of
the republic proceeds normally, we find an emergency constitution, applicable dur-
ing crisis situations. The ‘ordinary’ constitution is enshrined in the vast majority of
the provisions of the 1787 Constitution, formal amendments, and constitutional con-
ventions developed over time. The key provisions of the emergency constitution are
contained in the written text of the US Constitution. The most important one is the
first sentence of Article II. 2 of the Constitution, which establishes that
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of
the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.
Additionally, we find bits and pieces of the emergency constitution in the express
limits to constitutional applicable during emergencies.54 The remaining content of
the emergency constitution result from the constitutional practice during previous
emergencies (in particular, the War of Independence, the Civil War and the three
World Wars, including the Cold War). The core provisions of the emergency consti-
tution are those concerning the allocation of power, not its substantive provisions.
The vast variety of possible threats to the republic explain why the written constitu-
tion limits itself to determine in an unambiguous and definite manner who should be
in charge of establishing how the core principles of the constitution are to be opera-
tionalized in emergency situations.
Emergency powers are said to be vested almost exclusively in the President as
Commander in Chief. This is grounded on the claim that the President is the institu-
tional actor best placed to take decisions during extraordinary constitutional times,
for three reasons. He is the head of the most hierarchical branch of government, he
is invested with direct democratic legitimacy, and he is used to exercising key pow-
ers on the decisive policies during emergencies (foreign policy, defence and intelli-
gence).
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 were tantamount to a declaration of war
against the government and the people of the United States, something which by it-
self activated the inherent emergency powers of the President; the actuality of his
inherent emergency powers is said to have been further confirmed by Congress’s
Authorization to Use Military Force of September 18th, 2001.55 Moreover, the radi-
54 Thus, the Second Amendment establishes that the privilege the writ of habeas corpus should
not be suspended but ‘in cases of rebellion or invasion’ if moreover ‘the public safety’ may
require it.
55 115 Stat 224. See Yoo’s Memo of 25 September 2005, available at <http://www.justice.
gov/olc/warpowers925.htm>.
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cally new character of the threat posed by ‘Al Qaeda’ implied that this emergency
was like no others. The nature of ‘Al Qaeda’ resulted in a global combat where
cheap weapons of mass destruction might be used with unprecedented lethal conse-
quences. Because this was a war like no others, the emergency constitution might
have to be revised and most of the norms established in previous emergencies set
aside as they had been rendered ‘obsolete’ and ‘quaint’. The President could and
should rewrite the constitution of emergency to adapt it to the new circumstances.
This indeed amounts to claiming that the President has a power functionally akin to
the puovoir constituent residing in the People, only the chief of the executive holds
it as regards the emergency constitution, not the ordinary constitution.56 In particu-
lar, the emergency version of the ‘unitary doctrine of the executive’ vests the Presi-
dent with the power to review the constitutionality of the statutes passed by Con-
gress, and eventually to set them aside if unconstitutional; and also to ignore and left
without application the rulings of the Supreme Court concerning the constitutional-
ity of a given norm. This power is singularly exerted through a peculiar source of
law, the signing statement.57 Using them, Bush II has indeed contested the constitu-
tionality of more than seven hundred legal provisions58 by typically claiming that
‘[t]he executive branch shall construe [section, title and name of the act] in a manner
consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary
executive branch and as Commander in Chief’.59
II. International law as behavioural regularities
The second element of Bush II’s theory of constitutional law is his theory of interna-
tional law, according to which international norms other than bilateral treaties are
merely behavioural regularities, and not a source of legal obligations.
The argument is three-pronged.60 First, it is claimed that only a fraction of inter-
national norms can be characterized as legal norms proper. In particular, customary
56 Or does he? If the constitution of emergency is to remain activated for as long as the ‘war on
terror’ lasts, and that could well be an awful long time, the difference between the two consti-
tution-making powers becomes very diffuse indeed.
57 See American Bar Association, ‘Recommendation of the Task Force on Presidential Signing
Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine’, available at <http://www.abanet.org/ lea-
dership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/20060823144113.pdf>. On the literature, see P. J. Cooper,
By Order of the President (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2002), ch. 7; P. J. Cooper,
‘George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe and the Use and Abuse of Presidential Signing State-
ments’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (2005): 515-32.
58 See American Bar Association, ‘Recommendation of the Task Force on Presidential Signing
Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine’; Cooper, ‘Bush, Poe and Presidential
Signing Statements’. See also Cooper, ‘Bush, Poe and Presidential Statements’.
59 See for example the signing statement attached to the Detainee Treatment Act 2005.
60 Even more radical criticisms have been expressed by other Bushite lawyers. See for example
J. R. Bolton, ‘Is There “Really” Law in International Affairs?’ Transnational Law and Con-
temporary Problems 10 (2000): 1-48.
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norms and multilateral treaties are not law in a strict sense, because states comply
with them only if the national interest or the threat of coercion of powerful states
(and not any autonomous institution constituted by international law) coerce them
into compliance.61 Customary international law is thus better understood as a set of
behavioural regularities stabilized by mutual interest, cooperation in a prisoner’s di-
lemma situation, or coercion exerted by a hegemonic state;62 while multilateral trea-
ties are instruments through which states spread information about their mutual in-
tentions.63 Second, the only international customary norms with legal bite are those
supported by the United States. This claim derives from a rather idiosyncratic under-
standing of how the opinio juris which underlies international customary norms is
forged, in concrete, by transforming the de facto preminence of the United States in
world affairs in a law-making power.64 Third, the President as the pouvoir constitu-
ent of the constitution of emergency can decide in a final and unreviewable manner
whether or not a given international standard should be followed by US authorities;
so that even if customary norms or multilateral treaties have legal bite, they can be
override by the President.
The utmost expression of Bush II’s theory of international law is the neologism
‘lawfare’, intended to mean ‘the strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for
traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.’65 Thus, international
law is not only denied legal force, but stigmatized as one of the weapons of terror-
ists.
D. The minimalist and eclectic legal theory of Bush II
Bush II’s legal theory is not the result of a systematic effort at answering the trade
questions of legal theorists (what law is, in what relationship it stands with morality,
what are the basis of validity of positive norms, etc. ) but a minimal theory sufficient
to provide support to the radical changes in positive law and constitutional theory
advanced and relied upon the court attorneys of the President.
Bush II’s legal theory is minimalist and eclectic. The key premise of this theory is
that law is the ultimate source of validity of legal norms is the will of the sovereign.
61 E. Posner and J. Goldsmith, The Limits of International Law (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2005), p. 10.
62 Ibid., p. 39.
63 Ibid., p. 105.
64 Yoo, War, pp. 33 and 37.
65 Charles J. Dunlad Jr, at present Deputy Judge Advocate, in ‘Law and Military Interventions:
Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts’, a lecture delivered at the Kennedy School
of Government on 29 November 2001, available at <http://www.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.
pdf >.
66 Donald Rumsfeld and Jack Goldsmith expanded the concept and shifted its target, now ‘Eu-
ropean and South American allies and the human rights industry (sic) that supported their
universal jurisdiction aspirations’, see Goldsmith, Terror Presidency, pp. 59ff.
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We the People acting through its representatives is the sovereign under the ordinary
constitution, and We the People as represented by the President is the sovereign un-
der the emergency constitution. Bush II’s legal theory is thus a prescriptivist concep-
tion of law, which rejects the notion that legal reasoning should be viewed as a spe-
cial case of critical practical reasoning (and thus, neither as a fully discretionary ac-
tivity, in which moral and prudential arguments can be freely invoked to defeat posi-
tive legal norms; nor as a fully autonomous, technical activity; but one which in lim-
ited but decisive ways incorporates critical normative reasoning).66 And conse-
quently, the legal theory of the attorneys of the White House assumes that the inter-
pretation of legal norms, and very especially constitutional norms, is a matter of de-
cision, not a matter of reasoning.
The minimalist character of Bush II’s legal theory is closely related to its eclecti-
cism; as a ‘thin’ legal theory, it can rely on an ‘overlapping consensus’ of ‘thick’
legal theories to the extent that they subscribe, one way or the other, to the core pre-
scriptivist assumption, even if they are antagonistic and contradictory when we con-
sider them as ‘thick’ theories. This is indeed very convenient in strategic terms, as it
seems to provide an expanded ‘base’ of support for the concrete constitutional
changes being advocated.67 And indeed, Bush II’s lawyers have borrowed from three
distinct theories of law, namely: (1) the peculiar bred of positivism that originalist
theories endorse (exemplified by the originalism of Scalia); (2) the bred of ‘modern’
iusnaturalism concerned with the nature of positive law (exemplified by Finnis’s le-
gal theory); (3) pragmatist theories of law which characterize law as an instrument
for other social ends (exemplified by Richard A. Posner’s legal theory, applied and
developed to emergencies by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule).
It may be necessary to underline that I am not claiming that all of these authors
would fully agree with either the constitutional amendments or the constitutional
theory of Bush II. Rather, I make three far more modest claims. First, the eclectic
and incomplete theory of law put forward by Bush II’s lawyers has been built with
bits and pieces of the said three legal theories; whether it makes sense to take bits
and pieces from the original complete legal theory or not is a different question,
which is irrelevant to the court attorneys of the White House, but may be critical to
the original authors of the bit or piece. Second, these borrowings reveal that
66 As Robert Alexy, Ronald Dworkin or Neil D. MacCormick, to name only three outstanding
contemporary legal theories, conceptualize the law. This is not alien in any sense to the US
constitutional tradition; just the contrary; see M. J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pur-
suit of Justice (New York, Hill and Wang, 1999).
67 This strategy has structural parallelisms with that underlying the pragmatic legal theory de-
veloped by Cass Sunstein over the years, and very especially on his ‘Incompletely Theorized
Agreements’, Harvard Law Review 108 (1995): 1733-72; and now in his ‘Incompletely Theo-
rized Agreements on Constitutional Law’, University of Chicago Public Law Working Paper,
no 147, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID957369_code
249436.pdf?abstractid=957369&mirid=1>. Its political equivalent is ‘government by fringes’
as mastered by Karl Rove; see G. Wills, ‘Fringe Govermment’, New York Review of Books, 6
October 2005.
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originalism à la Scalia, pragmatism à la Posner and (modern) natural law à la Finnis
have a common prescriptivist foundation, even if the way in which law is reduced to
power in each case is very different, and has different consequences. But even then,
the ultimate endorsement of prescriptivism creates a potential affinity with theories
such as Bush II’s constitutional and legal theory. Third, the affinity between all
these theories has occasionally led to a partial, even if qualified, endorsement of
some of the most controversial aspects of the four constitutional amendments put
forward by Bush II in all three cases.
I. Originalism à la Scalia.
Originalism is a breed of legal positivism that affirms that there is an objective
meaning of legal norms, to be determined by reference to the authoritative constitu-
tional will.68 Although the term and the contours of the debate have been shaped in
relation to the US Constitution,69 it is obvious that similar debates concerning the
canons of interpretation are endemic to all legal systems.
Originalism is an attractive theory of law and legal interpretation for Bush II’s
lawyers because it can be used to weaken the constraints that constitutional law im-
poses upon the executive. Although formally speaking it offers criteria to determine
in an objective and fixed manner what the constitutional law says, in substantive
terms not only the subjective or intersubjective will of the constitution-makers may
be extremely difficult to ascertain in an objective manner (thus inviting discretionary
interpretation), but also the identification of law with the will of a given authority
(even if power has obtained in ‘democratic’ competition among elites) cracks the
door open for the characterization of law as a congeries of norms, only tied together
by their being willed by the sovereign; consequently, the ruling few have a larger
discretion to determine what the law is.70
Originalism supports Bush II’s constitutional amendments and his constitutional
and legal theory in two concrete ways.
First, it allows the attorneys of the White House to present revolutionary judg-
ments as conservative ones. By pretending to ground their claim on a ‘lost’ constitu-
tional norm, they obtain a conservative wrapping for claims that advance an inter-
pretation of positive constitutional law radically deviant from existing constitutional
68 The ‘loci classici’ are A. Scalia, ‘Originalism: The Lesser Evil’ (1989) 57 University of Cin-
cinnati Law Review 57 (1989): 849-65 and A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997).
69 See for example S. G. Calabresi (ed), Originalism, A Quarter-Century Debate (New York,
Regnery, 2007).
70 Cf. R. Dworkin, ‘On Gaps in the Law’ in P. Amselek and N. D. MacCormick (eds. ), Contro-
versies on Law’s Ontology (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1991), pp. 84-90; ‘The
Ardous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe and Nerve’ Fordham Law Review 65
(1997): 1249-1268; and also R. A. Posner, How Judges Think, (Cambridge, MA, Harvard
University Press, 2008), pp. 103-4.
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practice (for example, if the President orders the warrantless surveillance of a US
citizen within US territory in open breach of FISA, they claim that FISA was uncon-
stitutional because it breached inherent executive powers; so true compliance with
the Constitution requires allowing the President to order the warrantless surveil-
lance) Indeed, the attorneys of the White House have frequently claimed that they
were just rolling back the unconstitutional limits on executive action set by Congress
in the seventies.
Second, originalism helps claiming that the four constitutional amendments are
democratically legitimate. After all, it is generally assumed that the Constitution was
authored by the people, and that it should not be changed but by the people. So to
the extent that the President is faithfully restoring the true meaning of the constitu-
tion against meddling and elitist judges, and irresponsible notables in Congress, he is
actually advancing the cause of democracy.
II. Legal Pragmatism à la Posner
Posnerian legal pragmatism claims that law is to be understood as a set of behav-
ioural regularities concerning the use of state power. Denying any clear-cut distinc-
tion between what law is and what should be, Posner adds that officials should re-
gard law as a means to achieve specific social ends, and thus are well-advised to
take decisions in such a way that they maximize social welfare.71 The alleged
‘pragmatic’ character of this theory derives from its antifoundational, even anti-
theoretical stand and its companion emphasis on practice.72
Legal pragmatism à la Posner is attractive to Bush II’s lawyers because it weak-
ens constitutional constrains upon executive action to the extent that it emphasizes
the decisionistic and particularistic character of legal reasoning; not only must each
specific context indeed be thoroughly considered if the ultimate end is to maximize
social welfare through legal adjudication; but law is the result of action, of the ac-
tion taken by officials.
Still, the ‘standard’ view of Posner’s theory comes hand in hand with an institu-
tional theory which expands the role of courts, and dramatically constrains the legis-
lators and the executive. This is because judges, contrary what is the case with the
other two branches of government, proceed by means of incremental concrete deci-
sions to settle particular and specific problems, and not by sweeping general deci-
sions abstracted from any specific context. Judicial rulings are less prone to have
massive unintended consequences, not only because of their narrower scope, but
also because rectification is easier and speedier. How could it then be claimed that
Posner’s legal pragmatism serves the cause of aggrandisement of the executive
71 R. A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990),
p. 26; and Economic Analysis of Law (Boston, Little and Brown, 1972).
72 See ‘The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory’ Harvard Law Review 111 (1998): 1637-
1717.
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power? The explanation lies in the fact that Posner in Not a Suicide Pact (and, as
already said, Posner and Vermeule in Terror in the Balance) have assigned a key
role to the distinction between ordinary and emergency politics, and have claimed
that the benign role played by courts during ordinary times is actually to be played
by Presidents during emergencies.73 In concrete, they claim that the executive is the
best-placed institution to preserve the republic during emergencies, on account of
the speed, secrecy and decisiveness of its actions.74 If this premise is true in general,
is even truer if the emergency poses a radically new threat, as the present one does,
because everything must be rethought from the scratch. Because new measures must
have a chance to ‘prove themselves’,75 monitoring or surveillance by other branches
of government or by citizens themselves is unadvisable.76
Legal pragmatism offers support to Bush II’s constitutional amendments because
it justifies the four constitutional amendments in the name of the different weight to
be given to the collective interest in national security under emergencies, thus re-
quiring a new ‘weighing and balancing’ of subjective rights to freedom and the col-
lective good of security.77 In the book that ironically marked the launching of the
Oxford series on inalienable rights (sic), Posner claims that because ‘the law of ne-
cessity supersedes the Constitution’,78 the scope of fundamental rights should be
made less extensive.79 The reason is a simple calculus: the people at risk of being
victims of a terrorist attack are far more numerous than those whose liberties may be
curtailed; so the interest of the greatest number should prevail over that of the lesser.
Posner adds that subjective rights to freedom should be only ‘modestly’ curtailed,80
but then does endorse (with some qualifications, but also with some additions) Bush
II’s four constitutional amendments.81
73 R. A. Posner and A. Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts (Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 21
74 Ibid., p. 16 and 30.
75 R. A. Posner, Not A Suicide Pact (New York, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 31.
76 Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance, pp. 16 and 45.
77 Posner, Not A Suicide Pact, p. 31.
78 Ibid., p. 70
79 Ibid., p. 8.
80 Ibid., p. 41.
81 Ibid. In concrete: (1) all rights (not only habeas corpus, but all rights) could be denied to a
foreigner enemy combatant seized abroad and brought into the United States (reservations
should be held on whether foreign residents already present in the US could be treated simi-
larly (pp. 41 and 58); (2) the right to judicial protection is to be redefined, increasing the
length of time during which people could be arrested and held incommunicado on the sole au-
thority of the executive (pp. 65 and 73; with reasonable remaining undetermined); even citi-
zens could be detained indefinitely if they are deemed to be terrorists (pp. 67 and 73); (3) trial
by military commission is fine even when there is no war (p. 73); (4)Individuals could be re-
quired to prove they are not terrorists, rendering unnecessary that prosecutors prove it (p. 58);
(5) torture could be resorted to if there is a ‘state of necessity’ (pp. 12 and 81).
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III: Natural Law à la Finnis
It may seem counterintuitive to claim that modern natural law theory is one of the
house legal theories of Bush II’s lawyers. Leaving aside the fact that the main expo-
nents of modern natural law theories may share with the administration similar
views on sexual morality and bioethics,82 it is well-known that modern natural law
offers a sophisticated account of the relationship between legal and practical rea-
son.83 One would then suppose that the structural and substantial connection be-
tween law and objective principles of morality defended by Finnis and other modern
natural lawyers should provide a standpoint from which to criticize (and criticize
heavily for that purpose) the practice and theory of constitutional law followed by
Bush II’s lawyers.
Still, modern natural law offers critical support to Bush II’s constitutional and le-
gal theory on one specific (and key) account: its rationalization of the dualistic un-
derstanding of the constitution and consequently of the need of unlimited executive
power during emergencies, or what is the same, a moral grounded defence of the old
principle that inter armas silent leges. In a neglected passage in Natural Law and
Natural Rights reproduced at the beginning of this chapter, Finnis claims that when
societies are ‘threatened with military, economic or ecological disaster’,84 what the
executive decides and pretends to embody into law should be regarded for the time
being as a correct moral judgment; ‘statesmen’ must depart, ‘temporarily but per-
haps drastically’ from the ordinary constitution, while presumably both citizens and
scholars should simply be silent and comply, because ‘one could say nothing that
may appear to be a key to identifying the occasion or a guide to acting in it’. Thus, at
the critical moments of truth, not only does law cease to be a guide to action, but le-
gally constituted power ceases to be guided by practical reason and must be exer-
cised by reference to individual political judgment.85 Whatever ‘statesmanship’ ap-
plied to departing from law is, clearly it cannot be the same kind of public reason
which underpins ordinary constitutional and statutory norms.
It could be argued that I am making too much out of a short passage in Natural
Law and Natural Rights. Lack of space prevents me from attempting a deeper analy-
sis of the relationship between Finnis’ theory of emergencies and his overall theory,
or for that matter, the complex genealogy of this idea, and the relationship in which
it stands with Aristotles’ and Aquinas’ legal theory. I will only claim that Finnis
himself seems to have proved that his theory of emergencies is far from being an ab-
stract and marginal annotation in his Natural Law and Natural Rights to the extent
that it grounds his criticism to the ruling of the House of Lords on the constitutional-
82 Including active and passive hostility towards stem cell research, same sex-marriage, abortion
and any regulation of the right to die. See C. Tiefer, Veering Right (Berkeley, California Uni-
versity Press, 2004).
83 See N. D. MacCormick, ‘Natural Law Reconsidered’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1
(1981): 99-109.
84 J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 246.
85 Ibid., p. 275. The full quote is reproduced at the beginning of this chapter.
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ity of the indefinite detention of certain foreign suspected of being terrorists.86 By
claiming that aliens do not have a right to be treated equally when it comes to the
modalities of detention,87 Finnis seems to confirm the central role played by his
views on the morality and legality of unconstitutional action during emergencies.
Quite obviously, the intriguing question is in which other respects the rights to be
acknowledged to foreigners are different.
E. Conclusion: The constitution of emergency between law and propaganda
By holding to the narrative that the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 plunged
us into an unbrave new world, Bush II’s lawyers have pretended to justify the exer-
tion of the alleged inherent executive power to rewrite the emergency constitution
that is said to lurk behind the ordinary US constitution. The recent judgment of the
Supreme Court in Boumediene, the several investigatory committees set up in Con-
gress, and above all, the progressive change of mind of the US public, seem to indi-
cate that the revolution was close to success, but ultimately failed. But that cannot be
taken for granted. Boumediene was decided by the narrowest of majorities, Congress
lacks a clear goal in its investigations, and the public may get diverted if a new ter-
rorist attack takes place. Moreover, as has been argued in this chapter, the challenge
posed by Bush II was not merely one of unconstitutional action in the shadows, but
is properly described as a frontal attack aimed at the constitutional doctrines, consti-
tutional theory and legal theories of Bush II’s lawyers. Even if the four constitu-
tional amendments are about to be rejected, there are worrying signals that Bush II
has been rather successful at transforming the very terms of the debate in constitu-
tional and legal theory, and indeed in public debate in general. Ten years ago, argu-
ments in favour of the juridification of torture would have been regarded as extrava-
gant; today they are regularly taken to be serious propositions on which reasonable
people can reasonably disagree. By revealing the interconnections between constitu-
tional doctrine and theory, this chapter shows that the failure of Bush II’s constitu-
tional amendments may be temporary if his successes in theoretical terms are not
also reversed. This is a very good reason to take very seriously Bush II’s constitu-
tional and legal theory, and not be contented to disregard it as fringe thought.
Moreover, evidence is coming to light that proves that there is a causal chain be-
tween the blatant violations of constitutional and international law and the legal ad-
vice provided by key General Counsels within the Administration, and decisively,
from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Departament of Justice. The legal responsi-
bility of Bush II’s lawyers is not a partisan question, but a major issue which should
be of concern to all jurists, and to all scholars in general. Although Bush II’s lawyers
have repeatedly claimed that they limited themselves to describing what the law
86 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68.
87 J. Finnis, ‘Nationality, Alienage and Constitutional Principle’ Law Quarterly Review 127
(2007): 417-45, p. 438.
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said, and consequently, they do not have any legal responsibility for what politicians
decided to do within the bounds of what they were advised was legally permissible,
the contrary is well established in law since the Nuremberg Trials. Specious legal
advice leading to blatant violations of the law is part of the legal chain of causation,
and thus, lawyers may be brought before criminal courts.88 There are clear indica-
tions indeed that serious crimes have been committed by CIA operatives, military
personnel and lawyers.89
Still, it would be wrong to analyse Bush II’s constitutional and legal theories as if
they were simply constitutional and legal theories. By doing that we will not only
risk giving them too much undeserved credit, but we will miss the key role they
have played in the propaganda effort to transform constitutional and political prac-
tice. In short, we have to be aware of the double role of Bush II’s theories: as legal
theories and as propaganda. The core decisions in the so-called ‘war on terror’
would not have been feasible if unsupported by well-formed constitutional argu-
ments. They played a decisive role in convincing the restless many that the dissent-
ing voices against the ruling few were not to be listened to. That what was being
done was both legally and morally permissible. Because modern societies cannot be
integrated by mere force, because most people believe the law is by and large a re-
pository of moral principles, no matter how imperfect, the attempt to place the
President above the law has to be legitimized by means other than force, with legal
arguments playing a paramount role. But when the legal arguments put forward are
merely specious arguments put forward for narrow strategic reasons, when the form
of law is placed at the service of power, law is disconnected from public reason and
turned into (cheap) propaganda.90 The propagandistic subversion of law is far from
new. It is in a way typical, as Scott Horton has reminded us,91of mob lawyers. And
indeed the reduction of law to a mere technique cracks the door open to the propa-
gandistic use of law.92 But more worryingly, there are disturbing structural similari-
88 In particular, see the judgment in US v. Alstoetter, analysed in depth by Matthew Lippman,
‘The Prosecution of Josef Alstoetter et al: Law, Lawyers and Justice in the Third Reich’ Dick-
inson Journal of International Law 16 (1997): 343. On Alstoetter and the basis on which
Bush II’s lawyers could be prosecuted, see Milan Markovic, ‘Can Lawyers Be War Crimi-
nals?’ Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 20 (2007): 347-68.
89 ‘A Review of the FBI’s involvement and observations of detained interrogations in Guanta-
namo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq’, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/ spe-
cial/s0805/final.pdf>, p. xxii. Four recent books have articulated very cogent legal cases. See
M. Ratner, The Trial of Donald Rumfeld. A Trial by Book (New York, The New Press, 2008);
P. Sands, Torture Team (London, Allen Lane, 2008); E. de la Vega, US v. Bush (New York,
Seven Stories, 2006) and V. Bugliosi, The Prosecution of George W. Bush for Murder (New
York, Vanguard, 2008).
90 Indeed, it was only to be expected that the main advocates of Bush II’s theory of law (includ-
ing Justices Scalia and Thomas) would have been keen watchers of the TV show 24. Sands,
Torture Team; see also Clucas, Ch. 11 below.
91 S. Horton, ‘The Green Light’, 2 April 2008, available at <http://harpers.org/archive/
2008/04/hbc-90002779>.
92 B. Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: A Threat to the Rule of Law (Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006).
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ties between the constitutional and legal theory of Bush II’s lawyers and the consti-
tutional and legal theory of the court lawyers of Fascism and Nazism. The narrative
on the radical new circumstances, and the consequent the need for radically new
theories of law, as well as its infiltration of established and respected institutions and
bodies of law by raw power leave the reader with a frustrating sense of déjà-vu.93
All this should make us reflect, and reflect seriously and deeply. Because we had
been there already, they (and we) should have known better.
93 See S. Levinson, ‘Torture in Iraq and the Rule of Law in America’ (2004) 133 DAEDALUS
Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 5, available at <http://www. amacad.
org/publications/summer2004/levinson.pdf>; and S. Horton, ‘The Return of Carl Schmitt’,
published in Balkinization, 7 November 2005, available at <http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2005/11/return-of-carl-schmitt.html>. It is not my intention to draw comparisons be-
tween the ‘war on terror’ and other conflicts; or between Bush II and other historical political
leaders. My claim is a more modest one and considers the way in which Bush II’s lawyers
have argued in law. It is they and their arguments that I find pertinent to compare with, say,
Carl Schmitt (as Sanford Levinson and Scott Horton have already suggested), Karl Larenz,
Alfredo Rocco, Sergio Panunzio or Francisco Javier Conde. On the topic, see C. Joerges and
N. Singh (ed.), Darker Legacies of Law in Europe (Oxford, Hart, 2003).
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8. Torture, between Law and Politics: A Retrospective View
Marina Lalatta Costerbosa
A. Introduction
This chapter contributes to the discussion of torture at the present time from a his-
torical point of view. My contention has always been that the history of modern po-
litical thought can offer us a critical understanding of the question of the justifiabil-
ity of torture, a question that is today again scandalously being raised.
Torture is not only a practice of the past. People continue torturing today, even in
democratic countries, and we can see many attempts to justify it today in democratic
countries.
In this chapter I will not be directly concentrating on the revived contemporary
debate on torture. Rather, my purpose is to focus on the role which torture had in the
past and on the presumed change which has occurred in the last decades. For in-
stance, it has recently been argued, for example by Antonio Cassese, that ‘today tor-
ture is merely an instrument of repressing political and ideological dissent. Through
time it has become the most brutal form of war on political enemies, against those
who do not agree with the ideology of the dominant power’.1 From this angle I will
try to throw light on the recent Rehabilitierung of torture.
My question is the following: is it true that such a radical change has occurred? Is
it true that torture is essentially a political instrument and no longer a judicial in-
strument? Again, is it true that in the past torture was always something different
from today, ignoring of course the changing of the more or less sophisticated, more
or less cruel and underhand instruments to perform it in the most effective way? My
point is that the argument that the meaning of torture has changed from a judicial to
a political one, pace the good intentions of its supporters, favours the position of tor-
ture’s defenders. The reason is that, if we say that today torture has a new face, a po-
litical face, people could argue that today we are in an exceptional and dangerous
situation indeed, and that for this reason torture and in particular the ‘new’ form of
torture is a necessary and adequate reaction to the attack by the ‘forces of evil’, or
something like that. On the contrary, I think that we may reject torture with more
force and arguments if we recognize that what we have in front of us really is a reac-
tion without precedent, but that does not mean that it is justified by extraordinary
international and political circumstances; on the contrary, it presents a regression in
terms of liberty and rights, a regression insofar as the democratic process is con-
cerned.
Torture is an old instrument. It was used in the past to defend power through judi-
cial practice, but all of this happened in an age when people were not expected to
1 A. Cassese, I Diritti Umani Oggi (Laterza, Rom-Bari, 2005), p. 76, italics added.
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define themselves as upholders of democracy and human rights. My interpretation
tries to show, with, I hope, more evidence than the ‘change argument’, that torture is
unacceptable and incompatible with democracy and human rights, and I think that in
the process it may afford a realistic insight into the nature of the status quo. Today
people are trying to square the circle, so to speak; they support torture and at the
same time call themselves democratic. This does not work. Even the arguments
which were elaborated during the Enlightenment, for example by Christian Thoma-
sius, Pietro Verri, or Cesare Beccaria, are today misunderstood or simply ignored.2
Today we are going back to pre-modern forms of law and power.
Two points support this view. The first one goes back to Niccolò Machiavelli, be-
cause in his works we can find an idea of torture not only as a legal instrument, but
also as a political instrument stricto sensu.3 In Machiavelli’s age and thought, torture
was already political, just like today, and not only an instrument for judicial inquiry.
The second point deals with Enlightenment thought. If we read books by authors
like those mentioned above, we will find some arguments against torture which are
used today. Not so much has changed in this respect, and this means that today we
are facing a regression (a ‘three century regression’), a deeply antidemocratic
movement. To a great extent, today we are repeating that old debate, the claim to
justice of the Enlightenment has not yet been realized and, in any case, probably
never will be realized once and for all. Those thinkers have shown how useless and
inhuman torture is, but that is not enough in face of the new ideologies and policies
promoted by efficient modern instruments of hegemony designed to shape and shed
public consent. As I will try to demonstrate, in Machiavelli’s Discourses and in
Thomasius’ essay on torture we can already find clear awareness of the existence of
a political sense of torture. Arguments that using torture is pointless are strong ar-
guments only if we are talking about judicial torture, and this is crucial for my
analysis. Indeed, if torture is also a political instrument, it can be ‘useful’, and for
that reason – as was already clear to Thomasius – good arguments against torture
have to show its injustice, not only its uselessness. Torture cannot be a mere ques-
tion of utility. This holds today as in the past.
B. From judicial torture to political torture: the Machiavellian view
I prefer for the moment to proceed slowly and talk about a part of the history of tor-
ture. In Greek and Roman antiquity torture was an instrument which had a place
within a general concept of law and politics. It was a judicial instrument for extort-
2 C. Thomasius, Über die Folter, ed. by R. Liebewirth (Weimar, Hermann Böhlaus,
Nachfolger, 1960); P. Verri, Osservazioni sulla Tortura, ed. by C. Gallone (Milan, 1997).
3 N. Machiavelli, Lettere, ed. by Giorgio Inglese (Milan, Rizzoli, 1996); N. Machiavelli,
‘Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio’, in Id. , Opere, (Rome, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia
italiana fondata da Giovanni Treccani, 2006).
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ing by violence a confession or piece of information to be used in a trial against the
accused, who refused to confess, or a presumed witness, who was reticent about the
facts.4 It was considered an instrument of proof, which was only suited to the lower
classes, however, in particular to slaves (with the exception of crimes directly or in-
directly against political authority like magic, falsa moneta and majestatis causa, to
punish which cases the Romans also used to torture free people). It was considered
an instrument of proof regardless of the principle of the presumption of innocence
(as a sort of preventive detention, so-called mala mansio, demonstrates) or individ-
ual responsibility for having committed the crime in question (it involved witnesses
too). Moreover, torture differed from ordeal, which had nothing to do with forcing
the will of someone, and was related to the irrational and superstitious conviction
that a particular reaction by the accused to a cruel practice, such as bad water,5
would be a sign of truth. By contrast, torture had a ‘rational’ (if wrong) connection
with truth.
Under certain conditions torture in the pre-modern age was clearly considered le-
gal and right. So it was in theory and in law, so in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages.
In practice torture was used not only for judicial reasons, but also for more general
purposes. It was applied in order to destroy the enemy, including the ideological or
religious enemy, i.e. related to political aims. We may think of the Inquisition or the
torture of Christians in Ancient Rome because they were Christian.6
If this is true, and if my interpretation of Machiavelli is correct, as early as the
16th century, for instance in Machiavelli’s Discourses, we can find a political justi-
fication of extreme punishments including torture. Machiavelli was not a precursor,
but a good interpreter of his age. In this sense Machiavelli is important for my pur-
pose; to reflect on his theory and later on some Enlightenment thinkers seems to me
interesting for the present.
Focusing on Machiavelli’s thought is particularly interesting for two different
reasons. For one thing, after he was accused of conspiracy and arrested, he was him-
self tortured. And then again, he explicitly revealed the true nature of torture, its
double face: the political and the judicial.
So, a word about Machiavelli. On 18 February 1512, Niccolò Machiavelli was
accused as a presumed partner of Pier Paolo Boscoli and Agostino Capponi in their
conspiracy against the De Medici cardinal who would later become Pope Leone X.
After his arrest he was tortured, as he told Francesco Vettori in a letter dated 13
March 1513, when he left prison. This was the traditional use of torture. Judges tried
to obtain his confession. He was innocent and did not confess anything. But that is
not the most interesting thing as such. What I find more relevant is the reaction and
the opinion Machiavelli seems to have on torture in general, because – as we can see
in the correspondence with Vettori – he did not condemn the event in itself, he did
not reject torture, but the way in which in that (his) particular situation it was used.
4 P. Fiorelli, La tortura giudiziaria nel diritto comune (Milan, Giuffrè, 1954) Vol. I.
5 See Numbers 5:4-31
6 Fiorelli, La tortura giudiziaria nel diritto comune, p. 45.
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In Machiavalli’s opinion, torture can be unfairly suffered, that is, it can be fairly suf-
fered. When is torture unjust? When it is used against people that are only suspected
and not only against people who are seriously suspected or considered guilty.7 The
point at issue and the reason for his bitterness are not connected with the injustice of
that institution; on the contrary, they depend on the fact that a non-liberal and suspi-
cious political and social context make application of it unfair. But the reason for
this justification of torture is not the traditional one: the reason grounded on the need
to expiate someone’s extreme guilt or to receive confession and information about a
crime. Moreover, Machiavelli seems to know that in particular this way of obtaining
a confession is dangerous and problematic in itself (as his biography shows).
The 23rd chapter of his Discourses is of capital importance in this context. The ti-
tle is ‘How much did the Romans avoid using moderation in judging their subjects’.
Machiavelli’s thesis is that Romans used no moderation and they were right in so
doing. In fact extreme punishments are the necessary instrument not for justice (jus-
tice is not the end of adjudication), but for ‘ control over subjects which cannot and
must not be offensive any more’.8 ‘That is possible – Machiavelli continues – in two
ways, either by eliminating every possibility of being harmful, or giving them every-
thing they desire’.9 With Livy, Machiavelli concludes: ‘you have to annihilate them,
making them totally dependent on your power, either by punishment, or by induce-
ments.10
First of all, here extreme punishments are not a judicial instrument, but punish-
ments. They are not the outcome of applying the criterion of proportionality between
crime and punishment. They are related to political reasons, which can justify the
absence of penal proportionality as the criterion of fairness. Machiavelli thinks that
the independence of punishment from a proportional relationship with crimes and
even from application of the criterion of retribution has to be rightly understood. It is
here fundamental to look at the relationship between punishment and the political
circumstances. Punishment has to satisfy the political needs and requirements of the
ruler. In 1502 Florentine people made exactly this mistake: They looked at propor-
tionality and respected moderation in their judgements after the rebellions of Arezzo
and Val di Chiana. By contrast, the right criterion is for Machiavelli the criterion of
political efficacy. ‘They used,’ he tells us, ‘the criterion of moderation which is very
dangerous in judging people’.11
Here we see the primacy of politics over law, the priority of efficacy of political
decision over moral and legal correctness. For these reasons Machiavelli defends
extreme punishments like torture, and supports rulers and judges in using them for
political ends, in particular to stabilize power.
7 Machiavelli, Lettere, p. 99.
8 Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, p. 280.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 283.
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C: The worrying topicality of Eighteenth-century arguments against torture
In paragraph 16 of the rightly famous Dei delitti e delle pene (1764) by Cesare Bec-
caria the argument on torture presupposes an idea of torture as judicial torture,
which was considered a useful instrument for obtaining a confession or good infor-
mation, or for discovering the truth before a trial, or an extreme punishment suited to
very serious crimes, purifying the accused from the infamy deriving from heavy
guilt.12
In order to condemn torture and demonstrate its incompatibility with legal order,
Beccaria produces four interrelated arguments.
The first argument corresponds to the principle of the presumption of innocence.
‘A person cannot be considered guilty and the state cannot refuse him its public pro-
tection until it is demonstrated by trial that he has violated the social contract. What
sort of law can authorize a judge to punish a citizen before the sentence? Only a law
such as force’.13 The second argument concerns the usefulness of torture. It is not
only true that torture is unjust in itself, but it is also useless and a source of mistakes:
The offence is certain or uncertain. If it is certain, the punishment that law prescribes in each
case is enough, and torture is useless, because judges do not need a confession. If it is uncer-
tain, it is wrong to torture an innocent person, because they are innocent until proven guilty.
And I add that it goes against all reasons to expect that a person be at the same time the ac-
cused and the accuser, and that pain should be the test of truth, as if truth resided in the mus-
cles and fibres of a wretch under torture. That is an instrument for acquitting criminals and
condemning feeble innocents.14
The third argument is related to the intrinsic irrationality of torture as a judicial
instrument. Torture presupposes a factual levelling between the criminal and the in-
nocent, and this is contrary to every conception of justice and to the principle of in-
dividual responsibility. For this reason it is also incompatible with legality, because
it is irrational and unacceptable that the same consequences should derive from be-
ing guilty or innocent. Furthermore, Beccaria underlines that a very strange conse-
quence comes from applying torture, because the innocent is put in a worse condi-
tion than the criminal. Indeed, either the former confesses and is accused, or he is
recognized innocent and has suffered unfair torments. By contrast, the criminal in
any case has an advantage. If he confesses, he is condemned for his guilt, but he has
a chance of avoiding this. If he resists torture with determination, he has to be ac-
quitted. He has exchanged a bad punishment for a better one. In the end, an innocent
person can only lose, the criminal can only win.
When Beccaria refers to torture as the punishment for an infamous act, he pre-
sents his fourth argument, based on a principle of justice, because in this case the
problem consists in the abuse of power that torture implies. In torturing, the political
12 C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, ed. by A. Burgio (Milano, Feltrinelli, 2007).
13 Ibid. p. 60.
14 Ibid.
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authority exceeds its constitutive limits. And that is nonsense again, because ‘infamy
would be eliminated through infamy’!
Let me now briefly turn to another Italian philosopher, Pietro Verri. When he
writes on torture and its intrinsic injustice Verri is thinking about judicial torture,
which is usually justified by the argument of public security and the common good.
As is well-known, this sort of justification will be very clearly elaborated by Utili-
tarianism. In this regard a passage from the Manuscripts by Jeremy Bentham is
paradigmatic. Here the utilitarian philosopher points out two cases in which torture
may be applied:
There seem to be two Cases in which Torture may with propriety be applied. 1.
The first is where the thing which a Man is required to do being a thing which the public has
an interest in his doing, is a thing which for a certainty is in his power to do; and which there-
fore so long as he continues to suffer for not doing he is sure not to be innocent. 2. The second
is where a man is required what probably though not certainly it is in his power to do; and for
the not doing of which it is possible that he may suffer, although he be innocent; but which the
public has so great an interest in his doing that the danger of what may ensue from his not do-
ing it is a greater danger than even that of an innocent person’s suffering the greatest degree of
pain that can be suffered by Torture, of the kind and in the quantity permitted to be em-
ployed15
In order to favour general interests – that is the argument – it would be justified to
sacrifice the interest of a single individual.
Against this common opinion, Verri’s arguments are partially Beccaria’s argu-
ments (… we know how bitter Verri’s feelings were against Beccaria, who was ac-
cused of having plagiarized arguments by other authors, in particular by Verri him-
self). In any case, polemics apart, it is worth concentrating on Verri’s arguments
against torture, because some of them are very interesting, original, and in my opin-
ion, strong.
The first of Verri’s arguments is the well-known argument of the usefulness of
torture as an instrument of truth. The other four arguments are specifications of the
general argument of injustice. They are answers to the question: Why is torture un-
just as such? Here Verri’s considerations are very fertile.
First of all, torture exhibits an excessive nature. It is essentially excessive and for
this reason it is impossible to limit and moderate it through laws or judicial prac-
tices. Torture is excessive or it is not torture. Torture is efficacious and extreme or it
is not torture at all. Torture is structurally unjust: it is a form of injustice. Pretending
to avoid this excessive character is like pretending to avoid the excessive character
in something that is by nature excessive. It would become something radically dif-
ferent.
A second argument concerns the injustice peculiar to every act which is supera-
bundant in doing evil. Torture, in other words, has some psychological implications,
because it reveals the obscure sadistic face of human nature. Verri stresses that after
15 J. Bentham, Manuscripts, University College, London 46/63-70, in W. L. and P. E. Twining,
‘Bentham on Torture’ Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 24 (1973): 307-356, pp. 312-313.
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the initial disgust, torturers take pleasure from torturing; compassion and humanitar-
ian feelings fade away. The third argument is the one already mentioned: the pre-
sumption of innocence. The fourth one consists in recognition of the contra-naturam
character of torture. Forcing a confession, forcing one’s own confession, forcing the
principle of self-conservation to be violated, that is, the fundamental right to life
prescribed by natural law, is an action against nature itself. This argument of the
contra-naturam character together with the argument of the excessive nature of tor-
ture is peculiar and fundamental, because it insists on an evident violation of the ba-
sic individual right to life.
At this point, the German philosopher of law Christian Thomasius is very helpful
for my chapter, and may bring us to a conclusion.
Thomasius writes on torture in his essay Dissertatio de Tortura (1705, more than
three centuries ago). It is an essay in two parts. In the first part the author presents
some historical-reconstructive reflections. In the second part he presents his norma-
tive and critical theories. His first argument is the last one we described in talking
about Verri: the argument of the contra-naturam character of torture. The second one
is the usually recognized argument of the presumption of innocence. The third one is
the frequently maintained argument of the usefulness of torture and of its paradoxi-
cal character so well described by Beccaria, as we have just seen: judges lose rather
than gain certainty in finding judicial truth.16 The fourth argument is new and rele-
vant in this context. It deals with conventions and tradition. For Thomasius it is not a
good argument to justify torture on the grounds of its antiquity. History is not a prin-
ciple of justification at all. In this regard we may remember the poor eels of Benja-
min Constant’s French cook and his connected argument against slavery: for injus-
tice there is no justification through time.17
But another argument by Thomasius is decisive for us. He dedicates an entire
paragraph (number 4 of the second part) to the political nature of torture. Here he
writes: ‘Punishments give an opportunity to all tyrants to act cruelly towards their
subjects, misrepresenting justice. Torture gives the more powerful an instrument by
which to harm innocent and hated people’.18 It is a very clear passage. Torture is a
judicial instrument but also a political one, because this is an instrument for fighting
efficaciously against ideological and political enemies – a very significant aspect of
the current application of torture.
D: Concluding remarks
Such was Thomasius’ criticism three centuries ago. Old arguments supporting tor-
ture such as the Benthamite argument, and old practices such as torture in its differ-
ent applications are unfortunately recurring.
16 Part B, §§ 2 and 3
17 Thomasius, De l’Esprit de conquête et de l’usurpation, chap. XIII, fn. 2
18 Thomasius, Über die Folter, p. 164
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The ‘old’ counter-arguments are therefore still valid and have not lost their argu-
mentative force.
Torture has a dual nature: it is judicial and political.
Torture is useless in terms of public interest and produces paradoxical outcomes
for any trial.
Torture is unjust for at least four main reasons: (i) it violates the principle of the
presumption of innocence; (ii) it implies depreciation of fundamental rights, in par-
ticular and first of all the right to life; (iii) it is essentially excessive and cannot be
moderated by legal norms; (iv) finally it cannot be justified by tradition.
All this was already clear and evident to Enlightenment thinkers. But these ideas
no longer seem so evident today; they are again under debate. They have a worrying
topicality, because torture is a cogent reality as a political instrument, as a judicial
instrument, and, last but not least, as a practice prejudicial to prisoners, immigrants,
and refugees. My impression is that these circumstances show the regressive charac-
ter of the present, in which subjective rights seem to ‘have a price’: the price of so-
called public security: people expect to legitimize something that is a contradiction
in itself, since in a democracy law and torture cannot go together. Torture supporters
expect to transform subjective rights into relative rights, which can be sacrificed in
the name of public utility and the common interest; relative rights which cannot be
defined – borrowing Ronald Dworkin’s metaphor – as ‘trumps’ anymore, but simply
as good cards, whose importance depends on contingent conditions; they are always
held in reserve.
We may hope that the democratic crisis is only temporary, that the modern de-
mocratic process forms part of a general dialectical dynamic. We may hope that the
present time is a moment in a progressive process. But for that very reason we have
to reflect on the Enlightenment theses and take them seriously. We must not ignore
the real meaning of Verri’s words with regard to the present situation: they sound, to
my mind, like a warning against indifference, against the current risk of underesti-
mating the immorality of torture and what is at stake in terms of constitutional
rights.
‘It seems impossible to me,’ Verri wrote in 1770, ‘that torturing could have per-
sisted for so long’: never has a prediction erred more than this on the side of opti-
mism.
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9. Nursing During National Socialism: Complicity in Terror,
and Heroism
Alison J. O’Donnell, Susan Benedict, Jochen Kuhla and Linda Shields
A. Introduction
In 1933, Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany bringing with him the beliefs, poli-
cies and doctrines of National Socialism. All Germans, and many others in the oc-
cupied countries of Europe, had their lives controlled by the Nazis until mid-1945.
Nurses, like their colleagues in medicine, were important in the implementation of
the genocidal goals of the Nazis.
This paper describes the way nursing was organized, regulated, controlled, and
practiced during the era of the Third Reich. Using primary sources of legislation,
interviews and trial transcripts, and supported by secondary sources which explain
the development of the laws surrounding nursing, we present a description and ex-
planation of nursing practice during this unique era.
Nursing in Germany had had a long history, but was changed dramatically by the
prevailing philosophies of eugenics and National Socialism. In some institutions,
egregious crimes such as the murder of psychiatric patients were carried out by
nurses who subscribed to these philosophies or who believed they would be pun-
ished if they did not. However, some nurses, at great personal risk, were able to re-
sist, often saving the lives of their vulnerable patients. The organizational structure
of the various organizations made nursing a decentralized profession without a uni-
fied and powerful voice contributing to the lack of any but individual resistance.
B. The Development of Nursing in Germany
Germany made an important contribution to the development of the nursing profes-
sion worldwide. The deaconess schools and motherhouses which saw the education
of young women to care for the sick and needy, begun in the late 1700s (1782 Franz
Anton Mai in Mannheim), were the first formal schools of nursing.1
German nursing was organized according to the Mutterhaus (mother house) con-
cept which was an outgrowth of the religious order of St. Vincent de Paul. In the
first half of the 19th century, Theodor Fliedner, an Evangelical pastor of the Rhine-
land, founded a community which resembled in several ways the Mutterhaus of St.
Vincent. Women, known as ‘Deaconesses’ lived together in a motherhouse where
they received education in both nursing care and religion. These Deaconesses came
to be regarded as the exemplar of nursing. Florence Nightingale came from England
1 M. P. Donahue, Nursing: the Finest Art (St Louis, MO, Mosby, 1985).
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to spend time with the Deaconesses in Kaiserwerth in 1850, which at the time was
regarded as the center of nursing education in Europe. At Kaiserwerth, Nightingale
was impressed with Fliedner but found the nursing standards there to be inferior to
those she observed at the Sisters of Charity hospital in Paris.2
By the end of the 19th century, a ‘good trained nurse’ was one who was unques-
tioning in her obedience and selfless in her service to others.3 Obedience and self-
denial were paramount in Nightingale nurses who were ‘reared in an atmosphere of
obedience and conformity’.4 A secular approach to caring was advocated as Ger-
many, like other nations, experienced socio-economic and cultural changes which
accompanied rapid industrialization and urbanization, advances in medicine, philan-
thropic initiatives in welfare and the emancipation of women. Increasing sophistica-
tion in medicine led to a demand for a better class of nurses.5
Before World War One (WW1), population growth and development of a grow-
ing industrial proletariat, coupled with a rising middle class, altered the health needs
of the people and increased the need for nurses both in hospitals and private homes.
Increasing demands for nurses enabled some of them to become independent, to
separate themselves from restrictive regimes of their training schools, and for the
first time to work privately. Nurses who chose to work independently were called
‘free’ frei or ‘wild’ wilde nurses,6 and often worked in poor conditions, accepting
low wages in return for independence.7
Changing views of women’s roles in society enabled nurses to gain economic in-
dependence.8 Consequently, nursing began to be perceived as a more socially ac-
ceptable occupation.9 Women began to search for new roles outside the traditional
confines of ‘Kind, Küche, Kirche’, (children, kitchen, church).
At the beginning of the 20th Century, German nurses sought to establish them-
selves as members of a profession rather than a charitable and religious enterprise.
2 L. McDonald, The Collected Works of Florence Nightingale (Waterloo (Ontario), Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 2001).
3 C. Maggs, The Origins of General Nursing (London, Croom Helm, 1983); S. M. Collins and
E. R. Parker ‘A Victorian Matron; No Ordinary Woman. Eva Charlotte Ellis Lückes (8 July 8
1854-16 February 1919)’, International History of Nursing Journal 7 (2003): 66-74.
4 M. Baly, Florence Nightingale and the Nursing Legacy (London, Croom Helm, 1986), p. 34.
5 C. Helmstadter, ‘‘A Real Tone’: Professionalizing Nursing in Nineteenth-Nentury London’,
Nursing History Review 11 (2003): 3-30.
6 S. Hahn, ‘Nursing Issues in the Third Reich’, in J. J. Michalczyk (ed.), Medicine, Ethics and
the Third Reich: Historical and Contemporary Issues (Kansas City, Sheed and Ward, 1994).
7 G. Boschma, ‘Agnes Karll and the Creation of an Independent German Nursing Association’,
1900-1927’, Nursing History Review 4 (1996): 51-168.
8 L. Dock, ‘Nursing Organization in Germany’, (1901) ICN Report 443; L. Dock, A History of
Nursing: Volume IV (New York, Putman, 1912); Boschma, ‘Agnes Karll’; Hahn, ‘Nursing Is-
sues’.
9 E. R. Benson, ‘Nursing in Germany: a Historical Study of the Jewish Presence’, Nursing His-
tory Review 3 (1995): 189-202; H. Steppe, ‘Nursing in Nazi Germany’, Western Journal of
Nursing Research 14 (1992): 744-753; K. M. Klindt, ‘‘Gender’, and ‘Class’, as Categories of
Nursing History: Male Nurses in the Professionalization of Nursing in the Late Imperial
Germany’, Pflege 9 (1998): 35-42.
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Such ambitions reflected the growing international women’s movement.10 Similarly
to the United Kingdom (UK), professional registration initiatives were instituted and
by 1907 the ‘Regulations of a State Examination for Nursing Personnel in Prussia’
was in place. In order to take the examination, one had to provide an elementary
school certificate, be 21 years of age, physically and psychologically fit and show
proof of participation in a one-year nursing course.11 Similar regulations were en-
acted in 1908 in Württemberg and Hesse, 1909 in Saxony, 1919 in Baden and 1920
in Bavaria. After WW1, Prussia, Saxony, Hesse, Thuringia, Hamburg and Braun-
schweig increased the length of required training to two years and lowered the man-
datory age to 20 years. Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Bremen and Mecklenburg re-
tained the one-year training period. Inherent within German nurses at this time was a
strong commitment to the idea of care, service, duty, obedience and unquestioning
loyalty to the (usually male) physician.12 The virtue of obedience extended to obey-
ing orders issued by senior nurses and hospital administrators.13
After WW1, developments in nursing were set in a changing and unstable politi-
cal situation. Germans resented the perceived unfairness of post-war reparations and
the Treaty of Versailles. Rampant inflation, industrial collapse and extreme levels of
unemployment caused political turmoil. In 1928 a key event occurred. In the general
election, the Nazi Party won 12 seats in the German parliament, the Reichstag. So-
cietal problems such as unemployment and inflation continued to favour the Nazis
and their denunciation of Jews as the cause of the economic problems. In September
1930, an election was called and the number of Nazi seats in the Reichstag increased
from 12 to 107. The Nazi party was now the second largest party in Germany. In the
June 1932 presidential election, Field Marshal Hindenburg, the incumbent, won with
53% of the vote. Hitler garnered over 36%, coming in second. By 31 July 1932, the
Nazi Party held 230 seats, giving Hitler enough strength to establish a coalition gov-
ernment. He, however, refused to do so unless he was Chancellor. Lengthy political
crises led to negotiations and Hitler was appointed Chancellor on 30 January 1933 at
the age of 43 years.14
Coupled with the rise to power of Adolf Hitler was the surge of anti-Semitism
across Germany. From the beginning of the 20th Century, anti-Semitism had been an
integral part of the conservative political platform. Jews had been successful in
German academic, professional, and business circles in Germany. As the economy
10 M. Lungershausen, Agnes Karll, Her Life, Works and Inheritance (London, Elwin Staude,
1964).
11 E. von Abendroth and M. T. Strobl, ‘Nursing in Germany and Austria’, American Journal of
Nursing 50 (1950): 728-730.
12 D. Mansell and J. Hibberd, ‘We Picked the Wrong One to Sterilize: the Role of Nursing in
the Eugenics Movement in Alberta, 1920-1940’, International History of Nursing Journal 4
(1998): 4-11.
13 B. R. McFarlane-Icke, Nurses in Nazi Germany: Moral Choices in History (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1999); E. W. Kintner (ed.), The Hadamar Trial (London, William
Hodge and Co, 1949); S. Benedict ‘Killing While Caring: the Nurses of Hadamar’, Issues in
Mental Health Nursing 24 (2003): 59-79.
14 M. Gilbert, The Holocaust (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1985).
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declined and unemployment rose, they became the scapegoats. Where once assimi-
lated with a fairly high rate of intermarriage with non-Jews,15 they soon found them-
selves to be the objects of social and economic discrimination. Thus with Hitler
coming to power, the smoldering anti-Semitism of the Nazis and right-wing political
groups ignited.
C. Eugenics, health and nursing
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a new movement gained credence in Europe
and the United States (USA). The ‘science’ of eugenics influenced political thought
and became an integral, if perverted, platform of Nazi thinking. Its influence on
German nursing was profound.
Eugenic theories derived from Charles Darwin’s Theory of Evolution.16 However,
the idea of being able to manipulate survival of the most desirable human qualities
was further developed through the teachings of the founder of eugenics and cousin
of Charles Darwin, Sir Frances Galton (1822-1911).17
Galton suggested the term ‘eugenic’ in 1883. He further developed his theories
while working in the overcrowded slums of London, where he observed the rise of
what he perceived as an underclass, an ‘undesirable’ race, and formulated a theory
of heredity in which improvements in the human race could be obtained by ‘selec-
tive breeding’, rather than by natural inheritance. As this term became incorporated
into academic debate, its use by physicians as advocates of social hygiene had au-
thoritarian (and ultimately murderous) implications.18
Galton believed that Mendelian laws should be applied not only to physical char-
acteristics but also to human intelligence and ultimately, ominously, to fecundity.19
He suggested that those who had influence in society, namely medical men, support
notions of social purity and racial hygiene through therapeutic and medical interven-
tion, thereby preserving a race’s hereditary worth. In 1905, Professor Albert Ploetz
(1860-1940) founded the German Society for Racial Hygiene in Berlin, which
15 C. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press,
2004).
16 P. Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics Between Unification and Nazism 1870-1945
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989); International Medical Editorial Bulletin,
‘Contemporary Lessons from Nazi Medicine’, International Medical Editorial Bulletin 6
(1989): 13-20.
17 M. Baly, Nursing and Social Change (London, Routledge, 1995 (3rd ed.)); Mansell and Hib-
berd, ‘We Picked the Wrong One to Sterilize’.
18 Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics; R. S. Cowan, ‘Nature and Nurture: the Inter-
play of Biology and Politics in the Thoughts of Francis Galton’, Studies in the History of Bi-
ology 9 (1977): 133.
19 Baly, Nursing; M. Burleigh, Death and Deliverance (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1994).
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funded racial hygiene chairs in prominent medical schools.20 ‘Racial hygiene’ began
to be widely supported as physicians sought to halt what they perceived to be the
biological and psychological deterioration of the German Volk.21 In 1907, the medi-
cal profession drew further inspiration from the radical and pioneering sterilization
programs of the mentally disabled in Indiana, USA.22
In Germany and the UK, as a consequence of these views, numbers of patients
admitted to psychiatric institutions increased. Reasons for admission varied from
mental illness, to vagrancy, prostitution, theft, production of an illegitimate child,
political crimes, congenital physical and mental handicaps in children, or being a
Jew, Jehovah’s Witness, Sinti or Roma, or homosexual.23 Anyone deemed not able
to make a meaningful contribution to German society was lebensunwertes Leben,
‘life not worth living’ .24
World War One further concentrated this eugenic ethos as numbers of perceived
‘good healthy Germans’ perished in combat,25 while ‘incurables’ were cared for in
institutions.26 Between 1914-1919 over 45,000 of the pre-war institutional popula-
tion died as a result of deliberate starvation, neglect and extreme privations of war.27
With severe monetary problems following WW1, psychiatric patients were moved
into rural areas in an effort to decentralize the cost of care.28 In these areas, the num-
ber of people perceived to be abnormal escalated and eugenic theory increasingly
became the accepted norm, offering an apparently rational solution to a growing
problem. Instead of providing further support in community settings, psychiatrists
created a two-tier system with intensive therapy for acute cases and minimal therapy
20 R. J. Proctor, Medical Killing in the Nazi Era (New York, Basic Books, 1986); Weindling,
Health, Race and German Politics.
21 M. J. Franzblau, ‘Ethical Values in Health Care in 1995: Lessons from the Nazi Period’, The
Journal of the Medical Association of Georgia 6 (1995): 161-164.
22 M. Gwyther and S. McColville, ‘Nazi Experiments; Can Good Come from Evil?’,
(19/11/1989) Observer Magazine 18.
23 R. C. Baum, The Holocaust and the German Elite Genocide and the National Suicide in
Germany, 1871-1945 (New York, Totowa Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); R. Plant, The Pink
Triangle: the Nazi War Against Homosexuals (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1986);
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for chronic patients, coupled with sterilization of those discharged from institu-
tions.29
By the late 1920s, the eugenics movement was gaining strength. Influential aca-
demics adopted and supported these views in Germany and other countries. In the
UK, the prominent birth control campaigner Marie Stopes stated: ‘for the careless,
stupid or feeble-minded who persist in producing infants of no value to the State and
often a charge upon it, the right course seems to be sterilization’.30 Eminent German
geneticists Erwin Baur, Eugen Fisher, Fritz Lenz, Theodor Mollison, and Ernst
Rüdin promoted the definition of different human phenotypes; health, sanity and in-
telligence were considered positive and superior (höherwertig) while sickness, in-
sanity and mental retardation were negative attributes (minderwertig).31 During the
1920s, these scientists colluded with the rising Nazi Party in order to promote
‘eugenics’ legislation, which they redefined ‘race hygiene’.32
D. Implementation of eugenic theories
Physicians’ responsibility to promote the health of society and the nation included
the ethos of survival of the best or fittest; therefore medicine and nursing should act
in the interests of future generations. In the 1920s, the Nazis combined these con-
cepts of health and eugenics with anti-Semitism into their ideology.33 Genetic health
courts enforced the involuntary sterilization of people by vasectomy or tubal liga-
tion; physicians were required to report every case of genetic illness or be fined 150
Reichsmark (RM).34 Midwives and doctors were compelled to report any infant born
with an abnormality, and community nurses had to report people who were consid-
ered ‘unfit’ under the racial codes. Racial hygiene was perceived as a cost-effective
solution to escalating welfare costs, specifically targeting psychiatric patients in
hospitals.35 Society had the right and the responsibility to exterminate the unworthy,
29 Burleigh, ‘Euthanasia’.
30 M. C. Stopes, Wise Parenthood (London, Pitman’s and Sons Ltd, 1927), p. 42.
31 B. Müller-Hill, Murderous Science: Elimination by Scientific Selection of Jews, Gypsies and
Others, Germany 1933-1945 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992). (Phenotype: the way
in which the genotype, or genetic makeup, is expressed in the body. For example, the gene for
blue eyes as a unit of inheritance would provide the genetic makeup for that gene and if inher-
ited, would be expressed as the phenotype for the individual having blue eyes or not depend-
ing on the dominance of the trait of the gene: see B. Gates, Learning Disabilities, 3rd ed.,
New York, Churchill Livingstone, 1997).
32 Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics; Müller-Hill,Murderous Science.
33 R. J. Evans, In Defence of History (London, Granta Books, 1997).
34 Gardella, ‘Medicine in Nazi Germany’; M. Burleigh, Death and Deliverance (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
35 Aly, Chroust and Pross, Cleansing the Fatherland; Gardella, ‘Medicine in Nazi Germany’.
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individuals who could not contribute to society, and to protect and preserve those
deemed worthy, and nurses played an important role.
Lebensunwertes Leben (life unworthy of life) ideology was promoted widely in
literature, the popular press and films. School textbooks featured mathematical exer-
cises based upon the cost of care of the mentally ill.36 During the 1930s the public
were encouraged to visit psychiatric hospitals to view the disabled.37 Visits were or-
ganized with nationalistic groups, including Hitler Youth, League of German Maid-
ens, Nazi Women’s organization, nurses, lawyers, teachers, midwives and members
of the SA (Sturmabteilungen) and SS (Schutzstaffel). Institutions themselves organ-
ized these visits to emphasize their positive role in institutional care.38 In reality, the
tours disseminated racial hygiene propaganda39 by placing on display those patients
with the most visible and severe disabilities.
E. Nursing and National Socialism
Pioneering educational and practice partnerships were created in the form of newly
established training schools for nurses and community nursing posts, as the Nazi
Party idealized feminine and motherly roles of the nurse. The National Socialist
Physicians’ League (Nationalsozialistischer Ärztebund, NSDÄB), founded in 1929
at the Nuremberg Nazi Party Congress, had the express goal of promoting racial hy-
giene, racial science and eugenics in public health. National Socialism was openly
endorsed and supported by the traditionally nationalistic medical profession. Jewish
physicians lost their academic appointments and had their practices limited to Jew-
ish patients.
The ability to influence the security and tenure of colleagues’ positions coincided
with a rise in the popularity and membership of the NSDÄB. As doctors worked at
the edge of life and death, it was they who controlled and influenced the creation of
a purified, scientific and superior Volk population.40 The ethos of National Socialism
combined with the ethical and established values of German nursing, served as an
ideal platform from which the NSDAP promoted nurses as their ‘political soldiers’
of healthcare, and through this ‘heroic service’, nurses had a direct influence on the
German people with whom they came into contact.41 In preparing for impending
war, tensions developed. The NSDAP tried to influence the nursing profession by
36 A. Donner (1935), Mathematik im Dienste der nationalpolitischen Erziehung, in R. Proctor
‘The Destruction of “Lives not Worth Living”’, in R. Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine Un-
der the Nazis (Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 1998) 184.
37 Burleigh, Death and Deliverance; McFarlane-Icke, Nurses in Nazi Germany.
38 Burleigh, Death and Deliverance.
39 Burleigh, ‘Racism as a Social Policy’.
40 Proctor, Medical Killing.
41 Steppe, ‘Nursing in Nazi Germany’.
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suggesting that the number of nurses to be trained annually should be increased.
Traditional nursing virtues of obedience, unquestioning loyalty, duty and conformity
which had become internalized amongst some middle class German women were
adopted and transferred as the new authority to the Nazi women’s movement within
the NSDAP.42
F. The organization of nursing under National Socialism
In 1903, the Association of the Nursing Professionals in Germany (Berufsorganisa-
tion der Krankenpflegerinnen Deutschlands, BOKD) was founded through the influ-
ence of Agnes Karll (1868-1927).43 Membership comprised frei nurses; Mutterhaus
nurses such as those in the Catholic and Protestant organizations could not be mem-
bers. BOKD represented interests of nurses including development of professional
training and benefits, and it functioned as an employment agency. Soon, BOKD be-
came the supplier of nurses to hospitals and nursing schools as well as providing
continuing education. BOKD became a member of the International Council of
Nursing (ICN) in 1904.
Karll, although she died prior to 1933, believed that nurses would be promoters of
‘hygiene and social progress’, and this remained an inherent belief of practicing
nurses.44 With the advent of National Socialism,
The nurse, who until then had worked quietly and effectively, was now supposed to become
aggressive and a political soldier of the health service. … the well known (nursing) values
continued to be valid and were cleverly combined with the ideas of National Socialism.45
Political changes following WW1 facilitated further emancipation of nurses. Sev-
enty-five percent of all German nurses belonged to a Mutterhaus which provided
education, employment, and retirement benefits. Strong unions, the Free Union and
the Reich’s Union of Nurses, worked for their members, for better pay and de-
creased working hours. Dictates forbidding marriage were removed from employ-
ment contracts. During this time, the organization of nursing as a profession within
the parameters of the Volk and values of the ‘good German woman’ was important.46
With the advent of Nazism, German nurses found themselves with low social stand-
ing, no tradition of assertiveness; poorly paid, lacking a supportive professional or-
42 R. Bridenthal, A. Grossman and M. Kaplan (eds.), When Biology Became Destiny: Women in
Weimar and Nazi Germany (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1982).
43 G. Boschma, ‘Agnes Karll and the Creation of an Independent German Nursing Association
1900-1927’, Nursing History Review 4 (1996): 51-168.
44 Ibid.
45 H. Steppe, ‘Nursing in the Third Reich’, History of Nursing Journal 3 (1991): 21-37, pp. 25-
26.
46 Mansell and Hibberd, ‘We Picked the Wrong One to Sterilize’.
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ganization and increasingly dominated by the highly influential physicians of the
NSDÄB.
The Nazi government recognized that nursing must be reorganized and controlled
in order to implement their racial policies. The NSDAP appointed nursing leaders
who fully supported and strongly influenced the pivotal position of nursing. In one
of the nursing publications of the time (1934), Jensen wrote:
I hope that I may be understood when I say that National Socialism cannot do without exercis-
ing its influence over such a large and important profession as nursing. Indeed it must irrefuta-
bly take on the nursing profession in a special and thorough manner, since nurses belong to
that group of persons who, firstly, have important responsibilities to carry out in the area of na-
tional health, and, secondly, are in such intimate and direct contact with their national com-
rades under such special circumstances, that they can have an especially great educational in-
fluence on them.47
This statement was congruent with the medical profession’s prediction of the fu-
ture of nursing:
The requirements which German nurses in social and medical service have to meet in the new
state are completely different from the previous period in many respects. The new state does
not only want to look after the sick and weak; it also wants to secure a healthy development of
all national comrades, and also to improve their health, if their inherited biological predisposi-
tion allow for it. Above all, the new state wants to secure and promote a genetically sound,
valuable race and, in contrast to the past, not to expend an exaggerated effort on the care of
genetically or racially inferior people. Of course, such people must be looked after, but no
longer be supported and promoted at the cost of the more valuable people.48
Occurring concurrently with this reorganization of nursing and hugely influential
was emphasis on collective health of the Volk, rather than the individual. Vorsorge –
the notion that the focus of care should be on the promotion of health of the Volk
rather than on providing for ill individuals (Fürsorge) – emerged as the new order.49
The individual became valued only for his or her contribution to society, while those
unable to contribute had no right to be cared for and should be removed for the good
of the Volk. Public health’s new slogan was Vorsorge statt Fürsorge.50
There were a number of disparate nursing organizations. In 1933, the Red Swas-
tika Nurses (Roten Hakenkreuzschwestern), whose function was to care for sick
members of the Nazi Party, aid in military operations and political party events, and
to care for relatives of members of the Nazi Party who were incarcerated, was
47 Jenson (1934), cited in Steppe, ‘Nursing in Nazi Germany’, p. 746.
48 F. Bartels (1933), in S. Hahn, ‘Nursing Issues During the Third Reich’, in J. M. Michalczyk
(ed.), Medicine, Ethics, and the Third Reich: Historical and Contemporary Issues (Kansas
City, Sheed and Ward, 1994) 143, pp. 143-144).
49 W. Reich, ‘The Care-Based Ethic of Nazi Medicine and the Moral Importance of What We
Care About’, American Journal of Bioethics 1 (2001): 68-69.
50 H. Steppe, ‘Nursing Under Totalitarian Regimes: the Case of National Socialism’, a paper
presented at the Congress Nursing, Women’s History and the Politics of Welfare (Notting-
ham, England. 23/07/1993), p. 3.
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formed. In May 1934, the Red Swastika nursing organization was dissolved and the
NS Schwesternschaft (National Socialist Nursing Organization, NSS), known as the
‘Brown’ nurses for the color of their uniforms51 was formed. Their main area was to
be community nursing because that is where they could have the greatest influ-
ence.52 A NS Schwesternschaft mother house was established in the Rudolf Hess
Hospital in Dresden. Eight week courses on National Socialism were held there be-
ginning 1 October 1934.53
The Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF, German Labor Front),54 consolidated the nu-
merous small nursing organizations in 1933. Nurses previously associated with a
union were taken over by a national organization, Reichsgemeinschaft öffentlicher
Betriebe, which was concerned with wages. Male and female nurses were in differ-
ent organizations. The organizations for the female nurses were:
1. der Caritasverband (the Caritas Organization, the Catholic nurses’ organ-
ization, 1937)
2. die Schwestern des Deutschen Roten Kreuzes (Red Cross, 1934)
3. der Reichsbund der Freier Schwestern (Federation of Free Nurses, 1936)
4. die Diakoniegemeinschaft (the Protestant Nurses’ Organization, 1933)
5. die NS Schwesternschaft (National Socialist Nursing Association, 1934)55
The majority of nurses belonged to the two religious organizations, the Caritas-
verband and the Diakoniegemeinschaft with the Nazi nurses claiming just 1001
nurses in 1934.56 In 1935, the Reich’s Women’s Leader Gertrud Scholtz-Klink
formed the Expert Committee for Nursing within the Association of Free Welfare
Work. Two nursing leaders were appointed by Scholtz-Klink.57 This reorganization
effectively meant that all nurses who wanted to practice had to be a member of one
of these organizations. Nevertheless, the appointment of matrons selected by the
Nazi party further restricted the role, remit and status of nursing. Under their leader-
ship, National Socialism gained a greater and uncontested influence.58
Nursing was perceived by society as being highly disciplined and hierarchical
with members who, through self-sacrifice and a religious calling, nursed their pa-
51 C. Schweikardt, ‘You Gained Honor for Your Profession as a Brown Nurse: the Career of a
National Socialist Nurse Mirrored by her Letters Home’, Nursing History Review 12 (2004):
121-138.
52 H. Steppe, ‘Nursing since 1933’, Krankenpflege im Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main,
Mabuse-Verlag, 1996 (8th ed.)).
53 R. J. Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1988).
54 Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) was an organization established in 1933 to replace all labour
unions, guilds, and professional organizations. ‘Its goal was to organize all German labor
(mental and physical) and to train all authentic Germans into an effective work community’.
See R. Michael and K Doerr. 2002. Nazi-Deutsch, Nazi German. (Westport, CT, Greenwood
Press, 2002), p. 119.
55 Steppe, ‘Nursing since 1933’, p. 65.
56 Ibid.
57 McFarlane-Icke, Nurses in Nazi Germany.
58 Proctor, Medical Killing.
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tients.59 However, nurses in psychiatric institutions were different from the moti-
vated young people portrayed in Nazi propaganda films. Some came into nursing via
an in-house staff shuffling,60 usually from being a kitchen worker or cleaner.61 Their
capacity to care for the sick was not a pre-requisite.62 If individuals were members
of the Nazi Party, their membership permitted them to secure work in the public sec-
tor through the German Labour Front and the National Socialist Cell Organization,
which was directly involved in employing workers.63
Female nurses were required to have one year of domestic service, either in their
own homes or in those of someone else, as a prerequisite to nursing.64 Male caregiv-
ers often were older than females, from lower social classes and, prior to the be-
tween-war economic crisis, most had been in unskilled employment.65 Nonetheless,
in spite of an ethos of subordination, insecurity and persistently low status for many
nurses, others still believed that nursing was a worthwhile career.66 Under the Nazi
biomedical vision, nursing as a profession was given key recognition. With govern-
ment support, an independent Nazi community nursing service was established to
directly influence public health, health education, counselling and health care in ru-
ral communities.67
Community and Nazi nurses were ordered to actively promote Nazi doctrine as
part of their culture, values and working practices.68 Nurses instructed on the impor-
tant role of ‘Aryan’ motherhood advised on healthy lifestyles and reported to the
Public Health Officer, both positively and negatively, on local families.69
Recruitment and emergence of newly appointed community nurses enabled the
Nazi ideology of ‘Health of the Nation’ to be disseminated in rural areas. This en-
compassed eugenic, racist and eventually murderous directives.70 In 1937, the ICN
was told of changes being implemented by the Nazi government.71 Support was
59 McFarlane-Icke, Nurses in Nazi German.
60 Ibid.
61 Burleigh, ‘Racism as a Social Policy’.
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70 Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics.
71 J. E. Lynaugh, ‘From Chaos to Transformation’, in B. L. Brush, J. E. Lynaugh, G. Boschma,
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sought by key German nursing leaders to oppose these changes to nurses’ working
practices, but no objections were noted.72 A nurse working at the time reflected
Well, actually, everything went by so quietly, there was nothing special, I cannot remember
that we reacted in any particular way, we just continued to do our work, only different people
were coming … no really, I have to tell you honestly, it was not the case that we were in any
way concerned with these events, it was simply a transition.73
Indisputably, this transformation and shift of power proved to be significant.
G. Laws regulating nursing
The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 prohibited gentiles marrying or having sexual inter-
course with Jews, thereby ‘protecting’ future German citizens as a ‘pure blood race’
.74 These laws covered health, and from 1939, citizenship, and civil and racial hy-
giene laws,75 which enforced inspection and compulsory sterilization of those of
non-Aryan descent. Nurses were overtly involved in advisory and reconciliatory
roles with victims of sterilizations76 and in the subsequent ‘euthanasia’ program, ac-
tually administered lethal injections77. Others were involved in care for members of
party organizations78 and some were employed in health education programs in work
camps, psychiatric hospitals, SS infirmaries and Reviers (infirmaries) in concentra-
tion camps.79 Jewish nurses were transferred to newly created segregated ghetto
hospitals.80 Here they received special training to work with patients who had been
72 International Council of Nurses, Proceedings, International Council of Nurses, Eighth Con-
gress (1937).
73 Hahn, ‘Nursing Issues’, p. 142; Ernst Albers: Interview 04/11/1998.
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man and Littlefield, 1981
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discharged by their Nazi nursing colleagues from Jewish hospitals outside the ghetto
boundaries.81
H. The National Socialist Nursing Organization
By 1939, 9.2% of all nurses belonged to the NS nursing organization (Table 1). This
percentage, however, is not in agreement with the numbers and percentages cited by
Breiding.82 In 1942, the NS nurses organization joined with Reichbund der Freien
Schwestern (‘Blue’ nurses), who comprised 20% of German nurses, to form the NS
Reichbund of German Nurses.83 Hahn stated that a third (46,855) of nurses belonged
to the NS Reichbund.84 (Allowing for an increase in the numbers of nurses from
1939, as reported by Breiding, to 1942, the numbers provided by Breiding and Hahn
would be consistent). They worked in 476 hospitals, 4,450 community health sta-
tions, and 300 schools of nursing.85 Many of the nurses who were not politically ori-
ented found themselves, through this forced union with the NS nurses organization,
in an uncomfortable position. They were assumed by many non-nurses to be ‘Nazis’
and the organization expected them to become ‘aggressive and a political soldier of
the health service’.86
Table 1. Numbers of nurses in respective organizations in 1939
Organization Membership % of total nurses
Reichsbund 21,459 14.96
NS nurses 10,880 7.59








81 S. Hahn, ‘Nursing Issues in the Third Reich’, (1994).
82 B. Breiding, Die Braunen Schwestern (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998).
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In 1938, a law regulating nursing, Gesetz zur Neuordnung der Krankenpflege,,
stipulated that the medical training of professional nurses would be sanctioned only
in state approved schools.87
I. Nurses and the implementation of Nazi ideology
Some German nurses swore a public oath of allegiance to the Führer, but some were
uncomfortable at having to become political.88 The NS Schwesternschaft members
were sworn in under the following oath:
I swear unswerving loyalty and obedience to my Führer, Adolf Hitler. I obligate myself as a
National Socialist nurse, to fulfill my professional requirements wherever I will work in a
loyal and conscientious manner in my service to the people, so help me God.89
Even the Red Cross nurses (die Schwestern des Deutschen Roten Kreuz) swore
their allegiance to Hitler:
I swear loyalty to the Führer of the German people, Adolf Hitler, I solemnly promise obedi-
ence and discharge of duties in the work of the German Red Cross according to the orders of
my superior. So help me God.90
The Protestant nurses organization (die Diakoniegemeinschaft), too, was sympa-
thetic to the ideas of National Socialism and did not identify a conflict with the or-
ganization’s religious affiliation. For example, in 1934, Deaconess D. Bauer wrote
in Service to the People (Dienst am Volk):
National Socialism and Socialism, both are not foreign words to the world of deaconry … Out
of this social movement originates the serving throughout and the duty to the community. Also
the totalitarian demand of National Socialism is a term we know well because it is something
within us although it is characterized differently. This totality demands fight … Fight is the
basic motive of National Socialism … The Führer’s thought has been executed in the dea-
conry ever since the beginning. Discipline and obedience are promoted in the deaconry. Thus
the deaconry has already worked for 100 years on a National Socialistic basis. Therefore it
greets National Socialism with an open heart…A nurses’ association with this ideology can
only strengthen a National Socialistic state.91
87 The Reichs Law Review, Part I, Law for the Reorganization of Nursing of 28 September
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There were instances where nurses individually, through their own personal convic-
tion, did try to resist Nazi doctrines; however, documented evidence is sparse.92
Nurses forged patient records to exaggerate the severity of patients’ illnesses to de-
fer discharge, or substituted names of the dead for the living patients so they could
hide and escape discharge.93 If discovered, such actions would have had serious con-
sequences for nurses.94 Individual nurses entrapped in the killing web of the eutha-
nasia program resisted by seeking transfers to other jobs within the same institution
or within other institutions. Others became pregnant or moved away.95 Those who
did request transfers or job changes did not suffer reprisals as a result.96
K. Conclusion
As the continuum from the prohibition of marriage and relationships between Jews
and Aryans, to the sterilization of the handicapped, to the killing of ‘lives unworthy
of life’ developed in Nazi Germany, nurses were involved in every phase. They
identified and reported newborns with ‘defects’, convinced families to relinquish
their children to ‘Special Children’s Units’ where they were eventually killed, and
rode with adult psychiatric patients on their transports to the killing centres of the
‘euthanasia’ program where they were gassed. Nurses, acting both on physicians’
orders as well as autonomously, killed psychiatric patients by oral and injected
overdoses. Over 10,000 patients were killed by nurses.97 As Jews, Poles, and others
deemed ‘inferior’ were incarcerated in concentration camps, nurses participated –
with varying degrees of willingness – in the medical experiments.98
It is vital to acknowledge that not all nurses participated in these dreadful events.
It was the minority who were either ideologically committed to National Socialism,
or who were employed in institutions that were such an integral part of these actions
that it would be been extremely difficult to avoid participation – although some did.
Yet, just as it is important to know that most German nurses avoided involvement in
these events – either by choice or circumstances – it is equally important to under-
stand how those who were involved came to be either willing or reluctant partici-
pants so that nurses may never be in a position to carry out crimes on behalf of the
government again.
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97 Benedict and Kuhla, ‘Nurses’, Participation’.
98 Benedict, ‘The Nadir of Nursing’; Benedict and Georges, ‘Nurses and the Sterilization Ex-
periments’; Georges and Benedict, ‘An Ethics of Testimony’.
162
Among the most apparent reasons for the nurses’ participation are ideological
commitment, putative duress, and economic pressure such as fear of termination of
employment.99 Nurse-defendants in post-war ‘euthanasia’ trials stated that they were
convinced of not only the lawfulness of their actions but the requirement that they
follow the orders of their administrators, physicians, and superior nurses to carry out
killings that were mandated by the government.100 Given the nurses’ involvement in
these crimes and the history of the organization of nursing during the years of Na-
tional Socialism, it is important to look for the interactive effect.
Nursing was hierarchical in its organizational structure and the unifying behavior
was obedience. Thus when an order was handed down from government to adminis-
trators of institutions, it was to be implemented without question by physicians and
nurses. Some nurses who did not wish to kill in the name of the state asked for trans-
fers either within or between institutions. Many of these requests were denied, and
nurses became complicit in the killings. A few obtained transfers or resigned to
avoid participation. Although there was a stated fear of refusal by some, most who
refused were simply moved to other jobs without additional consequence. In fact, in
more than 60 years of post-war trials, there is no documented case of a nurse being
sent to a concentration camp or otherwise severely punished for refusal.101
As described earlier, there were five different nursing organizations active during
this era and even non-Nazi organizations such as the Red Cross and the Protestant
organization declared allegiance to Hitler and National Socialism. Thus, to voice a
complaint about unethical orders to the leaders of these organizations would have
been fruitless and possibly dangerous. Because of the encompassing nature of each
nursing organization, from training to retirement, it would have been impossible to
move membership from one to another. Furthermore, nursing as a whole possessed
pitifully little autonomy and was viewed as a subservient group to medicine. Thus,
even if unified – which, of course, they were not – the nursing organizations would
have had little voice or influence in opposing the physicians. Only by examining the
social structure, the place of the health care system within it, and the organization of
nursing can we begin to understand nurses being willing to kill for the ideology of
the state.
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München, file number 33. 029/2; Margarete T. 10 April 1962, Landesgericht München. File
location: Staarchiv München, file number 33. 029/3).
101 H. Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina
Press, 1995); Steppe, ‘Nursing in the Third Reich’; M. Lagerwey, ‘Nursing ethics at Ha-
damar’, Qualitative Health Research 9 (1999): 759-772.
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10. Torture and the Paradox of State Violence
Penny Green and Tony Ward
Our approach to torture in this paper is primarily criminological rather than philoso-
phical. We are opposed to torture (and we regret that this should seem worth say-
ing), but we leave it to other contributors to spell out the normative reasons why tor-
ture is wrong. What interests us as criminologists is how state agencies and individ-
ual officials come to order, condone or engage in torture. We draw on sociology,
psychology and anthropology to try and understand this phenomenon. We also try to
make some connections between the social science literature and the philosophical
debate.
This paper derives from a much larger project which centres on the concept of
‘state crime’ and its place in criminology.1 Recently we have become interested in
the work of Norbert Elias2 and the light it can shed on both state and anti-state vio-
lence.3 Elias interests us because of the connections he makes between macro-social
processes of state formation and individual sensibilities. Specifically, he argues that
the development of a state monopoly of violence is linked, in complex ways which
we cannot go into here, to the development of sensibilities which increasingly abhor
interpersonal violence. Spierenburg drew on Elias’s work to explain the abolition of
torture in the European enlightenment.4 Rationalist critiques of torture’s ineffective-
ness as a truth-finding device, he argues, long predated the abolition of torture but
only became effective because a change in sensibilities made cruelty abhorrent.
Elias’s theory raises an obvious problem, which we call the ‘paradox of state vio-
lence’. If states depend on a monopoly of organized violence (using the term, as
Elias’s translators do, in a broad and morally neutral sense), but cultivate an abhor-
rence of violence, why does this not lead to abhorrence, or at least deep unease, at
the state’s own practices? Elias was well aware of this paradox or ‘contradiction’
(1987: 81) but he says frustratingly little about how it is resolved.
1 See P. Green and T. Ward, State Crime: Governments, Violence and Corruption (London:
Pluto Press, 2004)
2 N. Elias, The Civilizing Process, trans. E. Jephcott (rev ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 2000)
3 T. Ward and Young, ‘Elias, Organised Violence and Terrorism’ in M. Mullard and B. Cole
(eds.) Globalisation, Citizenship and the War on Terror (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2007),
P. Green and T. Ward ‘Violence and the State’ in J. Sim, S. Tombs and D. Whyte (eds.) State,
Power, Crime (London, Sage, 2009).
4 P. C. Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), pp. 188-90.
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A. Three solutions to the paradox
There appear to be three possible resolutions to the paradox, so far as torture or any
other type of state violence, is concerned:
(i) It is incompatible with humane sensibilities and therefore unacceptable;
(ii) It is compatible with human sensibilities so long as it is used in a ra-
tional, rule-bound manner which contributes to the state’s overriding
goal of maintaining and protecting the pacified social spaces in which
‘civilized’ life is possible;
(iii) It is incompatible with humane sensibilities but nevertheless acceptable,
because certain persons in certain situations are exempt from civilized
restraints.
For the sake of logical completeness we should perhaps add a fourth possibility.
Some practices may be seen as compatible with humane sensibilities but nonetheless
unacceptable for some other reason, for example because, like the methods of condi-
tioning in Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange, they deny the value of free will. It is
unlikely that many people take this attitude to torture.5
Solutions (i) to (ii) seem at first sight to define three clear-cut and mutually exclu-
sive attitudes towards violence, and we shall show that elements of these three solu-
tions can be found in the contemporary debate about, and practice of, torture. The
practice of torture, however, rarely exemplifies either (ii) or (iii) in pure form. It is,
rather, the interplay between them that makes torture possible.
I. Legal humanitarianism: torture as taboo
The state’s use of force is supposed to be legitimate in accordance with humane sen-
sibilities because it is used in a parsimonious and humane fashion to protect citizens
against violence. If the humane, civilized, use of force is opposed to barbaric vio-
lence, then the epitome of barbarism, the thing no civilized official would do, is tor-
ture.
Legitimate state violence comes in three main forms, policing, punishment and
warfare.6
Policing relies on the use of force as an ever-present possibility (Bittner 1981). In
theory, in liberal societies, force is only ever used as last resort and to the minimum
extent necessary. The craft of good policework consists largely in avoiding recourse
to force except as a last resort.7 Of course, a large literature testifies that the reality is
5 A. Burgess, A Clockwork Orange (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972).
6 H. Steinert, ‘The Indispensable Metaphor of War: On Populist Politics and the Contradic-
tions of the State’s Monopoly of Force’, Theoretical Criminology 7 (2003): 265-91
7 Ibid.; W. K. Muir, Police: Streetcorner Politicians (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1977).
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often different;8 but torture, officially at least, is the antithesis of legitimate police
work. The temptation to torture is nevertheless a recognised ethical problem for po-
lice officers, as the much discussed ‘Dirty Harry problem’ indicates.9
Punishment involves the deliberate infliction of suffering, but a major penal trend
in post-enlightenment societies is away from the infliction of suffering by direct vio-
lence to the body.10 Even the death penalty is supposed to be administered with a
minimum of physical pain. Force is used (officially) only to get the offender to
comply with the punitive measures. Again, torture epitomizes the barbarous ‘other’
to modern, humane, penal practices. It is what Waldron calls a ‘legal archetype’, by
which judges and officials assert their civilized credentials:
The prohibition on torture is expressive of an important underlying policy of the law …. Law
is not brutal in its operation. Law is not savage. Law does not rule through abject fear and ter-
ror, or by breaking the will of those whom it confronts. If law is forceful or coercive, it gets its
way by nonbrutal methods which respect rather than mutilate the dignity and agency of those
who are its subjects. The idea is that even where law has to operate forcefully, there will not be
the connection that has existed in other times or places between law and brutality.11
Waldron observes in a footnote that those who, like the late Robert Cover, believe
that the central feature of law is ‘that it works its will “in a field of pain and death”’
will be unimpressed by his argument.12 We would suggest, however, that both Cover
and Waldron are right: the ‘legal archetype’ is important precisely because of the
legitimacy it confers on law’s violence.
Warfare, involving as it does the infliction of death and destruction on an im-
mense scale, poses the paradox of state violence in its most acute form. It does not
fit easily into a humanistic paradigm, despite being governed by something called
‘international humanitarian law’. Even in warfare, however, there is a taboo against
intimate, asymmetrical violence. You may kill large numbers of people who pose no
immediate threat to you if you do it anonymously, at a distance, by bombing, mis-
siles or gunfire. Or you may kill at close quarters in a desperate struggle, where it’s a
question of kill or be killed. What you may not do is wilfully to kill or torment help-
less prisoners, civilians or wounded enemies at close quarters. Even warfare, in its
‘civilized’ form, is antithetical to torture.13
8 E.g. J. Skolnick and J. J. Fyfe, Above the Law (New York, Free Press, 1993); W.A. Geller,
and H. Toch (eds.) Police Violence (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1996).
9 C. B. Klockars, ‘The Dirty Harry Problem’ Annals of the American Academy of Political
Science 452 (1980): 33-47. See also Steinhoff, Ch. 2 above.
10 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977); Spierenburg, Specta-
cle of Suffering.
11 J. Waldron, ‘Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House’ Columbia Law
Review 105 (2005): 1681-1750, p. 1720.
12 Ibid., n. 207, quoting R. Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 1601-
1629, p. 1601
13 The claim of ‘civilized’ mass killing to moral superiority over ‘barbarous’ violence against
civilians is, of course, debateable: see for example P. Richards Fighting for the Rain Forest:
War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford, James Currey, 1996); B. Grosscup, Stra-
tegic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment (London, Zed, 2006).
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II. Bureaucratic instrumentalism: acceptance of regulated torture
Unlike most instances of interpersonal aggression, state violence is commonly de-
picted as being disciplined and rational. In hierarchical organizations, it is com-
monly the case that those who calculate whether violence is necessary are not those
who carry it out. Thus the agents of violence can differentiate themselves from those
who display ordinary aggression, because they do not act on the basis of their own
emotions or desires but at the behest of others, and because they do not act for their
own ends but for some greater good which their superiors have calculated that their
actions will serve.
Systematic and sustained torture practices seemingly cannot exist independently
of bureaucratic structures which maintain organizational hierarchies of ‘facilitators
and perpetrators’. Huggins’ work on Brazilian torturers reveals that one of the chief
distinguishing features between police officers who became torturers and those who
did not – indeed the most important predictor of torture – was ‘membership of an
elite and/or physically separate and insular police operations or intelligence unit.’14
No-one could torture routinely unless they were associated with an interrogation
squad. It is in this sense that Rejali has argued that ‘there is no such thing as “THE
torturer”…to speak of the torturer abstracts the fact that the torturers are al situated
in an institution known as the State. It disguises a complex institutional and social
relationship as a relationship between two individuals.’15 While accepting Rejali’s
rationale we nonetheless see value in understanding the psycho-social processes
which act upon individuals in the process of dyscivilization.
The experiments of Stanley Milgram indicate the importance of the ‘agentic state’
in which individuals see themselves as passively carrying out the decisions of those
in authority.16 In such circumstances conscience alone is not enough to dissuade
people from engaging in barbarous behaviour. In the face of authoritative commands
the temptation to be resisted is in fact to follow ones own humane sensibilities.17 But
obedience to ‘authority’ as a psychological trait is to be distinguished from ‘obedi-
ence to violent authority’.18
Most torture regimes authorize, through legal means, violence against perceived
enemies.19 Legitimizing state violence in the case of torture also requires the de-
ployment of public justifications which most commonly take the form of utilitarian
14 M. K. Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros, and P. G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Tortur-
ers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities (Berkeley, University of California Press,
2002).
15 D. Rejali, Torture and Modernity (Boulder, Westview, 1994) p. 9.
16 S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York, Harper & Row, 1974).
17 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965), p. 150.
18 M Haritos-Fatouros, The Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture (London,
Routledge, 2003).
19 E. Peters, Torture (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); R. D. Crelenstein,
‘The World of Torture: A Constructed Reality’, Theoretical Criminology 7 (2003): 293-318
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arguments advancing a greater good. The fact that these have been consistently dis-
credited and rejected in case law20 has not it seems reduced their persuasive power.
In his critique of US legal and academic apologias for torture, David Luban calls
the utilitarian approach ‘the liberal ideology of torture’.21 It would be misleading to
suggest that only liberals embrace this ideology. As Huggins demonstrates, authori-
tarian Latin American regimes consistently justified their employment of torture in
utilitarian terms. The ticking bomb scenario, which Luban sees as the keynote of the
‘liberal ideology’ and expounded most recently by Harvard Professor Alan Der-
showitz, has a long and undistinguished pedigree.22 But utilitarianism is, Luban ar-
gues, the only ideology of torture most liberals could be tempted to embrace.23 Like
the humanitarian solution, it is predicated on a rejection of cruelty. Pain is to be ad-
ministered parsimoniously, within a rational framework, and only in accord with
strict legal rules (e.g. with a torture warrant issued by a judge, subject to judicial re-
view and accountability). It is to be future-oriented, serving the state’s highest goal –
the prevention of greater violence. Torture is to be highly managed and clinically
maintained: while Ignatieff favours what he sees as more ‘acceptable’ forms involv-
ing stress-induced or psychological violence,24 others from the same utilitarian per-
spective offer suggestions including the insertion of sterilized needles under the fin-
ger nails and dental drills applied to un-anaesthetized teeth.25 In so-called ‘torture
lite’, direct physical contact is generally to be avoided: the key techniques are sen-
sory deprivation and ‘self inflicted pain’ caused by standing for hours in stressful
positions.26 Such methods are depicted as ‘light years away from real torture and
hedged about with bureaucratic safeguards…nothing to do with the Abu Ghraib an-
archy’.27 Those who reject them, we are told, ‘have missed at least one half of the
humanitarian equation – and the better half at that’.28
20 N. S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law (Oxford, Clarendon,
1999), pp. 80-84.
21 D. Luban, ‘Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb’ in K. J. Greenberg (ed.) The Torture
Debate in America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 36.
22 A. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Chal-
lenge (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2002).
23 Steinhoff, Ch. 2 above provides an ostensibly non-utilitarian, ‘rights-based’ defence of torture
in ‘Dirty Harry’ situations, but not of institutionalized torture which is what concerns us here.
24 M. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Edinburgh, Edinburgh
University Press, 2005).
25 Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works.
26 A. W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on
Terror (New York, Owl Books, 2006).
27 H. MacDonald, ‘How to Interrogate Terrorists’ in Greenberg, Torture Debate, p. 84.
28 L. A. Casey and D. B. Rivkin, ‘Rethinking the Geneva Conventions’ in Greenberg, Torture
Debate, p. 211
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III. Licensed barbarism: exempting torturers from restraint.
The third solution to the paradox of state violence which posits simply that, in cer-
tain situations, agents of the state do not transgress civilized inhibitions on interper-
sonal violence and cruelty because they are exempt from them. This is not a position
one often finds clearly stated in the philosophical and ethical literature; but an hon-
ourable exception – in that he states the position only in order to denounce it – is
Stephen Holmes:
To respond to the savages who want to kill us, we must cast off our Christian-liberal meekness
and embrace a ‘healthy savagery’ of our own. We must confront ruthlessness with ruthless-
ness. We must pull out all the stops. After victory we will have plenty of time for civility, guilt
feelings and the rule of law.29
For Holmes, this is the subliminal message behind various political and legal ar-
guments of the US administration. Holmes suggests that torture is emotionally satis-
fying because it mirrors the characteristics imputed to the enemy; to rephrase his ar-
gument in anthropological terms, torture is a ritually, rather than rationally-
instrumentally, appropriate response to terrorism because it is based on the principle
of mimesis, the re-enactment of the violence it is intended to counter.30
For Elias, the civilizing process involves a renunciation of this kind of ‘magical
thinking’ in favour of a more ‘detached’ attitude which, though less emotionally sat-
isfying, enables human beings to respond to their environment more effectively.31
Such detachment, however, is much easier to attain in relation to natural phenom-
ena, which can be understood as the manifestation of impersonal forces, than to-
wards acts of violence which are the product of human agency. Even in the most
pacified societies, the urge to respond to malevolent human action by revenge or ret-
ribution, rather than a calm and detached search for the most effective means of pre-
venting a recurrence, remains strong.32 Elias feared that the triumph of such emo-
tionally involved responses over rational analysis would bring about nuclear annihi-
lation, and the same risks can be seen in the war on terror.
29 S. Holmes, ‘Is Defiance of Law a Proof of Success? Magical Thickening in the War on Ter-
ror’ in Greenberg, Torture Debate, p. 127.
30 See M. Taussig, (2002) ‘Culture of Terror – Space of Death: Roger Casement's Putumayo
Report and the Explanation of Torture,’ in A. L. Hinton, (ed.) Genocide: An Anthropological
Reader (Oxford, Blackwell, 2002); C. K. Mahmood, ‘Trials by Fire: Dynamics of Terror in
Punjab and Kashmir,’ in J. A. Sluka. (ed.) Death Squad (Philadelphia, University of Pennsyl-
vania Press, 2000); Ward and Young, ‘Elias, Organised Violence and Terrorism’.
31 N. Elias, Involvement and Detachment (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987).
32 D. Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001).
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B. Bureaucracy, barbarism and dyscivilization
From the point of view of bureaucratic instrumentalism, the ideal torturer would be
thoroughly detached, applying pain without emotional satisfaction or distress in or-
der to achieve organizational goals.33 It seems psychologically implausible, how-
ever, that this attitude could be sustained for long. As Haritos-Fatouros argues, mere
obedience to a supposedly legitimate authority may be sufficient to explain why
people are willing to inflict torture for brief periods while under the supervision of
an authority figure, as in the notorious Milgram experiments, but ‘Milgram’s model
… does not explain obedient torturing or killing over a long period in the absence of
authority’34
A method adopted by some torturing regimes to free their torturers from humane
inhibitions is to initiate future torturers, suddenly and dramatically, into a secret
world in which the rules, expectations and rationality of ordinary life do not apply.35
Recruits are first broken down by being subjected to arbitrary violence and senseless
orders, and then inducted into an elite that obeys no laws except the orders of supe-
rior officers. During the period of the Greek Junta, for example, officers within the
Special Interrogation Section (ESA) were afforded extraordinary powers. Even low
ranking members had the power to stop and arrest military personnel of any rank.36
A strategy of affording unlimited authority to torturers, training them out of humane
sensibilities while dehumanizing their potential victims, instils a sense of extraordi-
nary power in otherwise ordinary people:
‘The officers would tell us that the prisoners were worms and we had to crush them, they were
Communist, enemies of the state; they told us that ESA men could kill and not be judged by
anybody; they said an ESA man was equal to an army major’37
Once a torturer has been ‘created’ what commonly follows is a social –
psychological process through which ‘perpetrators develop an intense, fanatic com-
mitment to some higher good and supposed higher morality in the name of which
they commit atrocities’.38 Staub argues that this higher moral ideology combines
with a differentiated self (in which the torturer is able to exclude targeted groups
from his ‘moral universe’) to produce a person capable of inflicting extreme and in-
humane violence.
These psychological insights call into question any attempt to justify the bureau-
cratic instrumentalist to torture on utilitarian grounds.39 For a utilitarian, each per-
son’s pain counts equally. It seems almost inconceivable that any torturer could do
33 J. Wolfendale, ‘Training Torturers: A Critique of the “Ticking Bomb” Argument’, Social
Theory & Practice, 32, no.2 (2006): 269-87, p. 273
34 Haritos-Fatouros, Psychological Origins, p. 160.
35 Huggins et al., Violence Workers; Haritos-Fatouros, Psychological Origins.
36 Ibid., p. 34.
37 ‘A’ (former torturer), quoted ibid., p. 34
38 E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 64.
39 See Wolfendale, ‘Training’.
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his job while accepting the equal moral worth of his victim. For utilitarian reasons –
to reduce the potentially overwhelming psychic costs of torture to the torturer – the
latter has to learn to regard the former as less than human, or as an evil person who
deserves to suffer. But having learned that, the torturer will hardly be motivated to
use torture in the parsimonious way that utilitarianism advocates.
Seemingly irrational initiation rites alternating unpredictably between lenience
and severity were rationally designed to encourage in cadets obedience without
question to orders without logic.40 Within this framework disturbing, violent and de-
basing practices may be seen as part of a rational paradigm in which exposure to au-
thoritative, irrational and nonsensical violence delivers the torturer into a world in
which previously held norms and sensibilities no longer apply, no longer correspond
to the new reality. The torturer enters a bureaucratically defined torturing space
where traditional rules of engagement and humane sensibility give way to violence
without borders.
Would be torturers are brutalized and humiliated but at the same time they are en-
couraged to see themselves as superior and elite members of a state which at all
costs must be protected.41 Those who threaten that state are ideologically and sys-
tematically dehumanized so that acts of great cruelty against them are diminished in
affect for the torturer. There is a tacit recognition by torture trainers of the stress and
resistances which accompany the infliction of torture violence and training involves
a myriad of social modelling and systematic desensitization techniques to counteract
those inhibitions to violence.42 The apparent irrationality embodied in the training
experienced by torturers and their subsequent behaviour is, from the perspective of a
torturing regime, brutally rational. To create torturers who will be unrestrained in
their delivery of violence against targeted populations is always part of a wider
strategy of counterinsurgency and provides a lethal tool in the cultivation of fear and
control. Licensed violence exists within a bureaucratic-utilitarian strategy, not in op-
position to it. Within an Eliasian perspective, Abram de Swaan has captured this
synthesis well in his concept of enclaves of barbarism.43
Torture and other forms of state terror seem to be both rational and irrational;44
there is a dialectic between the civilizing process and barbarity. Elias argues that
state formation leads to a civilizing process which diminishes interpersonal violence
(and indeed state violence). The civilizing process also involves the recognition of at
least a minimal level of equality, so that in at least limited respects all persons are
seen as entitled to protection and humane concern (hence the unacceptability of
40 Haritos-Fatouros, Psychological Origins, p. 34
41 Ibid.; Huggins et al., Violence Workers; J. T. Gibson, ‘Factors Contributing to the Creation of
a Torturer’ in P. Suedfeld (ed.) Psychology and Torture (New York, Hemisphere, 1990);
42 Ibid., p. 85.
43 A. de Swaan, ‘Dyscivilization, Mass Extermination and the State’, Theory, Culture & Society
18(2001): 265–276.
44 Green and Ward, State Crime, pp. 111-6.
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slavery).45 But Elias also indicates that sometimes the civilizing process does not
accord all citizens equality. Certain groups within society (for reasons relating to
state and identity) may be excluded from the protection generally afforded by the
state’s monopoly of violence. This exclusion exposes these groups not only to
higher degrees of interpersonal violence but more significantly to all the violent re-
sources of the state. If we accept Elias’s later position46 that civilization is, in fact, a
precarious and reversible process, then ‘order and barbarism, design and impulse,
organization and wildness’47 may exist concurrently. Within the civilizing process
runs a counterflow, so that while the state promotes civilized modes of behaviour it
is also capable of extreme and barbarous violence against those sections of its own
population or of other societies not afforded the same degree of protection.
In de Swaan’s view, the key feature of the ‘bureaucratization of barbarism’ is the
comparmentalization of the target population, the sites of torture or murder, the roles
of the perptrators, and their emotional experiences:
wildness and brutality are let loose, or maybe even instilled, and at the same time instrumental-
ized, for specific purposes, within demarcated spaces at an appointed time: an archipelago of
enclaves where cruelty reigns while being reined in all the while…. [T]he regime creates and
maintains compartments of destruction and barbarism, in meticulous isolation, almost invisible
and well-nigh unmentionable.48
The well-documented practices of past authoritarian regimes like those of Argen-
tina, Brazil and Greece, clearly fit this model, but so in many respects do the prac-
tices of the ‘war on terror’. There are, of course, very significant differences. Rather
than enclaves within the society from which torturers are drawn, the American en-
claves are physically remote from it, and with a few well-known exceptions the cap-
tives are not US citizens. Abu Ghraib was situated not in a pacified society but in the
heart of a war zone, though it did constitute an ‘enclave’ within the command struc-
tures of the US military.49 Perhaps partly for these reasons, the creation of torturers
does not appear to require anything resembling the fearsome initiation rites docu-
mented in Brazil and Greece. The USA is not a totalitarian state and torture faces
serious challenges from civil society and elements of the judiciary,50 the political
class and – perhaps most significantly – from within the military hierarchy.51 Never-
theless, the use of torture within the ‘war on terror’ does appear to fit de Swaan’s
45 T. L. Haskell, ‘Capitalism and the Origin of Humanitarian Sensibilities’, American Historical
Review 90 (1985): 339-361, 546-576
46 See especially N. Elias, The Germans (Cambridge, Polity, 1997)
47 de Swaan, ‘Dyscivilization’, p. 267
48 Ibid., p. 269
49 Maj-Gen. A. M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade
<http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf> (accessed 21 July 2008) pp. 38-44.
50 Notably the majority of the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006),
overturning President Bush’s decision that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did
not apply to ‘illegal combatants’.
51 McCoy, Question; P. Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and the Compromise of Law
(London, Allen Lane, 2008).
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concept of ‘dyscivilization’. It is not a wholesale regression into barbarism (‘decivi-
lization’), but rather a calculated deployment of barbarism in the service of the state,
ostensibly for the purpose of preserving civilization itself.
Violent bureaucracies diffuse responsibility for torture52 by separating decision
from action.53 At the same time, they create scope for, and may even demand, initia-
tive and inventiveness on the part of low-level operatives.54 Statements from mili-
tary police personnel in Abu Ghraib, for example, indicate that intelligence officers
gave them instructions such as ‘Loosen this guy up for us. Make sure he has a bad
night. Make sure he gets the treatment’.55 Rather than supervision or criticism of the
precise methods used, they received positive feedback on the results achieved, so
they assumed they were doing the right thing.56
In order to exercise the degree of inventiveness required to carry out such general
instructions, guards or interrogators must adopt an attitude that resembles sadism at
least to the extent that they are able to imagine the effects of their actions in produc-
ing pain and humiliation, and desire to produce those effects. The desire may or may
not be erotically charged, or its fulfilment pleasurable, but the torturer learns to be-
have in ways that are outwardly indistinguishable from sadism. One Greek torturer
interviewed by Haritos-Fatouros was variously described by his victims as:
‘…zealous and unlimited in his variations on torture.’
‘He tortured following the whim of the moment and laughed while torturing. He was literally a
sadist.’
‘…severe but not cruel…he only pretended to be a savage’57
The Stanford Prison Experiment provides a classic illustration of ‘the ease with
which sadistic behavior could be elicited in individuals who were not “sadistic
types”’58 by giving one group power over a group of anonymous others and leaving
them to improvise means of maintaining control. Zimbardo, the ‘superintendent’ of
the simulated prison, has noted the parallels with events at Abu Ghraib.59
52 M. K. Huggins, ‘Torture 101: What Sociology Can Teach Us’, Anthropology News 45, no. 6
(2004): 12-13.
53 Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge, Polity, 1989)
54 See for example McCoy, Question, pp. 86-9, discussing US training manuals of the 1980s.
55 Taguba, Investigation, p. 19. The chaotic climate in which the Military Police carried out
their vague instructions from Military Intelligence is vividly portrayed in P. Gourevitch and
E. Morris, Standard Operating Procedure: A War Story (London, Picador, 2008)
56 M. Danner, Torture and Truth: Abu Ghraib and America in Iraq (New York, New York Re-
view Books, 2004)
57 Haritos-Fatouros, Psychological Origins, pp. 69-70.
58 C. Haney, C. Banks, and P. Zimbardo, ‘Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison,’ Inter-
national Journal of Criminology and Penology 1 (1973): 69-97, p. 89.
59 P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil (London, Rider, 2007), pp.
352-5. As Zimbardo notes, the same parallel is drawn independently in J. R. Schlesinger
(Chair) ‘Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations’ in K. J.
Greenberg and J. L. Dratel (eds.) The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 970-3.
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The dynamics of dyscivilization are frighteningly simple. Once pacified public
spaces are established – and the process by which they are established is long and
complex – people generally abstain from violence because they know it carries high
moral cost. It will cause shock and disapproval, damage one’s reputation (unless one
is among the minority who cultivate a reputation for violence), and possibly bring
about public humiliation and the intervention of coercive state agencies. Most of the
time we do not need to think about these consequences because we develop a ‘habi-
tus’ – a term Elias used long before Bourdieu – of peaceable behaviour, and the idea
of infringing the ban on public violence simply does not enter our heads. Once we
find ourselves, however, in a setting where violence seems to be expected and ap-
proved, our unthinking, peaceable habitus no longer allows us to negotiate encoun-
ters with others successfully. What the Stanford Prison Experiment, and historical
studies of the Third Reich,60 demonstrate is how is how adaptable most people are to
these situations; how rapidly they will develop a new habitus, be it one of conform-
ing to the new rules or of inventive and pleasurable cruelty. The more people around
one succeed in shedding their inhibitions against violence, the easier it is shed those
inhibitions oneself. Lifton in his work on Auschwitz doctors demonstrated that ‘the
average person entering’ such institutions of violence ‘will commit or become asso-
ciated with atrocities’.61 And average people can and have entered these institutions
of violence, sometimes, at alarmingly high rates. At the most repressive moment in
Uruguay’s rule of terror (1985) over twenty percent of the country’s medical per-
sonnel were engaged in torture practices. According to Weschler their sustained in-
volvement could largely be attributed to ‘professional ambition and financial re-
ward’.62 Those who refused to be involved, however, ‘disappeared at such a rate that
Uruguay’s medical and health care programs entered a state of crisis’.63
For most people, somewhat reassuringly, there do seem to be limits to this proc-
ess of easy adaptation to a new social environment. Why else would torturing re-
gimes need such brutal initiation methods? Why did Greek torturers need to be told
‘that if a warden helps a prisoner, he’ll take the prisoner’s place and the whole pla-
toon will flog him’?64 Why would the Nazis need a special hospital to treat SS men
who ‘had broken down while executing women and children’?65 It seems that ex-
tremes of physical cruelty and destruction do run up against inhibitions that are more
than skin-deep.
The ways to overcome these inhibitions, however, are well understood. The vic-
tims must kept at a physical and/or psychological distance; they must be anonymous
60 A compelling example is C. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the
Final Solution in Poland (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998).
61 R. J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York,
Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 425.
62 L. Wechsler, A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 127.
63 E. Scarry, The Body in Pain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 42.
64 Haritos-Fatouros, Psychological Origins, p. 58
65 M. Burleigh, The Third Reich (London, Macmillan, 2001), p. 604.
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and dehumanized, excluded from the class of beings to whom moral sentiments ap-
ply.66 The methods of ‘torture lite’ are well suited to produce these effects, because
they require relatively little direct physical violence and at the same time achieve the
anonymization and dehumanization of the victims. Hooding, employed as a means
of sensory deprivation, also achieves the effect of concealing the victim’s face, re-
ducing him to an anonymous body, and at the same time concealing the torturer
from him.67 As Major-General Fay noted in his investigation of Abu Ghraib, ‘The
use of clothing as an incentive (nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to
an escalating “de-humanization” of the detainees and set the stage for additional and
more severe abuses to occur’.68 Treating prisoners as dogs – a form of humiliation
deemed especially suitable for Arabs – gave a further twist to the spiral of dehu-
manization. When dehumanization is coupled with intense pressure to get results
from interrogation, the dangers of ‘force drift’69 – the escalation of abuse when in-
terrogators encounter resistance – are obvious.
C. Conclusion
We began by outlining three possible attitudes to torture: one which regards it as
incompatible with civilized values and absolutely unacceptable; one which regards it
as acceptable so long as it is strictly regulated and parsimoniously employed; and
one which is willing to throw aside all civilized restraints, albeit only within certain
limited spaces. The public and academic debate about torture is almost entirely a de-
bate between the first two positions. Our argument is that the utilitarian case for lim-
ited torture is socially and psychologically implausible.70 The ethical torturer, who
scrupulously inflicts the minimum amount of pain justified by the greater good, is as
much a myth as the humane executioner averting his eyes from the severed heads on
the guillotine.71 To create spaces where torture is permissible is to create spaces
where civilized norms do not apply – enclaves of barbarism.
Moreover, dyscivilization is incompatible with the maintenance of a liberal soci-
ety. For a state to torture while permitting the existence of a free press, a vibrant
66 See H. C. Kelman. and V. L. Hamilton Crimes of Obedience (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1989); H. Fein, ‘Genocide: A Sociological Perspective,’ Current Sociology 38 (1990):
1-111; Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, Ch. 13.
67 Huggins, ‘Torture 101’
68 G. R. Fay, AR 56 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Bri-
gade, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040825fay.pdf> (accessed 21 July
2008), p. 10.
69 The phrase used by Dr Mike Gelles, chief psychologist of the US Naval Criminal Investiga-
tive service and an important opponent of torture and coercive interrogation within the US
Military (quoted by McCoy, Question of Torture, p. 128 and Sands, Torture Team, p. 161)
70 In this we are in agreement with Luban, ‘Liberalism’ and Wolfendale, ‘Training Torturers’.
71 A. I. Applbaum, ‘Professional Detachment: The Executioner of Paris’, Harvard Law Review
109 (1995): 458-486, p. 461.
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civil society, a reasonably independent judiciary, and a population part of which has
strong feelings of religious or ethnic solidarity for the victims, is not only immoral
but deeply stupid – as the more rational elements of the US military and the FBI un-
derstand very well.72 It is therefore likely that the drift towards torture after 9/11 was
not the product of rational calculation but an emotionally satisfying response to a
crisis which demanded the appearance of resolute action, however uncertain the re-
sults.73 In the words of the CIA’s counterterrorism chief, ‘After 9/11, the gloves
came off’74 – a phrase perfectly symbolizing the casting off of civilized restraints.
The choice is not between pragmatism and moral scrupulousness; the choice –
forgive the cliché – is between civilization and barbarism. It really is that simple.
72 J. Rives et al., ‘JAG Memos re: Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Le-
gal, Policy and Operation Issues Relating to the Interrogation of Detainees Held by the US
Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism’, February-March 2003’ in Greenberg, Torture De-
bate;McCoy, Question; Sands, Torture Team.
73 J. Katz, Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil (New York: Basic
Books, 1988); Holmes, ‘Defiance’; McCoy, Question of Torture, pp. 206-9
74 Cofer Black, 2002, quoted ibid., p. 119. Marshall Billingslea, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense, introduced new guidance on interrogations to a meeting of military lawyers
with the words: ‘Guys, wake up, smell the coffee, take your gloves off’ (quoted by Sands,
Torture Team., p. 166). And (then) Brigadier-General Janis Karpinski, commander of military
prisons in Iraq, recalls being told by Major General Miller to ‘tak[e] off the kid gloves’ and
get ‚actionable intelligence’ from her detainees (J. Karpinski, One Woman’s War, quoted by
Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, p. 336).
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11. 24 and Torture
Bev Clucas*
A. Introduction
In contrast to the majority of the papers in this collection, this chapter does not
examine the permissibility of torture or deal with one of the other more frequent
angles on the topic. Instead, I consider the portrayal of torture as an element of
entertainment in the Emmy-award winning television series 24 and pose the
question whether 24’s depiction of torture crosses the boundary between mere
entertainment and propaganda.
Many of us are familiar with 24, the phenomenally popular series from the US,
the seventh season of which is due to be aired in January 2009. The formula of each
season is the same: 24 hours pass ‘in real-time’, as we follow the adventures of the
protagonists, mainly personnel of a fictional body located in Los Angeles, CTU
(Counter-Terrorism Unit). Principal among the characters of the show is Jack Bauer,
its hero. Each 24 hours (i.e. 24 episodes) is devoted to defeating some evil terrorist
person or group. In each series, people are tortured or killed, in pursuit of a higher
goal.
The programme makes repeated use of a device called the ‘ticking time bomb’
scenario: the good guy has in his power a terrorist or suspected terrorist, against the
backdrop of an imminent threat (for example, in 24’s case, nuclear bombs or
biological weapons), which would have, if fulfilled, catastrophic consequences for
innocent people. The terrorist refuses to talk – but the hero is convinced that if only
he can persuade the suspect to spill the beans, this major catastrophe will be averted.
Time is desperately short, so ‘persuasion’ (if any) quickly turns into a form of
torture. In 24, torture is almost invariably successful as a means of extracting
information, which ultimately does prevent the threatened disaster. The only
exception to this rule is found in the character of Jack Bauer, who never capitulates,
no matter how hard he is pressed.
Despite, or perhaps because of its popular and commercial success, particularly in
the context of the US and UK War on Terror and abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib,
a groundswell of concern about 24 has started to be heard. There is disquiet about
the number of torture scenes on television, particularly since 9/11. The Parents’
Television Council has crowned 24 as the worst offender.1 Many people decry the
inaccuracies about torture that are promulgated by the show. There is unease about
* With grateful thanks to all who contributed to the gestation of this paper, particularly Suzanne
Uniacke and Christian Twigg-Flesner.
1 J. Shirlen, ‘Worst TV Show of the Week’. Available online: <http://www.parentstvorg/
PTC/publications/bw/2007/0125worst.asp> (accessed 25 July 2008).
177
the effect the show may be having on real soldiers’ interrogation techniques.2 Others
wonder whether 24 has a persuasive effect that works against the US and its allies –
their enemies might themselves be more inclined to believe that torture is
widespread amongst Western soldiers, and therefore feel themselves justified in
violent action against US and UK soldiers and civilians.
In this chapter, I explore and reflect on the underlying themes concerning torture
and legitimate action in 24. I begin with a short introduction to the TV show itself,
highlighting the many different instances of torture, as well as some of the general
criticsms levelled at it. I then proceed to consider some of the moral issues
associated with the dissemination of information about torture in general, first in
relation to factual instances of torture, and then fictional. This discussion informs a
more detailed analysis of the depiction of torture in 24. Having considered the
express intentions of the programme makers, I apply a scheme of analysis on
‘speech acts’ devised by J.L.Austin, and developed by Langton, to argue that the
real intention of the programme makers is better understood as pro-torture
propaganda: an instance of double immorality, as not only does the show push a pro-
torture message, but also, it does so under the pretense of pure entertainment.
B. The show
The series began in 2001, making it broadly contemporaneous with 9/11. The unique
selling point of the show is that all the action takes place ‘in real-time’. Each hour of
an episode on television accounts for an hour in the life of the show. Even breaks for
adverts count towards time elapsed. As the action of each series takes part within
one 24-hour period, there is urgency to the drama on the screen, which is augmented
by the recurrent interpolation of a digital clock, and frequent use of split-screens,
enabling the viewer to see the simultaneous activities of different characters.
The good guys of the series, by and large, are the staff of CTU and the American
Administration. It is CTU’s task to prevent or frustrate threatened terrorist attacks.
The prevention of terrorism requires intelligence. And in 24, the necessary
information is almost always obtained by torture. Unusually, at least at the time the
programme was first aired, torture is done just as much by the good people as the
bad – if not more.
The types of torture I have viewed on the show include, but are not limited to, the
following:3
Hanging a person on hooks
the application of hot scalpels to the body
2 See below.
3 References to specific seasons and episodes where these particular instances occur have not
been included for the sake of concision. All are taken from seasons 1-6.
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the application of a sanding machine to the body
beating someone up or other physical violence
targeted physical harm (e.g. the bundle of nerves on the shoulder) intended
to cause the maximum possible pain
aggravation of wounds with caustic liquid
pharmaceutical torture – injections to cause pain (hyocine-pentothal)
removing the tip of someone’s finger with a cigar cutter
threats to shoot
breaking a suspect’s fingers
using a power drill on someone’s shoulder
threats with a knife
shooting a suspect in the leg and threatening to shoot the other one if the
information is not revealed
non-specific threats to ‘do anything to get answers’
threats to kill a loved one
electric shocks (including at the order of the President)
electrocution using a hotel lamp
shocks by taser
denial of painkillers to someone suffering from a bullet wound
psychological torture in the form of a fake execution of the wife and
children of a terrorist.
Howard Gordon, one of the show’s writers who invents many of the torture
scenes, describes them as ‘improvisations in sadism’.4 Their source material
includes CIA interrogation manuals, but the scenes in the programme are mainly the
result of writers’ imagination. However, Gordon admits that ‘the truth is, there is a
certain amount of fatigue. It’s getting harder not to repeat the same torture
techniques over and over’.5
Perhaps 24 is nothing more than a phenomenally successful TV show with a
nasty imagination. But various people have been raising concerns about the effects
of the show.
I. Effects of the show
In 2006, there was a visit by US Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, Dean of
the United States Military Academy at West point, to meet the creative team of 24.
4 J. Mayer, ‘Whatever it takes: the politics of the man behind ‘24’’ The New Yorker 19
February 2007, p. 3. Available online:
<http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219 fa_fact_mayer?printable=true>
(accessed 11 July 2008)
5 Ibid.
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Also accompanying him were persons described as three ‘of the most experienced
military and FBI interrogators in the country’.6 This delegation had come to express
their concerns about what they saw as the primary political and moral messages of
the show – that protection against torture under American law must practically, and
morally ought to be, surrendered, in order to preserve security. Apparently, the
immoral and illegal behaviour endorsed by the show had already had a negative
effect on real American soldiers in training.7 To this, Philippe Sands adds a
description of the way in which 24 provided both the inspiration for interrogation
techniques8 and ‘[c]ultural sensitisation... that normalised violence and justify
aggression.’9
Other concerns have been raised about the nature of the entertainment in 24, as
well as this allegedly corrosive effect on the minds and methods of US soldiers. One
criticism is that the ticking time bomb scenario hardly (if ever) happens in real life,
and that by perpetually presenting this plot device as the case where torture is
acceptable or even required, those watching the show become more inclined to
accept the permissibility of torture in other cases.10 And, an important point stressed
by real-life interrogators is that torture is not effective – it does not yield reliable
information. Yet shows such as 24 send the message that the essential and correct
information obtained by torture is what justifies the torture in the first place.11
B. Are bad consequences the only measure?
These consequences, if they do indeed result from the broadcast of shows such as
24, are alarming and arguably immoral. But consequences are easy to presume and
predict, and hard to prove.
In any case, to focus on consequences, on teleological theories as a measure of
rights and wrongs (what is morally right or wrong depends on the consequences) is
to ignore another important, in my opinion more important, type of moral theory: the
type of standpoint from which people have rights and duties, and actions are morally
permissible or impermissible, independently of potential consequences – for
example in Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. This latter type of
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
8 P. Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty and the Compromise of Law (London, Penguin,
2008) pp. 73-4.
9 Ibid., p. 272.
10 See Association for the Prevention of Torture, Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario: why we
must say No to torture, Always (Geneva, The Association for the Prevention of Torture,
2007). Available online:
http://www.apt.ch/index.php?searchword=defusing&option=com_search&Itemid=5
(accessed 8 August 2008)
11 See below.
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position/stance might argue that shows such as 24 are immoral irrespective of
whether or not they cause bad consequences.
For the purposes of this chapter, I assume that torture is categorically
impermissible in principle (i.e. independently of consequences).12 Instead, my focus
is on this question: if we accept, for the sake of argument, that torture is
categorically prohibited, what significance does this acceptance have for our
evaluation of 24? What conclusions ought we to draw about the moral nature of the
particular representations of torture in 24, or the moral status of a television
programme that utilizes torture as an aid to dramatic tension?
Before considering these issues, I take a step back to think about the
dissemination of images of or portrayal of torture in general.
C. Disseminating torture ‘information’ – factual and fictional
Information about torture, including allusions to, descriptions or depictions of, and
discussions about torture (‘information’ for short, as an admittedly clumsy
shorthand), seems at least capable of being morally neutral in itself. Information
may be put to moral use (preventing torture) or immoral use (e.g. the instigation of
torture, the encouragement of torture, and the failure to prevent torture). In this view
(of at least the neutrality of information about torture), I differ from my colleague,
Massimo La Torre, who in his chapter takes the position that even to discuss torture
is morally wrong, unless the intention of the discussants is to combat arguments in
favour of torture (in which case it is the lesser of two evils).13
Whether or not ‘information’ about torture is real (for example in Abu Ghraib) or
fictional (24), it is useful to distinguish three sets of circumstances, which will assist
in determining the moral status of the publication:
1. the intention or motive of the publisher/broadcaster/disseminator/author (I
use the term ‘publisher’ and ‘publication’ to cover all of these possible
scenarios);
2. the consequences of the publication (broadcast/dissemination/etc),
measured by some moral standard;
3. the intention or motive of the recipient (viewer/listener/reader) of the
broadcast.
12 Space constraints preclude a discussion of this position.
13 Chapter 1 above.
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I. Actual torture
First, I consider these three sets of circumstances in the context of information
dissemination about real torture.
1. Intention of the publisher
Where the intention of the publisher is to use this information for a morally good
purpose, e.g. exposure in order to prevent continuation of the practice, then
publication is morally required. (And where someone has knowledge of real torture,
it is a least a prima facie moral duty to make this public, not just in order to rescue
the victims, but in order that other agents may use this information to guide their
choices (e.g. to protest; to lobby against torture; to vote against a government which
supports torture)).
2. Consequences of the publication
Even if we assume that the publication of information about real torture is prima
facie morally required, there might be thought to be two possible sets of
consequences (not the result of any intervening action) that outweigh this prima
facie obligation: direct and indirect consequences.
a) Direct
In some circumstances, it might be argued that publication causes a further direct
wrong (e.g. a further violation of the rights or dignity or privacy of the person or
group against whom the torture was committed). In my view, any such violation
could be avoided by obtaining the consent of the person or group involved, or by
maintaining anonymity. But even if it were arguable that a violation still persists,
any such injustice might be thought to be outweighed by the prevention of more
serious wrong (i.e. the continuation of torture; failure to bring a torturer to justice,
etc).
b) Indirect
It might be thought that some pernicious, indirect consequences may flow from the
publication of information about torture. On occasion, it is argued that, even where
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activities are not impermissible in themselves, they ought to be prohibited because
they make illegitimate activities more likely in various ways.14 These types of
argument come under the umbrella of ‘slippery slope’ arguments. For example,
perhaps it is feared that making it known that torture does in fact occur, or making
known the ways in which it occurs, makes it more likely that bad people will use
torture in the future, or will give someone inspiration about how best to go about
torturing a victim. Or perhaps it is feared that the sight of scenes of torture causes
psychological damage to the viewer. Could the force of the slippery slope argument
require suppression of factual information?
My answer is a cautious ‘perhaps’, but this case would need to be made out in
full. Beyleveld and Brownsword put it this way, in the context of human dignity:
[T]hose who argue that intrinsically acceptable activities are unacceptable because they make
it impossible effectively to prohibit activities that are contrary to human dignity need to
establish their case. This is no easy matter, once it is appreciated that the endpoint ‘failure
effectively to prohibit activities contrary to human dignity’ cannot be broadly defined – e.g. so
that it is satisfied by the mere possibility of or even the actual doing of things contrary to
human dignity by a limited number of individuals. If such an endpoint is acceptable, and if we
accept the argument against cloning of sheep then, in consistency, we must argue that any
technological development (or research into it) that provides the means to carry out activities
that violate human dignity that ought to be prohibited ought itself to be prohibited. Thus, for
example, we should argue that the construction of the printing press (and research and
technology that made this possible) should have been prevented, because, for example, the
printing press would provide the means for the dissemination of racist propaganda that could
(and would, one day, somewhere) be used to aid and abet policies of genocide that are contrary
to human dignity. But this logically requires us to argue that all technology, even Stone Age
technology and fire-making, should have been prohibited, because such technology could, and
would, be used for evil purposes. And it cannot be stopped here; for human beings have,
without employing any technology, through using what exists in nature, and by the use of their
bare hands, the means to steal, rape, and murder, etc. Hence, accepting this argument requires
us to accept that human beings ought to be prohibited. In effect, the view that human beings
ought not to exist because they have the ability to eat from the tree of knowledge is implicit in
the use of a broad endpoint in slippery slope arguments based on empirical claims.15
We can apply this analogously to torture. Thus, the indirect consequences are not
the responsibility of the publisher, unless and until there is clear evidence that the
specific ‘slippery slope’ scenario is being brought about (e.g. watching news reports
about torture invariably causes the majority of viewers to behave with more violence
towards other agents than they would have otherwise).
14 D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2001), p. 166 and S. D. Pattinson, ‘Regulating Germ-Line Gene Therapy to
Avoid Sliding Down the Slippery Slope’ Medical Law International 4, nos. 3-4 (2000): 213-
222.
15 Beyleveld and Brownsword, Human Dignity, p. 167.
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3. The intention of the recipient
Where the publication or dissemination of information about torture is morally
permissible or required, I would suggest that (fear of) any immoral intention or
motive on the part of the recipient does not make the publication immoral. One
practical example might be the exposure of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and the
concern that this would invite retaliation (allegedly the impetus for the beheading of
US civilian Nick Berg).16 The wrongdoing is an intervening act which is not the
responsibility of the publisher. Many good or neutral things can be put to evil use
(e.g. using a pencil to stab someone in the eye), but this does not mean that we
should prohibit the thing itself; rather we should attempt to prevent wrongdoing and
punish wrongdoers.
To conclude: where the publication of factual information is morally neutral or
morally required, I suggest that only a specific and established slippery slope evil
ought to override the promulgation of that which is at least morally neutral.
II. Fictional torture
Perhaps we can agree that torture is wrong. We might even agree that torture is
absolutely wrong, even where the goal is to save other persons’ lives. We might
agree that my diagnosis of the moral import of the three circumstances which I have
just discussed in respect of real torture.
If the torture scenes depicted in 24 were real, this television show would depict
heinously wrong actions, without any noble purpose such as exposure, and without
any attempt to bring those responsible for the torture to justice. However, 24 is
fiction; entertainment; what’s the harm in that?
Entertainment need not be ‘mere entertainment’. Educational films, for example,
provide a means of disseminating information in a context which is palatable for the
viewer. Art of various kinds – whether painting, film, or literature – can prompt the
viewer or reader to think, to question, to take part in an ethical enterprise, or at least
to discover, in Milan Kundera’s words, ‘the various dimensions of existence’.17
These instances will all seem to fall within the category where the intention or
motive of the publisher is good. And, as discussed earlier, I suggest that where
publication is morally neutral or morally good, only a specific and established
slippery slope evil ought to override the promulgation of that which is morally
neutral.
Popular television programmes, although not part of the high culture that we
normally think of as providing a doorway to the ethical world – what Roger Scruton
16 B. Branford, ‘Berg father “had to let son go”’. Available online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/americas/3853607.stm> (accessed 25 July 2008).
17 M. Kundera, The Art of the Novel (rev. ed., London, Faber and Faber, 2005), p. 5.
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calls ‘the secular path to the ethical life...which teaches us to live as if our lives
mattered eternally’,18 need not be excluded, surely, from categories of fiction which
may have morally good or morally neutral status. In March 2000 the soap opera
Hollyoaks broadcast an episode in which a young man was raped by a group of
youths, aiming to raise awareness of the fact that rape is not simply a wrong that is
practised against women.19 Perhaps some perverted individuals were titillated by in
this, but I do not think, if this was the case, that the intervening acts or motives of
the recipient of the broadcast detract from the morally good aim of the programme.
According to the scheme outlined above, the depiction of torture may be
permissible where the intention of the publisher is not immoral, and the publication
neither causes direct harm nor leads to a demonstrable ‘slippery slope’ situation.
This would tend to suggest that fictional TV series which include scenes of torture
may be broadcast, so long as they avoid harm. However, the assumption that a
programme with the express intention of entertainment is not immoral requires
further investigation.
D. The morality of 24
In the case of 24, has the series stepped out of the category of programmes which we
might accept as pure entertainment? Is it arguable that there is some other,
discernable, implicit message?20 If so, might this change our view of the legitimacy
or moral permissibility of the intention of the publisher? In order to address this
question, I consider the quantity of torture in the programme; the portrayal of torture
as a necessary and valuable means of extracting information; the dodging of
questions regarding legal permissibility; the clear implication that heroes torture as
part of their duty; the suggestion that torture does not have serious physical or
psychological consequences for the victim; the role of the repeated ‘ticking time
bomb’ scenario providing support for the necessity of torture; and the lack of any
convincing dramatic challenge to these points.
18 R. Scruton, Modern Culture (London, Continuum, 2000), p. 14.
19 BBC News, ‘The Drama and Crisis of Soaps’. Available online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/entertainment/tv_and_radio/1574982.stm> (accessed 25 July 2008).
20 At various points during the gestation of this chapter, I worried that I might have set myself
the mammoth task of pronouncing on the moral status of all films, TV series, and books, con-
taining violence that lacked an overarching moral, educational, purpose. I’m thinking in part-
icular about films such as the Terminator, or Steven Segal movies with their high violence
and body counts. But I do not think it is necessary, for this paper, to come to any verdict on
this type of entertainment, though this is a very important question. (Though we should not
forget that even if such programmes are morally permissible in themselves, they arguably
ought to be prohibited if a serious slippery slope case can be made out.)
185
I. The quantity of torture
The Parents’ Television Council, a non-partisan watchdog group, reports that the
first five seasons of 24 (120 hours’ of viewing) contained 67 torture scenes – 1
torture scene per 1.8 episodes, or an average of 13 per series. The New Yorker
reports that Melissa Caldwell, the Council’s senior director of programmes, said, ‘24
is the worst offender on television: the most frequent, most graphic, and the leader in
the trend of showing the protagonists using torture’.21
I counted a similar prevalence of torture in season six – 13 scenes or types of
torture. In so counting, I restricted myself to instances where physical or
psychological distress was inflicted in order to force one of the characters to reveal
information (e.g. the location of the remaining nuclear bombs), or perform an action
under time pressure (e.g. programme a trigger for the remaining nuclear bombs).
These were in addition to various other instances of threat, blackmail, beatings,
shootings, and killings.
We tend to think that frequency has some correlation with an agent’s attitude
towards something. A man who once, in an unusual state of emotional distress,
lashes out and hits his wife, is not necessarily branded a perpetrator of domestic
violence (which implies a person who believes it is permissible to behave violently,
in this case towards women). However, the husband of a woman who ends up in
hospital on multiple occasions is likely to be identified as a wife-beater. If 24 had
used torture as a device to break the ticking timebomb deadlock on one occasion or
perhaps twice throughout its six series, we would not necessarily diagnose a pro-
attitude towards torture on the part of 24’s creators. But 70 times in six series is too
frequent to make plausible the equivalent excuse of ‘I walked into a door/fell down
the stairs’.
II. Torture is necessary
24 continually reinforces the message that torture is necessary (whether or not it is a
necessary evil). When faced with the ticking time bomb scenario, or other shortness
of time, one is required to torture.
This requirement, this necessity, is a practical necessity and, particularly when
practised against (suspected) terrorists, a moral necessity. Time and time again,
characters, especially Jack Bauer, are portrayed as being backed into a corner by
circumstances, the only solution to which is torture.
And no one is safe. In Season Four, the Secretary of Defence orders the torture of
his own teenage son by sensory deprivation, in order to make him reveal the names
of his associates, who, it was feared, had used information he had innocently
21 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’, p. 2.
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disclosed in order to kidnap the Secretary and his daughter. Later in the same series,
the daughter of the Secretary of Defence, Audrey, is herself subject to intimidating
interrogation by Jack (who is her lover), and then pharmaceutical torture by Burke
of CTU, in order to reveal information about the same terrorists who had earlier
kidnapped her and threatened her life. (Happily, Jack discovers that the information
CTU possesses about Audrey – which mandated the decision to interrogate and
torture her – has been planted by another of their prisoners. He holds a gun to this
woman’s head and threatens to kill her, until she confesses that the evidence
implicating Audrey is a fabrication.)
Joel Surnow, co-creator and executive producer of 24, has said this about fighting
terrorism: ‘[t]here are not a lot of measures short of extreme measures that will get it
done’.22 Could he have stated his view more plainly?
III. Torture is valuable
24 assures us that not only is torture necessary; it is valuable. It yields useful
information, the majority of the time (though sometimes a suspect will die before
confessing).23 There are rare instances where a terrorist will endure torture rather
than reveal a plot, but even this unusual stoicism can be overcome, as in the case of
Sayyid Ali in the second series. Jack beats him, breaks his hands, and threatens
unbearable pain, none of which measures is successful. Eventually, Jack stages the
fake execution of Ali’s wife and children, shown to Ali via a remote satellite link.
When Ali’s son is ‘killed’, he finally breaks, and reveals vital information about the
nuclear bomb.
Tony Lagournais, former interrogator for the US Army in Iraq, told the show’s
creators:
In Iraq, I never saw pain produce intelligence... I worked with someone who used
waterboarding... I used severe hypothermia, dogs, and sleep deprivation. I saw suspects after
soldiers had gone into their homes and broken their bones, or made them sit on a Humvee’s
hot exhaust pipes until they got third degree burns. Nothing happened... [confessions] just told
us what we already knew. It never opened up a stream of new information... physical pain can
strengthen the resolve to clam up.24
In 2006, a letter and Statement on Interrogation Practices was sent by 20
former25 US army interrogators and interrogation technicians to the Committee on
22 Ibid.
23 See D. P. O’Mathúna, ‘The Ethics of Torture in 24: Shockingly Banal’ in J. Hart Weed, R.
Davis and R. Weed, 24 and Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell, 2008), pp 100-101 for a
discussion of the efficacy and effects of torture.
24 Ibid., 5.
25 The names of interrogators on active duty were deliberately not included, in order to avoid
open conflict with public statements by the US Secretary of Defense, his officials, and the
Vice President and his office.
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the Armed Services. The interrogators included the Army’s most senior interrogator
at the time of his retirement, and veterans from conflicts ranging from Vietnam to
Iraq. These documents denied that ‘coercive interrogation techniques’ and torture
are necessary tools in the War on Terror, and in fact stated that ‘experienced
interrogators find prisoner/detainee abuse and torture to be counter-productive to the
intelligence countering mission’.26
Interestingly, the statement itself uses the following phrasing: ‘Prisoner/detainee
abuse and torture are to be avoided at all costs, in part because they can degrade the
intelligence collection efforts by interfering with the skilled interrogator’s efforts to
establish rapport with the subject’.27 This suggests that this instrumental reason is
only one aspect of these seasoned interrogators’ objections to torture.
IV. Torture is legally permissible
The show gives the erroneous impression that torture is legally permissible, but this
ignores both domestic provisions28 and international agreements (such as the UN
Convention against torture) outlawing the use of torture. The only concession to the
question of permissibility of torture in the course of duty are occasional references
to internal CTU protocols on the limits on the use of pharmaceutical torture.
2:12 P.M. Buchanan shows Jack the toxicology reports on Graem. The coronary was caused
by hyocine-pentothal used in the interrogation. The field reports show that Jack exceeded
protocols, even after Burke warned him about the dangerous levels of serum.29
Yet despite having cavalierly ignored operational limitations, Jack is portrayed as
a hero, not a criminal or a liability. Some oblique reference to the dubious nature of
his intended actions can be inferred from the occasions on which Bauer resigns from
CTU in order to remove procedural constraints from his actions. On one occasion,
after discussing his planned illegitimate activities with the President, he resigns in
order to ensure that the President has formal deniability.
V. Heroes do torture as part of their duty
The depiction of torture in 24 leads us to understand that Bauer takes no pleasure in
inflicting pain;30 rather he does these unpleasant things, again and again, because it
is necessary and dutiful.
26 P. Bauer, et al., Statement on Interrogation Practices 31 July 2006. Available online:
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/denounce_torture/statement_on_interrogation.pdf> (accessed 10
November 2007).
27 Ibid. (emphasis added).
28 However controversially interpreted – see la Torre, Ch. 1 above.
29 Fox, Series 6, Episode Guide.
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For US army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, one of the military experts who
protested to the creators of 24 about its pernicious effect on American soldiers, this
equation of torture and duty is particularly distressing: ‘the disturbing thing is that
although torture may cause Jack Bauer some angst, it is always the patriotic thing to
do’.31
This message of 24’s resonates with the words of Dick Cheney, speaking shortly
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11:
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We’ve got to spend time in the
shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done
quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our
intelligence agencies, if we’re going to be successful. That’s the world these folks operating in,
and so it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our
objective.32
Joel Surnow, co-creator and executive producer, puts it this way:
Isn’t it obvious that if there was a nuke in New York City that was about to blow – or any
other city in this country – that, even if you were going to go to jail, it [torture] would be the
right thing to do?
And
America wants the war on terror fought by Jack Bauer. He’s a patriot.33
Surnow also claims that soldiers in Iraq and personnel in the Bush administration
are partial to the show: ‘it’s a patriotic show. They should love it’.34 Cannily, this
juxtaposition of torture and duty makes those who protest about Jack’s actions not
just weak, but also – one of the greatest of American sins – unpatriotic.
VI. What differentiates heroes and villains?
There is little differentiation between heroes and villains in terms of their actions.35
It seems that the main thing that marks Jack and his colleagues apart from the
terrorists is the nature of their goal: Jack et al want to save CTU/Los Angeles/the
USA: the terrorists desire to destroy CTU/Los Angeles/the USA. Yet without any
independent means of weighing the relative worth of these opposing goals, the series
is left with nothing more than a conventional prejudice in favour of the US, or its
30 Cf. T. Morris, ‘Philosophy? If you don’t know 24, you don’t know Jack’ in J. Hart Weed, R.
Davis and R. Weed, 24 and Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell, 2008).
31 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’, p. 4.
32 T. Russert, NBC News' Meet The Press: interview with Dick Cheney. Available online:
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/timeline/2001/meetthepress091601.html (accessed 10
November 2007).
33 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’, p. 2.
34 Ibid., p. 1.
35 The lines are blurred still further in Series 6 with a sadistic CTU agent, Doyle.
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power. It would be overly simplistic to say that 24 promotes the idea that might is
right. However in all of the series, it tends to be the case at the mightier (the US) is
more right than its opponents.
VII. Torture doesn’t have serious (physical or psychological) consequences
Jack Bauer is almost superhuman in his ability to rise from the dead (literally, in one
scene in which his heart was stopped by electrocution), or recuperate from less lethal
damage, for example athletically escaping Fayed and his men after being tortured,
and carrying on with active duties even whilst suffering from fragmented ribs in
Series 6.
His colleagues also display remarkable fortitude. Two examples taken from the
same series provide a brief snapshot. Morris, after having a steel bit power-drilled
into his shoulder in order to compel him to do a task for some terrorists, returns to
CTU and work at a computer. The only ill effect he seems to suffer is the impetus to
start drinking alcohol again. Men are not the only heroes: Nadia, after suffering
credible and frightening threats from her sadistic co-worker, Doyle, returns to work
(and shortly afterwards even takes the role of Acting Director). Far from resenting or
fearing Doyle, she seems to feel gratitude to him later in the programme.
These examples seem to suggest a rather flippant attitude on the creators’ parts,
denying the real aftermath of torture. This is the corollary to the ‘sane and somewhat
sanitized’36 presentation of torture on 24.
VIII. The ticking timebomb situation is a real threat to the US
Mayer quotes Bob Cochran, one of the show’s co-creators, saying ‘most terrorism
experts will tell you that the ‘ticking time bomb’ situation never occurs in real life,
or very rarely. But on our show it happens every week’.37 The sympathetic
presentation of Bauer and CTU’s mission has been described as ‘a weekly
rationalization of the ‘ticking timebomb’ defence of torture’.38
The Association for the Prevention of Torture describes the ticking time bomb
scenario in the following terms:
[It] operates by manipulating the emotional reactions of the audience. It creates a context of
fear and anger. It artificially tilts the circumstances to evoke sympathy or even admiration for
the torturer, and hatred or indifference towards a torture victim...
36 O’Mathúna, ‘The Ethics of Torture in 24’, p.99.
37 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’, p. 1.




[T]he intended effect of the ticking bomb scenario is to create a doubt about the wisdom of the
absolute prohibition of torture. This doubt, in turn, is usually designed to lead the audience to
accept the creation of legal exception to that prohibition, or at least to accept non-application
of the criminal law against torture in particular cases. The true aim of proponents of the ticking
bomb argument may be to create a broad exception while seeming to argue for a narrow one.
By trying to force torture opponents to concede that torture may be acceptable in at least one
extreme case, proponents of the ticking bomb argument hope to undermine the very idea that
opposition to torture must be absolute as a matter of principle and practice. As such, the
scenario has been given prominence lately by those who seek to end the taboo against torture,
to make its application to prisoners suspected of involvement in terrorism seem acceptable,
and to provide legal immunity for themselves and others who authorise, tolerate, order, or
inflict it.39
What does it say about the goals and political sympathies of the show’s creator(s)
that they repeatedly portray the ticking time bomb scenario as real, with the
concomitant message that torture is necessary to frustrate these attacks?
IX. These messages are unambiguous
There are occasional points in the programme at which the acceptability of torture
might be thought to be questioned. For example, in the most recent series, Jack loses
his nerve: there is a moment when he took can no longer force himself to ‘do what is
necessary.’
Bauer has been returned to the US after 18 months of secret detention and
ceaseless torture in China (he was captured at the end of Series 5). However, his
return is not to safety: Jack learns that his superiors and the President have agreed to
exchange him for a wanted terrorist, Assad, believed to be planning an imminent
attack on the US. The compatriot who is betraying Assad wants to possess Jack
Bauer in order to exact revenge for some encounter in their mutual past in Beirut.
Bauer, whilst accepting with stoicism that it is legitimate for the President to use
him as a pawn, to trade his life in order to thwart a major terrorist attack (accepting
the universalization of the principle he lives by), manages to escape.
In one of the plot twists characteristic of the series, Assad turns out to be a
sympathetic character, now resolved on peaceful political action, and it is in fact his
compatriot Fayed who is planning the terror attack.
Bauer discovers that there is a mole within Assad’s organization, who may have
information the US security services need. He pursues this spy. An hour and a half
into Series 6, Bauer has the spy in his power; circumstances require Bauer to extract
information from the terrorist spy by inserting a knife into his open wound:
7:35 A.M. Jack aggravates Omar’s open wound but Omar claims to be unaware where Fayed
is. Suddenly, Jack stops. He is oddly reluctant to inflict any more pain on the man. This
39 Association for the Prevention of Torture, Defusing the Ticking Bomb Scenario, pp. 2-3.
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uncharacteristically disturbs him. He tells the puzzled Assad that he could see it in Omar’s
eyes that he wasn’t going to talk.
7:36 A.M. Assad sticks his knife into Omar, who gives up that he knows where Fayed’s men
are going to meet. After Omar gives him the address, Assad kills him. Assad goes to leave but
Jack is frozen. ‘I don’t know how to do this anymore,’ Jack whispers.40
Jack is so traumatized by this and other happenings at the beginning of the latest
series (he was ‘forced’ to shoot and kill Curtis, his colleague, in order to protect
Assad) that he resigns from CTU.
However at 9:58 a.m., Fayed’s group detonates a nuclear bomb in Los Angeles.
Jack’s qualms are dissolved by the impetus to do his duty, which in this case
involves torturing his own brother (who has been implicated in the supply of the
nuclear weapons), just under an hour later:
10:56 A.M. Jack slugs Graem and knocks him out. He ties Graem up in a chair. Jack grabs
him by the throat and threatens to hurt him if he doesn’t give up information. Graem says he is
already hurting him. ‘Trust me, I’m not,’ Jack says intently.41
A few moments later, Jack suffocates his brother (non-fatally) with a plastic bag.
Jack’s reluctance to torture the spy a few hours earlier is shown to be a
momentary weakness, which is overcome when he comprehends the depravity of the
terrorists. He is soon back on message after this epiphany: gung ho, efficient, and
determined.
This is not the only occasion where opposition to its torture is shown to be
weakness. In an earlier series, a suspected terrorist named Joe Prado is released from
CTU just before interrogation, thanks to the efforts of a lawyer working for
‘Amnesty Global’, who had received an anonymous tipoff. Jack resigns from CTU
in order to avoid implicating the organization in his actions. Prado is handcuffed in a
parked car outside the CTU building. Jack enters the car, breaks Prado’s hands, and
is rewarded with crucial and accurate information. Earlier, the audience had been
shown that Prado’s lawyer’s tipoff came from a terrorist source. This undoubtedly
accentuated the predominant message of that storyline: ‘regardless of good
intentions, those seeking to protect suspects’ rights risk abetting terrorist activities,
to catastrophic ends.’42
The pro-torture message of the series is unambiguous. Any derogation from the
position that ‘torture is a necessity; it is my duty to torture’ is shown to be frailty:
psychological or political weakness; rather than a reasonable and rational position to
take.
40 Fox, Season Six Episode Guide.
41 Ibid.
42 A. Green, ‘Normalising Torture on “24”’, New York Times 22 May 2005. Available online:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/22/arts/television/22gree.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagew
anted=print> (accessed 12 November 2007).
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In the counterterrorist world of ‘24,’...torture represents not the breakdown of a
just society, but the turning point – at times even the starting point – for social
relations. Through this artistic sleight of hand, the show makes torture appear
normal.43
E. Intention(s) of the programme makers
What meaning do the programme-makers aim to convey?
I. One message?
A complicating factor is that different people are involved in various aspects of the
creation of the programme. The writers on the show are described by Surnow as a
mixture of liberals and conservatives.44
Squarely on the conservative side is Joel Surnow, co-creator and executive
producer, and as such most clearly the author of the show.
Surnow is quoted as saying that the series is
‘... ripped out of the Zeitgeist of what people’s fears are – their paranoia that we’re going to be
attacked... [it] makes people look at what we’re dealing with...’45
Suzanne Fields, in the Washington Times, reports Surnow to have said ‘Every
American wishes we had someone out there neatly taking care of business’. She
relates his response to a question – whether he would show waterboarding as one of
the techniques used to produce a confession – ‘Yes...But only with bottled water —
this is Hollywood’.46 This response in isolation might simply be viewed as tasteless,
but Surnow clearly isn’t joking about justice and heroism when he discusses the
character, Jack Bauer: ‘There’s nothing left but to do the right thing... He’s come to
symbolize this sort of pure killing machine that all of us secretly want to unleash on
the bad guys... [Bauer] really represents just justice’.47
And, as he told The Washington Times,
43 Ibid.
44 A. Cusac, ‘Watching Torture in Prime Time’ The Progressive, August (2005). Available
online: <http://www.progressive.org/?q=mag_cusac0805> (accessed 12 November 2007).
45 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’, p. 2
46 S. Fields, ‘Tortured by compromise’ Washington Times 15 October 2007. Available online:
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071015/EDITORIAL02/11
0150006&template=printart> (accessed 12 November 2007).
47 R. S. McCain, ‘“24” producer: Hilary as president is “nuts”’ Washington Times, 11
November 2007. Available online: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20071111/ NATION/71111001/-1/RSS_NATION_POLITICS&template=printart>
(accessed 12 November 2007).
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‘[i]f there’s a bomb about to hit a major U.S. city and you have a person with information . . .
if you don’t torture that person, that would be one of the most immoral acts you could
imagine.’48
Surnow is reported to have said that 24 does not ‘try to push an agenda,’ but is
‘committed to being non-PC’.49 It is unlikely that many readers would accept a
commitment to being ‘non-PC’, with all of the negative connotations a conservative
such as Surnow places on ‘being PC’, as a neutral position. But even if it were,
Duncan Kennedy could have told Surnow that a commitment not to act ideologically
is in itself an ideological position.50
Bob Cochran, co-creator with Surnow (and a law graduate), is reported by Jane
Mayer in The New Yorker to have said that he:
...supports the use of torture ‘in narrow circumstances’ and believes that it can be justified
under the Constitution’ [in the case of necessity, i.e. ticking timebomb].51
So here, we can clearly see that the two most important individuals driving the
series – whose imagination and inspiration provides the overarching flavour of the
show – accept torture, at least in ticking time-bomb situations. And perhaps
unsurprisingly, this is the message one derives from 24.
II. ‘Just entertainment’
On the liberal flank of the writing team is Howard Gordon, who describes himself as
a moderate Democrat. He also writes many of the torture scenes. He is concerned
when:
‘...critics say that we’ve enabled and reflected the public’s appetite for torture. Nobody wants
to be the handmaid to a relaxed policy that accepts torture as a legitimate means of
interrogation... I think people can differentiate between a television show and reality’.52
This is frequently the cry of those who are involved in 24 and don’t support
torture – it’s just a television show; it’s just entertainment; it’s not real.
One of the most vocal proponents of this view is Kiefer Sutherland, the actor who
plays Jack Bauer, who in addition to being executive producer of the show, is left-
wing and anti-torture.
In a TV interview with Charlie Rose, he is reported to have said:
‘Do I personally believe that the police or any of these other legal agencies that are working
for this government should be entitled to interrogate people and do the things that I do on the
show? No, I do not’53
48 Cusac ‘Watching Torture’.
49 Ibid.
50 D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University
Press, 1998).
51 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’, p. 4.
52 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’, p. 3.
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In People News, Sutherland said:
‘24’ is absolutely not – categorically not – a justification for torture. I think the whole thing
has been taken out of context. We are interested this has become a debate on a very public
level. That’s what is fantastic about entertainment – it brings certain subjects into people’s
conversations...‘We are a television show, we use some of the torture sequences as a dramatic
device to heighten tension. We are not saying, ‘This is the way the world should be, and we
are condoning this.54
On the other hand, there is the following description by David Danzig, a project
director at Human Rights First, of an encounter between interrogators visiting the set
of 24 and Kiefer Sutherland:
Sutherland was ‘really upset, really intense’ and stressed that he tries to tell people that the
show ‘is just entertainment’. But Sutherland, who claimed to be bored with playing torture
scenes, admitted that he worried about the ‘unintended consequences of the show’.55
III. The true message – more than mere entertainment
O’Mathúna argues that ‘the banality of torture in 24 should shock us into realising
how easily and quickly torture becomes acceptable.’56 However, I argue that the
effect on the viewer is not shock, but acceptance. In 24, there is a constant,
dramatically unchallenged repetition of the message that torture is necessary;
valuable; morally (and legally) permissible; that a hero has the duty to torture; that
America is under constant ticking time bomb threat. The way the programme is
constructed, with action taking place against the clock; the repeated recourse to
torture as ‘the only option available’, required in the circumstances (averaging 13
instances of torture per series); the fact that the torturer-in-chief is the ‘hero’ with
whom we are meant to identify and sympathize – all these things are much more
than ‘mere entertainment’. The eminently watchable – what some people call
‘addictive’ – nature of the content makes the ideological message more powerful.57
These qualities convince me that 24 is more than merely entertainment with a
right-wing slant. Certain characteristics of the series are more than amusement and
rather akin to propaganda. For present purposes, we can borrow the OED’s
definition of propaganda as ‘the systematic dissemination of information, esp. in a
biased or misleading way, in order to promote a political cause or point of view.
Also: information disseminated in this way; the means or media by which such ideas
53 Cusac ‘Watching Torture’.
54 People News ‘Kiefer Sutherland's 24 Defense’ 18 March 2007. Available online:
<http://people.monstersandcritics.com/news/article_1279058.php/Kiefer_Sutherlands_24_
defense> (accessed 12 November 2007).
55 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’, p. 5.
56 O’Mathúna, ‘The Ethics of Torture in 24’, p.103.
57 See also S. i ek, ‘The depraved heroes of 24 are the Himmlers of Hollywood’, The
Guardian, 10 January 2006.
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are disseminated’. Specifically in 24, there is a repeated and systematic
dissemination of material which favours the cause of a particular right-wing, pro-
torture viewpoint. This may or may not be consciously done by (all) the show’s
creators, but the utterances of Joel Surnow, co-creater and executive producer of 24,
suggest that thoughtlessness at least is not one of the factors in his part of the show’s
gestation.
Even if we accept that the express intention of 24 is to entertain, we may believe
that the meaning of the programme goes further, giving it an altogether different,
and worrying, significance. It is therefore neecessary to identify what this more
extensive message might be.
F. Subordination and Silencing
The question of more extensive messages is precisely the point considerd by Rae
Langton in the context of pornography. She discusses whether there may come a
point at which the speech of one person subordinates and silences another, depriving
them of effective speech, and reflects on the two feminist claims – often regarded as
confused or problematic – that pornography, in addition to depicting subordination
and causing subordination, is itself a form of subordination, and that it silences
women. I explore her arguments before applying them to the context of torture in 24.
I. Subordination
In her examination of pornography as subordination, she draws on J. L. Austin’s
categorization of words as ‘speech acts’ in How to Do Things with Words.58 If a first
man tells a second man to shoot the woman standing next to them (and the second
man does so), the act of uttering ‘shoot her’ is the performance of a locutionary act –
the utterance of a sentence with a particular meaning. But this does not exhaust the
description of the scene. Additionally, part of the perlocutionary act involved is the
shock generated by such an utterance; as is the persuasive effect of saying ‘shoot
her’.59 And this is still not a comprehensive description:
... if you stop there you will still have left something out. You will have ignored what our first
man did it saying what he said. So you go on. In saying ‘shoot her’, the first man urged the
second to shoot the woman. That description captures the action constituted by the utterance
itself: it captures what Austin called the illocutionary act.60
58 R. Langton, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 4
(1993): 293-330, p. 295 et seq.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., pp. 295-296.
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Austin’s account of this additional dimension of speech acts encompasses the idea
that speech has some kind of illocutionary power when certain ‘felicity conditions’
are satisfied, usually specified by written or unwritten conventions, which
characteristically require intention on the part of the speaker.61 Examples Langton
gives of such illocutionary acts include warning, promising, and marrying.
However, as a type of action, speech acts suffer from the same weaknesses as
action in general: sometimes we do something other than that which we aimed to do
– the recipient of our speech may have understood our words as an order rather than
advice, for example. Alternatively, the intended illocution may simply fail.62
Langton considers that Catherine MacKinnon’s claim63 that speech can
subordinate makes sense if the illocutionary aspect of speech is taken into account,
in addition to locution and perlocution. In the context of pornography, its
illocutionary force is subordination.64
Where subordinating speech is uttered by someone in power (for example ‘Blacks
are not permitted to vote’ said by a legislator enacting legislation which underpins
apartheid),65 the illocutionary power of the utterance
... unfairly ranks blacks as having inferior worth; they legitimate discriminatory behaviour on
the part of whites; and they unjustly deprive them of some important powers.
...Actions of ranking, valuing and placing are illocutions... labelled verdictive by Austin.66
Other types of illocutions – those which order, permit, prohibit, authorize, enact,
or dismiss – may confer on or deprive of powers and rights. These are called
exercitive by Austin. Crucial to both these types of illocution is the fact that the
speaker is in a position of authority (formal or practical), which gives such speech a
power it would otherwise lack.67
Can it correctly be said that pornographic speech acts have the authority needed
to be verdictive, without which they cannot subordinate women? After all,
pornographers tend not to be legislators, statesman, etc. Langton considers that
what is important here is not whether the speech of pornographers is universally held in high
esteem: it is not – hence the common assumption among liberals that in defending
pornographers they are defending the underdog. What is important is whether it is
authoritative in the domain that counts – the domain of speech about sex – and whether it is
authoritative for the hearers that count: people, men, boys, who in addition to wanting
‘entertainment,’ want to discover the right way to do things, want to know which moves in the
sexual game are legitimate. What is important is whether it is authoritative for those hearers
61 Ibid., p. 301.
62 Ibid., pp. 301-302.
63 C. MacKinnon, ‘Francis Biddle’s Sister’ in Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge
(Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 176, as cited in Langton, ‘Speech Acts’,
p. 294, n. 2.
64 R. Langton, ‘Speech Acts’, p. 302.
65 Langton, ‘Speech Acts’, p. 302.
66 Ibid., p. 304.
67 Ibid., pp. 304-305.
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who – one way or another – do seem to learn that silence is sexy and coercion legitimate... in
this domain, and for these hearers, it may be that pornography has all the authority of a
monopoly.68
Authority, then, may be practical and subjective, rather than formal, and need not
follow the conventional social order.
II. Silencing
Langton proffers a threefold classification of silencing that corresponds to Austin’s
scheme. First, persons or a group may be literally silent due to intimidation or
hopelessness. Here, they do not perform even a locutionary act. Second, despite
speaking, the group or persons will fall short of their intended goal – their
perlocutionary act has been frustrated, for example when one’s vote for a particular
party is part of the minority. The third silencing goes to the heart of the illocutionary
action intended:
... one speaks, one utters words, and fails not simply to achieve the effect one aims at, but fails
to perform the very action one intends. Here, speech misfires... Silencing of this third kind we
can call illocutionary disablement....69
Not having authority in a relevant field may constitute illocutionary
disablement.70 This kind of silencing, in Langton’s terms, has made the actor’s
speech unspeakable. Langton goes on to consider instances of illocutionary
disablement in the context of pornography, and concludes that pornography may
silence women by making it impossible for them to achieve the effect they wish to
achieve – for example, if one of pornography’s messages is that sexual violence is
permissible, it is a corollary that pornography may prevent a woman’s genuine
refusal of sex from being taken seriously: ‘the felicity conditions for refusal, for
protest, are not being met. Something is robbing the speech of its intended force’.71
What is preventing a woman’s refusal from being understood in this type of case?
For Langton, the diagnosis is stark:
The felicity conditions for women’s speech acts are set by the speech acts of pornography. The
words of the pornographer, like the words of the legislator, are ‘words that set conditions.’
they are words that constrain, that make certain actions – refusal, protest – unspeakable for
women in some contexts.72
Whilst pornography does not usually prevent women from uttering words at all
(performing locutionary acts), Langton wishes us to take very seriously the claim
that pornography literally silences. If women are merely able to use words, but not
68 Ibid., p. 312
69 Ibid., p. 315.
70 Ibid., p. 316.
71 Ibid., p. 323.
72 Ibid., p. 324.
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achieve their aim – if the illocutionary import of an utterance has been neutralized or
disabled, they fail to perform a speech act.
On Austin’s view, locutions on their own are nothing. Locutions are there to be used. Words
are tools. Words are for doing things with. There is little point in giving someone tools if they
cannot do things with them. And there is little point in allowing women words if we cannot do
things with them. That, at any rate, is not free speech.73
III. 24 as speech acts
Having set out Langton’s analysis, we can now consider whether 24 contains an
important illocutionary message.
In 24, the locutionary aspect of the torture scenes, the ‘speech act’ in question, is
the depiction of torture. The effect this depiction has on viewers – including the
potential encouragement of torture as an interrogation method in real life – would be
a perlocutionary aspect of the series’ speech acts. What illocutionary message might
the programme hold?
To misquote Langton:74 not all explicit depictions of torture promote torture.
Locutions that depict torture could in principle be used to perform speech acts that
are a far cry from torture promotion: documentaries, for example, or investigative
reports, or government studies, or books that protest against torture, or perhaps even
legal definitions of torture. It all depends, as Austin might have said, on the use to
which the locution is put.
What does 24 do in its depiction of torture? In repeatedly portraying torture as
necessary, valuable, legally and morally permissible, and the proper remit of the
hero, the series urges both the public and the interrogator to accept torture as a good
tool, and to disregard any qualms we may have about its legitimacy and efficacy,
and the subordination and dehumanization of any person suspected of terrorism.
This is 24’s illocutionary aspect.
Again, substituting ‘24’ and the theme of ‘torture’ for Langton’s references to
pornography:75 torture promotion is first, verdictive speech that ranks victims as
inferiors, and second, exercitive speech that legitimizes violence interrogation. Since
torture is not simply harm, not simply crime, but discriminatory behaviour, torture
promotion subordinates because it legitimizes misbehaviour... for these two reasons,
then, 24 is an illocutionary act of subordination.
The verdicts in its message are unfair, giving undue weight to one side of the
argument; are discriminatory against anyone suspected of possible involvement in
terror, and the illocutionary message of 24 unjustly deprives terror suspect of
important safeguards. In its own world as well as the real, the verdictive force of 24
73 Ibid., p. 327.
74 Ibid., pp. 305-306.
75 Ibid., pp. 307-308.
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is also exercitive, as those suspected of terrorism are deprived of power and rights,
and those suspecting terrorism are permitted frightening latitude in their
interrogations.
A television show that depicted positive messages of torture in a debate about
diverse interpretations of ‘right action’ and different criteria of morality would not
have this illocutionary force. Debate is valuable in its own right; not least to expose
the weaknesses of any argument. The existence of alternative, credible points of
view would negate the overwhelmingness of one illocutionary message, and
undermine the verdictive power of one standpoint. But in 24, there is no debate. Any
divergence from the orthodox message is quickly portrayed as pathetic and
insubstantial. The verdictive illocutionary effect remains.
How important is this illocutionary message? If we agree that 24 has a pro torture
message that subordinates the interests of anyone suspected (reasonably or not) of
terrorism, is this a real cause for concern? The answer to this question depends on
whether the verdictive and exercitive messages of 24 are taken seriously by its
recipients. In other words, does 24 have practical, subjective authority for (at least a
significant part of) its audience?
Before addressing this, we need to pause to deal with one potential objection: it
might be thought, when referring back to my three sets of circumstances in the
context of information dissemination, above, that I am attempting some sleight of
hand. Why is the subjective authority of the speaker important, when I have already
stated that the intention of the recipient of (torture) information cannot make a
publication immoral? However, in that instance, I was referring to situations where
the publication or dissemination of information about torture is either morally
permissible or required. This present discussion relates to practical considerations in
the instance where the intention of the publisher is (at least arguably) impermissible.
Joel Surnow, as principal creator of 24, has broadcast his views on torture and
legitimate interrogation quite extensively. As the creator and director of a popular
television series, and the personality in his own right, he may be seen as
authoritative person for at least some of 24’s audience. However, I suspect that the
principal person giving voice to the speech acts of 24 is someone else: Jack Bauer.
Jack’s views are, unsurprisingly, coextensive with his creator Surnow’s. Jack is
the hero, the man who always does the right thing, the character with whom we are
invited to identify and for whom we are expected to feel admiration. When we
suspend our critical faculties and enjoy the entertainment on offer, the internal logic
of the series makes eminent sense, and we, too, feel that Jack has no real option but
to torture, even with the most slender grounds for suspicion of a particular
individual. Kiefer Sutherland’s contribution to this message is the way in which he
convinces the audience that his character is admirable rather than abhorrent.
Is it implausible to think that interrogators who want to discover the right way to
do things, want to know which moves in the interrogation game are legitimate, may
use 24 as their guide? It is reported that Sutherland agreed to talk to cadets at West
Point military academy, at the invitation of the US military, in order to teach recruits
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that torture is wrong.76 Sutherland’s commitment indicates that he thinks that this is
at least plausible.
Is it not possible that the illocutionary message of 24 has contributed to the
illocutionary disablement of suspects in the war on terror? It seems that there is at
the least the danger of illocutionary disablement. If we accept that pornography may
make women’s protests unspeakable, we should be concerned that 24 may silence
victims of torture and other interrogation abuses by making it impossible for them to
achieve the effect they wish to achieve; by frustrating the felicity conditions for the
arguments against it.
But it is important not to overstate the case against 24. Although the TV series
sends a message that purports to have authority and is plausibly subjectively
received as such, and does seem to have had some very regrettable effects on the
actions of soldiers,77 it is not the only culprit. Nor is the popularity of 24, although
extensive, comparable with the pervasiveness of pornography and other means of
subordinating women.
Moreover, my objection is not simply that 24 sends an immoral illocutionary
message. I object to the context in which it does so.
IV Propaganda, lies and disguise
24 is not simply entertainment. 24 is a vehicle with a pervasive ideological message.
It is propaganda.
Propaganda generally involves some element of persuasion, if not deception.78
We may agree that deception is prima facie wrong, but I doubt that many people
would claim that deception is always wrong. There may be circumstances in which
the purposes of a lie justify its telling: where the wrong done is outweighed on the
moral scales. Examples might include lying to the victim of a car accident about the
extent of their injuries, with the intention of inculcating hope and therefore
promoting survival, or disseminating untruthfully positive information about Allied
military successes during World War II, to avoid despair and therefore defeat.79
In this chapter, I have assumed, rather than established, that torture is morally
wrong. If we continue to accept this, we may be willing to categorize the message of
24 as an untruth, relevantly similar to the factual untruths in the above scenarios. As
such, it it would be prima facie wrong.
Perhaps we may consider that telling lies about the permissibility and efficacy of
torture is justifiable in some circumstances. If so, it may be possible to generate an
76 Mayer, ‘Whatever it Takes’.
77 See e.g., P.Sands, ‘Stress, hooding, noise, nudity, dogs’ The Guardian 19 April 2008.
78 Cf. Paul Taylor’s neutral definition of progaganda: P.M.Taylor, ‘Perception Management and
the “war” against terrorism’ Journal of Information Warfare 1(3) (2002): 16-29.
79 ‘Information warfare’ as per Taylor. Ibid.
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argument that justifies the broadcasting of 24. I am unable to think of one, it is true –
but even my outrage at the wrong of telling lies about torture does not seem to
exhaust the iniquity of 24.
Let us consider another scenario: an alternative show, with similarly entertaining
storylines, but which promoted a (stereo)typically liberal position in a comparably
repetitive, simplistic, didactic and authoritative manner.
Per series, this imaginary show (working title 9 Months) depicts an average of 13
instances of abortion, because:
it is the right thing to do;
it’s what a woman needs to do in those circumstances;
and
any squeamishness on the part of those involved needs to be overridden,
because it is their duty to choose/perform abortions;
in the face of the imminent threat of population explosion/global
warming/food shortages, abortion is what’s necessary.
Would Surnow, and 24’s creative team be satisfied with the excuse that 9 Months
is just entertainment’? Rightly, I suspect they would not. The verdictive,
illocutionary aspect of such a show would shift the programme outside the category
of mere entertainment – as is the case with 24.
But the ‘just entertainment’ excuse is not simply an inaccurate description of such
a programme. ‘Just entertainment’ is part of 24’s disguise.
24 is propaganda by virtue of its illocutionary force. Moreover, it is surreptitious
propaganda which masquerades as entertainment; whose existence is ‘justified’ as
entertainment. Its very existence as a television programme is a lie, irrespective of
its ideological content. Here, we have a double lie: content and concealment.
Moreover, 24 stealthily, seductively convinces us that torture is a serious option,
in fact a necessary, mandatory and inevitable right response to suspicion and time
pressure and the need for information, and does so in the guise of entertainment.
G. Conclusion
The programme 24 is immoral in its exclusively pro-torture message, which has a
disturbingly verdictive force, and in the way this message masquerades as
entertainment.
Torturers deny the humanity of their victims. Torturers violate our most important
moral and societal norms. 24 violates these standards, in the name of entertainment,
and it also abuses the norms of entertainment. It is part of the poison of the
programme that we are persuaded to suspend disbelief and witness repeated
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inflictions of extreme physical or mental violence. To return to my third point about
the intention of the recipient: we suspend our humanity by watching uncritically.
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